Hubert Enterprises, Inc. and Subsidiaries v. Commissioner ( 2005 )


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    125 T.C. No. 6
    UNITED STATES TAX COURT
    HUBERT ENTERPRISES, INC. AND SUBSIDIARIES, ET AL.,1 Petitioners
    v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
    Docket Nos.    4366-03, 10669-03,   Filed September 21, 2005.
    16798-03.
    A few individuals controlled a corporation (P1)
    and a limited liability company (ALSL). P1 transferred
    $2,440,684.38 to ALSL primarily to retransfer to a
    related limited partnership for use in the construction
    of a retirement community. The construction project
    was discontinued, and $2,397,266.32 of the transferred
    funds has not been repaid. P1 seeks to deduct those
    unrecovered funds as either a bad debt or a loss of
    capital/equity invested in ALSL. P2 had a subsidiary
    (S) that was a member of a limited liability company
    (L) that was involved in equipment leasing activities
    most of which arose in different years. Ps claim that
    the activities are aggregated under sec.
    465(c)(2)(B)(i), I.R.C., into a single activity for the
    1
    Cases of the following petitioners are consolidated
    herewith: Hubert Enterprises, Inc. and Subs., docket No.
    10669-03; and Hubert Holding Co., docket No. 16798-03.
    -2-
    purpose of applying the at-risk rules of sec. 465,
    I.R.C. Ps also claim that S was at risk for portions
    of L’s losses by virtue of a deficit account
    restoration provision that, Ps state, made S liable for
    portions of L’s recourse obligations.
    Held: P1 may not deduct the unrecovered funds as
    either a bad debt or a loss of equity.
    Held, further, S may not aggregate all of L’s
    equipment leasing activities in that sec.
    465(c)(2)(B)(i), I.R.C., treats as a single activity
    only those activities for which the equipment is placed
    in service in the same taxable year.
    Held, further, S may not increase its at-risk
    amounts on account of the deficit capital account
    restoration provision in that the provision was not
    operative in the relevant years.
    William F. Russo and R. Daniel Fales, for petitioners.2
    Gary R. Shuler, Jr., for respondent.
    LARO, Judge:   The Court has consolidated these cases for
    trial, briefing, and opinion.   In docket Nos. 4366-03 and
    10669-03, Hubert Enterprises, Inc. (HEI), and Subsidiaries
    petitioned the Court to redetermine respondent’s determination of
    Federal income tax deficiencies of $974,805, $734,093, and
    $1,542,820 in its taxable years ended July 27, 1997, August 3,
    1998, and July 31, 1999, respectively (HEI’s 1997, 1998, and 1999
    2
    The petitions in these cases were filed with the Court by
    James H. Stethem (Stethem), Mark A. Denney (Denney), and
    R. Daniel Fales. Stethem later died and was withdrawn from the
    cases on Dec. 1, 2003. Denney withdrew from the cases on Feb. 2,
    2005. William F. Russo entered his appearance in docket Nos.
    4366-03 and 10669-03 on Feb. 11, 2004, and in docket No. 16798-03
    on Mar. 15, 2004.
    -3-
    taxable years, respectively).     Respondent reflected these
    determinations in notices of deficiency issued on December 17,
    2002, and April 9, 2003, to HEI and its subsidiaries.     Hubert
    Holding Co. (HHC), HEI’s successor as parent of its affiliated
    group, petitioned the Court in docket No. 16798-03 to redetermine
    respondent’s determination of Federal income tax deficiencies of
    $1,437,240 and $1,093,008 in its taxable years ended July 29,
    2000, and July 28, 2001, respectively (HHC’s 2000 and 2001
    taxable years, respectively).     Respondent reflected this
    determination in a notice of deficiency issued to HHC on June 30,
    2003.
    Following concessions by petitioners, we must decide the
    following issues:
    1.   For HEI’s 1997 taxable year, whether HEI may deduct as
    either a bad debt or as a loss of capital (equity) $2,397,266.32
    of unrecovered funds that it transferred to Arbor Lake of
    Sarasota Limited Liability Co. (ALSL), a limited liability
    company of which HEI was not an owner but which was owned
    primarily and controlled by a few individuals who also controlled
    HEI.    We hold HEI may not deduct the funds as either a bad debt
    or a loss of capital; and
    2.   for HHC’s 2000 and 2001 taxable years, whether HHC may
    deduct passthrough losses from leasing activities relating to
    equipment placed in service in different taxable years.       As an
    -4-
    issue of first impression, petitioners claim that section
    465(c)(2)(B)(i) aggregates these activities into a single
    activity for purposes of applying the at-risk rules of section
    465.3       Petitioners also claim that the members of the passthrough
    entity, a limited liability company named Leasing Co., LLC (LCL),
    were at risk for LCL’s losses by virtue of a deficit account
    restoration provision that, petitioners state, made LCL’s members
    liable for portions of LCL’s recourse obligations.       We hold that
    HHC may not deduct equipment leasing activity losses greater than
    those allowed by respondent in the notice of deficiency.
    FINDINGS OF FACT
    Some facts were stipulated.    We incorporate herein by this
    reference the parties’ stipulation of facts and the exhibits
    submitted therewith.       We find the stipulated facts accordingly.
    I.   HEI
    HEI was organized by the Hubert Family Trust (HFT) on or
    about October 8, 1992.       HEI’s only shareholder has always been
    HFT.        When HEI’s petitions were filed with the Court, its mailing
    address was in Cincinnati, Ohio.
    For HEI’s 1997, 1998, and 1999 taxable years, HEI was the
    parent corporation of an affiliated group of corporations that
    filed consolidated Federal corporate income tax returns.       For
    3
    Unless otherwise noted, section references are to the
    applicable versions of the Internal Revenue Code, and Rule
    references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.
    -5-
    HEI’s 1997 and 1998 taxable years, the group’s other members,
    each of which was wholly owned by HEI, were (1) Printgraphics,
    Inc. (Printgraphics), (2) HBW, Inc. (HBW) (also known as Weber
    Co.), (3) BES Manufacturing, d.b.a. Mr. Spray, (4) Vogt
    Warehouse, Inc. (Vogt), (5) HGT, Inc. (HGT), (6) Hubert Co., and
    (7) Graphic Forms and Labels, Inc. (Graphic).   For HEI’s 1999
    taxable year, the affiliated group of corporations in addition to
    HEI consisted of the just-stated seven wholly owned subsidiaries
    and two other wholly owned subsidiaries; namely, Public Space
    Plus, Inc., and Hubert Development, Co.
    From HEI’s organization through at least 1998, Howard Thomas
    (Thomas) was HEI’s president, Edward Hubert was chairman of HEI’s
    board of directors, George Hubert, Jr., was an HEI vice president
    and secretary, Sharon Hubert was an HEI vice president, and J.
    Gregory Ollinger (Ollinger) was an HEI vice president.    From its
    organization through August 1, 1998, HEI did not declare a
    dividend or formally distribute any of its earnings and profits.
    HEI’s undistributed earnings as of July 25, 1995, July 26, 1996,
    August 2, 1997, and August 1, 1998, were $14,847,028,
    $19,878,907, $25,164,181, and $31,298,257, respectively.
    II.   HHC
    In August 1999, HEI transferred the stock of its
    subsidiaries to HHC.   For HHC’s 2000 and 2001 taxable years, HHC
    was the parent corporation of an affiliated group of corporations
    -6-
    that filed consolidated Federal corporate income tax returns.
