Neonatology Associates, P.A. v. Commissioner ( 2000 )


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    115 T.C. No. 5
    UNITED STATES TAX COURT
    NEONATOLOGY ASSOCIATES, P.A., ET AL.,1 Petitioners v.
    COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
    Docket Nos. 1201-97,   1208-97,             Filed July 31, 2000.
    2795-97,   2981-97,
    2985-97,   2994-97,
    2995-97,   4572-97.
    Certain insurance salesmen formed two purported
    voluntary employees’ beneficiary associations (VEBA’s)
    to generate commissions on their sales of life and
    other insurance products purchased through the VEBA’s.
    Each employer/participant contributed to its own plan
    formed under the VEBA’s, and each plan generally
    provided that a covered employee would receive current-
    1
    Cases of the following petitioners are consolidated
    herewith: John J. and Ophelia J. Mall, docket No. 1208-97; Estate
    of Steven Sobo, Deceased, Bonnie Sobo, Executrix, and Bonnie
    Sobo, docket No. 2795-97; Akhilesh S. and Dipti A. Desai, docket
    No. 2981-97; Kevin T. and Cheryl McManus, docket No. 2985-97;
    Arthur and Lois M. Hirshkowitz, docket No. 2994-97; Lakewood
    Radiology, P.A., docket No. 2995-97; and Wan B. and Cecilia T.
    Lo, docket No. 4572-97.
    - 2 -
    year (term) life insurance on his or her life.
    Premiums on the underlying insurance policies were
    substantially greater than the cost of term life
    insurance because they funded both the cost of term
    life insurance and credits which would be applied to
    conversion universal life policies of the individual
    insureds. The credits applied to a conversion policy
    were “earned” on that policy evenly over 120 months,
    meaning that policyholders generally could withdraw any
    earned amount or borrow against it with no out-of-
    pocket expense.
    Held: The corporate employer/participants (N and
    L) may not deduct contributions to their plans in
    excess of the cost of term life insurance.
    Held, further, L may deduct payments made outside
    its plan for life insurance on two of its employees to
    the extent the payments funded term life insurance.
    Held, further, neither M, a sole
    proprietorship/participant, nor N may deduct
    contributions to its plan to purchase life insurance
    for certain nonemployees.
    Held, further, sec. 264(a)(1), I.R.C., precludes M
    from deducting contributions to its plan to purchase
    life insurance for its two employees.
    Held, further, in the case of N and L, the
    disallowed deductions are constructive dividends to
    their employee/owners.
    Held, further, Ps are liable for the accuracy-
    related penalties for negligence or intentional
    disregard of rules or regulations determined by R under
    sec. 6662(a), I.R.C.; L also is liable for the addition
    to tax for failure to file timely determined by R under
    sec. 6651(a), I.R.C.
    Held, further, no P is liable for a penalty under
    sec. 6673(a)(1)(B), I.R.C.
    Neil L. Prupis, Kevin L. Smith, and Theresa Borzelli, for
    petitioners.
    Randall P. Andreozzi, Peter J. Gavagan, Mark A. Ericson, and
    Matthew I. Root, for respondent.
    - 3 -
    LARO, Judge:   The docketed cases, consolidated for purposes
    of trial, briefing, and opinion, represent three test cases
    selected by the parties to resolve their disagreements as to
    certain voluntary employees’ beneficiary association (VEBA)
    plans; namely, the Southern California Medical Profession
    Association VEBA (SC VEBA) and the New Jersey Medical Profession
    Association VEBA (NJ VEBA).2   The parties in 19 other cases
    pending before the Court have agreed to be bound by the decisions
    we render herein as to these VEBA issues.
    Two of the test cases involve a corporate employer and one
    or more employee/owners.   These employer/employee groups are the
    Neonatology Associates, P.A (Neonatology), group and the Lakewood
    Radiology, P.A. (Lakewood), group.     These groups relate to two
    purported welfare benefit funds formed under the SC VEBA; namely,
    the Neonatology Employee Welfare Plan (Neonatology Plan) and the
    Lakewood Employee Welfare Plan (Lakewood Plan).3
    The third test case involves an individual working as a sole
    proprietor and two of his employees.     This group is the Wan B.
    Lo, Ph.D., D.O., d.b.a. Marlton Pain Control and Acupuncture
    2
    We use the terms “VEBA” and “plan” for convenience and do
    not suggest that any or all of the subject arrangements are
    either bona fide plans for Federal income tax purposes or VEBA’s
    under sec. 501(c)(9).
    3
    Petitioners argue that these plans are welfare benefit
    funds within the meaning of sec. 419(e). Respondent argues to
    the contrary. We do not decide this issue.
    - 4 -
    Center (Marlton) group.   The Marlton group relates to the Marlton
    Employee Welfare Plan (Marlton Plan), a purported welfare benefit
    fund formed under the NJ VEBA.4
    In regard to each test case, respondent determined that the
    employer or sole proprietor could not deduct its or his
    contributions to the respective plan and, in the case of
    Neonatology and Lakewood, that the employee/owners had income to
    the extent that he or she benefited from a contribution.5
    Respondent determined that each petitioner was liable for
    deficiencies in Federal income tax as a result of the VEBA
    determinations and that each petitioner was liable for a related
    accuracy-related penalty under section 6662(a) for negligence or
    intentional disregard of rules or regulations.   In the case of
    Lakewood, respondent also determined that it was liable for a 15-
    percent addition to tax under section 6651(a) for failure to file
    timely its 1992 Federal income tax return and a section 6621
    increased rate of interest on its 1991 deficiency as to interest
    accruing after July 20, 1995.
    Each petitioner petitioned the Court to redetermine
    respondent’s determinations.    Respondent’s notices of deficiency
    4
    We do not decide whether this plan is a welfare benefit
    fund under sec. 419(e).
    5
    Respondent also made certain other adjustments of income
    and expense. Petitioners concede these adjustments, unless they
    are mathematical computations relating to the VEBA issues.
    - 5 -
    list the following deficiencies, addition to tax, and accuracy-
    related penalties:6
    Neonatology Group
    Neonatology, docket No. 1201-97
    Addition to Tax   Accuracy-Related Penalty
    Year       Deficiency   Sec. 6651(a)(1)        Sec. 6662(a)
    1992         $1,620           —                     $324
    1993          6,262           —                    1,252
    John J. and Ophelia J. Mall, docket No. 1208-97
    Addition to Tax   Accuracy-Related Penalty
    Year       Deficiency   Sec. 6651(a)(1)        Sec. 6662(a)
    1992         $6,186           —                   $1,237
    1993          7,404           —                    1,481
    Lakewood Group
    Lakewood, docket No. 2995-97
    Addition to Tax   Accuracy-Related Penalty
    Year       Deficiency   Sec. 6651(a)(1)        Sec. 6662(a)
    1991       $169,437           —                  $33,887
    1991           —              —                     —
    1992         71,110        $10,667                14,222
    1993         93,111           —                   18,622
    Estate of Steven Sobo, Deceased, Bonnie Sobo, Executrix, and
    Bonnie Sobo, docket No. 2795-97
    Addition to Tax   Accuracy-Related Penalty
    Year       Deficiency   Sec. 6651(a)(1)        Sec. 6662(a)
    1991        $27,729           —                   $5,546
    1992          5,107           —                    1,021
    1993          3,018           —                      604
    6
    All years refer to the calendar year, except that, in the
    case of Lakewood, the first 1991 year is a fiscal year ended on
    Oct. 31, 1991, and the second 1991 year is a short taxable year
    ended on Dec. 31, 1991.
    - 6 -
    Akhilesh S. and Dipti A. Desai, docket No. 2981-97
    Addition to Tax      Accuracy-Related Penalty
    Year        Deficiency    Sec. 6651(a)(1)           Sec. 6662(a)
    1991         $42,047            —                      $8,409
    1992          15,751            —                       3,150
    1993          25,016            —                       5,003
    Kevin T. and Cheryl McManus, docket No. 2985-97
    Addition to Tax      Accuracy-Related Penalty
    Year        Deficiency    Sec. 6651(a)(1)           Sec. 6662(a)
    1991          $6,821            —                      $1,364
    1992           6,146            —                       1,229
    1993           8,214            —                       1,643
    Arthur and Lois M. Hirshkowitz, docket No. 2994-97
    Addition to Tax      Accuracy-Related Penalty
    Year        Deficiency    Sec. 6651(a)(1)           Sec. 6662(a)
    1991         $82,933            —                     $16,587
    1992          45,233            —                       9,047
    1993          79,853            —                      15,971
    Marlton Group
    Wan B. and Cecilia T. Lo, docket No. 4572-97
    Addition to Tax      Accuracy-Related Penalty
    Year        Deficiency    Sec. 6651(a)(1)           Sec. 6662(a)
    1993         $41,807            —                      $8,361
    1994          49,970            —                       9,994
    We decide the following issues:
    1.    Whether Neonatology and Lakewood may deduct
    contributions to their respective plans in excess of the amounts
    needed to purchase current-year (term) life insurance for their
    covered employees.       We hold they may not.
    2.    Whether Lakewood may deduct payments made outside of its
    plan to purchase additional life insurance for two of its
    - 7 -
    employees.   We hold it may to the extent that the payments funded
    term life insurance.
    3.   Whether Neonatology may deduct contributions made to its
    plan to purchase life insurance for John Mall (Mr. Mall), who was
    neither a Neonatology employee nor a person eligible to
    participate in the Neonatology Plan.     We hold it may not.
    4.   Whether Marlton may deduct contributions to its plan to
    purchase insurance for its sole proprietor, Dr. Lo, who was
    neither a Marlton employee nor a person eligible to participate
    in the Marlton Plan.   We hold it may not.
    5.   Whether section 264(a) precludes Marlton from deducting
    contributions to its plan to purchase term life insurance for its
    two employees.   We hold it does.
    6.   Whether, in the case of Lakewood and Neonatology, the
    disallowed contributions/payments are includable in the
    employee/owners’ gross income.7     We hold they are.
    7.   Whether petitioners are liable for the accuracy-related
    penalties for negligence or intentional disregard of rules or
    regulations determined by respondent under section 6662(a).    We
    hold they are.
    7
    Petitioners concede that the contributions are includable
    in the employees’ gross income to the extent that they provided
    current-year life insurance protection.
    - 8 -
    8.   Whether Lakewood is liable for the addition to tax for
    failure to file timely determined by respondent under section
    6651(a).    We hold it is.
    9.   Whether we should grant respondent’s motion to impose a
    $25,000 penalty against each petitioner under section
    6673(a)(1)(B).    We hold we shall not.
    Unless otherwise indicated, section references are to the
    Internal Revenue Code applicable to the relevant years, Rule
    references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure,
    and dollar amounts are rounded to the dollar.
    FINDINGS OF FACT
    I.   Overview of Petitioners
    Neonatology is a professional medical corporation wholly
    owned by Ophelia J. Mall, M.D. (Dr. Mall).      Its principal place
    of business was in New Jersey when we filed its petition.     Dr.
    Mall and her husband, Mr. Mall (collectively, the Malls), resided
    in New Jersey when we filed their petition.
    Neonatology reports its income and expenses for Federal
    income tax purposes using the cash receipts and disbursements
    method and the calendar year.      It reported the following relevant
    amounts on its 1992 and 1993 Federal corporate income tax
    returns:
    - 9 -
    1992       1993
    Total income                   $282,104      $213,092
    Officer compensation            250,000       168,000
    Salaries & wages                  -0-            -0-
    Pension, profit-sharing, plans    -0-            -0-
    Employee benefit programs        26,000        28,623
    Taxable income (loss)           (18,881)      (20,958)
    Income tax                        -0-            -0-
    Alt. minimum tax                  -0-            -0-
    Lakewood is a professional medical corporation owned equally
    by Arthur Hirshkowitz (Dr. Hirshkowitz), Akhilesh Desai (Dr.
    Desai), Kevin T. McManus (Dr. McManus), and Steven Sobo (Dr.
    Sobo), until his death on September 23, 1993, and by Vijay
    Sankhla (Dr. Sankhla) afterwards.    When we filed the petitions of
    the various members of the Lakewood group,8 Lakewood’s principal
    place of business and the residence of each individual (and his
    or her spouse) was in New Jersey.
    Lakewood reports its income and expenses for Federal income
    tax purposes using the cash receipts and disbursements method
    and, but for 1991, using the calendar year; its 1991 taxable
    years consist of a fiscal year ended on October 31, 1991, and a
    short taxable year ended on December 31, 1991.   It reported the
    following relevant amounts on its Federal corporate income tax
    returns for the subject years:
    8
    The members of the Lakewood group are Lakewood, Drs.
    Hirshkowitz, Desai, and McManus, and the Estate of Steven Sobo,
    Deceased.
    - 10 -
    1993
    10/1991   12/1991     1992   (As amended)
    Total income                        $2,303,425 $403,869 $2,411,265 $2,286,460
    Officers’ compensation                 987,554 350,000 1,171,931      940,895
    Salaries & wages                       148,750   29,167    200,565    303,750
    Pension, profit-sharing, plans          46,907   25,000    132,428    169,170
    Employee benefit programs                 -0-      -0-       -0-        -0-
    Other deductions (VEBA contribution)   480,901     -0-     209,869    296,056
    Taxable income (loss)                    3,664 (103,857)   (23,325)    (7,796)
    Income tax                               1,246     -0-       -0-        -0-
    Alt. minimum tax                          -0-      -0-       -0-       20,531
    It filed its 1992 Federal corporate income tax return untimely on
    May 28, 1993.
    Marlton is a sole proprietorship owned by Wan B. Lo (Dr.
    Lo), and he reports Marlton’s income and expenses on his personal
    Schedule C, Profit or Loss from Sole-Proprietor Business, using
    the cash receipts and disbursements method and the calendar year.
    Dr. Lo reported the following amounts for Marlton on Schedules C
    of his joint 1993 and 1994 Federal individual income tax returns:
    1993       1994
    Gross income                           $875,477     $868,275
    Wages                                   130,944      124,939
    Pension, profit-sharing, plans           16,920       17,396
    Employee benefit programs               100,000      120,000
    Net profit                              406,863      381,122
    Dr. Lo and his wife, Cecilia (Ms. Lo) (collectively, the Los),
    resided in New Jersey when we filed their petition.
    II. The Subject VEBA’s
    Pacific Executive Services (PES) was a California
    partnership formed by two insurancemen named Stephen R. Ross (Mr.
    - 11 -
    Ross) and Donald S. Murphy (Mr. Murphy).9   PES devised the idea
    of using a speciously designed life insurance product in the
    setting of deviously designed VEBA’s to prosper financially from
    the enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA), Pub. L. 99-
    514, 
    100 Stat. 2085
    .   PES believed that the TRA restricted the
    ability of closely held businesses to reduce their tax
    liabilities through contributions to retirement and employee
    benefit plans.   PES believed that the TRA gave PES the
    opportunity to market aggressively to owners of such businesses a
    novel tax avoidance scheme.   PES anticipated that few of the
    prospective investors in the scheme would be interested in
    purchasing life insurance, the subject matter of the scheme, but
    that these persons would purchase the life insurance (C-group
    term) product described below in order to get the advertised
    benefits.
    PES united with Barry Cohen (Mr. Cohen), a longtime
    insurance salesman, to market the subject VEBA’s to medical
    professionals primarily through the Kirwan Cos. (Kirwan).    Mr.
    Cohen is an officer, director, and part owner of Kirwan.    He is
    not an attorney or an accountant.   Michael J. Kirwan (Mr. Kirwan)
    9
    PES dissolved on or about Nov. 11, 1992, and Messrs. Ross
    and Murphy each formed a sole proprietorship under the respective
    names of Sea Nine Associates and DSM inc. Sea Nine Associates
    and DSM inc. divided up the participants in the VEBA’s. For
    simplicity, subsequent references to PES may include Sea Nine
    Associates and DSM inc.
    - 12 -
    is Kirwan’s president and other part owner.   Mr. Kirwan is not an
    attorney or an accountant.
    Kirwan represented to prospective investors during its
    marketing of one or both of the subject VEBA’s that the VEBA’s
    let an investor make unlimited tax-deductible contributions to
    his or her separate plan and that each plan would give a covered
    employee significant paid-up life insurance when he or she left
    the plan.10   PES represented to prospective investors that each
    of the subject VEBA’s gave investors
    the ability to park funds for several years while the
    funds continue to grow at interest in a tax free
    environment. While most people would be happy to take
    accumulated funds, pay the tax due at that time at
    ordinary rates, [sic] we have created a plan which
    provides for a permanent deferral of all the taxes due,
    either during ones [sic] lifetime or to the heirs. In
    summary, we create a tax deduction for the
    contributions to the * * * [VEBA] going in and a
    permanent tax deferral coming out.
    *    *    *    *    *    *    *
    Each individual employer establishes his own level of
    benefits and has his own trust account with a third
    party trustee * * *. The contribution goes into the
    individual trust account for each employer and the
    benefits provided under the plan are paid for out of
    the individual accounts. Each employer receives
    reports which apply only to his account.
    The SC VEBA and the NJ VEBA were formed by the Southern
    California Medical Profession Association and the New Jersey
    10
    We use the term “paid-up” in this context to mean that
    the insured did not have to make any additional premium payments
    on the underlying policy.