    For HHC’s 2000 taxable year, that affiliated group in addition to
    HHC consisted of the nine subsidiaries that were members of the
    HEI affiliated group in HEI’s 1999 taxable year.    For HHC’s 2001
    taxable year, the HHC affiliated group of corporations in
    addition to HHC consisted of (1) Printgraphics, (2) HBW,
    (3) Vogt, (4) HGT, and (5) Graphic.    When HHC’s petition was
    filed with the Court, its mailing address was in Cincinnati,
    Ohio.
    III.    HFT
    Thomas and Stethem are unrelated by blood or marriage to any
    member of the Hubert family.   Thomas and Stethem (sometimes
    collectively, trustees) were HFT’s trustees.    HFT’S settlors were
    Anthony Hubert, Benjamin Hubert, Brian Hubert, Christopher
    Hubert, Cynthia Hubert, Edward Hubert, George Hubert, Jr.,
    Gregory Hubert, Joshua Hubert, Karen Hubert, Kathleen Hubert,
    Kimberly Hubert, Robert Hubert, Scott Hubert, Sharon Hubert, and
    Zachary Hubert (collectively, settlors).    Edward Hubert, George
    Hubert, Jr., and Sharon Hubert (collectively, controlling
    settlors) have always held interests in HFT of 36.339 percent,
    13.185 percent, and 16.488 percent, respectively.    Anthony
    Hubert, Benjamin Hubert, Christopher Hubert, Joshua Hubert, Karen
    Hubert, Kathleen Hubert, Kimberly Hubert, Robert Hubert, Scott
    Hubert, and Zachary Hubert have each always held interests in HFT
    -7-
    of 3.095 percent.    Brian Hubert, Cynthia Hubert, and Gregory
    Hubert have each always held interests in HFT of 1.012 percent.
    During their lives, the controlling settlors were to receive
    annually all income attributable to their respective percentage
    interests in the trust estate.    Each of the other settlors was to
    receive annually the income attributable to his or her trust
    interest commencing as follows:    (1) one-third at age 25,
    (2) two-thirds at age 30, and (3) 100 percent at age 35.
    Stethem died in 2003.    He had been legal counsel for the
    Hubert family and their companies.      He drafted the trust
    agreement (trust agreement) underlying HFT, and the settlors and
    trustees executed the trust agreement on June 6, 1988.        Under the
    trust agreement, the trustees had the absolute discretion to
    distribute HFT’s money, securities, or other property, either pro
    rata or otherwise.    The trust agreement also allowed the
    controlling settlors, generally upon majority consent, to alter,
    amend, or revoke the trust agreement.      By amendments dated
    December 30, 1988, and January 1, 1991, the settlors and the
    trustees modified the trust agreement.      Through the earlier
    amendment, the Howard Thomas Trust acquired the rights and
    privileges of a controlling settlor.      Through the later
    amendment, the Katherine Hubert Trust acquired the rights and
    privileges of a controlling settlor.
    -8-
    IV.   ALSL
    ALSL, also known as Seasons of Sarasota Limited Liability
    Co., is a Wyoming limited liability company organized on
    January 18, 1995.    ALSL was organized to provide funds to a
    limited partnership, Arbor Lake Development, Ltd. (ALD), to use
    to construct a retirement condominium community in Sarasota,
    Florida, to be known as the Seasons of Sarasota Retirement
    Community (Seasons of Sarasota).    For ALSL’s taxable years ended
    December 31, 1995, 1996, and 1997, ALSL filed Federal partnership
    returns of income.    ALSL reported and had no revenue for those
    years.
    From January 18, 1995, through December 31, 1997, ALSL’s
    units were owned as follows:
    Member                Units
    Edward Hubert                20
    George Hubert, Jr.           20
    Sharon Hubert                20
    Ollinger                      5
    Stethem                       5
    Sun Valley Investments       10
    Thomas                       20
    100
    According to the ALSL operating agreement, (1) ALSL and all of
    its affairs were controlled by its members as a group, (2) the
    members’ decisions by majority vote on the basis of membership
    interests controlled, and (3) absent approval by a majority vote,
    no single member had the power or authority to act on behalf of
    -9-
    ALSL.    During the relevant years, the owners of Sun Valley
    Investments, a partnership, were Thomas and Stethem.
    Pursuant to ALSL’s operating agreement, ALSL’s members were
    required to contribute the following capital to ALSL:
    Member               Contribution
    Edward Hubert                $200
    George Hubert, Jr.            200
    Sharon Hubert                 200
    Ollinger                       50
    Stethem                        50
    Sun Valley Investments        100
    Thomas                        200
    1000
    None of ALSL’s members, with the exception of Thomas and Stethem,
    ever contributed any capital to ALSL from his, her, or its own
    funds.    During 1996, Thomas and Stethem contributed $200,000 and
    $50,000, respectively, to ALSL’s capital.4
    As of December 31, 1995, ALSL reported for Federal income
    tax purposes that it had cash of $7,298, that it owned a
    $1,338,334 nonrecourse note receivable from ALD, and that it was
    liable on a $1,345,684 nonrecourse note payable to HEI.    ALSL
    4
    During HEI’s 1997 taxable year, Thomas was HEI’s most
    highly compensated officer, and Edward Hubert, George Hubert,
    Jr., and Sharon Hubert were its next three most highly
    compensated officers. During that year, HEI paid Thomas
    $420,922, and it paid $370,236 to each of the other three
    officers. During HEI’s 1998 taxable year, Thomas received
    significantly less compensation than these other three officers.
    During HEI’s 1998 taxable year, HEI paid Edward Hubert, George
    Hubert, Jr., Sharon Hubert, and Thomas $644,236, $894,236,
    $644,236, and $397,342, respectively.
    -10-
    reported no other asset or liability as of that date, but for a
    $52 bank charge which it elected to amortize over 60 months.
    As of December 31, 1996, ALSL reported for Federal income
    tax purposes that its sole asset was cash of $7,298 and that it
    had no liabilities.     ALSL also reported for Federal income tax
    purposes that it had realized a $250,000 loss for 1996.     ALSL
    reported that the loss was attributable to “Defeasance of Debt
    Income”, “Bad Debt Losses”, and “Miscellaneous Expenses” of
    $2,345,685, negative $2,588,376, and negative $7,309,
    respectively.
    As of December 31, 1997, ALSL reported for Federal income
    tax purposes that it had no assets, liabilities, or capital.
    V.   ALSL Note
    Pursuant to a promissory note (ALSL note) dated January 18,
    1995, ALSL (under the name Seasons of Sarasota Limited Liability
    Co.) promised to pay HEI “$2,500,000.00, or so much thereof as
    may be advanced and outstanding pursuant to any advances made by
    the Lender to the Company.”     The ALSL note was drafted as a
    demand note without a fixed maturity date, and it stated that it
    bore interest at a rate corresponding to the applicable Federal
    rate.     In connection with the ALSL note, HEI transferred a total
    of $2,440,684.38 to ALSL from January 18, 1995, through March 6,
    1997.     ALSL then transferred those funds to ALD in connection
    with a January 18, 1995, nonrecourse promissory note (ALD note)
    -11-
    between ALD and ALSL.   ALD would repay these transferred funds to
    ALSL only upon the sale of condominium units in the Seasons of
    Sarasota project, and ALSL would repay HEI only when and if it
    received repayment from ALD.   In December 1996, HEI decided not
    to devote any more funds to the Seasons of Sarasota project.