    - 13 -
    Medical Profession Association, respectively.   PES established,
    manages, and controls both of these associations, neither of
    which is a valid or operating professional association.   PES
    established both associations for the sole purpose of forming the
    subject VEBA’s and of furthering its VEBA scheme by misleading
    targeted investor/medical professionals into believing that
    respectable, established medical associations were sponsoring an
    investment in the VEBA’s.   PES named the VEBA’s after the medical
    profession to attempt further to legitimize its sale of the
    advertised tax benefits with the targeted investors.   PES paid an
    established medical society, the Medical Society of New Jersey, a
    voluntary society of physicians and surgeons operating in the
    State of New Jersey, approximately $25,000 to endorse the SC VEBA
    as a final attempt to legitimize its scheme.    PES represented to
    the Medical Society of New Jersey that the SC VEBA provided
    medical professionals with tax-deductible payments for high
    policy limits of life insurance and the potential to convert some
    or all of those payments into annuities or cash value life
    insurance which would allow the policyholders ultimately to
    withdraw that cash value tax free.
    The subject VEBA’s are structured so that each participating
    employer establishes its own plan thereunder, executes its own
    plan document, and has a plan name that bears its own name.     Each
    employer, with the aid of an insurance salesman (primarily Mr.
    - 14 -
    Cohen), selects its plan administrator, the members of the
    committee administering its plan, and the level of benefits
    offered under its plan;11 the only employee benefit provided
    under the subject VEBA’s is a current-year death benefit payable
    at a specified multiple of prior-year compensation.    Each
    employer generally funds its plan with a limited number of group
    insurance policies and/or group annuities owned by its plan for
    the benefit of its employees.    All group life insurance policies
    must provide explicitly that the insured individual may convert
    his or her policy, without medical examination, to an individual
    policy upon termination of eligibility for coverage.
    Each employer has its own trust account maintained under its
    plan for its covered employees, and each plan is accounted for
    separately.    A covered employee has no recourse for benefits
    other than, first, from insurance contracts on his or her life
    and, second, from any assets held in the employer’s plan.
    Employees covered by one plan cannot reach assets of another
    plan, and occurrences in one plan do not affect another plan’s
    operation.    Each plan prepares its own separate summary plan
    description, each employer may amend its plan at any time, and
    each employer may terminate its plan at any time by delivering
    11
    The committee members of the Neonatology Plan and the
    Lakewood Plan are Messrs. Murphy, Cohen, and Kirwan, and the
    committee members of the Marlton Plan are Mr. Ross, Daniel
    Sonnelitter, and Timothy S. Lo. PES administered all three plans
    at all times relevant herein.
    - 15 -
    written notice of termination to the trustee.   When an employer
    terminates its plan, assets remaining in that plan are
    distributed to the employer’s covered employees in proportion to
    their compensation.
    Independent entities serve as trustees of the respective
    trusts underlying the subject VEBA’s, and each trust’s terms are
    the same except for the sponsor’s name.   Under the trusts’ terms,
    each participating employer agrees to make the contributions
    required by the administrator to provide benefits under the plan,
    and neither the participating employer nor another employer is
    liable for a participating employer’s contributions.   Any
    benefits payable under one plan are paid solely from that plan’s
    allocable share of the trust fund, and neither the participating
    employer, administrator, nor trustee is liable for the inadequacy
    of funds required to be paid.    Each plan and corresponding trust
    account benefit exclusively the related employer’s covered
    employees and their beneficiaries, and no part of that trust
    account may be used for, or diverted to, purposes other than the
    exclusive benefit of those employees.
    III. The Insurance Companies
    The Inter-American Insurance Co. of Illinois (Inter-
    American) specializes in providing to small, closely held
    corporations products such as qualified pension and profit
    sharing plans and group life insurance plans.   When Inter-
    - 16 -
    American was formed in the late 1970’s, it was owned indirectly
    by Beaven/Inter-American Cos., Inc. (Beaven/Inter-American), the
    wholly owned company of Raymond G. Ankner (Mr. Ankner), who has
    worked in the insurance industry for more than 30 years.     Inter-
    American liquidated on December 23, 1991, pursuant to a court
    order to do so, and Beaven/Inter-American changed its name to
    Beaven Cos., Inc.   Mr. Ankner currently markets the life
    insurance products described herein through a company of his
    called CJA & Associates.
    Capital Holding Agency Group, Inc. (Capital Holding),
    underwrites life and health insurance, annuities, and other
    insurance products offered for sale through certain of its
    affiliated insurance companies; e.g., Commonwealth Life Insurance
    Co. (Commonwealth) and Peoples Security Life Insurance Co.
    (Peoples Security, sometimes referred collectively with
    Commonwealth as Commonwealth).   Capital Holding changed its name
    to Providian Agency Group, Inc., in 1994, and 3 years later,
    AEGON NV acquired Providian Agency Group, Inc., Commonwealth, and
    Peoples Security.   Commonwealth and Peoples Security merged with
    the Monumental Life Insurance Co. in 1998, and all three
    companies are currently part of the AEGON USA Insurance Group
    (AEGON USA).
    - 17 -
    IV.   The Life Insurance Products
    Inter-American and Commonwealth both issue a virtually
    identical conventional group term life insurance product known as
    the millennium group 5 (MG-5) policy.   Premiums on an MG-5 policy
    are generally commensurate with the life insurance risk assumed
    by the issuing company and do not present policyholders with
    asset accumulation.   The MG-5 policies allow policyholders to
    convert their policies to 5-year level annual renewable term,
    universal or whole life products which do not have any
    accumulated value (or “conversion credits” as that term is
    described below).
    Inter-American and Commonwealth both issue a second
    virtually identical innovative life insurance product known as
    the continuous group (C-group) product.   The C-group product is a
    novel product designed by Inter-American (and later adopted by
    Commonwealth) to masquerade as a policy that provides only term
    life insurance benefits in order to make the product marketable
    to targeted investors and to allow Inter-American to make life
    insurance purchases from it more attractive than purchases from
    its larger competitors.   The C-group product is actually a
    universal life product consisting of two related policies.     The
    first policy, the accumulation phase of the C-group product, is a
    group term life insurance policy known as the C-group term
    policy.   The second policy, the payout phase of the C-group
    - 18 -
    product, is an individual universal life insurance policy known
    as the C-group conversion universalife (UL) policy.    The C-group
    conversion UL policy is referenced in the C-group term contract
    and the C-group conversion UL contract as a “special conversion
    policy”.
    The C-group term policy provides covered employees with a
    life insurance (death) benefit while they work and a cash value
    that they may access by converting the term policy to the C-group
    conversion UL policy.   Commonwealth and Inter-American assumed
    that 95 percent of the C-group term policyholders would
    ultimately convert their policies to C-group conversion UL
    policies, and they priced both policies together as two
    components of a single policy.   Premiums on the C-group term
    policy are paid annually, and these premiums are approximately
    four to six times greater than premiums for a conventional life
    insurance group term policy (e.g., the MG-5 policy); as discussed
    infra, premiums on the C-group term policy fund both
    preconversion death benefits and postconversion credits
    (conversion credits) anticipated to be applied to the C-group
    conversion UL policy.   If a premium is not paid timely on the C-
    group term policy, the policy terminates; i.e., lapses.   Upon its
    lapsing, an individual policyholder has a guaranteed right (i.e.,
    without evidence of insurability) to convert his or her policy to
    an individual policy; e.g., the C-group conversion UL policy.     A
    - 19 -
    covered employee converts from a C-group term policy to a C-group
    conversion UL policy merely by filing an application.
    The C-group conversion UL policy was specially designed for
    employees converting from the C-group term policy to individual
    coverage, and, absent an additional expense, it is issued only to
    individuals who convert from the C-group term policy to
    individual coverage.   An insured employee has the right to
    convert, generally without expense, from the C-group term policy
    to a C-group conversion policy with equal or less face value if
    group coverage ceases because (1) the employee ceases employment,
    (2) the employee leaves the class eligible for coverage, (3) the
    underlying contract terminates, (4) the underlying contract is
    amended to terminate or reduce the insurance of a class of
    insured employees, or (5) the underlying contract terminates as
    to an individual employer or plan.12     Upon conversion, conversion
    credits are transferred from the C-group term policy to the C-
    group conversion UL policy in a total amount that would
    approximate the cash value that would have been present if a
    typical universal life policy had been purchased when the C-group
    term policy was first issued.    Inter-American and Commonwealth
    12
    As discussed below, many of the individual petitioners
    ultimately received a C-group conversion UL policy by converting
    a C-group term policy. Each of these conversions occurred
    although none of these five conditions was met. The parties to
    the C-group product expected and understood that a C-group term
    policy could be converted at any time at the election of the
    insured.
    - 20 -
    developed and used tables to reference the amount of conversion
    credits which would accumulate under the C-group term policy and
    be transferred to the C-group conversion UL policy upon
    conversion, and the table amounts were referenced in marketing
    materials provided to prospective customers; no C-group term
    policyholder who converted to a C-group conversion UL policy ever
    received anything less than the appropriate amount referenced in
    the tables.   Upon conversion, the C-group conversion UL policy is
    generally fully funded, and C-group conversion UL policyholders
    need not pay additional premiums on the C-group conversion UL
    policy.   A converting policyholder may, if he or she desires, pay
    additional premiums on the C-group conversion UL policy.   None of
    the individual petitioners chose to do so.
    Mr. Ankner designed the concept of conversion credits to
    allow the C-group term policy to operate in tandem with the C-
    group conversion UL policy, while preserving the appearance and
    argument that the two policies were separate and distinct.
    Conversion credits generally work as follows.   With respect to
    each premium paid on the C-group term policy, the portion that
    exceeds the applicable mortality charge (cost of insurance) is
    set aside in a conversion credit account bearing interest at 4.5
    percent per annum for transfer to the C-group conversion UL
    policy upon conversion thereto.   Upon conversion, the conversion
    credits which have accumulated up to that time (conversion credit
    - 21 -
    balance) are generally transferred to the C-group conversion UL
    policy in accordance with a schedule under which (1) none of the
    conversion credit balance is transferred to the C-group
    conversion UL policy if conversion occurs in the C-group term
    policy’s first year, (2) 47.5 percent of the conversion credit
    balance is transferred to the C-group conversion UL policy if
    conversion occurs in the C-group term policy’s second year, (3)
    90.25 percent of the conversion credit balance is transferred to
    the C-group conversion UL policy if conversion occurs in the C-
    group term policy’s third year, and (4) 95 percent of the
    conversion credit balance is transferred to the C-group
    conversion UL policy if conversion occurs in the C-group term
    policy’s fourth or later year.13   Policyholders never receive
    more than 95 percent of their conversion credit balance because
    the insurance salesperson, upon conversion, is paid a commission
    equal to 5 percent of that balance.    Conversion credits
    transferred from the C-group term policy to the C-group
    conversion UL policy are applied to the cash value in the C-group
    conversion UL policy (i.e., they are earned by the policyholder
    and made available to him or her) in 120 monthly installments,
    13
    For C-group term policies issued after Jan. 31, 1993, 0
    percent of the conversion credit balance is transferred to the C-
    group conversion UL policy if conversion occurs in the policy’s
    first 4 years, and 95 percent of the conversion credit balance is
    transferred to the conversion policy if conversion occurs at any
    other time.
    - 22 -
    beginning with the month of conversion.14    C-group conversion UL
    policyholders may borrow against their policies up to the net
    loan value (i.e., cash value less any prior outstanding loans),
    and, after the fourth year, any loans are at the same interest
    rate as is credited to the conversion credit balance.
    Statutory reserves are maintained for the C-group term
    policies in an amount that equals the greater of:    (1) The
    minimum statutory reserve for group term life insurance, which
    excludes consideration of the conversion benefits, or (2) the
    present value of expected future payments under the policies
    (including both death benefits and applied conversion credits)
    less the present value of expected future premiums.15    Present
    values are calculated using best-estimate assumptions as to
    interest, mortality, lapses, and expenses.    Inter-American and
    Commonwealth reinsured with a third party certain amounts of the
    risk associated with the C-group product.
    The C-group term policy provides an annual experience refund
    to the policyholder.   Interest of 4.5 percent per annum is
    14
    An insurance company usually imposes a surrender charge
    upon a policyholder who surrenders his or her policy before the
    insurance company recovers its costs as to that policy. The C-
    group conversion UL policy was generally designed without
    surrender charges by treating portions of the conversion credit
    balance as earned and unearned, depending on the number of months
    that the policy was held. A policyholder forfeits the unearned
    portion upon surrender of the policy.
    15
    Statutory reserves were maintained separately for the C-
    group conversion UL policies.
    - 23 -
    credited to the conversion credit balance at or about the end of
    each certificate year, and, to the extent that the interest on
    the funds reflected in the balance actually exceeds the credited
    amount, the excess is returned to the policyholder as an
    experience refund.   The experience refund is credited to the
    policyholder as a reduction of the next premium due on the
    policy.
    V. The Neonatology Plan
    Mr. Cohen introduced Dr. Mall to the SC VEBA, and she
    decided on her own, without seeking the advice of an independent
    knowledgeable professional, to cause Neonatology to invest
    therein.   Dr. Mall knew that term life insurance was
    substantially more expensive to buy through the SC VEBA than
    through other plans offered to her by the American Medical
    Association and the American Academy of Pediatrics.     She believed
    that the SC VEBA was the best investment for Neonatology because
    it offered her the proffered tax benefits and accumulated value.
    Dr. Mall received correspondence on the SC VEBA but generally
    chose not to read it before investing in the SC VEBA.
    Neonatology established the Neonatology Plan under the SC
    VEBA on January 31, 1991, effective January 1, 1991, and the
    Malls were the only persons covered by that plan during the
    relevant years.   Mr. Mall was not a paid employee of Neonatology,
    and he was not eligible to join the plan.   Dr. Mall and PES, the
    - 24 -
    plan administrator, allowed Mr. Mall to join the plan, and they
    made him eligible to receive a death benefit in an amount
    commensurate with the death benefit payable under other life
    insurance that he had owned outside the plan.   Dr. Mall falsified
    and backdated documents in an attempt to legitimize Mr. Mall’s
    participation in the Neonatology Plan and to attempt to
    legitimize the plan with various governmental agencies and
    regulatory bodies.
    The Neonatology Plan’s adoption agreement provides that all
    employees covered by the plan will receive a death benefit equal
    to 6.5 times his or her prior-year “compensation” (defined by the
    plan to exclude nontaxable fringe benefit items).   Neonatology
    paid Dr. Mall compensation of $240,000, $250,000, and $168,000
    during 1991, 1992, and 1993, respectively.   Neonatology did not
    pay Mr. Mall any compensation during those years.
    Neonatology contributed to the Neonatology Plan during each
    year from 1991 through 1993 and, for each subject year, claimed a
    deduction for those contributions and other related amounts.     In
    1991, Neonatology contributed $10,000 to the plan on behalf of
    Dr. Mall.   It also paid the plan’s trustee and its administrator
    $1,000 each.   In 1992, Neonatology contributed $10,000 to the
    plan on behalf of Dr. Mall and $10,000 on behalf of Mr. Mall.     It
    deducted the $20,000 on its 1992 Federal corporate income tax
    return as an employee benefit program expense, and it deducted on
    - 25 -
    that return another $1,000 that was paid to PES for its
    administrator services.     In 1993, Neonatology contributed $21,623
    to the plan on behalf of Dr. Mall and $250 for a “VEBA set-up
    fee”.     It deducted those amounts on its 1993 Federal corporate
    income tax return as an employee benefit program expense, and it
    deducted on that return $750 that it contributed to the plan and
    $1,000 that it paid PES for its administrator services.
    During the relevant years, the Neonatology Plan purchased
    three life insurance policies, two on the life of Dr. Mall and
    the third on the life of Mr. Mall.16     The attributes of these
    policies are as follows.
    1.    Dr. Mall’s Inter-American C-Group Term Policy
    Effective March 15, 1991, Inter-American issued a $650,000
    C-group term policy (certificate No. 5076202) on the life of Dr.
    Mall, age 45.     The first-year premium was $9,906, and the cost of
    insuring Dr. Mall for that year was $1,689.85.     The Neonatology
    Plan paid the first-year premium, and, at the end of that year,
    the conversion credit balance was $8,585.88 ($9,906 - $1,689.85 +
    $369.73); the $369.73 is the interest of 4.5 percent earned on
    the conversion credit balance (($8,585.88 - $369.73) x 4.5% =
    $369.73)).     None of the conversion credit balance could have been
    16
    The Neonatology Plan also purchased one annuity during
    those years. On or about Mar. 15, 1991, Inter-American issued to
    the Neonatology Plan a Plus II Group Annuity (#C15576/91079) for
    an initial premium of $69.
    - 26 -
    transferred at this time to the C-group conversion UL policy,
    upon conversion thereto, because the C-group term policy was in
    its first year.    This policy lapsed on March 15, 1992.
    2.   Dr. Mall’s Commonwealth C-Group Term Policy
    Effective March 15, 1992, Commonwealth issued a $650,000 C-
    group term policy (certificate No. 6007725) on the life of Dr.