    In connection with the ALSL note, HEI transferred funds to
    ALSL and ALSL made repayments to HEI as follows:
    Date         Amount         Amount Repaid     Unpaid Balance
    1/18/95     $20,000.00            -0-            $20,000.00
    1/18/95         698.00            -0-             20,698.00
    2/24/95      15,000.00            -0-             35,698.00
    3/3/95      20,000.00            -0-             55,698.00
    3/7/95      15,000.00            -0-             70,698.00
    3/10/95      10,000.00            -0-             80,698.00
    3/15/95      84,302.00            -0-            165,000.00
    3/24/95       7,500.00            -0-            172,500.00
    3/24/95      75,000.00            -0-            247,500.00
    4/4/95      25,000.00            -0-            272,500.00
    4/11/95     220,000.00            -0-            492,500.00
    6/9/95     100,000.00            -0-            592,500.00
    6/23/95     100,000.00            -0-            692,500.00
    6/26/95      50,000.00            -0-            742,500.00
    6/30/95         368.40            -0-            742,868.40
    7/14/95      50,000.00            -0-            792,868.40
    7/31/95       1,366.58            -0-            794,234.98
    8/1/95      50,000.00            -0-            844,234.98
    8/15/95      50,000.00            -0-            894,234.98
    8/21/95      50,000.00            -0-            944,234.98
    8/31/95         356.53            -0-            944,591.51
    9/5/95      50,000.00            -0-            994,591.51
    10/31/95       1,092.87            -0-            995,684.38
    11/27/95      50,000.00            -0-          1,045,684.38
    12/7/95      50,000.00            -0-          1,095,684.38
    12/27/95      50,000.00            -0-          1,145,684.38
    1/8/96      50,000.00            -0-          1,195,684.38
    2/5/96      50,000.00            -0-          1,245,684.38
    2/12/96      50,000.00            -0-          1,295,684.38
    3/6/96      75,000.00            -0-          1,370,684.38
    3/8/96      75,000.00            -0-          1,445,684.38
    4/12/96      50,000.00            -0-          1,495,684.38
    -12-
    4/29/96      50,000.00            -0-          1,545,684.38
    5/13/96      50,000.00            -0-          1,595,684.38
    6/6/96      50,000.00            -0-          1,645,684.38
    6/10/96     100,000.00            -0-          1,745,684.38
    6/28/96      50,000.00            -0-          1,795,684.38
    7/2/96      75,000.00            -0-          1,870,684.38
    7/12/96      50,000.00            -0-          1,920,684.38
    7/31/96      50,000.00            -0-          1,970,684.38
    8/21/96      50,000.00            -0-          2,020,684.38
    9/5/96      75,000.00            -0-          2,095,684.38
    9/10/96      50,000.00            -0-          2,145,684.38
    10/8/96      50,000.00            -0-          2,195,684.38
    10/21/96      50,000.00            -0-          2,245,684.38
    11/12/96      50,000.00            -0-          2,295,684.38
    12/2/96      50,000.00            -0-          2,345,684.38
    1/9/97      26,000.00            -0-          2,371,684.38
    1/21/97      15,000.00            -0-          2,386,684.38
    1/27/97       5,000.00            -0-          2,391,684.38
    2/5/97      13,000.00            -0-          2,404,684.38
    2/12/97      11,000.00            -0-          2,415,684.38
    2/14/97       5,000.00            -0-          2,420,684.38
    2/19/97       5,000.00            -0-          2,425,684.38
    3/6/97      15,000.00            -0-          2,440,684.38
    7/14/97          -0-          $43,418.06       2,397,266.32
    HEI did not establish a written schedule for repayment of any of
    these transferred funds (or interest thereon), and HEI never
    demanded that ALSL repay any of the funds (or interest thereon).
    HEI never required that ALSL pledge any of its assets to secure
    repayment of any of the transferred funds, and ALSL never pledged
    any of its assets to secure such repayment.    HEI never required
    that ALSL’s members pledge security for repayment of any of the
    transferred funds, and ALSL’s members never pledged any such
    security.   ALSL’s members never agreed to personally guarantee
    repayment of any of the transferred funds.
    On or as of July 31, 1996, HEI recorded on the ALSL note
    that it was entitled to accrued interest of $93,200.   This
    -13-
    interest was never paid.    HEI never accrued any other interest on
    the HEI note.
    The $43,418.06 payment that ALSL made to HEI on July 14,
    1997, resulted from a reported liquidation of ALD’s assets in
    1996.
    VI.   ALD
    ALD was a Florida limited partnership formed on January 6,
    1995, to develop the Seasons of Sarasota.      ALD had one general
    partner, ALSL, and one limited partner, James Culpepper
    (Culpepper).    Thomas was an ALD officer.
    Pursuant to the ALD limited partnership agreement, ALSL was
    to acquire a 97-percent interest in ALD in exchange for a $100
    capital contribution, and Culpepper was to acquire a 3-percent
    interest in ALD in exchange for a $100,000 capital contribution.
    The limited partnership agreement stated that the percentages of
    the partners’ interests in ALD did not have any relationship to
    their respective capital contributions.      Culpepper contributed
    the referenced $100,000 in 1995.    ALSL never contributed the
    referenced $100 as such.
    For its taxable years ended December 31, 1995, 1996, and
    1997, ALD filed Federal partnership returns of income.      ALD
    reported and had no revenue for those years.
    As of December 31, 1995, ALD reported on its 1995 return
    that it had assets totaling $1,438,334 and a single liability of
    -14-
    $1,338,334.    The assets consisted of cash of $37,172, accounts
    receivable of $1,714, deposits of $411,353, prepayments of
    $11,505, work in progress of $567,705, depreciable assets of
    $7,829, and intangible assets of $401,056.    The single liability
    was the $1,338,334 nonrecourse note payable to ALSL.
    As of December 31, 1996, ALD reported on its 1996 return
    that it had no assets or liabilities.    On its 1996 return, ALD
    wrote off its intangible assets and reported a liquidation of its
    other assets.
    As of December 31, 1997, ALD reported on its 1997 return
    that it had no assets or liabilities.