    Mall, age 46.     The first-year premium was $10,653.50, and the
    cost of insuring Dr. Mall for that year was $1,764.60.      The
    Neonatology Plan paid the first-year premium, and, at the end of
    that year, the conversion credit balance was $9,288.90
    ($10,653.50 - $1,764.60 + $400); the $400 is the interest of 4.5
    percent earned on the conversion credit balance (($9,288.90 -
    $400) x 4.5% = $400)).     None of the conversion credit balance
    could have been transferred at this time to the C-group
    conversion UL policy, upon conversion thereto, because the C-
    group term policy was in its first year.
    The second-year premium, before any experience refund, was
    $10,731.50.   The policy was credited with an experience refund of
    $106.08, and the Neonatology Plan paid the net premium of
    $10,625.42 ($10,731.50 - $106.08).       The cost of insuring Dr. Mall
    for the second year was $1,814.34, and, at the end of that year,
    the conversion credit balance was $19,025.33 ($9,288.90 +
    $10,731.50 - $1,814.34 + $819.27); the $819.27 is the interest of
    4.5 percent earned on the conversion credit balance (($19,025.33
    - 27 -
    - $819.27) x 4.5% = $819.27)).    Of the conversion credit balance,
    $9,037.03 could have been transferred at this time to the C-group
    conversion UL policy, upon conversion thereto, because the C-
    group term policy was in its second year ($19,025.33 x 47.5%).
    The Neonatology Plan continued to pay the premiums on this
    policy, net of the applicable experience refund, through 1996.
    Effective October 15, 1996, Dr. Mall converted this policy to a
    fully paid, individually owned C-group conversion UL policy in
    the face amount of $71,102.    At the time of conversion, the C-
    group term policy’s conversion credit balance was $46,508.32, and
    $44,182.90 of that amount ($46,508.32 x 95%) was transferred to
    the C-group conversion UL policy for potential earning.     Dr. Mall
    will earn these credits in 120 equal monthly installments,
    beginning October 1996.    The conversion credit balance of
    $46,508.32 equaled the amount referenced in Commonwealth’s table
    of conversion credit values for the following variables:      (1)
    Business issued before February 1, 1993, (2) female, (3) issue
    age 46, (4) duration of 4 years 7 months, and (5) $650,000 death
    benefit.
    3.    Mr. Mall’s Commonwealth C-Group Term Policy
    Effective March 15, 1992, Commonwealth issued a $500,000 C-
    group term policy (certificate No. 6010423) on the life of Mr.
    Mall, age 47.    The first-year premium was $10,290, and the cost
    of insuring Mr. Mall was $2,056.78.     The Neonatology Plan paid
    - 28 -
    the first-year premium, and, at the end of that year, the
    conversion credit balance was $8,603.71 ($10,290 - $2,056.78 +
    $370.49); the $370.49 is the interest of 4.5 percent earned on
    the conversion credit balance (($8,603.71 - $370.49) x 4.5% =
    $370.49)).   None of the conversion credit balance could have been
    transferred at this time to the C-group conversion UL policy,
    upon conversion thereto, because the C-group term policy was in
    its first year.
    The second-year premium, before any experience refund, was
    $10,530.   The policy was credited with an experience refund of
    $98.25, and the Neonatology Plan paid the net premium of
    $10,431.75 ($10,530 - $98.25).   The cost of insuring Mr. Mall for
    the second year was $2,250.45, and, at the end of that year, the
    conversion credit balance was $17,643.01 ($8,603.71 + $10,530 -
    $2,250.45 + $759.75); the $759.75 is the interest of 4.5 percent
    earned on the conversion credit balance (($17,643.01 - $759.75) x
    4.5% = $759.75)).   Of the conversion credit balance, $8,380.43
    could have been transferred at this time to the C-group
    conversion UL policy, upon conversion thereto, because the C-
    group term policy was in its second year ($17,643.01 x 47.5%).
    The Neonatology Plan continued to pay the premiums on this
    policy, net of the applicable experience refund, through 1996.
    Effective October 15, 1996, Mr. Mall converted this policy to a
    fully paid, individually owned C-group conversion UL policy in
    - 29 -
    the face amount of $67,069.   At the time of conversion, the C-
    group term policy’s conversion credit balance was $43,304, and
    $41,138.80 of that amount ($43,304 x 95%) was transferred to the
    C-group conversion UL policy for potential earning.    Mr. Mall
    will earn these credits in 120 equal monthly installments,
    beginning October 1996.   The conversion credits of $41,138.80
    equaled the amount referenced in Commonwealth’s table of
    conversion credit values for the following variables:    (1)
    Business issued before February 1, 1993, (2) male, (3) issue age
    47, (4) duration of 4 years 7 months, and (5) $500,000 death
    benefit.
    The Neonatology Plan paid no benefits during the relevant
    years, and the 1992 and 1993 Forms W-2, Wage and Tax Statements,
    that Neonatology issued to Dr. Mall did not report any life
    insurance benefits provided to her under the plan.    On their
    joint 1992 and 1993 Federal individual income tax returns, the
    Malls reported $1,626 and $3,654, respectively, as P.S. 58
    income.17
    17
    The term “P.S. 58" refers to the rates deemed by the
    Commissioner to be acceptable in determining the cost of life
    insurance protection includable in gross income for a participant
    covered by a life insurance contract held in a qualified pension
    plan. See Rev. Rul. 55-747, 1955-
    2 C.B. 228
    ; see also sec.
    1.72-16, Income Tax Regs.; cf. sec. 1.79-3, Income Tax Regs.
    (rules generally used to determine the cost of group term life
    insurance provided to employee by employer). See generally sec.
    79(a)(1) (employee’s gross income generally does not include the
    cost of the first $50,000 of group term life insurance on his or
    (continued...)
    - 30 -
    During the subject years, Commonwealth paid the following
    commissions on the C-group products issued on the Malls’ lives:
    Period
    Beginning     Kirwan      Mr. Ankner1   Mr. Murphy
    3/92     $8,922.94       $709.34      $2,498.67
    3/93        852.82        136.88         273.74
    1
    These commissions were paid to Mr. Ankner either
    indirectly through one of his companies or directly.
    Kirwan also received, in or about 1996, commissions equal to 5
    percent of the conversion credit balances, both earned and
    unearned, which were applied to the Malls’ C-group conversion UL
    policies.    These commissions totaled $4,266.09 (($44,182.90 x 5%)
    + ($41,138.80 x 5%)).
    Respondent determined that Neonatology could not deduct its
    excess contributions to the Neonatology Plan and increased
    Neonatology’s income by $23,646 in 1992 and $19,969 in 1993 to
    reflect the following adjustments:
    1992       1993
    Contributions to the Neonatology Plan          $20,000   $22,623
    Administrator’s fees                             1,000     1,000
    1991 NOL from plan contributions                 4,272      —
    Subtotal                                        25,272    23,623
    Less: P.S. 58 costs included in income           1,626     3,654
    Adjustment                                      23,646    19,969
    Respondent determined primarily that the disallowed contributions
    were not deductible under section 162(a) because they did not
    17
    (...continued)
    her life).
    - 31 -
    provide current-year life insurance protection.18   Respondent
    determined alternatively that the excess contributions were not
    deductible under section 404(a)(5); respondent determined that
    the Neonatology Plan was not a “welfare benefit fund” under
    section 419(e) but a nonqualified plan of deferred compensation
    subject to the rules of section 404.   Respondent determined as a
    second alternative that, assuming the Neonatology Plan is a
    “welfare benefit fund”, any deduction of the excess contributions
    was precluded by section 419; for this alternative, respondent
    determined that the SC VEBA was not a “10-or-more employer plan”
    under section 419A(f)(6) as asserted by petitioners.
    As to the Malls, respondent determined they had “other
    income” of $19,374 in 1992 (Neonatology’s adjustment of $23,646
    less the 1991 NOL of $4,272) and $19,969 in 1993.   Respondent
    determined that the other income was either constructive dividend
    income under section 301 or nonqualified deferred compensation
    under section 402(b).   As to the latter position, respondent
    determined that Dr. Mall was taxable on the disallowed
    18
    Although respondent’s determination acknowledges that
    Neonatology may deduct any contribution that is attributable to
    current-year life insurance protection, respondent has not
    determined as to the Neonatology group (or the Lakewood group as
    discussed infra) the cost of that current-year protection. As to
    the Neonatology group, respondent’s determination merely takes
    into account the fact that the Malls recognized P.S. 58 income
    for the subject years. As mentioned supra note 17, P.S. 58
    income relates to life insurance contracts held in a qualified
    pension plan.
    - 32 -
    contributions when they were made, because she received in
    connection with services property not subject to a substantial
    risk of forfeiture under section 83.
    VI. The Lakewood Plan
    Mr. Cohen introduced Drs. Hirshkowitz and Desai to the SC
    VEBA in 1990.   Drs. Hirshkowitz and Desai both knew that the
    premiums paid on the C-group product were more expensive than the
    cost of term life insurance.   They caused Lakewood to invest in
    the SC VEBA anyway because, as they understood it, the SC VEBA
    ultimately allowed Lakewood’s principals to withdraw the excess
    premiums from the plan tax free by way of policy loans.    All of
    Lakewood’s principals are physicians, and Dr. Hirshkowitz, on the
    basis of his conversations with Mr. Cohen, understood that the SC
    VEBA allowed policyholders to convert their C-group term policies
    to individual policies which allowed the withdrawal of the cash
    value at no additional expense.   Dr. Desai, on the basis of his
    conversations with Mr. Cohen, understood that premiums on the C-
    group product covered both term insurance and conversion credits,
    and, in his capacity as a member of Lakewood’s board of
    directors, would have spoken against the SC VEBA had the
    conversion credits not been available.   Drs. Hirshkowitz and
    Desai both relied on the word of Mr. Cohen as to the validity of
    the SC VEBA, seeking no independent competent professional advice
    - 33 -
    and neither requesting nor reading any of the literature on the
    plan.
    Lakewood established the Lakewood Plan under the SC VEBA on
    December 28, 1990, effective January 1, 1990.   The only employees
    covered by the plan during the subject years were Drs.
    Hirshkowitz, Desai, Sobo, McManus, and Sankhla.19   During the
    respective years from 1990 through 1993, Lakewood paid Dr. Desai
    compensation of $318,020, $308,279, $297,452, and $275,270, it
    paid Dr. Sobo compensation of $330,030 $354,277, $329,185, and
    $203,640, it paid Dr. McManus compensation of $218,821, $368,708,
    $340,376, and $333,204, and it paid Dr. Sankhla compensation of
    $50,000, $127,500, $142,500, and $147,500.   During the respective
    years from 1990 through 1992, Lakewood paid Dr. Hirshkowitz
    compensation of $327,691, $181,994, and $204,918.
    Under the terms of the Lakewood Plan, as in effect through
    December 31, 1992, a covered employee received a death benefit
    equal to 2.5 times his or her prior-year compensation.   Lakewood
    amended its plan as of January 1, 1993, effective January 1,
    1990, to increase the death benefit to 8.15 times prior-year
    compensation.   Drs. Hirshkowitz, Desai, and McManus each elected
    on January 1, 1993, not to accept this additional coverage.
    19
    Drs. Bharat Patel and Chadru Jain were also employees of
    Lakewood. The record indicates that they joined the Lakewood
    Plan after the subject years.
    - 34 -
    No Lakewood employee covered by the Lakewood Plan, if he or
    she had died, would ever have received a death benefit equal to
    2.5 times or 8.15 times his or her prior-year compensation.   Each
    of Lakewood’s employee/owners decided the amount that Lakewood
    would contribute to the SC VEBA on his or her behalf, and
    Lakewood wrote separate checks for each employee/owner’s
    contribution, noting on the check the name of the person for whom
    the contribution was made.
    On its Federal corporate income tax return for its taxable
    year ended October 31, 1991, Lakewood claimed a $480,901.49
    deduction for VEBA contributions made to the Lakewood Plan for
    the following persons’ benefits:
    Trustee’s fees........ $1,000.00
    Dr. Hirshkowitz.......254,051.49
    Dr. Desai.............122,750.00
    Dr. Sobo.............. 83,100.00
    Dr. McManus........... 20,000.00
    480,901.49
    On its 1992 Federal corporate income tax return, Lakewood
    claimed a $209,869.03 deduction for VEBA contributions made for
    the following persons’ benefits:
    Dr.   Hirshkowitz......$136,678.43
    Dr.   Desai............ 42,056.44
    Dr.   Sobo............. 13,213.52
    Dr.   McManus.......... 17,920.64
    209,869.03
    This deduction consists of contributions to the Lakewood Plan and
    $70,000 that Lakewood paid directly to Peoples Security for C-
    group term policies purchased outside of the Lakewood Plan for
    - 35 -
    Drs. Hirshkowitz and Desai.   Of the $70,000 paid to Peoples
    Security, $50,000 was attributable to the coverage of Dr.
    Hirshkowitz, and $20,000 was attributable to the coverage of Dr.
    Desai.
    On its 1993 Federal corporate income tax return, Lakewood
    claimed a $296,055.90 deduction for VEBA contributions made for
    the following persons’ benefits:
    Trustee’s fees........ $1,000.00
    Dr. Hirshkowitz.......211,119.90
    Dr. Desai............. 55,000.00
    Dr. Sobo.............. 15,000.00
    Dr. Sankhla........... 5,750.00
    Dr. McManus........... 18,186.00
    296,055.90
    1
    The Lakewood Plan returned this $5,000 to Lakewood in
    October 1993.
    This deduction consists of contributions to the Lakewood Plan and
    $82,926.23 that Lakewood paid directly to Peoples Security for C-
    group term policies purchased outside of the Lakewood Plan for
    Drs. Hirshkowitz, Sankhla, and Desai.   Of the $82,926.23 paid to
    Peoples Security, $57,168.80 was attributable to the coverage of
    Dr. Hirshkowitz, $5,750 was attributable to the coverage of Dr.
    Sankhla, and $20,007.43 was attributable to the coverage of Dr.
    Desai.
    During the relevant years, the Lakewood Plan purchased 12
    insurance policies on the lives of Lakewood’s principals.     The
    attributes of these policies are as follows.
    - 36 -
    1.   Dr. Hirshkowitz’ Inter-American C-Group Term Policy
    Effective December 31, 1990, Inter-American issued a $1
    million C-group term policy (certificate No. 5076058) on the life
    of Dr. Hirshkowitz, age 57.    The first-year premium was $48,680,
    and the cost of insuring Dr. Hirshkowitz for that year was
    $9,475.15.   The Lakewood Plan paid the first-year premium, and,
    at the end of that year, the conversion credit balance was
    $40,969.07 ($48,680 - $9,475.15 + $1,764.22); the $1,764.22 is
    the interest of 4.5 percent earned on the conversion credit
    balance (($40,969.07 - $1,764.22) x 4.5% = $1,764.22)).    None of
    the conversion credit balance could have been transferred at this
    time to the C-group conversion UL policy, upon conversion
    thereto, because the C-group term policy was in its first year.
    This policy lapsed on December 31, 1991.
    2.   Dr. Desai’s Inter-American C-Group Term Policy
    Effective December 31, 1990, Inter-American issued a $1
    million C-group term policy (certificate No. 5076059) on the life
    of Dr. Desai, age 45.   The first-year premium was $17,390, and
    the cost of insuring Dr. Desai for that year was $3,419.48.     The
    Lakewood Plan paid the first-year premium, and, at the end of
    that year, the conversion credit balance was $14,599.19 ($17,390
    - $3,419.48 + $628.67); the $628.67 is the interest of 4.5
    percent earned on the conversion credit balance (($14,599.19 -
    $628.67) x 4.5% = $628.67)).   None of the conversion credit
    - 37 -
    balance could have been transferred at this time to the C-group
    conversion UL policy, upon conversion thereto, because the C-
    group term policy was in its first year.   This policy lapsed on
    December 31, 1991.
    3.   Dr. Sobo’s Inter-American C-Group Term Policy
    Effective December 31, 1990, Inter-American issued a $1
    million C-group term policy (certificate No. 5076057) on the life
    of Dr. Sobo, age 38.    The first-year premium was $10,800, and the
    cost of insuring Dr. Sobo for that year was $2,374.08.    The
    Lakewood Plan paid the first-year premium, and, at the end of
    that year, the conversion credit balance was $8,805.09 ($10,800 -
    $2,374.08 + $379.17); the $379.17 is the interest of 4.5 percent
    earned on the conversion credit balance (($8,805.09 - $379.17) x
    4.5% = $379.17)).    None of the conversion credit balance could
    have been transferred at this time to the C-group conversion UL
    policy, upon conversion thereto, because the C-group term policy
    was in its first year.    This policy lapsed on December 31, 1991.
    4.   Dr. Hirshkowitz’ Commonwealth C-Group Term Policy
    Effective October 31, 1991, Commonwealth issued a $150,000
    C-group term policy (certificate No. 6000972) on the life of Dr.
    Hirshkowitz, age 58.    The first-year premium was $7,540.50, and
    the cost of insuring Dr. Hirshkowitz for that year was $1,572.75.
    The Lakewood Plan paid the first-year premium, and, at the end of
    that year, the conversion credit balance was $6,236.30 ($7,540.50
    - 38 -
    - $1,572.75 + $268.55); the $268.55 is the interest of 4.5
    percent earned on the conversion credit balance (($6,236.30 -
    $268.55) x 4.5% = $268.55)).   None of the conversion credit
    balance could have been transferred at this time to the C-group
    conversion UL policy, upon conversion thereto, because the C-
    group term policy was in its first year.
    The second-year premium, before any experience refund, was
    $7,720.   The policy was credited with an experience refund of
    $115.21, and the Lakewood Plan paid the net premium of $7,604.79
    ($7,720 - $115.21).   The cost of insuring Dr. Hirshkowitz for the
    second year was $1,665.17, and, at the end of that year, the
    conversion credit balance was $12,844.23 ($6,236.30 + $7,720 -
    $1,665.17 + $553.10); the $553.10 is the interest of 4.5 percent
    earned on the conversion credit balance (($12,844.23 - $553.10) x
    4.5% = $553.10)).   Of the conversion credit balance, $6,101.01
    could have been transferred at this time to the C-group
    conversion UL policy, upon conversion thereto, because the C-
    group term policy was in its second year ($12,844.23 x 47.5%).
    The third-year premium, before any experience refund, was
    $7,972.50.   The policy was credited with an experience refund of
    $176.01, and the Lakewood Plan paid the net premium of $7,796.49
    ($7,972.50 - $176.01).   The cost of insuring Dr. Hirshkowitz for
    the third year was $1,798.22, and, at the end of that year, the
    conversion credit balance was $19,874.34 ($12,844.23 + $7,972.50
    - 39 -
    - $1,798.22 + $855.83); the $855.86 is the interest of 4.5
    percent earned on the conversion credit balance (($19,874.34 -
    $855.83) x 4.5% = $855.83)).   Of the conversion credit balance,
    $17,935.59 could have been transferred at this time to the C-
    group conversion UL policy, upon conversion thereto, because the
    C-group term policy was in its third year ($19,874.34 x 90.25%).
    The Lakewood Plan continued to pay the premiums on this
    policy, net of the applicable experience refund, through 1996.
    Effective October 31, 1996, Dr. Hirshkowitz converted this policy
    to a fully paid, individually owned C-group conversion UL policy
    in the face amount of $44,653.   At the time of conversion, the
    balance in the C-group term policy’s conversion credit account
    was $35,400, and $33,630 of that amount ($35,400 x 95%) was
    transferred to the C-group conversion UL policy for potential
    earning.   Mr. Hirshkowitz will earn these credits in 120 equal
    monthly installments, beginning October 1996.   The conversion
    credit balance of $33,630 equaled the amount referenced in
    Commonwealth’s table of conversion credit values for the
    following variables:   (1) Business issued before February 1,
    1993, (2) male, (3) issue age 58, (4) duration of 5 years, and
    (5) $150,000 death benefit.
    - 40 -
    5.   Dr. Desai’s Commonwealth C-Group Term Policy
    Effective October 31, 1991, Commonwealth issued a $150,000
    C-group term policy (certificate No. 6000973) on the life of Dr.
    Desai, age 46.   The first-year premium was $2,836.50, and the
    cost of insuring Dr. Desai for that year was $565.11.    The
    Lakewood Plan paid the first-year premium, and, at the end of
    that year, the conversion credit balance was $2,373.60 ($2,836.50
    - $565.11 + $102.21); the $102.21 is the interest of 4.5 percent
    earned on the conversion credit balance (($2,373.60 - $102.21) x
    4.5% = $102.21)).   None of the conversion credit balance could
    have been transferred at this time to the C-group conversion UL
    policy, upon conversion thereto, because the C-group term policy
    was in its first year.
    The second-year premium, before any experience refund, was
    $2,890.50.   The policy was credited with an experience refund of
    $44.06, and the Lakewood Plan paid the net premium of $2,846.44
    ($2,890.50 - $44.06).    The cost of insuring Dr. Desai for the
    second year was $607.89, and, at the end of that year, the
    conversion credit balance was $4,865.74 ($2,373.60 + $2,890.50 -
    $607.89 + $209.53); the $209.53 is the interest of 4.5 percent
    earned on the conversion credit balance (($4,865.74 - $209.53) x
    4.5% = $209.53)).   Of the conversion credit balance, $2,311.23
    could have been transferred at this time to the C-group
    - 41 -
    conversion UL policy, upon conversion thereto, because the C-
    group term policy was in its second year ($4,865.74 x 47.5%).
    The third-year premium, before any experience refund, was
    $2,962.50.   The policy was credited with an experience refund of
    $66.69, and the Lakewood Plan paid the net premium of $2,895.81
    ($2,962.50 - $66.69).   The cost of insuring Dr. Desai for the
    third year was $665.36, and, at the end of that year, the
    conversion credit balance was $7,485.21 ($4,865.74 + $2,962.50 -
    $665.36 + $322.33); the $322.33 is the interest of 4.5 percent
    earned on the conversion credit balance (($7,485.21 - $322.33) x
    4.5% = $322.33)).   Of the conversion credit balance, $6,755.40
    could have been transferred at this time to the C-group
    conversion UL policy, upon conversion thereto, because the C-
    group term policy was in its third year ($7,485.21 x 90.25%).
    The Lakewood Plan continued to pay the premiums on this
    policy, net of the applicable experience refund, through 1996.
    Effective October 31, 1996, Dr. Desai converted this policy to a
    fully paid, individually owned C-group conversion UL policy in
    the face amount of $22,916.   At the time of conversion, the C-
    group term policy’s conversion credit balance was $13,143.16, and
    $12,486 of that amount ($13,143.16 x 95%) was transferred to the
    C-group conversion UL policy for potential earning.   Dr. Desai
    will earn this amount in 120 equal monthly installments,
    beginning October 1996.   The conversion credit balance of $12,486
    - 42 -
    equaled the amount referenced in Commonwealth’s table of
    conversion credit values for the following variables:   (1)
    Business issued before February 1, 1993, (2) male, (3) issue age
    46, (4) duration of 5 years, and (5) $150,000 death benefit.
    6.   Dr. Sobo’s $150,000 Commonwealth C-Group Term Policy
    Effective October 31, 1991, Commonwealth issued a $150,000
    C-group term policy (certificate No. 6000971) on the life of Dr.
    Sobo, age 38.   The first-year premium was $1,620, and the cost of
    insuring Dr. Sobo for that year was $356.11.   The Lakewood Plan
    paid the first-year premium, and, at the end of that year, the
    conversion credit balance was $1,320.76 ($1,620 - $356.11 +
    $56.87); the $56.87 is the interest of 4.5 percent earned on the
    conversion credit balance (($1,320.76 - $56.87) x 4.5% =
    $56.87)).   None of the conversion credit balance could have been
    transferred at this time to the C-group conversion UL policy,
    upon conversion thereto, because the C-group term policy was in
    its first year.
    The second-year premium, before any experience refund, was
    $1,638.   The policy was credited with an experience refund of
    $24.48, and the Lakewood Plan paid the net premium of $1,613.52
    ($1,638 - $24.48).   The cost of insuring Dr. Sobo for the second
    year was $370.54.
    - 43 -
    Dr. Sobo died on September 23, 1993.    On December 14, 1993,
    the Lakewood Plan paid $150,000 to Bonnie W. Sobo (Ms. Sobo) as
    the beneficiary of this policy.
    7.    Dr. McManus’ Commonwealth C-Group Term Policy
    Effective October 31, 1991, Commonwealth issued a $2.1
    million C-group term policy (certificate No. 6001004) on the life
    of Dr. McManus, age 34.    The first-year premium was $18,186, and
    the cost of insuring Dr. McManus for that year was $4,496.72.
    The Lakewood Plan paid the first-year premium, and, at the end of
    that year, the conversion credit balance was $14,305.30 ($18,186
    - $4,496.72 + $616.02); the $616.02 is the interest of 4.5
    percent earned on the conversion credit balance (($14,305.30 -
    $616.02) x 4.5% = $616.02)).    None of the conversion credit
    balance could have been transferred at this time to the C-group
    conversion UL policy, upon conversion thereto, because the C-
    group term policy was in its first year.
    The second-year premium, before any experience refund, was
    $18,186.    The policy was credited with an experience refund of
    $265.36, and the Lakewood Plan paid the net premium of $17,920.64
    ($18,186 - $265.36).    The cost of insuring Dr. McManus for the
    second year was $4,465.82, and, at the end of that year, the
    conversion credit balance was $29,286.63 ($14,305.30 + $18,186 -
    $4,465.82 + $1,261.15); the $1,261.15 is the interest of 4.5
    percent earned on the conversion credit balance (($29,286.63 -
    - 44 -
    $1,261.15) x 4.5% = $1,261.15)).    Of the conversion credit
    balance, $13,911.15 could have been transferred at this time to
    the C-group conversion UL policy, upon conversion thereto,
    because the C-group term policy was in its second year
    ($29,286.63 x 47.5%).
    The third-year premium, before any experience refund, was
    $18,186.   The policy was credited with an experience refund of
    $401.32, and the Lakewood Plan paid the net premium of $17,784.68
    ($18,186 - $401.32).    The cost of insuring Dr. McManus for the
    third year was $4,433.46, and, at the end of that year, the
    conversion credit balance was $44,975.93 ($29,286.63 + $18,186 -
    $4,433.46 + $1,936.76); the $1,936.76 is the interest of 4.5
    percent earned on the conversion credit balance (($44,975.93 -
    $1,936.76) x 4.5% = $1,936.76)).    Of the conversion credit
    balance, $40,590.78 could have been transferred at this time to
    the C-group conversion UL policy, upon conversion thereto,
    because the C-group term policy was in its third year ($44,975.93
    x 90.25%).
    The Lakewood Plan continued to pay the premiums on this
    policy, net of the applicable experience refund, through 1996.
    Effective October 1, 1996, Dr. McManus converted this policy to a
    fully paid, individually owned C-group conversion UL policy in
    the face amount of $187,827.    At the time of conversion, the C-
    group term policy’s conversion credit balance was $78,672.63, and
    - 45 -
    $74,739 of that amount ($78,672.63 x 95%) was transferred to the
    C-group conversion UL policy for potential earning.   Dr. McManus
    will earn these credits in 120 equal monthly installments,
    beginning October 1996.   The conversion credit balance of $74,739
    equaled the amount referenced in Commonwealth’s table of
    conversion credit values for the following variables:   (1)
    Business issued before February 1, 1993, (2) male, (3) issue age
    34, (4) duration of 5 years, and (5) $2.1 million death benefit.
    8.   Dr. Hirshkowitz’ Commonwealth C-Group Term Policy
    Effective December 31, 1991, Commonwealth issued a $1
    million C-group term policy (certificate No. 6004482) on the life
    of Dr. Hirshkowitz, age 58.   The premium for the 10-month period
    from December 31, 1991, through October 30, 1992, was $41,891.67,
    and the cost of insuring Dr. Hirshkowitz for the 10-month period
    was $8,814.60.   The Lakewood Plan paid the 10-month premium, and,
    at the end of that 10-month period, the conversion credit balance
    was $34,317.46 ($41,891.67 - $8,814.60 + $1,240.39); the
    $1,240.39 is the interest of 4.5 percent earned on the conversion
    credit balance (($34,317.46 - $1,240.39) x 4.5% x 10/12 =
    $1,240.39)).   None of the conversion credit balance could have
    been transferred at this time to the C-group conversion UL
    policy, upon conversion thereto, because the C-group term policy
    was in its first year.
    - 46 -
    The premium for the next 12-month period, before any
    experience refund, was $51,470.   The policy was credited with an
    experience refund of $200, and the Lakewood Plan paid the net
    premium of $51,270 ($51,470 - $200).   The cost of insuring Dr.
    Hirshkowitz for the second year was $11,189.96, and, at the end
    of that year, the conversion credit balance was $77,954.39
    ($34,317.46 + $51,470 - $11,189.96 + $3,356.89); the $3,356.89 is
    the interest of 4.5 percent earned on the conversion credit
    balance (($77,954.39 - $3,356.89) x 4.5% = $3,356.89)).     Of the
    conversion credit balance, $37,028.34 could have been transferred
    at this time to the C-group conversion UL policy, upon conversion
    thereto, because the C-group term policy was in its second year
    ($77,954.39 x 47.5%).
    The third-year premium for the next 12-month period, before
    any experience refund, was $53,150.    The policy was credited with
    an experience refund of $1,321.18, and the Lakewood Plan paid the
    net premium of $51,828.82 ($53,150 - $1,321.18).   The cost of
    insuring Dr. Hirshkowitz for the third year was $12,095.03, and,
    at the end of that year, the conversion credit balance was
    $124,364.78 ($77,954.39 + $53,150 - $12,095.03 + $5,355.42); the
    $5,355.42 is the interest of 4.5 percent earned on the conversion
    credit balance (($124,364.78 - $5,355.42) x 4.5% = $5,355.42)).
    Of the conversion credit balance, $112,239.22 could have been
    transferred at this time to the C-group conversion UL policy,
    - 47 -
    upon conversion thereto, because the C-group term policy was in
    its third year ($124,364.78 x 90.25%).
    The Lakewood Plan continued to pay the premiums on this
    policy, net of the applicable experience refund, through 1996.
    Effective October 31, 1996, Dr. Hirshkowitz converted this policy
    to a fully paid, individually owned C-group conversion UL policy
    in the face amount of $296,937.    At the time of conversion, the
    C-group term policy’s conversion credit balance was $227,084.21,
    and $215,730 of that amount ($227,084.21 x 95%) was transferred
    to the C-group conversion UL policy for potential earning.     Dr.
    Hirshkowitz will earn these credits in 120 equal monthly
    installments, beginning October 1996.    The conversion credit
    balance of $215,730 equaled the amount referenced in
    Commonwealth’s table of conversion credit values for the
    following variables:    (1) Business issued before February 1,
    1993, (2) male, (3) issue age 58, (4) duration of 4 years 10
    months, and (5) $1 million death benefit.
    9.   Dr. Desai’s Commonwealth C-Group Term Policy
    Effective December 31, 1991, Commonwealth issued a $1
    million C-group term policy (certificate No. 6004483) on the life
    of Dr. Desai, age 46.    The premium for the 10-month period from
    December 31, 1991, through October 30, 1992, was $15,758.33, and
    the cost of insuring Dr. Desai for this 10-month period was
    $3,149.57.   The Lakewood Plan paid the 10-month premium, and, at
    - 48 -
    the end of that 10-month period, the conversion credit balance
    was $13,081.59 ($15,758.33 - $3,149.57 + $472.83); the $472.83 is
    the interest of 4.5 percent earned on the conversion credit
    balance (($13,081.59 - $472.83) x 4.5% x 10/12 = $472.83)).     None
    of the conversion credit balance could have been transferred at
    this time to the C-group conversion UL policy, upon conversion
    thereto, because the C-group term policy was in its first year.
    The premium for the next 12-month period, before any
    experience refund, was $19,270.   The policy was credited with an
    experience refund of $60, and the Lakewood Plan paid the net
    premium of $19,210 ($19,270 - $60).   The cost of insuring Dr.
    Desai for the second year was $4,064.12, and, at the end of that
    year, the conversion credit balance was $29,560.40 ($13,081.59 +
    $19,270 - $4,064.12 + $1,272.93); the $1,272.93 is the interest
    of 4.5 percent earned on the conversion credit balance
    (($29,560.40 - $1,272.93) x 4.5% = $1,272.93)).    Of the
    conversion credit balance, $14,041.19 could have been transferred
    at this time to the C-group conversion UL policy, upon conversion
    thereto, because the C-group term policy was in its second year
    ($29,560.40 x 47.5%).
    The third-year premium for the next 12-month period, before
    any experience refund, was $19,750.   The policy was credited with
    an experience refund of $474.65, and the Lakewood Plan paid the
    net premium of $19,275.35 ($19,750 - $474.65).    The cost of
    - 49 -
    insuring Dr. Desai for the third year was $4,449.23, and, at the
    end of that year, the conversion credit balance was $46,879.92
    ($29,560.40 + $19,750 - $4,449.23 + $2,018.75); the $2,018.75 is
    the interest of 4.5 percent earned on the conversion credit
    balance (($46,879.92 - $2,018.75) x 4.5% = $2,018.75)).    Of the
    conversion credit balance, $42,309.13 could have been transferred
    at this time to the C-group conversion UL policy, upon conversion
    thereto, because the C-group term policy was in its third year
    ($46,879.92 x 90.25%).
    The Lakewood Plan continued to pay the premiums on this
    policy, net of the applicable experience refund, through 1996.
    Effective October 1, 1996, Dr. Desai converted this policy to a
    fully paid, individually owned C-group conversion UL policy in
    the face amount of $151,656.   At the time of conversion, the C-
    group term policy’s conversion credit balance was $84,397.58, and
    $80,177.70 of that amount ($84,397.58 x 95%) was transferred to
    the C-group conversion UL policy for potential earning.    Dr.
    Desai will earn these credits in 120 equal monthly installments,
    beginning October 1996.   The conversion credit balance of
    $80,177.70 equaled the amount referenced in Commonwealth’s table
    of conversion credit values for the following variables:     (1)
    Business issued before February 1, 1993, (2) male, (3) issue age
    46, (4) duration of 4 years 10 months, and (5) $1 million death
    benefit.