    VII.    ALD Note
    The ALD note was a promissory note dated January 18, 1995,
    and payable to ALSL (under the name Seasons of Sarasota Limited
    Liability Co.) in the amount of “$2,750,000.00, or so much
    thereof as may be advanced and outstanding pursuant to any
    advances made by the Lender to the Partnership.”    The ALD note
    was drafted as a demand note without a fixed maturity date, and
    it stated that it bore interest at a rate corresponding to the
    applicable Federal rate.    In connection with the ALD note, ALSL
    transferred a total of $2,690,531.88 to ALD from January 31,
    1995, through March 31, 1997.    ALSL transferred these funds to
    ALD and ALD made a repayment to ALSL as follows:
    -15-
    Date       Amount      Amount Repaid   Unpaid Balance
    1/31/95   $20,698.00          -0-         $20,698.00
    2/28/95    19,442.85          -0-          40,140.85
    2/28/95    10,570.73          -0-          50,711.58
    3/31/95    82,500.00          -0-         133,211.58
    3/31/95     5,000.00          -0-         138,211.58
    3/31/95   101,825.86          -0-         240,037.44
    4/30/95    25,000.00          -0-         265,037.44
    4/30/95   220,000.00          -0-         485,037.44
    6/30/95   100,000.00          -0-         585,037.44
    6/30/95   100,000.00          -0-         685,037.44
    6/30/95       368.40          -0-         685,405.84
    6/30/95    50,000.00          -0-         735,405.84
    7/5/95       112.40          -0-         735,518.24
    7/28/95    50,000.00          -0-         785,518.24
    7/31/95     1,366.58          -0-         786,884.82
    8/1/95    50,000.00          -0-         836,884.82
    8/15/95    50,000.00          -0-         886,884.82
    8/21/95    50,000.00          -0-         936,884.82
    8/31/95       356.53          -0-         937,241.35
    9/5/95    50,000.00          -0-         987,241.35
    9/15/95    50,000.00          -0-       1,037,241.35
    10/3/95    50,000.00          -0-       1,087,241.35
    10/4/95       564.00          -0-       1,087,805.35
    10/9/95        58.28          -0-       1,087,863.63
    10/16/95    50,000.00          -0-       1,137,863.63
    10/24/95       470.59          -0-       1,138,334.22
    10/27/95    50,000.00          -0-       1,188,334.22
    11/30/95    50,000.00          -0-       1,238,334.22
    12/7/95    50,000.00          -0-       1,288,334.22
    12/27/95    50,000.00          -0-       1,338,334.22
    1/31/96    50,000.00          -0-       1,388,334.22
    2/29/96    50,000.00          -0-       1,438,334.22
    2/29/96    50,000.00          -0-       1,488,334.22
    3/31/96    50,000.00          -0-       1,538,334.22
    3/31/96    50,000.00          -0-       1,588,334.22
    3/31/96    75,000.00          -0-       1,663,334.22
    4/30/96    50,000.00          -0-       1,713,334.22
    4/30/96    75,000.00          -0-       1,788,334.22
    5/31/96    50,000.00          -0-       1,838,334.22
    6/30/96   200,000.00          -0-       2,038,333.22
    7/31/96   175,000.00          -0-       2,213,334.22
    8/31/96    50,000.00          -0-       2,263,334.22
    9/30/96   125,000.00          -0-       2,388,334.22
    10/31/96   100,000.00          -0-       2,488,334.22
    11/30/96    50,000.00          -0-       2,538,334.22
    12/31/96    50,000.00          -0-       2,588,334.22
    -16-
    1/31/97        7,197.66           -0-          2,595,531.88
    1/31/97       46,000.00           -0-          2,641,531.88
    2/28/97       34,000.00           -0-          2,675,531.88
    3/31/97       15,000.00           -0-          2,690,531.88
    7/10/97        5,000.00       $43,418.06       2,647,213.82
    ALD used the transferred funds received from ALSL to pay
    ALD’s operating expenses incurred in connection with the Seasons
    of Sarasota project, including professional fees for site plans,
    construction drawings, environmental assessments, surveying,
    marketing studies, and expenses of the sales staff.   ALSL did not
    establish a written schedule for repayment of any of these
    transferred funds (or interest thereon), and ALSL never demanded
    that ALD repay any of the funds (or interest thereon).   ALSL
    never required that ALD pledge any of its assets to secure
    repayment of any of the transferred funds, and ALD never pledged
    any of its assets to secure such repayment.    ALSL never required
    that ALD’s members pledge security for repayment of any of the
    transferred funds, and ALD’s members never pledged any such
    security.   ALD’s members never agreed to personally guarantee
    repayment of any of the transferred funds.
    The $43,418.06 payment that ALD made to ALSL on July 10,
    1997, resulted from the reported liquidation of ALD’s assets in
    1996.
    VIII.   Seasons of Sarasota
    On October 24, 1994, William Shaner (Shaner) delivered
    documentation to Seasons Management Co. (SMC) describing the
    -17-
    Seasons of Sarasota project.    Shaner later told HEI about the
    possibility of investing in the project.    Afterwards, in 1994,
    Thomas retained an appraisal and consulting firm to prepare a
    detailed analysis of the market for a retirement community in
    Sarasota.   The firm delivered such an analysis to Thomas on
    December 23, 1994, in the form of a 39-page report (exclusive of
    addenda) entitled “Analysis of Service Enhanced Retirement
    Facility Market in Sarasota, Florida”.    At the request of Thomas,
    the firm on June 26, 1996, updated its analysis and conclusions
    reflected in that report.
    Eugene Schwartz (Schwartz) is unrelated by blood or marriage
    to Thomas, Stethem, or any member of the Hubert family.    In
    January 1995, ALSL agreed to pay $3 million to Schwartz for 49.8
    acres in Sarasota on which the Seasons of Sarasota was proposed
    to be built.   As a condition to the agreement, ALSL had to obtain
    commitments from buyers of at least 59 condominium units which
    were to be built on the land.    Absent written notice to the
    seller, ALSL had until December 31, 1995, to purchase the land
    from Schwartz.   Also in January 1995, SMC and ALD agreed that SMC
    would direct the marketing of, manage, and operate the Seasons of
    Sarasota.   The duties and responsibilities of SMC were to begin
    on January 1, 1995, and continue until December 31, 2004, unless
    terminated earlier.
    -18-
    The plan for the Seasons of Sarasota called for 298
    individually owned condominium units with one to three bedrooms,
    a 30,000-square-foot clubhouse, and an 80-unit assisted living
    facility.    Pursuant to the plan, construction of 98 condominium
    units would start in the fall of 1996.    The construction of the
    Seasons of Sarasota was to be financed in phases with each phase
    consisting of approximately one-third of the projected 298
    condominium units.
    On June 24, 1996, Provident Bank (Provident) relayed to
    Thomas the possibility of Provident’s lending funds to ALD.
    Provident would make the loan only if certain conditions were
    met.    One condition was that HEI be a comaker of the loan and
    agree to certain financial covenants such as maintaining a stated
    debt to equity ratio and a stated minimum net worth.    A second
    condition was that ALD procure in the first phase of construction
    at least 45 firm contracts to purchase condominium units with a
    total gross sale price of at least $10.8 million and total
    initial earnest money deposits of at least $1.62 million.    A
    third condition was the monthly payment on the loan of accrued
    interest and principal.    A fourth condition was that the loan be
    secured.    A fifth condition was that the earnest money from sales
    be deposited with Provident.
    Through June 30, 1996, 34 condominium units in the Seasons
    of Sarasota were reserved with refundable deposits.    By the
    -19-
    latter part of 1996, some individuals who had reserved
    condominium units canceled their reservations, and the number of
    cancellations exceeded the number of new reservations.      By
    December 31, 1996, ALD had not sold 45 of the condominium units
    planned for the first phase.
    ALD never purchased the land from Schwartz, and the
    construction of the Seasons of Sarasota never began.     Nor did
    Provident ever lend any funds to ALD, ALSL, or HEI.    On
    December 31, 1996, the duties and responsibilities of SMC ended
    when SMC and ALD agreed to terminate their agreement because the
    land had not been purchased.
    IX.   LCL
    LCL is a Wyoming limited liability company formed on
    April 30, 1998.   LCL filed its initial Federal partnership return
    of income on the basis of a taxable year ended July 31, 1998
    (LCL’s 1998 taxable year).   LCL’s organizers were Thomas, in his
    capacity as managing member of Hubert Commerce Center, Inc.
    (HCC), and Ollinger, in his capacity as vice president of HBW.
    HCC was connected with both the HEI and HHC affiliated groups.
    LCL’s ownership consisted of 100 membership units.     During
    LCL’s 1998 taxable year, HBW received 99 of those units in
    exchange for a $9,900 capital contribution, and HCC received the
    last unit in exchange for a $100 capital contribution.      On
    April 30, 1998, HBW and LCL also executed as a contribution to
    -20-
    LCL’s capital an assignment in which HBW transferred to LCL all
    of HBW’s rights, title, and interest in its leases, subject to
    existing loans.
    Section 4.2 of LCL’s operating agreement stated that “No
    Member shall be liable as such for the liabilities of the
    Company.”   On March 28, 2001, the LCL operating agreement was
    amended and restated in its entirety (revised LCL operating
    agreement), effective retroactively to January 1, 2000.     The
    revised LCL operating agreement is construed under Wyoming law,
    and only the parties who signed the revised LCL operating
    agreement (and their successors in interest) have any rights or
    remedies under that agreement.    The revised LCL operating
    agreement stated that neither HBW nor HCC was required to make
    any additional capital contribution to LCL.    The revised LCL
    operating agreement also stated:
    7.7 Deficit Capital Account Restoration. If any
    Partner has a deficit Capital Account following the
    liquidation of his, her or its interest in the
    partnership, then he, she or it shall restore the
    amount of such deficit balance to the Partnership by
    the end of such taxable year or, if later, within 90
    days after the date of such liquidation, for payment to
    creditors or distribution to Partners with positive
    capital account balances.