    - 50 -
    10.   Dr. Sobo’s Commonwealth C-Group Term Policy
    Effective December 31, 1991, Commonwealth issued a $1
    million C-group term policy (certificate No. 6004474) on the life
    of Dr. Sobo, age 39.   The premium for the 10-month period from
    December 31, 1991, through October 30, 1992, was $9,583.33, and
    the cost of insuring Dr. Sobo for this 10-month period was
    $2,079.88.   The Lakewood Plan paid the 10-month premium, and, at
    the end of that 10-month period, the conversion credit balance
    was $7,784.83 ($9,583.33 - $2,079.88 + $281.38); the $281.38 is
    the interest of 4.5 percent earned on the conversion credit
    balance (($9,583.33 - $281.38) x 4.5% x 10/12 = $281.38)).    None
    of the conversion credit balance could have been transferred at
    this time to the C-group conversion UL policy, upon conversion
    thereto, because the C-group term policy was in its first year.
    The premium for the next 12-month period, before any
    experience refund, was $11,620.   The policy was credited with an
    experience refund of $20, and the Lakewood Plan paid the net
    premium of $11,600 ($11,620 - $20).    The cost of insuring Dr.
    Sobo for the second year was $2,588.77.
    On February 3, 1994, the Lakewood Plan paid Ms. Sobo $1
    million as the beneficiary of this policy.    Pursuant to the plan,
    Dr. Sobo’s death benefit should have been $2,682,858 (prior-year
    compensation of $329,185 multiplied by 8.15).    The Lakewood Plan
    had assets from which it could have paid Ms. Sobo more than the
    - 51 -
    $1,150,000 that it did (the $1 million on this policy and the
    $150,000 on certificate No. 6000971).    The Lakewood Plan retained
    those assets for the remaining covered employees.
    11.   Dr. Sankhla’s Commonwealth MG-5 Policy
    Effective December 31, 1991, Commonwealth issued a $150,000
    MG-5 policy on the life of Dr. Sankhla, age 38, for a 1-year
    premium of $397.50.    The policy was renewed for a second year at
    a premium of $397.50, and for a third year at a premium of
    $397.50.   The Lakewood Plan paid all three of these premiums.
    12.   Dr. Hirshkowitz’ Commonwealth C-Group Term Policy
    Effective December 31, 1993, Commonwealth issued a $100,000
    C-group term policy (certificate No. 6022354) on the life of Dr.
    Hirshkowitz, age 60.   The premium for the 10-month period from
    December 31, 1993, through October 30, 1994, was $4,496.67, and
    the cost of insuring Dr. Hirshkowitz for that 10-month period was
    $1,107.84.   The Lakewood Plan paid the 10-month premium, and, at
    the end thereof, the conversion credit balance was $3,515.91
    ($4,496.67 - $1,107.84 + $127.08); the $127.08 is the interest of
    4.5 percent earned on the conversion credit balance (($3,515.91 -
    $127.08) x 4.5% x 10/12 = $127.08)).    None of the conversion
    credit balance could have been transferred at this time to the C-
    group conversion UL policy, upon conversion thereto, because the
    C-group term policy was in its first year.
    - 52 -
    In addition to its purchase of these 12 life insurance
    policies, the Lakewood Plan, during the subject years, purchased
    three group annuities designated for certain Lakewood employees.
    None of these annuities funded the life insurance provided under
    the plan.   The Lakewood Plan generally purchased these annuities
    to accumulate wealth to pay future premiums on the C-group term
    policies.   The attributes of these annuities are as follows.
    1.   Plus II Group Annuity
    Effective December 31, 1990, Inter-American issued to the
    Lakewood Plan a Plus II group annuity (#C15518/C91063).    The
    Lakewood Plan deposited $78,240 into the annuity on the day it
    was effective and $92,700 in 1991.     The Lakewood Plan closed the
    annuity in April 1997, withdrawing $230,169.02.     The $59,229.02
    difference between the total deposits ($170,940) and the amount
    withdrawn ($230,169.02) represents interest.
    2.   Commonwealth Sygnet 24 Group Annuity Effective in 1991
    Effective October 31, 1991, Commonwealth issued to the
    Lakewood Plan a Sygnet 24 group annuity (#D10120/D90039).     This
    annuity is designed for asset accumulation over a long period of
    time and has surrender charges that grade off over 6 years.      The
    Lakewood Plan deposited $242 into the annuity on the day it was
    effective, $143,344.17 in 1992, and $33,664.37 in 1993.    The
    Lakewood Plan withdrew $76,442.08 from the annuity on November 4,
    1994, and $93,301.59 on December 12, 1995, in closing it.     The
    - 53 -
    Lakewood Plan used both withdrawals to pay C-group term policy
    premiums for Drs. Hirshkowitz and Desai.   The Lakewood Plan paid
    $30,153.10 of charges on its deposits and $4,138.44 of surrender
    charges on its withdrawals.   The $26,784.67 difference between
    the (1) total deposits into the account ($177,250.54) and (2) sum
    of the charges ($34,291.54) plus total withdrawals ($169,743.67),
    represents interest.
    3.   Commonwealth Sygnet 24 Group Annuity Effective in 1993
    Effective December 30, 1993, Commonwealth issued to the
    Lakewood Plan a second Sygnet 24 group annuity (#D11794/D90214).
    The Lakewood Plan deposited $75,551.50 into the annuity on the
    day it was effective and closed the annuity on November 25, 1996,
    withdrawing $65,078.20.   The Lakewood Plan paid a $15,865.68
    charge on its deposit and a $3,436.85 surrender charge on its
    withdrawal.   The $7,042.45 difference between the (1) deposit
    ($75,551.50) and (2) sum of the charge ($3,436.85) plus
    withdrawal ($65,078.20) represents interest.
    Beginning in 1992, Lakewood purchased outside of the SC VEBA
    three Peoples Security C-group term policies.   Lakewood owned
    these policies and deducted the underlying premiums as VEBA
    contributions.   The attributes of these policies are as follows.
    1.   Dr. Desai’s Peoples Security C-Group Term Policy
    Effective August 15, 1992, Peoples Security issued a
    $1,005,000 C-group term policy (certificate No. 7003612) on the
    - 54 -
    life of Dr. Desai, age 46.    The first-year premium was
    $19,004.55, and the cost of insuring Dr. Desai for that year was
    $3,786.22.    Lakewood paid this premium, and, at the end of that
    year, the conversion credit balance was $15,903.15 ($19,004.55 -
    $3,786.22 + $684.82); the $684.82 is the interest of 4.5 percent
    earned on the conversion credit balance (($15,903.15 - $684.82) x
    4.5% = $684.82)).   None of the conversion credit balance could
    have been transferred at this time to the C-group conversion UL
    policy, upon conversion thereto, because the C-group term policy
    was in its first year.
    The second-year premium, before any experience refund, was
    $19,366.35.   The policy was credited with an experience refund of
    $145.33, and Lakewood paid the net premium of $19,221.02
    ($19,366.35 - $145.33).    The cost of insuring Dr. Desai for the
    second year was $4,072.87, and, at the end of that year, the
    conversion credit balance was $32,600.48 ($15,903.15 + $19,366.35
    - $4,072.87 + $1,403.85); the $1,403.85 is the interest of 4.5
    percent earned on the conversion credit balance (($32,600.48 -
    $1,403.85) x 4.5% = $1,403.85)).    Of the conversion credit
    balance, $15,485.23 could have been transferred at this time to
    the C-group conversion UL policy, upon conversion thereto,
    because the C-group term policy was in its second year
    ($32,600.48 x 47.5%).
    - 55 -
    Lakewood continued to pay the premiums on this policy, net
    of the applicable experience refund, through 1996.    Effective
    February 15, 1996, Dr. Desai converted this policy to a fully
    paid, individually owned C-group conversion UL policy in the face
    amount of $106,353.    At the time of conversion, the C-group term
    policy’s conversion credit balance was $58,141.90, and $55,234.80
    of that amount ($58,141.90 x 95%) was transferred to the C-group
    conversion UL policy for potential earning.    Dr. Desai will earn
    these credits in 120 equal monthly installments, beginning
    February 1996.    The conversion credit balance of $55,234.80
    equaled the amount referenced in Commonwealth’s table of
    conversion credit values for the following variables:    (1)
    Business issued before February 1, 1993, (2) male, (3) issue age
    46, (4) duration of 3 years 6 months, and (5) $1,005,000 death
    benefit.
    2.    Dr. Hirshkowitz’ Peoples Security C-Group Term Policy
    Effective August 15, 1992, Peoples Security issued a
    $940,000 C-group term policy (certificate No. 7002550) on the
    life of Dr. Hirshkowitz, age 59.    The first-year premium was
    $48,861.20, and the cost of insuring Dr. Hirshkowitz for that
    year was $10,907.54.    Lakewood paid this premium, and, at the end
    of that year, the conversion credit balance was $39,661.57
    ($48,861.20 - $10,907.54 + $1,707.91); the $1,707.91 is the
    interest of 4.5 percent earned on the conversion credit balance
    - 56 -
    (($39,661.57 - $1,707.91) x 4.5% = $1,707.91)).   None of the
    conversion credit balance could have been transferred at this
    time to the C-group conversion UL policy, upon conversion
    thereto, because the C-group term policy was in its first year.
    The second-year premium, before any experience refund, was
    $50,440.40.   The policy was credited with an experience refund of
    $362.35, and Lakewood paid the net premium of $50,078.05
    ($50,440.40 - $362.35).   The cost of insuring Dr. Hirshkowitz for
    the second year was $11,830.58, and, at the end of that year, the
    conversion credit balance was $81,793.61 ($39,661.58 + $50,440.40
    - $11,830.58 + $3,522.21); the $3,522.21 is the interest of 4.5
    percent earned on the conversion credit balance (($81,793.61 -
    $3,522.21) x 4.5% = $3,522.21)).   Of the conversion credit
    balance, $38,851.96 could have been transferred at this time to
    the C-group conversion UL policy, upon conversion thereto,
    because the C-group term policy was in its second year
    ($81,793.61 x 47.5%).
    Lakewood continued to pay the premiums on this policy, net
    of the applicable experience refund, through 1995.   Effective
    October 15, 1995, Dr. Hirshkowitz converted this policy to a
    fully paid, individually owned C-group conversion UL policy in
    the face amount of $164,406.   At the time of conversion, the C-
    group term policy’s conversion credit balance was $129,411.70,
    and $122,941.12 of that amount ($129,411.70 x 95%) was
    - 57 -
    transferred to the C-group conversion UL policy for potential
    earning.    Dr. Hirshkowitz will earn these credits in 120 equal
    monthly installments, beginning October 1995.    The conversion
    credit balance of $122,941.12 equaled the amount referenced in
    Commonwealth’s table of conversion credit values for the
    following variables:    (1) Business issued before February 1,
    1993, (2) male, (3) issue age 59, (4) duration of 3 years 2
    months, and (5) $940,000 death benefit.
    3.    Dr. Sankhla’s Peoples Security C-Group Term Policy
    Effective January 31, 1993, Peoples Security issued a
    $500,000 C-group term policy (certificate No. 7003453) on the
    life of Dr. Sankhla, age 39.    The first-year premium was $5,750,
    and the cost of insuring Dr. Sankhla for that year was $1,245.51.
    Lakewood paid this premium, and, at the end of that year, the
    conversion credit balance was $4,707.19 ($5,750 - $1,245.51 +
    $202.70); the $202.70 is the interest of 4.5 percent earned on
    the conversion credit balance (($4,707.19 - $202.70) x 4.5% =
    $202.70)).    None of the conversion credit balance could have been
    transferred at this time to the C-group conversion UL policy,
    upon conversion thereto, because the C-group term policy was in
    its first year.
    During the relevant years, Commonwealth, Inter-American, and
    Peoples Security paid Kirwan, Mr. Murphy, and Mr. Ankner (either
    indirectly through one of his companies or directly) commissions
    - 58 -
    of $90,503.82, $6,681.23, and $20,960, respectively, on the C-
    group products and Sygnet group annuities sold to the Lakewood
    Plan.    Kirwan also received, in or about 1996, commissions equal
    to 5 percent of the conversion credits, both earned and unearned,
    which were applied to the C-group conversion UL policies of Drs.
    Hirshkowitz, Desai, and McManus.    These commissions totaled
    $29,746.93 (($33,630 x 5%) + ($12,486 x 5%) + ($74,739 x 5%) +
    ($215,730 x 5%) + ($80,177.70) + ($55,234.80) + ($122,941.12 x
    5%).
    The 1991, 1992, and 1993 Forms W-2 issued by Lakewood to
    Drs. Hirshkowitz, Desai, Sobo, McManus, and Sankhla did not
    report any taxable life insurance benefits provided to them under
    the Lakewood Plan.    Dr. Hirshkowitz reported $4,590, $4,590, and
    $13,338 as P.S. 58 income on his joint 1991, 1992, and 1993
    Federal individual income tax returns, respectively.    Drs. Desai,
    Sobo, McManus, and Sankhla did not report on their 1991, 1992, or
    1993 Federal individual income tax returns any income from the
    life insurance benefits provided to them by Lakewood.
    Respondent determined that Lakewood could not deduct the
    amounts claimed as contributions to the Lakewood Plan in its
    October 31, 1991, and its 1992 and 1993 taxable years and
    disallowed the related claimed deductions of $480,901, $209,869,
    and $296,056, respectively.    In contrast with the Neonatology
    adjustments, respondent’s Lakewood adjustments do not reflect the
    - 59 -
    fact that an employee/owner (Dr. Hirshkowitz) reported P.S. 58
    income as to the benefits that he received from the Lakewood
    Plan.   Consistent with the Neonatology determination, respondent
    determined primarily that Lakewood’s contributions to its plan
    were not deductible under section 162(a) to the extent they did
    not provide current-year life insurance protection.   Respondent
    determined alternatively that the contributions were not
    deductible under section 404(a)(5); respondent determined that
    the Lakewood Plan was not a “welfare benefit fund” under section
    419(e) but a nonqualified plan of deferred compensation subject
    to the rules of section 404.   Respondent determined as a second
    alternative that, assuming that the Lakewood Plan is a “welfare
    benefit fund”, any deduction of the contributions was precluded
    by section 419; for this purpose, respondent determined that the
    SC VEBA was not a “10-or-more employer plan” under section
    419A(f)(6) as asserted by petitioners.
    As to the petitioning individuals of the Lakewood group,
    respondent determined that each group of petitioning individuals
    had “additional income” in the following amounts for the
    respective years from 1991 through 1993:   Dr. and Ms.
    Hirshkowitz-–$254,051, $136,678, and $211,120; Dr. and Ms. Desai-
    –$122,750, $42,056, and $55,000; Dr. and Ms. McManus-–$20,000,
    $17,921, and $18,186; and the Estate of Steven Sobo, Deceased,
    - 60 -
    and Ms. Sobo-–$83,100, $13,214, and $5,000.20      Respondent
    determined that the additional income was either constructive
    dividend income under section 301 or nonqualified deferred
    compensation under section 402(b).     As to the latter position,
    respondent determined that the petitioning employee/owners of the
    Lakewood group were taxable on their shares of the contributions,
    when made, because they received in connection with services
    property not subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture under
    section 83.
    VII. The Marlton Plan
    Marlton established the Marlton Plan under the NJ VEBA on
    December 31, 1993, effective January 1, 1993.      Marlton
    contributed $100,000 and $120,000 to the plan during 1993 and
    1994, respectively, and Dr. Lo deducted those respective amounts
    on his 1993 and 1994 Schedules C as employee benefit program
    expenses.   Marlton also paid a $2,500 VEBA fee in 1993, which Dr.
    20
    In summary, respondent determined that the disallowed
    contributions were attributable to the following persons:
    1991         1992       1993
    Dr. Hirshkowitz             $254,051      $136,678   $211,120
    Dr. Desai                    122,750        42,056     55,000
    Dr. McManus                   20,000        17,921     18,186
    Dr. Sobo                      83,100        13,214      5,000
    Dr. Sankhla                     —              —        5,750
    Trustee’s fees                 1,000           —        1,000
    480,901       209,869    296,056
    - 61 -
    Lo deducted on his joint 1993 Federal individual income tax
    return.
    The Marlton Plan provides in relevant part that:     (1) Each
    person covered by the plan is entitled to a death benefit equal
    to eight times his or her prior-year compensation, (2) an
    employee’s spouse may not join the plan, and (3) a proprietor may
    join the plan only if 90 percent or more of the plan’s total
    participants are employees of Marlton on 1 day of each quarter of
    the plan year.    The only persons covered by the Marlton Plan are
    Dr. Lo, Ms. Lo, and Edward Lo,21 and, during 1994, the Marlton
    Plan purchased a separate insurance policy on the life of each of
    these persons.    None of these persons, had he or she died, would
    have received a death benefit under the plan equal to eight times
    his or her prior-year compensation.     Ms. Lo was a Marlton
    employee during 1994, and it paid her, ostensibly as employee
    compensation, $46,800, $51,600, and $54,000 during the respective
    years from 1992 to 1994.    Edward Lo was an employee of Marlton
    during 1994, and it paid him, ostensibly as employee
    compensation, $39,930, $39,358, and $37,918 during the years 1992
    through 1994.    Dr. Lo was never a Marlton employee, and he was
    not eligible to participate in the plan during any of the
    21
    The record does not reveal Edward Lo’s relationship (if
    any) to Dr. Lo.