    In 2000 and 2001, neither HBW nor HCC liquidated its
    interest in LCL.   Nor at those times did either member have a
    deficit in its LCL capital account.
    -21-
    X.   Equipment Leasing Activities
    A.   1991 Rapistan Conveyor System
    Starwood Corp. (Starwood), Ministers Life--A Mutual Life
    Insurance Co. (Ministers Life), Inter-Market Capital Corp.
    (Inter-Market), and General Motors Corp. (GM) are corporations
    unaffiliated with any Hubert company.     Pursuant to agreements
    dated April 30 and June 25, 1991, Starwood leased a 1991 Rapistan
    conveyor system to GM.   The term of that lease included the 180-
    month period beginning November 1, 1991.     For each of those 180
    months, GM agreed to pay $13,659.83 on the first day of the
    month, beginning November 1, 1991.
    On October 1, 1991, Starwood purchased the 1991 Rapistan
    conveyor system from Ministers Life for $1,327,237.89.     All
    payments on that purchase were to be made from proceeds from the
    lease of the 1991 Rapistan conveyor system.     The payment schedule
    for the October 1, 1991, promissory note underlying the purchase
    anticipated that the monthly payments would be $13,659.83,
    starting November 1, 1991.
    On October 31, 1991, Printgraphics purchased the 1991
    Rapistan conveyor system (subject to the lease) from Starwood for
    $1,412,468.68.   On the same day, Printgraphics paid Starwood
    $75,000 towards that purchase price and financed the rest by
    assuming liability for the October 1, 1991, promissory note
    between Starwood and Ministers Life.    For each of its taxable
    -22-
    years ended in 1992 through 1998, Printgraphics reported as to
    the 1991 Rapistan conveyor system the following amounts of lease
    income, interest expense, depreciation, and loss:
    1992        1993        1994        1995        1996        1997        1998
    Lease income        $122,938    $163,918    $163,918    $163,918    $163,918    $163,918    $122,940
    Interest expense     (80,877)   (117,907)   (113,466)   (108,596)   (103,256)    (97,401)    (68,234)
    Depreciation        (201,842)   (345,913)   (247,041)   (176,417)   (126,133)   (125,992)    (94,228)
    Loss                 159,781     299,902     196,589     121,095      65,471      59,475      39,
    522 B. 1995
     Computer Equipment
    Capital Resources Group, Inc. (CRG), is a corporation
    unaffiliated with any Hubert company.                        On April 30, 1995,
    Starwood sold computer equipment (1995 computer equipment) to CRG
    for $6,822,000, and CRG leased the 1995 computer equipment back
    to Starwood.         Pursuant to promissory notes dated April 30, 1995,
    CRG promised to pay $445,538 and $6,058,983 to Starwood as to the
    sale.
    Also on April 30, 1995, Printgraphics purchased the 1995
    computer equipment (subject to the lease) from CRG for
    $6,822,000.         Printgraphics paid CRG $360,000 and issued CRG a
    short-term promissory note for $445,538 and an installment
    promissory note for $6,016,462.                       The installment note stated it
    was recourse to the extent of $2.2 million and that payments of
    principal on the recourse portion would be reduced pro rata to
    the extent the outstanding indebtedness on the note was reduced.
    For each of its taxable years ended in 1995 through 1998,
    Printgraphics reported as to the 1995 computer equipment the
    -23-
    following amounts of lease income, interest expense,
    depreciation, and income/(loss):
    1995              1996         1997          1998
    Lease income             -0-        $1,157,816     $1,646,796    $1,341,589
    Interest expense     ($150,412)       (433,423)      (490,523)     (285,889)
    Depreciation        (1,364,400)     (2,183,040)    (1,309,824)     (589,467)
    Income/(loss)       (1,514,812)     (1,458,647)      (153,551)      466,
    233 C. 1998
     Amtel Equipment
    Amtel Corp. (Amtel) and Third Street Services, Inc. (TSS),
    are corporations that are unaffiliated with any Hubert company.
    On April 30, 1998, CRG purchased from Starwood for $8,927,204.90
    a 60.55-percent interest (60.55-percent interest) in certain
    equipment (1998 Amtel equipment) leased by TSS to Amtel.
    Pursuant to promissory notes dated April 30, 1998, CRG agreed to
    pay Starwood $8,222,860.90 and $235,000.           Also on April 30, 1998,
    CRG leased the 60.55-percent interest back to Starwood for an
    86-month term beginning August 1, 1998.
    Also on April 30, 1998, LCL purchased the 60.55-percent
    interest (subject to the lease) from CRG for $8,927,204.90.
    Pursuant to promissory notes dated April 30, 1998, LCL agreed to
    pay CRG $8,172,204.90 and $235,000.        No individual member of LCL
    signed or directly guaranteed these promissory notes, the first
    of which stated it was recourse to the extent of $4.75 million
    and that payments of principal and interest would be applied to
    the recourse portion before the nonrecourse portion.              The second
    note stated it was nonrecourse.
    -24-
    On July 31, 1998, CRG purchased from Starwood the remaining
    39.45-percent interest (39.45-percent interest) in the 1998 Amtel
    equipment for $5,814,720.10, and CRG leased the 39.45-percent
    interest back to Starwood.       Pursuant to promissory notes dated
    July 31, 1998, CRG promised to pay Starwood $5,346,686.52 and
    $53,932.54.
    Also on July 31, 1998, LCL purchased the 39.45-percent
    interest (subject to the lease) from CRG for $5,814,720.10.
    Pursuant to promissory notes dated July 31, 1998, LCL promised to
    pay CRG $5,310,887.56 and $53,832.54.          No individual member of
    LCL signed or guaranteed these notes, the first of which stated
    it was recourse to the extent of $2.75 million and that payments
    of principal and interest would be applied to the recourse
    portion before the nonrecourse portion.            The second note stated
    it was nonrecourse.
    For each of its taxable years ended in 1998 through 2001,
    LCL reported as to the 1998 Amtel equipment the following amounts
    of lease income, interest expense, depreciation, net “G&A”
    expense and interest income, and loss:
    1998              1999        2000          2001
    Lease income               -0-        $1,987,157     2,167,807    $2,167,807
    Interest expense       ($156,167)       (971,811)     (877,785)     (786,273)
    Depreciation          (2,948,385)     (4,717,416)   (2,830,450)   (1,698,270)
    Net G&A expense
    and interest income      -0-            4,047         32,922       13,815
    Loss                   3,104,552      3,698,023      1,507,506      302,921
    -25-
    The portions of these losses allocated to HBW’s 99-percent
    ownership interest were $3,073,507, $3,661,043, $1,492,431, and
    $299,892, respectively.
    D.    1999 Blisk Equipment
    Relational Funding Corp. (RFC) is a corporation that is
    unaffiliated with any Hubert company.       On April 30, 1999, RFC
    sold (subject to a lease) a Lear Precision ECM 1999 blisk machine
    (1999 blisk equipment) to LCL for $2,950,382.86.        At that time,
    the 1999 blisk equipment was leased to General Electric Aircraft
    Engines.   LCL paid $133,000 towards the purchase, issued to RFC a
    $30,742 short-term note, assumed a $403,505.60 long-term note of
    RFC, and assumed RFC*s position with respect to lender liens on
    the 1999 blisk equipment.
    For each of its taxable years ended in 1999 through 2001,
    LCL reported as to the 1999 blisk equipment the following amounts
    of lease income, interest expense, depreciation, “G&A” expense
    and interest income, and loss:
    1999          2000         2001
    Lease income             $108,296         $433,185    $433,185
    Interest expense          (35,449)        (172,353)   (154,497)
    Depreciation             (421,484)        (722,543)   (516,022)
    Net G&A expense
    and interest income             221         6,579       2,761
    Loss                         348,416       455,132     234,573
    The portions of these losses allocated to HBW’s 99-percent
    ownership interest were $344,932, $440,672, and $232,227,
    respectively.
    -26-
    E.     2000 Computer Equipment
    On April 30, 2000, CRG purchased computer equipment (2000
    computer equipment) from RFC for $765,326.        Pursuant to
    promissory notes dated April 30, 2000, CRG agreed to pay RFC
    $56,850 and $672,101.    On the same day, CRG leased the 2000
    computer equipment back to RFC.
    Also on April 30, 2000, LCL purchased the 2000 computer
    equipment (subject to the lease) from CRG for $765,326, and LCL
    executed promissory notes to CRG in the amounts of $56,850 and
    $667,766.    No individual member of LCL signed or directly
    guaranteed the notes, the latter of which stated it was recourse
    to the extent of $340,000 and that payments of principal would be
    applied first to the recourse portion.         For each of its taxable
    years ended in 2000 and 2001, LCL reported as to the 2000
    computer equipment the following amounts of lease income,
    interest expense, depreciation, “G&A” expense and interest
    income, and loss:
    2000            2001
    Lease income                      -0-         $100,341
    Interest expense               ($17,065)       (48,816)
    Depreciation                   (153,065)      (244,904)
    Net G&A expense
    and interest income              -0-              639
    Loss                            170,130        192,740
    The portions of these losses allocated to HBW’s 99-percent
    ownership interest were $168,429 and $190,813, respectively.
    -27-
    F.    2000 RFC Equipment
    On April 30, 2000, CRG purchased computer equipment (2000
    RFC equipment) from RFC for $9,181,432 and leased the 2000 RFC
    equipment back to RFC.    Pursuant to promissory notes dated
    April 30, 2000, CRG promised to pay RFC $663,400 and $8,080,320
    as to the purchase.
    Also on April 30, 2000, LCL purchased the 2000 RFC computer
    equipment (subject to the lease) from CRG for $9,181,432.
    Pursuant to promissory notes dated April 30, 2000, LCL promised
    to pay CRG $663,400 and $8,029,222.     No individual member of LCL
    signed or directly guaranteed the notes, the latter of which
    stated it was recourse to the extent of $3.225 million and that
    payments of principal and interest would be applied first to the
    recourse portion.    For each of its taxable years ended in 2000
    and 2001, LCL reported as to the 2000 RFC equipment the following
    amounts of lease income, interest expense, depreciation, “G&A”
    expense and interest income, and loss:
    2000         2001
    Lease Income                -0-      $1,545,155
    Interest expense        ($205,190)     (508,995)
    Depreciation           (1,836,287)   (2,938,058)
    Net G&A expense and
    interest income            -0-           9,848
    Loss                    2,041,477     1,892,050
    The portions of these losses allocated to HBW’s 99-percent
    ownership interest were $2,021,062 and $1,873,130 respectively.
    -28-
    OPINION
    I.   Transferred Funds
    A.   Overview
    Petitioners argue primarily that HEI’s transfers to ALSL
    created debt which became uncollectible in HEI’s 1997 taxable
    year, thus for that year entitling HEI to a bad debt deduction
    under section 166.5   Alternatively, petitioners argue, the
    transfers were HEI’s contribution to the capital of ALSL, which
    entitled HEI for its 1997 taxable year to deduct an ordinary loss
    resulting from a loss of that capital.   Respondent argues that
    the transfers were not debt.   Respondent also argues that the
    transfers were not capital contributions made by HEI, noting that
    ALSL was owned not by HEI but primarily by the individuals who
    controlled HEI.
    We agree with respondent that HEI is not entitled to either
    of its desired deductions with respect to the transfers.      We
    conclude that the transfers were not deductible for HEI’s 1997
    taxable year as debt nor as contributions made by HEI to the
    capital of ALSL.
    5
    Sec. 166(a)(1) provides that a taxpayer may deduct as an
    ordinary loss a debt which becomes worthless during the taxable
    year.
    -29-
    B.   Petitioners’ Claim to a Bad Debt Deduction
    Petitioners bear the burden of proving that the transfers
    are debt.6   See Rule 142(a)(1); Roth Steel Tube Co. v.
    Commissioner, 
    800 F.2d 625
    , 630 (6th Cir. 1986), affg. 
    T.C. Memo. 1985-58
    ; Smith v. Commissioner, 
    370 F.2d 178
    , 180 (6th Cir.
    1966), affg. 
    T.C. Memo. 1964-278
    .      Debt for Federal income tax
    purposes connotes an existing, unconditional, and legally
    enforceable obligation to repay.    See Roth Steel Tube Co. v.
    Commissioner, supra at 630; First Natl. Co. v. Commissioner,
    
    289 F.2d 861
    , 864-865 (6th Cir. 1961), revg. and remanding
    
    32 T.C. 798
     (1959); Burrill v. Commissioner, 
    93 T.C. 643
    , 666
    (1989); see also AMW Invs., Inc. v. Commissioner, 
    T.C. Memo. 1996-235
    .    Transfers between related parties are examined with
    special scrutiny.    Cf. Roth Steel Tube Co. v. Commissioner, supra
    at 630.   A transfer’s economic substance prevails over its form,
    see Smith v. Commissioner, supra at 180; Byerlite Corp. v.
    Williams, 
    286 F.2d 285
    , 291 (6th Cir. 1960), and a finding of
    economic substance turns on whether the transfer would have
    followed the same form had it been between the transferee and an
    6
    Petitioners have not raised the issue of sec. 7491(a),
    which shifts the burden of proof to the Commissioner in certain
    situations, and we conclude that sec. 7491(a) does not apply.
    In the case of a corporation such as each petitioner, sec.
    7491(a)(2) limits the shifting of the burden of proof to
    situations where, among other things, the corporation shows that
    upon filing its petition in this Court, its net worth was no more
    than $7 million. See also 28 U.S.C. sec. 2412(d)(2)(B) (2000).
    Neither petitioner has made such a showing.
    -30-
    independent lender, see Scriptomatic, Inc. v. United States,
    
    555 F.2d 364
     (3d Cir. 1977).   The more a transfer appears to
    result from an arm’s-length transaction, the more likely the
    transfer will be considered debt.     See Bayer Corp. v. Mascotech,
    Inc. (In re Autosytle Plastics, Inc.), 
    269 F.3d 726
    , 750 (6th
    Cir. 2001).   The subjective intent of the parties to a transfer
    that the transfer create debt does not override an objectively
    indicated intent to the contrary.     See Stinnett’s Pontiac Serv.,
    Inc. v. Commissioner, 
    730 F.2d 634
    , 639 (11th Cir. 1984), affg.
    
    T.C. Memo. 1982-314
    .
    In the case of transfers from shareholders to their
    corporations, courts generally refer to numerous factors to
    determine whether the transfers create debt.    Petitioners argue
    that such an approach is irrelevant where, as here, a transfer is
    made to a partnership rather than a corporation.    Petitioners
    assert that the Court in a case such as this must focus solely on
    the form of the document connected with the transfer (here, the
    ALSL note) and decide whether that document establishes a debtor-
    creditor relationship under applicable State law.    We disagree.