    - 62 -
    relevant years.   Dr Lo’s participation in the plan was
    inconsistent with the terms thereof.
    On April 28, 1994, the Marlton Plan purchased from Southland
    Life Insurance Co. (Southland) a $3.2 million flexible premium
    adjustable life insurance policy (certificate No. 0600008928) on
    the life of Dr. Lo, age 52, and it paid Southland a $158,859
    premium on the policy during that year.22    Dr. Lo’s death
    beneficiary was an irrevocable trust by and between him and Ms.
    Lo, as grantors, and Edward Lo as trustee.    The policy’s cash
    value (i.e., its accumulation value23 less surrender charges)
    could be obtained by surrendering the policy, but the product was
    designed to access that value by borrowing it through a “wash
    loan” (i.e., a loan for which the interest rate charged thereon
    equaled the interest rate earned on the policy).    The Southland
    policy’s accumulated value was $154,483 on December 28, 1994, its
    surrender charge for that year was $68,800, and the interest
    credited to the policy during that year approximated $5,046.96.
    For 1994, a $3.2 million term insurance policy on the life of Dr.
    Lo would have cost approximately $9,255.05.
    22
    Under the terms of the policy, after Southland received
    an initial premium payment of $98,859, a minimum monthly premium
    payment of $3,738.33 was required to prevent the policy from
    lapsing during the first 5 years.
    23
    The accumulation value equaled the total premiums paid
    plus commercial interest less the cost of term insurance and
    administrative expenses.
    - 63 -
    Also during 1994, the Marlton Plan purchased from the First
    Colony Life Insurance Co. (First Colony) a $412,800 graded
    premium policy on the life of Ms. Lo, age 44, and a $264,008
    graded premium policy on the life of Edward Lo, age 45.   The
    Marlton Plan paid First Colony a $584.26 annual premium on Ms.
    Lo’s policy and a $556.34 annual premium on Edward Lo’s policy.
    The beneficiary of both policies was the Marlton plan trustee.
    The annual premium on these two policies remained constant for
    the first 10 years and then increased substantially unless the
    policyholder provided evidence of insurability to begin another
    10-year period of reduced, level premiums.
    The Marlton Plan paid no benefits during the subject years.
    On their joint 1993 Federal individual income tax return, the Los
    reported no P.S. 58 income.   They reported P.S. 58 income of
    $4,288 on their joint 1994 Federal individual income tax return.
    Respondent determined that Marlton could not deduct its
    contributions to the Marlton Plan and increased the Los’ income
    by $102,500 in 1993 and $116,212 in 1994 to reflect the following
    adjustments:
    1993      1994
    Contributions to the Marlton Plan        $100,000   $120,000
    Administrator’s fees                        2,500        500
    Subtotal                                  102,500    120,500
    Less: P.S. 58 costs included in income       -0-       4,288
    Adjustment                                102,500    116,212
    - 64 -
    Respondent determined primarily that the contributions were not
    deductible under section 162(a).   Respondent determined
    alternatively that the contributions were not deductible under
    section 404(a)(5); respondent determined that the Marlton Plan
    was not a “welfare benefit fund” under section 419(e) but a
    nonqualified plan of deferred compensation subject to the rules
    of section 404.   Respondent determined as a second alternative
    that, assuming that the Marlton Plan is a “welfare benefit fund”,
    any deduction of the contributions was precluded by section 419;
    for this purpose, respondent determined that the NJ VEBA was not
    a “10-or-more employer plan” under section 419A(f)(6) as asserted
    by petitioners.   Respondent determined as a third alternative
    that any deduction of the contributions was precluded by section
    264(a); for this purpose, respondent determined that each life
    insurance policy issued under the Marlton Plan covered the life
    of a person financially interested in Dr. Lo’s trade or business
    and that Dr. Lo was directly or indirectly a beneficiary under
    the policy.
    OPINION
    We must determine the tax consequences flowing from the
    subject VEBA’s, which, petitioners claim, are “10-or-more
    employer plans” entitled to the favorable tax treatment set forth
    - 65 -
    in section 419A(f)(6).24   The VEBAs’ framework was crafted by the
    insurance salesmen mentioned herein and marketed to professional,
    small business owners as a viable tax planning device.    The
    VEBAs’ scheme was subscribed to by varied small businesses whose
    employee/owners sought primarily the advertised tax benefits and
    24
    The term “10-or-more employer plan” is defined by sec.
    419A(f)(6), which provides as follows:
    (6) Exception for 10-or-More Employer Plans.--
    (A) In general.--This subpart [i.e., the
    rules of subpt. D that generally limit an
    employer’s deduction for its contributions to
    a welfare benefit fund to the amount that
    would have been deductible had it provided
    the benefits directly to its employees] shall
    not apply in the case of any welfare benefit
    fund which is part of a 10 or more employer
    plan. The preceding sentence shall not apply
    to any plan which maintains experience-rating
    arrangements with respect to individual
    employers.
    (B) 10 or more employer plan.--For
    purposes of subparagraph (A), the term “10 or
    more employer plan" means a plan--
    (i) to which more than 1
    employer contributes, and
    (ii) to which no employer
    normally contributes more than 10
    percent of the total contributions
    contributed under the plan by all
    employers.
    See generally Booth v. Commissioner, 
    108 T.C. 524
    , 562-563
    (1997), for a discussion of the tax consequences which flow from
    a 10-or-more employer plan vis-a-vis another type of welfare
    benefit fund, on the one hand, or a plan of deferred
    compensation, on the other hand.
    - 66 -
    tax-free asset accumulation.    The subject VEBA’s were not
    designed, marketed, purchased, or sold as a means for an employer
    to provide welfare benefits to its employees.    Cf. Booth v.
    Commissioner, 
    108 T.C. 524
    , 561-563 (1997) (designers of welfare
    benefit funds intended to provide employees with real welfare
    benefits that would not be subject to abuse).    The small business
    owners at bar (namely, the petitioning physicians) invested in
    the VEBA’s through their businesses and caused their businesses
    to purchase the C-group product from the insurance salesmen.      The
    insurance salesmen, guided by the designer of the C-group
    product, represented to the physicians that favorable tax
    consequences would flow from an investment in the VEBA’s and the
    purchase of the C-group product.
    Before turning to the issues at hand, we pause to pass on
    our perception of the trial witnesses.    We observe the candor,
    sincerity, and demeanor of each witness in order to evaluate his
    or her testimony and assign it weight for the primary purpose of
    finding disputed facts.    We determine the credibility of each
    witness, weigh each piece of evidence, draw appropriate
    inferences, and choose between conflicting inferences in finding
    the facts of a case.   The mere fact that one party presents
    unopposed testimony on his or her behalf does not necessarily
    mean that the elicited testimony will result in a finding of fact
    in that party’s favor.    We will not accept the testimony of
    - 67 -
    witnesses at face value if we find that the outward appearance of
    the facts in their totality conveys an impression contrary to the
    spoken word.   See Boehm v. Commissioner, 
    326 U.S. 287
    , 293
    (1945); Wilmington Trust Co. v. Helvering, 
    316 U.S. 164
    , 167-168
    (1942); see also Gallick v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 
    372 U.S. 108
    ,
    114-115 (1963); Diamond Bros. Co. v. Commissioner, 
    322 F.2d 725
    ,
    730-731 (3d Cir. 1963), affg. 
    T.C. Memo. 1962-132
    .
    Petitioners called eight fact witnesses and one expert
    witness.   Petitioners’ fact witnesses were Drs. Desai,
    Hirshkowitz, and Mall, Messrs. Ankner, Mall, and Ross, and AEGON
    USA employees Paula Jackson and Timothy Vance.   Petitioners’
    expert witness was Jay M. Jaffe, F.S.A., M.A.A.A. (Mr. Jaffe).
    Mr. Jaffe is the president and sole consultant of Actuarial
    Enterprises, Ltd., and we generally recognized him as an expert
    on the characterization of an insurance policy as term insurance.
    We recognized him as such but expressed concern as to whether he
    was actually an unbiased expert who could help us.   Mr. Jaffe
    generally testified that the C-group term policy and the C-group
    conversion UL policy were separate insurance products with no
    interrelationship.
    Respondent called two fact witnesses and one expert witness.
    Respondent’s fact witnesses were Mr. Cohen and Vincent Maressa,
    the latter of whom is the executive director and general counsel
    of the Medical Society of New Jersey.   Respondent’s expert
    - 68 -
    witness was Charles DeWeese, F.S.A., M.A.A.A. (Mr. DeWeese).     Mr.
    DeWeese is an independent consulting actuary, and we recognized
    him as an expert on, among other things, the difference between
    group term insurance and universal life insurance.     Mr. DeWeese
    generally testified that the C-group term policy and the C-group
    conversion UL policy were one insurance product; i.e., both
    policies were parts of a single life insurance product.
    We have broad discretion to evaluate the cogency of an
    expert’s analysis.    Sometimes, an expert will help us decide a
    case.    See, e.g., Booth v. Commissioner, supra at 573; Trans City
    Life Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 
    106 T.C. 274
    , 302 (1996); see also
    M.I.C. Ltd. v. Commissioner, 
    T.C. Memo. 1997-96
    ; Proios v.
    Commissioner, 
    T.C. Memo. 1994-442
    .      Other times, he or she will
    not.    See, e.g., Estate of Scanlan v. Commissioner, 
    T.C. Memo. 1996-331
    , affd. without published opinion 
    116 F.3d 1476
     (5th Cir.
    1997); Mandelbaum v. Commissioner, 
    T.C. Memo. 1995-255
    , affd.
    without published opinion 
    91 F.3d 124
     (3d Cir. 1996).     We weigh
    an expert’s testimony in light of his or her qualifications and
    with due regard to all other credible evidence in the record.
    See Estate of Kaufman v. Commissioner, 
    T.C. Memo. 1999-119
    .      We
    may embrace or reject an expert’s opinion in toto, or we may pick
    and choose the portions of the opinion we choose to adopt.      See
    Helvering v. National Grocery Co., 
    304 U.S. 282
    , 294-295 (1938);
    Silverman v. Commissioner, 
    538 F.2d 927
    , 933 (2d Cir. 1976),
    - 69 -
    affg. 
    T.C. Memo. 1974-285
    ; IT&S of Iowa, Inc. v. Commissioner, 
    97 T.C. 496
    , 508 (1991); Parker v. Commissioner, 
    86 T.C. 547
    , 562
    (1986); see also Pabst Brewing Co. v. Commissioner, 
    T.C. Memo. 1996-506
    .   We are not bound by an expert’s opinion and will
    reject an expert’s opinion to the extent that it is contrary to
    the judgment we form on the basis of our understanding of the
    record as a whole.   See Orth v. Commissioner, 
    813 F.2d 837
    , 842
    (7th Cir. 1987), affg. Lio v. Commissioner, 
    85 T.C. 56
     (1985);
    Silverman v. Commissioner, supra at 933; Estate of Kreis v.
    Commissioner, 
    227 F.2d 753
    , 755 (6th Cir. 1955), affg. 
    T.C. Memo. 1954-139
    ; IT&S of Iowa, Inc. v. Commissioner, supra at 508; Chiu
    v. Commissioner, 
    84 T.C. 722
    , 734 (1985); see also Gallick v.
    Baltimore & O. R. Co., supra at 115; In re TMI Litig., 
    193 F.3d 613
    , 665-666 (3d Cir. 1999).
    Mr. DeWeese is no stranger to this Court.   He testified in
    Booth v. Commissioner, 
    108 T.C. 524
     (1997), as an expert on
    multiple employer plans.   We find him to be reliable, relevant,
    and helpful.   We credit his opinion as set forth in his report
    and as clarified at trial.   We rely on his opinion in making our
    findings of fact and reaching the conclusions we draw therefrom.
    - 70 -
    Mr. Jaffe helped us minimally.25    He admitted at trial that
    he works with Commonwealth in its everyday business operation,
    including helping it develop an innovative term life insurance
    product and rendering critical advice to it on an unrelated
    litigation matter.   An expert witness loses his or her
    impartiality when he or she is too closely connected with one of
    the parties.   See, e.g., Estate of Kaufman v. Commissioner, supra
    (the Commissioner’s expert was inherently biased because he was
    the Commissioner’s employee).    An expert witness also is
    unhelpful when he or she is merely a biased spokesman for the
    advancement of his or her client’s litigating position.      When we
    see and hear an expert who displays an unyielding allegiance to
    the party who is paying his or her bill, we need not and
    generally will not hesitate to disregard that testimony as
    untrustworthy.   See Estate of Halas v. Commissioner, 
    94 T.C. 570
    ,
    577 (1990); Laureys v. Commissioner, 
    92 T.C. 101
    , 129 (1989); see
    also Jacobson v. Commissioner, 
    T.C. Memo. 1989-606
     (when experts
    act as advocates, “the experts can be viewed only as hired guns
    of the side that retained them, and this not only disparages
    their professional status but precludes their assistance to the
    Court in reaching a proper and reasonably accurate conclusion”).
    25
    In addition to the reasons stated infra, Mr. Jaffe’s
    knowledge of critical facts was generally influenced by his
    relationship with Commonwealth, he relied incorrectly on
    erroneous data to reach otherwise unsupported conclusions, and he
    concededly did not review all pertinent facts.
    - 71 -
    We also do not find the testimony of most of the fact
    witnesses to be helpful as to the critical facts underlying the
    issues at hand.   Drs. Desai, Hirshkowitz, and Mall and Messrs.
    Ankner, Mall, and Ross testified incredibly with regard to
    material aspects of this case.    They all seemed coached and
    frequently displayed during cross-examination (or in response to
    questions asked by the Court) a loss of memory or hesitation with
    respect to their testimony.26    Each of them (with the exception
    of Dr. Desai and Mr. Mall) also acknowledged that he or she had
    on prior occasions consciously misrepresented material facts in
    order to achieve a personal goal.    Their testimony, as well as
    the testimony of Mr. Cohen, was for the most part self-serving,
    vague, elusive, uncorroborated, and/or inconsistent with
    documentary or other reliable evidence.    Under circumstances such
    as these, we are not required to, and we do not, rely on the bald
    or otherwise unreliable testimony of these named fact witnesses
    to support our decision herein.    See Diamond Bros. Co. v.
    Commissioner, 
    322 F.2d 725
     at 730-731; see also Tokarski v.
    Commissioner, 
    87 T.C. 74
    , 77 (1986).     We rely mainly on the
    testimony of Mr. DeWeese and the voluminous record built by the
    parties through their stipulation of approximately 2,167 facts
    and approximately 1,691 exhibits.
    26
    In fact, petitioners’ counsel Neil L. Prupis (Mr. Prupis)
    even acknowledged to the Court that the testifying physicians had
    selective memories.
    - 72 -
    We turn to the nine issues for decision and address each of
    these issues seriatim.
    1.   Contributions to the Neonatology and Lakewood Plans
    We decide first the question of whether section 162(a)
    allows Neonatology and Lakewood to deduct their contributions to
    their plans.   Section 162(a) generally provides a deduction for
    all ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the
    taxable year in carrying on a trade or business.   A taxpayer must
    meet five requirements in order to deduct an item under this
    section.   The taxpayer must prove that the item claimed as a
    deductible business expense:   (1) Was paid or incurred during the
    taxable year; (2) was for carrying on his, her, or its trade or
    business; (3) was an expense; (4) was a necessary expense; and
    (5) was an ordinary expense.   See Commissioner v. Lincoln Savs. &
    Loan Association, 
    403 U.S. 345
    , 352 (1971); Welch v. Helvering,
    
    290 U.S. 111
    , 115 (1933).   A determination of whether an
    expenditure satisfies each of these requirements is a question of
    fact.   See Commissioner v. Heininger, 
    320 U.S. 467
    , 475 (1943).
    Petitioners argue that Neonatology and Lakewood meet all
    five requirements with respect to their contributions to their
    plans, and, hence, petitioners assert, those contributions are
    fully deductible under section 162(a).   Petitioners contend that
    the contributions were paid as compensation because, they assert,
    the contributions funded a fringe benefit in the form of term
    - 73 -
    life insurance.   Petitioners assert that the contributions all
    were made to the plans to pay premiums on term life insurance and
    that the premiums entitled the insureds to nothing more.
    Respondent argues that section 162(a) does not allow
    Neonatology and Lakewood to deduct their contributions in full.
    Respondent concedes that Neonatology and Lakewood may deduct
    their contributions to their plans to the extent that the
    contributions funded term life insurance.   See sec. 1.162-10(a),
    Income Tax Regs.; see also Joel A. Schneider, M.D., S.C. v.
    Commissioner, 
    T.C. Memo. 1992-24
    ; Moser v. Commissioner, 
    T.C. Memo. 1989-142
    , affd. on other grounds 
    914 F.2d 1040
     (8th Cir.
    1990).    As to the excess contributions, respondent asserts, those
    amounts are not deductible under section 162(a).   Respondent
    argues primarily that the excess contributions are distributions
    of surplus cash and not ordinary and necessary business expenses.
    Respondent points to the fact that the only benefit provided
    explicitly under the plans was term life insurance and asserts
    that the excess contributions did not fund this benefit.
    We agree with respondent that the excess contributions which
    Neonatology and Lakewood made to their plans are nondeductible
    distributions of cash for the benefit of their employee/owners
    and do not constitute ordinary or necessary business expenses.27
    27
    We need not and do not decide the correctness of
    respondent’s alternative determinations disallowing deductions of
    (continued...)