    Petitioners have cited no authority to support their view, and we
    believe that the relevant factors distinguishing debt from equity
    are most helpful to us in deciding whether HEI transferred the
    disputed funds to ALSL in an arm’s-length transaction made with a
    genuine intention to create a debt.    See Berthold v.
    -31-
    Commissioner, 
    404 F.2d 119
    , 122 (6th Cir. 1968) (“Established
    authority holds that the intention of the parties is the
    controlling factor in determining whether or not advances should
    be termed loans.”), affg. 
    T.C. Memo. 1967-102
    ; cf. Recklitis v.
    Commissioner, 
    91 T.C. 874
    , 905 (1988).
    The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, to which an
    appeal of this case most likely lies, refers primarily to eleven
    factors in distinguishing debt from equity.   See Roth Steel Tube
    Co. v. Commissioner, supra at 630.    These factors are:    (1) The
    name given to an instrument underlying a transfer of funds;
    (2) the presence or absence of a fixed maturity date and a
    schedule of payments; (3) the presence or absence of a fixed
    interest rate and actual interest payments; (4) the source of
    repayment; (5) the adequacy or inadequacy of capitalization;
    (6) the identity of interest between creditors and equity
    holders; (7) the security for repayment; (8) the transferee’s
    ability to obtain financing from outside lending institutions;
    (9) the extent to which repayment was subordinated to the claims
    of outside creditors; (10) the extent to which transferred funds
    were used to acquire capital assets; and (11) the presence or
    absence of a sinking fund to provide repayment.    Id.     No one
    factor is controlling, and courts must consider the particular
    circumstances of each case.   Id.
    -32-
    We turn to analyzing and weighing the relevant facts of this
    case in the context of the 11 factors set forth in Roth Steel
    Tube Co. v. Commissioner, supra.
    1.     Name of Certificate
    We look to the name of the certificate evidencing a transfer
    to determine whether the parties thereto intended that the
    transfer create debt.    Although the issuance of a note weighs
    toward a finding of bona fide debt, see Bayer Corp. v. Mascotech,
    Inc. (In re Autostyle Plastics, Inc.), supra at 750; Estate of
    Mixon v. United States, 
    464 F.2d 394
    , 403 (5th Cir. 1972), the
    mere fact that a taxpayer issues a note is not dispositive.    The
    issuance of a demand note is not indicative of genuine debt when
    the note is unsecured, without a maturity date, and without
    meaningful repayments.    See Stinnett’s Pontiac Serv., Inc. v.
    Commissioner, supra at 638; Tyler v. Tomlinson, 
    414 F.2d 844
    , 849
    (8th Cir. 1969).
    We give little weight to the fact that ALSL issued the ALSL
    note to HEI.   The ALSL note was a demand note with no fixed
    maturity date, no written repayment schedule, no provision
    requiring periodic payments of principal or interest, no
    collateral, and no meaningful repayments.    In addition, HEI never
    made a demand for repayment or otherwise sought enforcement of
    the ALSL note.    See Stinnett’s Pontiac Serv., Inc. v.
    Commissioner, supra at 640 (the fact that notes were due on
    -33-
    demand but that the obligee never demanded payments supports a
    strong inference that the obligee never intended to compel the
    obligor to repay the notes).   Although both HEI and ALSL posted
    in their records that the transfers were loans, those postings
    provide little if any support for a finding of bona fide debt.
    Roth Steel Tube Co. v. Commissioner, 
    800 F.2d at
    631 (citing
    Raymond v. United States, 
    511 F.2d 185
    , 191 (6th Cir. 1975)).
    Petitioners argue that HEI asserted its rights as a lender
    by receiving all of the existing capital of ALSL upon its demise.
    According to petitioners, had the transfers not been debt, then a
    portion of that capital would have gone to Stethem and Thomas,
    who together contributed $250,000 of capital to ALSL.   We
    consider this argument unpersuasive.   We find nothing in the
    record to support petitioners’ claim that HEI asserted its rights
    as a lender by receiving all of the existing capital of ALSL upon
    its claimed demise.7   We also find nothing in the record to
    support petitioners’ claim that Stethem and Thomas failed to
    receive anything of value as to their capital contributions.
    Stethem and Thomas were fixtures in most of the financial
    ventures of the Hubert family and their companies.   In addition
    7
    Nor do we find that the business of either ALSL or ALD
    ceased in 1996 or 1997, as petitioners claim. Indeed, in and
    after December 1996, HEI made to ALSL nine transfers totaling
    $145,000, and ALSL made to ALD six transfers totaling
    $157,197.66. HEI also did not receive the reported liquidation
    proceeds until July 14, 1997.
    -34-
    to serving with Thomas as a trustee of the HFT, Stethem was legal
    counsel for the Hubert family and their companies and presumably
    made a good living in that capacity.   Thomas was HEI’s longtime
    president and in that capacity received more than $800,000 in
    compensation in just HEI’s 1997 and 1998 taxable years alone.
    We also note that Thomas as of the time of trial continued to
    work for the Hubert enterprise as its chief executive officer and
    that his $200,000 contribution to ALSL’s capital was
    contemporaneous with his receipt from HEI of an amount of officer
    compensation that appears to have been inflated to enable him to
    make that contribution.
    This factor weighs toward a finding that the transfers did
    not create bona fide debt.
    2.   Fixed Maturity Date and Schedule of Payments
    The absence of a fixed maturity date and a fixed obligation
    to repay weighs against a finding of bona fide debt.   See Bayer
    Corp. v. Mascotech, Inc. (In re Autostyle Plastics, Inc.), 
    269 F.3d at 750
    ; Roth Steel Tube Co. v. Commissioner, supra at 631.
    The ALSL note had no fixed maturity date.   While petitioners
    assert that the ALSL note was a demand note for which payment
    could have been requested at any time, the fact of the matter is
    that HEI never made any such demand and, more importantly, ALSL
    never had the ability to honor such a request had one been made.
    ALSL made its first (and only) payment on the ALSL note
    -35-
    approximately 2-1/2 years after HEI’s first transfer to ALSL and
    did so only on account of ALD’s claimed liquidation.   Moreover,
    notwithstanding this lack of repayments throughout the referenced
    2-1/2-year period, HEI continued to transfer funds to ALSL
    without any schedule for repayment.   HEI even transferred a total
    of $95,000 to ALSL in 1997 even though in December 1996 HEI
    decided to stop funding the Seasons of Sarasota project and ALSL
    treated the “debt” as discharged on its Federal income tax return
    for 1996.
    Petitioners ask the Court to conclude that the issuance of
    the ALSL note as a demand note strongly supports a finding of
    debt because the obligeee of a demand note, unlike an equity
    holder, may at any time demand repayment.   We decline to reach
    such a conclusion.   As noted by the Court of Appeals for the
    Eleventh Circuit, “an unsecured note due on demand with no
    specific maturity date, and no payments is insufficient to
    evidence a genuine debt.”   Stinnett’s Pontiac Serv., Inc. v.
    Commissioner, 
    730 F.2d at 638
    ; cf. Bayer Corp. v. Mascotech, Inc.
    (In re Autostyle Plastics, Inc.), supra at 750 (“use of demand
    notes along with a fixed rate of interest and interest payments
    is more indicative of debt than equity” (Emphasis added.)).
    Repayment of the ALSL note was unsecured, HEI never prepared a
    written repayment schedule as to the transfers, and ALSL never
    had assets available to pay all, or even a significant part, of
    -36-
    the ALSL note.    Whether or when to make demand for repayment of
    the transfers was within the discretion of HEI and was not
    conditioned upon the occurrence of any stated event.     See
    Stinnett’s Pontiac Serv., Inc. v. Commissioner, supra at 639.