    - 74 -
    The Neonatology Plan and the Lakewood Plan are primarily vehicles
    which were designed and serve in operation to distribute surplus
    cash surreptitiously (in the form of excess contributions) from
    the corporations for the employee/owners’ ultimate use and
    benefit.   Although the plans did provide term life insurance to
    the employee/owners, the excess contributions simply were not
    attributable to that current-year protection.   The excess
    contributions, which represent the lion’s share of the
    contributions, were paid to Inter-American, Commonwealth, or
    Peoples Security, as the case may be, to be set aside in an
    interest-bearing account for credit to the C-group conversion UL
    policy, upon conversion thereto, and it was the holders of these
    policies (namely, the employee/owners) who benefited from those
    excess contributions by way of their ability to participate in
    the C-group products.28   We find incredible petitioners’
    assertion that the employee/owners of Neonatology and Lakewood,
    each of whom is an educated physician, would have caused their
    respective corporations to overpay substantially for term life
    insurance with no promise or expectation of receiving the excess
    27
    (...continued)
    these excess contributions.
    28
    The distributing corporations (Neonatology and Lakewood),
    on the other hand, received little if any benefit from the excess
    contributions to the plans.
    - 75 -
    contributions back.   The premiums paid for the C-group term
    policy exceeded by a wide margin the cost of term life insurance.
    We recognize that the conversion credit balance in a C-group
    term policy would be forfeited completely were the policy to
    lapse and not be converted.   Such was the case, for example, when
    Neonatology let Dr. Mall’s Inter-American C-group term policy
    lapse on March 15, 1992;29 in that case, Dr. Mall forfeited the
    conversion credit balance of $8,585.88.     Petitioners focus on the
    possibility and actual occurrence of such a forfeiture and
    conclude therefrom that the premiums are all attributable to
    current life insurance protection.     We disagree with this
    conclusion.   The mere fact that a C-group term policyholder may
    forfeit the conversion credit balance does not mean, as
    petitioners would have it, that the balance was charged or paid
    as the cost of term life insurance.     The current-year insurance
    purchased from Inter-American on the life of Dr. Mall cost only
    $1,689.85 for the certificate year then ended, and the fact that
    Neonatology choose to deposit with Inter-American an additional
    $8,216.05 ($9,906 premium less $1,689.85 cost of insurance)
    expecting that Dr. Mall would eventually receive that deposit
    29
    Other C-group term policies which lapsed during the
    Neonatology and Lakewood subject years without conversion were
    the other two Inter-American C-group term policies; i.e., the
    ones owned by Drs. Hirshkowitz and Desai. Although petitioners
    do not explain why these policies were allowed to lapse without
    conversion, we note that the lapse of these policies occurred
    right after Inter-American’s forced liquidation.
    - 76 -
    with commercial interest does not recharacterize the deposited
    funds as the cost of term insurance simply because Neonatology
    ultimately decided to abandon the funds.   Although it is true
    that Neonatology and the insurancemen represented in form that
    Neonatology paid the entire $9,906 to Inter-American as a premium
    on term life insurance, the fact of the matter is that neither
    Neonatology nor Inter-American actually considered the excess
    premium to fund the cost of term life insurance.   The substance
    of the purported premium payment outweighs its form, and, after
    closely scrutinizing the facts and circumstances of this case,
    including especially the interrelationship between the two
    policies underlying the C-group product and the expectations and
    understandings of the parties to the contracts underlying that
    product, we are left without any doubt that the amount credited
    to the conversion account balance was neither charged nor paid as
    the cost of current life insurance protection.   The parties to
    those contracts have always expected and understood that the
    conversion credit balance would be returned to the insured in the
    future by way of no-cost policy loans.
    We also recognize that the conversion credit balance would
    not be paid in addition to the underlying policy’s face value
    when the insured died, and, if the insured had borrowed from the
    balance, that the death benefit would be reduced by the amount of
    any outstanding loan.   In the case of Dr. Sobo, for example, his
    - 77 -
    beneficiary, Ms. Sobo, received upon his death only the face
    value of the two C-group term policies which were then
    outstanding on his life.   Neither she nor anyone else was
    entitled to, or actually received, the conversion credit balance
    on either policy.   For the reasons stated immediately above, we
    do not believe that this “forfeiture” provision changes the fact
    that the amount credited to the conversion credit balance was
    simply a deposit that could either grow with interest, or, in the
    case of Dr. Sobo, dissipate, and that this deposit was
    insufficiently related to the current life insurance protection
    to label it as such.30
    We conclude that the excess contributions are disguised
    (constructive) distributions to the petitioning employee/owners
    of Neonatology and Lakewood, see Mazzocchi Bus Co., Inc. v.
    Commissioner, 
    14 F.3d 923
    , 927-928 (3d Cir. 1994), affg. 
    T.C. Memo. 1993-43
    ; Commissioner v. Makransky, 
    321 F.2d 598
    , 601-603
    (3d Cir. 1963), affg. 
    36 T.C. 446
     (1961); Truesdell v.
    Commissioner, 
    89 T.C. 1280
     (1989); see also Old Colony Trust Co.
    v. Commissioner, 
    279 U.S. 716
     (1929) (individual taxpayer
    constructively received income to the extent corporate employer
    agreed to pay his tax bill), which means, in turn, that the
    30
    Neither party has suggested that Dr. Sobo, upon death, is
    entitled to deduct a loss equal to the conversion credit balance,
    and we do not decide that issue.
    - 78 -
    distributing corporations cannot deduct those payments.31     The
    fact that neither Lakewood nor Neonatology formally declared
    these excess contributions as cash distributions does not
    foreclose our finding that the excess contributions were
    distributions-in-fact.   See Commissioner v. Makransky, 
    supra at 601
    ; Truesdell v. Commissioner, supra at 1295; see also Loftin &
    Woodard, Inc. v. United States, 
    577 F.2d 1206
    , 1214 (5th Cir.
    1978); Crosby v. United States, 
    496 F.2d 1384
    , 1388 (5th Cir.
    1974); Noble v. Commissioner, 
    368 F.2d 439
    , 442 (9th Cir. 1966),
    affg. 
    T.C. Memo. 1965-84
    .   What is critical to our conclusion is
    that the excess contributions made by Neonatology and Lakewood
    conferred an economic benefit on their employee/owners for the
    primary (if not sole) benefit of those employee/owners, that the
    excess contributions constituted a distribution of cash rather
    than a payment of an ordinary and necessary business expense, and
    that neither Neonatology nor Lakewood expected any repayment of
    the cash underlying the conferred benefit.32   See Noble v.
    31
    In addition to the deeply ingrained principle that a
    corporation may not deduct a distribution made to its
    shareholder, the subject distributions neither funded a plan
    benefit nor are viewed as passing directly from the corporation
    to the plan. See Enoch v. Commissioner, 
    57 T.C. 781
    , 793 (1972)
    (distributions deemed to have passed from the distributing
    corporation to the recipient shareholder and then to the third-
    party actual recipient).
    32
    That the distributing corporations and/or the
    employee/owners may not have intended that the excess
    contributions constitute a taxable distribution does not preclude
    (continued...)
    - 79 -
    Commissioner, supra at 443; see also Loftin & Woodard, Inc. v.
    United States, supra at 1214-1215; Crosby v. United States, supra
    at 1388; Magnon v. Commissioner, 
    73 T.C. 980
    , 993-994 (1980).
    Petitioners argue that the excess contributions were paid to
    the employee/owners as compensation for their services.    We
    disagree.    Whether amounts are paid as compensation turns on the
    factual determination of whether the payor intends at the time
    that the payment is made to compensate the recipient for services
    performed.   See Whitcomb v. Commissioner, 
    733 F.2d 191
    , 194 (1st
    Cir. 1984), affg. 
    81 T.C. 505
     (1983); King’s Ct. Mobile Home
    Park, Inc. v. Commissioner, 
    98 T.C. 511
    , 514-515 (1992); Paula
    Constr. Co. v. Commissioner, 
    58 T.C. 1055
    , 1058-1059 (1972),
    affd. without published opinion 
    474 F.2d 1345
     (5th Cir. 1973).
    The intent is not found, as petitioners would have it, at or
    after the time that respondent challenges the payment’s
    characterization as something other than compensation.    See
    King’s Ct. Mobile Home Park, Inc. v. Commissioner, supra at 514;
    Paula Constr. Co. v. Commissioner, supra at 1059-1060; Joyce v.
    Commissioner, 
    42 T.C. 628
    , 636 (1964); Drager v. Commissioner,
    
    T.C. Memo. 1987-483
    .   The mere fact that petitioners now choose
    32
    (...continued)
    dividend treatment. Nor is it precluded because the corporations
    did not formally distribute the cash directly to the
    owner/employees. See Loftin & Woodard, Inc. v. United States,
    
    577 F.2d 1206
    , 1214 (5th Cir. 1978); Crosby v. United States, 
    496 F.2d 1384
    , 1388 (5th Cir. 1974).
    - 80 -
    to characterize the excess contributions as compensation does not
    necessarily mean that the payments were compensation in fact.
    The facts of this case do not support petitioners’ assertion
    that Neonatology and Lakewood had the requisite compensatory
    intent when they made the contributions to their plans.   We find
    nothing in the record, except for petitioners’ assertions on
    brief, that would support such a finding.   See Rule 143(b)
    (statements on brief are not evidence).   Indeed, all reliable
    evidence points to the contrary conclusion that we reach as to
    this issue.   On the basis of our review of the record, we are
    convinced that the purpose and operation of the Neonatology Plan
    and the Lakewood Plan was to serve as a tax-free savings device
    for the owner/employees and not, as asserted by petitioners, to
    provide solely term life insurance to the covered employees.     To
    be sure, some of the plans even went so far as to purchase
    annuities for designated employee/owners.
    2.   Lakewood’s Payments Made Outside of Its Plan
    Lakewood made payments outside of the Lakewood Plan for
    additional life insurance for two of its employees.   Lakewood
    argues that these payments are deductible in full under section
    162(a) as ordinary and necessary business expenses.   We disagree.
    For the reasons stated above, we hold that these payments are
    nondeductible constructive distributions to the extent they did
    not fund term life insurance.    The payments are deductible to the
    - 81 -
    extent they did fund term life insurance for the relevant
    employees.
    3.   Neonatology Contributions as to Mr. Mall
    Neonatology contributed money to the Neonatology Plan for
    the benefit of Mr. Mall.    Mr. Mall was neither an employee of
    Neonatology nor an individual who was eligible to participate in
    Neonatology’s Plan.   We conclude that these contributions served
    no business purpose of Neonatology, and, hence, that they were
    not ordinary and necessary expenses paid to carry on
    Neonatology’s business.    See sec. 1.162-10(a), Income Tax Regs.;
    see also Joel A. Schneider, M.D., S.C. v. Commissioner, 
    T.C. Memo. 1992-24
    ; Moser v. Commissioner, 
    T.C. Memo. 1989-142
    .    The
    contributions are nondeductible constructive distributions to Dr.
    Mall.33
    4. & 5.   Marlton Contributions as to Dr. Lo and Its Two Employees
    Marlton contributed money to the Marlton Plan to purchase
    life insurance on the lives of three individuals; namely, Dr. Lo,
    Ms. Lo, and Edward Lo.    As to Dr. Lo, he was neither a Marlton
    employee nor an individual who was eligible to participate in
    Marlton’s plan.   We conclude that the contributions made on his
    behalf served no legitimate business purpose of Marlton, and,
    33
    We view Dr. Mall, Neonatology’s sole shareholder, as
    having directed her corporation to make these contributions on
    behalf of her husband. Accordingly, we view these contributions
    as passing first through Dr. Mall on the way to the Neonatology
    Plan.
    - 82 -
    hence, that they were not ordinary and necessary expenses paid to
    carry on Marlton’s business.     See sec. 1.162-10(a), Income Tax
    Regs.; see also Joel A. Schneider, M.D., S.C. v. Commissioner,
    supra; Moser v. Commissioner, supra.     In contrast with
    Neonatology’s contributions to purchase insurance on the life of
    Mr. Mall, which we have just held were a constructive
    distribution to Dr. Mall, the contributions which Marlton made on
    behalf of Dr. Lo are not a constructive distribution to him
    because Marlton is not a corporation.
    As to Ms. Lo, she was a Marlton employee.     Under section
    264(a)(1), however, a taxpayer may not deduct life insurance
    premiums to the extent that the taxpayer is “directly or
    indirectly a beneficiary” of the underlying policy.34       Sec.
    264(a)(1).    Respondent argues that section 264(a)(1) applies to
    disallow Marlton’s deduction of the contributions that it made to
    pay the premiums on Ms. Lo’s term life insurance policy because,
    34
    Sec. 264(a)(1) provides:
    SEC. 264. CERTAIN AMOUNTS PAID IN CONNECTION WITH
    INSURANCE CONTRACTS.
    (a) General Rule.--No deduction shall be allowed
    for–-
    (1) Premiums paid on any life insurance
    policy covering the life of any officer or
    employee, or of any person financially
    interested in any trade or business carried
    on by the taxpayer, when the taxpayer is
    directly or indirectly a beneficiary under
    such policy.
    - 83 -
    respondent asserts, the policy’s beneficiary was a grantor trust
    formed by the Los.
    We agree with respondent’s conclusion that section 264(a)(1)
    prevents Marlton from deducting the contributions which it made
    to its plan to pay the premiums on Ms. Lo’s term life insurance
    policy.    We do so, however, for reasons different from the reason
    espoused by respondent.    As we see it, Marlton’s deduction of its
    contributions for Ms. Lo’s life insurance policy turns on whether
    Marlton35 was “directly or indirectly a beneficiary” of that
    policy within the meaning of section 264(a)(1).    If it was, the
    premiums are not deductible, regardless of whether they would
    otherwise be deductible as a business expense.    See Carbine v.
    Commissioner, 
    83 T.C. 356
    , 367-368 (1984) (and cases cited
    thereat), affd. 
    777 F.2d 662
     (11th Cir. 1985); Glassner v.
    Commissioner, 
    43 T.C. 713
    , 715 (1965), affd. per curiam 
    360 F.2d 33
     (3d Cir. 1966); sec. 1.264-1(a), Income Tax Regs.
    Respondent asserts that the policy’s beneficiary was the
    Los’ grantor trust.    We are unable to find that such was the
    case.     As we view the record, and as we found supra, the
    beneficiary of Ms. Lo’s term life insurance policy was the
    Marlton Plan.    Although the trust to which respondent refers was
    indeed the beneficiary of Dr. Lo’s policy, we find nothing in the
    35
    For the purpose of our inquiry, we view Marlton, a sole
    proprietorship, as an alter ego of Dr. Lo, the sole proprietor.
    - 84 -
    record to suggest that the same trust also was the beneficiary of
    Ms. Lo’s policy.   Nor has respondent pointed us to any part of
    the record that would support such a finding.
    We ask whether Dr. Lo is a direct or indirect beneficiary of
    Ms. Lo’s term life insurance policy given the fact that the
    Marlton Plan is the named beneficiary.     We conclude that he is.36
    In the event of Ms. Lo’s death, the face value of her life
    insurance policy would be paid to the Marlton Plan, for which Dr.
    Lo and Edward Lo would be the remaining beneficiaries.     Although
    Dr. Lo would not be the sole beneficiary of those death benefits,
    section 264(a)(1) requires only that he be a beneficiary in order
    to render the premiums nondeductible.     See Keefe v. Commissioner,
    
    15 T.C. 947
    , 952-953 (1950).   Nor does it matter for purposes of
    section 264(a)(1) that he was not expressly listed on Ms. Lo’s
    policy as the beneficiary thereof.      See Rieck v. Heiner, 
    25 F.2d 453
     (3d Cir. 1928).
    Dr. Lo, as opposed to Edward Lo, also stood to gain the most
    from the plan assets, were Ms. Lo to have died.     Whereas Edward
    Lo had a fairly inexpensive term life insurance policy, Dr. Lo
    had a fairly expensive universal life policy.     Ms. Lo’s life
    insurance proceeds also could be used to pay the premiums on the
    36
    For the same reasons as stated infra, we also conclude
    that Dr. Lo is a direct or indirect beneficiary of Edward Lo’s
    term life insurance policy, and, hence, that Marlton may not
    deduct the contributions that it made to its plan to pay his
    premiums.
    - 85 -
    policies, thus satisfying the obligation of Marlton to do so.
    See Rodney v. Commissioner, 
    53 T.C. 287
    , 318-319 (1969) (benefit
    requirement of section 264(a)(1) is satisfied where the insurance
    would ultimately satisfy an obligation of the taxpayer); Glassner
    v. Commissioner, supra (same).
    6.   Disallowed Payments
    A corporate distribution is taxed as a dividend to the
    recipient shareholder to the extent of the corporation’s earnings
    and profits.   The portion of the distribution that is not a
    dividend is a nontaxable return of capital to the extent of the
    shareholder’s stock basis.   The remainder of the distribution is
    taxed to the shareholder as gain from the sale or exchange of
    property.   See sec. 301(c); Enoch v. Commissioner, 
    57 T.C. 781
    ,
    793 (1972); see also Commissioner v. Makransky, 
    321 F.2d at 601
    .
    Petitioners do not challenge respondent’s determination that
    Lakewood and Neonatology had sufficient earnings and profits to
    characterize the subject distributions as dividends.   We sustain
    respondent’s determination that all the distributions are taxable
    dividends to the recipient employee/owners.   See Rule 142(a);
    Welch v. Helvering, 
    290 U.S. at 115
    .
    Petitioners challenge the timing of that income, however,
    arguing that it is not taxable to the employee/owners in the year
    determined by respondent; i.e., the year in which Neonatology and
    Lakewood contributed the excess amounts to their plans or, in the
    - 86 -
    three instances where the insurance was purchased directly from
    Peoples Security, in the year that Lakewood paid Peoples Security
    for that insurance.   Petitioners assert that the income is not
    taxable to the employee/owners until after the subject years
    because the conversion credit balance would be forfeited if the
    underlying policy lapsed or if the insured died.   Petitioners
    observe that the employee/owners’ ability to withdraw the
    conversion credit balance was limited to the percentage of that
    balance that was transferred to the C-group conversion UL policy.
    Petitioners observe that the transferred credits could be reached
    by an insured only if a C-group term policy was converted to a C-
    group conversion UL policy, and then only in equal increments
    over 120 months.   Petitioners observe that an insured would
    forfeit the transferred credits in the event of his or her death.
    Petitioners rely primarily on section 83(a).
    Respondent argues that the income is taxable currently.
    Respondent asserts that the excess contributions purchased
    insurance contracts and annuities for the benefit of the
    employee/owners.   Respondent asserts that the employee/owners had
    the unfettered ability to withdraw the conversion credit balances
    at their whim.
    We agree with respondent that the dividends are taxable in
    the years that he determined.    As mentioned supra, we view
    Neonatology and Lakewood’s excess contributions to their plans as
    - 87 -
    passing first through the employee/owners.     We view likewise the
    excess payments which Lakewood made directly to Peoples Security.
    Accordingly, in both cases, the employee/owners are considered
    for purposes of the Federal tax law to have received the excess
    contributions (or payments) when the contributions (or payments)
    were first made.
    Petitioners rely mistakenly on section 83 to argue that the
    individual petitioners may not be taxed currently on the excess
    contributions.37    Section 83 has no application to a case such as
    37
    Sec. 83 provides in relevant part:
    SEC. 83.    PROPERTY TRANSFERRED IN CONNECTION WITH
    PERFORMANCE OF SERVICES.
    (a) General Rule.--If, in connection with the
    performance of services, property is transferred to any
    person other than the person for whom such services are
    performed, the excess of--
    (1) the fair market value of such
    property (determined without regard to any
    restriction other than a restriction which by
    its terms will never lapse) at the first time
    the rights of the person having the
    beneficial interest in such property are
    transferable or are not subject to a
    substantial risk of forfeiture, whichever
    occurs earlier, over
    (2) the amount (if any) paid for such
    property,
    shall be included in the gross income of the person who
    performed such services in the first taxable year in
    which the rights of the person having the beneficial
    interest in such property are transferable or are not
    subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture, whichever
    (continued...)
    - 88 -
    this where a corporation makes a cash distribution for the
    benefit of a shareholder, even when, as is the case here, that
    shareholder is also an employee of the distributing corporation.
    Section 83 requires a transfer of property in connection with the
    performance of services, see sec. 83(a), and, as explained supra,
    such a requirement is not met in the case of a distribution.
    7.   Accuracy-Related Penalties
    Respondent determined that each petitioner was liable for an
    accuracy-related penalty under section 6662(a) and (b)(1) for
    negligence or intentional disregard of rules and regulations.
    Petitioners argue that none of them are so liable.   Petitioners
    assert that they were “approached by various professionals” who
    introduced petitioners to the VEBA’s and that they invested in
    the VEBA’s relying on “tax opinion letters written by tax
    attorneys and accountants and discussions with insurance
    brokers”.   Petitioners assert that the accountants who prepared
    their returns agreed with the reporting position taken as to the
    contributions, as evidenced by the fact that the accountants
    prepared the returns in the manner they did.   Petitioners assert
    that many of the issues at bar are matters of first impression,
    which, petitioners conclude, means they cannot be liable for an
    accuracy-related penalty for negligence.
    37
    (...continued)
    is applicable. * * *
    - 89 -
    We disagree with all of petitioners’ assertions as to the
    accuracy-related penalties determined by respondent under section
    6662(a) and (b)(1).    Section 6662(a) and (b)(1) imposes a 20-
    percent accuracy-related penalty on the portion of an
    underpayment that is due to negligence or intentional disregard
    of rules or regulations.    Negligence includes a failure to
    attempt reasonably to comply with the Code.    See sec. 6662(c).
    Disregard includes a careless, reckless, or intentional
    disregard.   See id.   An underpayment is not attributable to
    negligence or disregard to the extent that the taxpayer shows
    that the underpayment is due to the taxpayer’s reasonable cause
    and good faith.   See secs. 1.6662-3(a), 1.6664-4(a), Income Tax
    Regs.
    Reasonable cause requires that the taxpayer have exercised
    ordinary business care and prudence as to the disputed item.      See
    United States v. Boyle, 
    469 U.S. 241
     (1985); see also Hatfried,
    Inc. v. Commissioner, 
    162 F.2d 628
    , 635 (3d Cir. 1947); Girard
    Inv. Co. v. Commissioner, 
    122 F.2d 843
    , 848 (3d Cir. 1941);
    Estate of Young v. Commissioner, 
    110 T.C. 297
    , 317 (1998).      The
    good faith reliance on the advice of an independent, competent
    professional as to the tax treatment of an item may meet this
    requirement.   See United States v. Boyle, 
    supra;
     sec. 1.6664-
    4(b), Income Tax Regs.; see also Hatfried, Inc. v. Commissioner,
    supra at 635; Girard Inv. Co. v. Commissioner, supra at 848;
    - 90 -
    Ewing v. Commissioner, 
    91 T.C. 396
    , 423 (1988), affd. without
    published opinion 
    940 F.2d 1534
     (9th Cir. 1991).   Whether a
    taxpayer relies on advice and whether such reliance is reasonable
    hinge on the facts and circumstances of the case and the law that
    applies to those facts and circumstances.   See sec. 1.6664-
    4(c)(i), Income Tax Regs.   A professional may render advice that
    may be relied upon reasonably when he or she arrives at that
    advice independently, taking into account, among other things,
    the taxpayer’s purposes for entering into the underlying
    transaction.   See sec. 1.6664-4(c)(i), Income Tax Regs.; see also
    Leonhart v. Commissioner, 
    414 F.2d 749
     (4th Cir. 1969), affg.
    
    T.C. Memo. 1968-98
    .   Reliance may be unreasonable when it is
    placed upon insiders, promoters, or their offering materials, or
    when the person relied upon has an inherent conflict of interest
    that the taxpayer knew or should have known about.   See Goldman
    v. Commissioner, 
    39 F.3d 402
     (2d Cir. 1994), affg. 
    T.C. Memo. 1993-480
    ; LaVerne v. Commissioner, 
    94 T.C. 637
    , 652-653 (1990),
    affd. without published opinion 
    956 F.2d 274
     (9th Cir. 1992),
    affd. in part without published opinion sub nom. Cowles v.
    Commissioner, 
    949 F.2d 401
     (10th Cir. 1991); Marine v.
    Commissioner, 
    92 T.C. 958
    , 992-93 (1989), affd. without published
    opinion 
    921 F.2d 280
     (9th Cir. 1991).   Reliance also is
    unreasonable when the taxpayer knew, or should have known, that
    the adviser lacked the requisite expertise to opine on the tax
    - 91 -
    treatment of the disputed item.    See sec. 1.6664-4(c), Income Tax
    Regs.
    In sum, for a taxpayer to rely reasonably upon advice so as
    possibly to negate a section 6662(a) accuracy-related penalty
    determined by the Commissioner, the taxpayer must prove by a
    preponderance of the evidence that the taxpayer meets each
    requirement of the following three-prong test:    (1) The adviser
    was a competent professional who had sufficient expertise to
    justify reliance, (2) the taxpayer provided necessary and
    accurate information to the adviser, and (3) the taxpayer
    actually relied in good faith on the adviser’s judgment.    See
    Ellwest Stereo Theatres, Inc. v. Commissioner, 
    T.C. Memo. 1995-610
    ; see also Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 
    290 U.S. at 115
    .    We are unable to conclude that any of petitioners has met
    any of these requirements.    First, none of petitioners has
    established that he, she, or it received advice from a competent
    professional who had sufficient expertise to justify reliance.38
    The “professional” to whom petitioners refer is their insurance
    agent, Mr. Cohen.   Mr. Cohen is not a tax professional, nor do we
    find that he ever represented himself as such.   Petitioners’ mere
    reliance on Mr. Cohen was unreasonable, given the primary fact
    that he was known by most of them to be involved intimately with
    38
    We note at the start that we heard no testimony from Dr.
    McManus or Lo, their respective wives, or Ms. Sobo.
    - 92 -
    and to stand to gain financially from the sale of both the
    subject VEBA’s and the C-group product.   Given the magnitude of
    petitioners’ dollar investment in the C-group product and the
    favorable consequences which Mr. Cohen represented flowed
    therefrom, any prudent taxpayer, especially one who is as
    educated as the physicians at bar, would have asked a tax
    professional to opine on the tax consequences of the C-group
    product.   The represented tax benefits of the C-group product
    were simply too good to be true.    Such is especially so when we
    consider the fact that the physicians who testified admitted that
    they knew that term insurance was significantly less expensive
    than the premiums purportedly paid under the C-group product
    solely for term insurance.
    Petitioners assert on brief that they also relied on tax
    opinion letters written by tax attorneys and accountants.    We do
    not find that such was the case.    The record contains neither a
    credible statement by one or more of the individual petitioners
    to the effect that he or she saw and relied on a tax opinion
    letter, nor a tax opinion letter written by a competent,
    independent tax professional.    In fact, petitioners have not even
    proposed a finding of fact that would support a finding that such
    a tax opinion letter exists, let alone that any of them ever read
    - 93 -
    or relied on one.   See Rule 143(b) (statements on brief are not
    evidence).39
    We also are unpersuaded by petitioners’ assertion that they
    relied reasonably on the correctness of the contents of their
    returns simply because their returns were prepared by certified
    public accountants.   The mere fact that a certified public
    accountant has prepared a tax return does not mean that he or she
    has opined on any or all of the items reported therein.    In this
    regard, the record contains no evidence that, possibly with the
    exception of Dr. Hirshkowitz, any of petitioners asked a
    competent accountant to opine on the legitimacy of his, her, or
    its treatment for the contributions, or that an accountant in
    fact did opine on that topic.    In the case of Dr. Hirshkowitz,
    the record does reveal that he showed his accountant something on
    the SC VEBA and that the accountant expressed some reservations
    as to the advertised tax treatment of the SC VEBA, but no
    reservations which Dr. Hirshkowitz considered “major”, as he put
    it.   The record does not reveal what exactly Dr. Hirshkowitz
    showed his accountant as to the SC VEBA or the particular
    reservations which the accountant expressed.    Nor do we know
    whether a reasonable person would consider those reservations to
    39
    Because petitioners have failed the first prong of the
    three-prong test set forth above, we do not set forth a copious
    discussion of our holdings as to the other two prongs. Suffice
    it to say that none of petitioners has met his, her, or its
    burden of proof as to those prongs.
    - 94 -
    be “major” from the point of view of accepting Mr. Cohen’s
    representations of the tax consequences which flowed from the SC
    VEBA.
    We also are not persuaded by petitioners’ assertion that the
    accuracy-related penalties are inapplicable because, they claim,
    the issues at bar are matters of first impression.     It is not new
    in the arena of tax law that individual shareholders have tried
    surreptitiously to withdraw money from their closely held
    corporations to avoid paying taxes on those withdrawals.       The
    fact that the physicians at bar have attempted to do so in the
    setting of a speciously designed life insurance product does not
    negate the fact that the underlying tax principles involved in
    this case are well settled.     Nor does the application of the
    negligence accuracy-related penalty turn on the fact that this
    case is a “test case” as to the tax consequences flowing from a
    taxpayer’s participation in the subject VEBA’s.     When the
    requirements for the negligence accuracy-related penalty are met,
    a taxpayer in a test case is just as negligent as the taxpayers
    who have agreed to be bound by the resolution of the test case.
    We conclude that each of petitioners is liable for the
    accuracy-related penalties determined by respondent.
    8.   Addition to Tax for Failure To File Timely
    Lakewood filed its 1992 tax return with the Commissioner on
    May 28, 1993.     The unextended due date of the return was March
    - 95 -
    15, 1993, and Lakewood neither requested nor received an
    extension from that date.   Respondent determined that Lakewood’s
    untimely filing made it liable for an addition to tax under
    section 6651(a) equal to 15 percent of the underpayment, and
    Lakewood has not shown reasonable cause for its untimely filing.
    We sustain respondent’s determination and hold that Lakewood is
    liable under section 6651(a) for an addition to tax of 5 percent
    for each month during which its failure continued, or, in other
    words, a 15-percent addition to tax as determined by respondent.
    See sec. 6651(a)(1); see also Rule 142(a).
    9.   Penalties Under Section 6673(a)(1)(B)
    Respondent moves the Court under section 6673(a)(1)(B) to
    impose a $25,000 penalty against each petitioner, asserting that
    petitioners’ positions in this proceeding are frivolous and
    groundless.   Respondent asserts that the C-group product is a
    “deceptive subterfuge” that was “designed to deceive on its
    face”.   Respondent asserts that petitioners have not proven the
    critical allegations set forth in their petitions as to the
    operation of the C-group product and that, at trial, petitioners,
    through their counsel, Mr. Prupis and Kevin Smith (Mr. Smith),
    contested unreasonably the admissibility of documents that
    respondent obtained from third parties as to the workings of the
    C-group product.   Respondent asserts that petitioners, through
    Messrs. Prupis and Smith, failed to comply fully with discovery
    - 96 -
    requests, “forcing respondent to attempt to obtain the vast
    majority of the documentary evidence in this case from third
    parties”.   Respondent asserts that petitioners were unreasonable
    by calling witnesses at trial to testify in support of
    petitioners’ proposed findings of fact that the C-group term
    policy’s only benefit is current life insurance protection.
    Respondent asserts that it was unreasonable for Mr. Smith to
    defend against (1) respondent’s motion to compel documents from
    AEGON USA, Mr. Smith’s client, and (2) respondent’s offer of
    evidence as to certain marketing materials and other evidence.
    Petitioners argue that their positions are meritorious.
    Petitioners assert that respondent’s motion to impose sanctions
    against each of them is frivolous and that the Court should
    sanction respondent’s counsel under section 6673(b)(2).
    We disagree with respondent’s assertion that we should order
    each petitioner to pay a penalty to the Government under section
    6673(a)(1)(B).40    Section 6673(a)(1)(B) provides this Court with
    the discretion to award to the Government a penalty of up to
    $25,000 when a taxpayer takes a frivolous or groundless position
    in this Court.     The penalty under section 6673(a)(1)(B) is
    imposed against each taxpayer, see sec. 6673(a)(1), and a
    taxpayer’s position is frivolous or groundless if it is contrary
    40
    We also decline petitioners’ invitation to sanction
    respondent’s counsel.
    - 97 -
    to established law and unsupported by a reasoned, colorable
    argument for change in the law, see Coleman v. Commissioner, 
    791 F.2d 68
    , 71 (7th Cir. 1986).    Section 6673(a)(2)(B) provides this
    Court with the discretion to sanction respondent’s counsel if he
    or she “unreasonably and vexatiously” multiples any proceedings
    before us.
    The mere fact that petitioners are defending the position
    that was advertised to them in connection with their investment
    in the subject VEBA’s is insufficient grounds to penalize each
    petitioner under the facts herein.       Petitioners are not directly
    responsible for most of the actions listed by respondent in
    support of his motion to impose penalties.      Those actions are
    best traced to petitioners’ counsel, and, given the facts of this
    case, we decline to impute the actions of petitioners’ counsel to
    petitioners themselves for the purposes of imposing a penalty
    under section 6673(a)(1)(B).    Petitioners have reasonably relied
    on the advice of their trial counsel that their litigating
    positions had merit.   See Murphy v. Commissioner, 
    T.C. Memo. 1995-76
     (section 6673 penalty against taxpayer was inappropriate
    where serious failure to present credible evidence at trial was
    attributable to her counsel).
    We conclude our report directing the parties to prepare
    computations under Rule 155 in all but one of the docketed cases,
    taking into account the cost of term life insurance for those
    - 98 -
    employees who were eligible to receive that protection.    In
    reaching our holdings we have considered all of petitioners’
    arguments for contrary holdings; those arguments not discussed
    herein are irrelevant or without merit.     We also have considered
    respondent’s arguments as to his determinations to the extent
    necessary to reject or sustain each determination.     We also have
    considered all of respondent’s arguments as to his motion to
    impose a penalty against each petitioner.
    As mentioned supra,
    Decision will be entered for
    respondent in docket No. 4572-97,
    decisions will be entered under
    Rule 155 in all other dockets, and
    an appropriate order will be issued
    denying respondent’s motion to
    impose penalties under section
    6673(a)(1)(B).