    This factor weighs toward a finding that the transfers did
    not create bona fide debt.
    3.    Interest Rate and Actual Interest Payments
    A reasonable lender is concerned about receiving payments of
    interest as compensation for, and commensurate with, the risk
    assumed in making the loan.    See id. at 640; cf. Deputy v. du
    Pont, 
    308 U.S. 488
    , 498 (1940) (in the business world, interest
    is paid on debt as “compensation for the use or forbearance of
    money”).   The absence of an adequate rate of interest and actual
    interest payments weighs strongly against a finding of bona fide
    debt.   See Bayer Corp. v. Mascotech, Inc. (In re Autostyle
    Plastics, Inc.), supra at 750; Roth Steel Tube Co. v.
    Commissioner, supra at 631.
    Although the ALSL note on its face bore a rate of interest,
    the facts of this case persuade us that the parties to the note
    did not intend that ALSL actually pay HEI any (let alone a market
    rate of) interest for the use of the transferred funds unless the
    Seasons of Sarasota project was successful.    We do not believe
    that a reasonable lender would have lent unsecured funds to ALSL,
    a company with no revenues and few liquid assets, at the rate of
    -37-
    interest stated in the ALSL note.      A transferor of funds who does
    not insist on reasonable interest payments as to the use of the
    funds may not be a bona fide lender.     See Stinnett’s Pontiac
    Serv., Inc. v. Commissioner, supra at 640.
    ALSL never paid any interest to HEI as to the transferred
    funds and made but a single, nominal payment as to the principal
    of those funds.    Petitioners assert that payments were not made
    because neither principal nor interest was ever due under the
    terms of the ALSL note.   We consider this assertion unavailing.
    Indeed, HEI did not even report that accrued interest was owing
    on the ALSL note until more than 18 months after the first
    transfer of funds.
    This factor weighs toward a finding that the transfers did
    not create bona fide debt.
    4.   Source of Repayment
    Repayment that depends solely upon the success of the
    transferee’s business weighs against a finding of bona fide debt.
    Repayment that does not depend on earnings weighs toward a
    finding of debt.   See Bayer Corp. v. Mascotech, Inc. (In re
    Autostyle Plastics, Inc.), supra at 751; Roth Steel Tube Co. v.
    Commissioner 
    800 F.2d at 632
    ; Lane v. United States, 
    742 F.2d 1311
    , 1314 (11th Cir. 1984).   “An expectation of repayment solely
    from * * * earnings is not indicative of bona fide debt
    regardless of its reasonableness.”      Roth Steel Tube Co. v.
    -38-
    Commissioner, supra at 631 (citing Lane v. United States, supra
    at 1314); see also Stinnett’s Pontiac Serv., Inc. v.
    Commissioner, supra at 638-639; Raymond v. United States,
    
    511 F.2d at 191
    ; Segel v. Commissioner, 
    89 T.C. 816
    , 830 (1987);
    Deja Vu, Inc. v. Commissioner, 
    T.C. Memo. 1996-234
    .
    HEI’s transfers to ALSL were placed at the risk of ALSL’s
    business.    ALSL’s ability to repay these transfers depended
    primarily (if not solely) on its earnings, which in turn rested
    on the success of ALD and the Seasons of Sarasota project.      ALSL
    was unable to repay the ALSL note as ALSL had no revenue and
    virtually no liquid assets.
    This factor weighs toward a finding that the transfers did
    not create bona fide debt.
    5.   Capitalization
    Thin or inadequate capitalization to fund a transferee’s
    obligations weighs against a finding of bona fide debt.    See Roth
    Steel Tube Co. v. Commissioner, supra at 630; Stinnett’s Pontiac
    Serv., Inc. v. Commissioner, supra at 639.
    The record indicates that ALSL was inadequately capitalized
    to be, as it was, the funding vehicle for ALD and that ALSL had
    no meaningful capital, apart from the transferred funds, either
    before or when it received the transferred funds.    While ALSL
    received capital contributions totaling $250,000 from Thomas and
    Stethem, that amount was small in comparison to the amount of the
    -39-
    transferred funds and minuscule in comparison to the cost of the
    Seasons of Sarasota project.     As to that project, ALD agreed to
    pay $3 million for land and had agreed to pay construction-
    related costs potentially totaling millions of dollars more.          For
    its own equity capitalization, ALD had only $100,000 from its
    limited partner Culpepper.
    This factor weighs toward a finding that the transfers did
    not create bona fide debt.
    6.   Identity of Interest
    Transfers made in proportion to ownership interests weigh
    against a finding of bona fide debt.       A sharply disproportionate
    ratio between an ownership interest and the debt owing to the
    transferor by the transferee generally weighs toward a finding of
    debt.     See Bayer Corp. v. Mascotech, Inc. (In re Autostyle
    Plastics, Inc.), 
    269 F.3d at 751
    ; Stinnett’s Pontiac Serv., Inc.
    v. Commissioner, 
    730 F.2d at 630
    ; Estate of Mixon v. United
    States, 
    464 F.2d at 409
    .
    HEI was not an owner of ALSL.       HFT’s controlling settlors
    and trustees were.     In fact, the only portion of ALSL not owned
    by those individuals was the 5-percent interest owned by
    Ollinger, an HEI vice president, who never made any contribution
    of capital to ALSL in return for his interest.       The individuals
    who controlled HEI effectively caused HEI to fund their
    investment in ALSL.
    -40-
    This factor is either inapplicable or does not support a
    finding that the transfers created bona fide debt.
    7.   Presence or Absence of Security
    The absence of security for the repayment of transferred
    funds weighs strongly against a finding of bona fide debt.   See
    Bayer Corp. v. Mascotech, Inc. (In re Autostyle Plastics, Inc.),
    supra at 752; Roth Steel Tube Co. v. Commissioner, supra at 632;
    Lane v. United States, supra at 1317; Raymond v. United States,
    supra at 191; Austin Village, Inc. v. United States, 
    432 F.2d 741
    , 745 (6th Cir. 1970).
    The disputed transfers were unsecured.
    This factor weighs toward a finding that the transfers did
    not create bona fide debt.
    8.   Inability To Obtain Comparable Financing
    The question of whether a transferee could have obtained
    comparable financing from an independent source is relevant in
    measuring the economic reality of a transfer.    See Roth Steel
    Tube Co. v. Commissioner, supra at 631; Estate of Mixon v. United
    States, supra at 410; Nassau Lens Co. v. Commissioner, 
    308 F.2d 39
    , 47 (2d Cir. 1962), remanding 
    35 T.C. 268
     (1960).   Evidence
    that a transferee could not at the time of the transfer obtain a
    comparable loan from an arm’s-length creditor weighs against a
    finding of bona fide debt.   See Roth Steel Tube Co. v.
    Commissioner, supra at 631; Stinnett’s Pontiac Serv., Inc. v.
    -41-
    Commissioner, supra at 640; Calumet Indus., Inc. v. Commissioner,
    
    95 T.C. 257
    , 287 (1990).
    We do not believe that a creditor dealing at arm’s length
    would have made the transfers to ALSL under the terms that
    petitioners allege were entered into between ALSL and HEI.    In
    fact, ALD discussed borrowing funds from a commercial lender;
    i.e., Provident.   Although Provident did not lend any funds to
    ALD, the terms of the proposed financing arrangement were
    different in many regards from those contained in the ALSL note.
    First, Provident would have required that HEI be a co-maker of
    the note.   Second, Provident would have required that HEI agree
    to certain financial covenants such as the maintenance of a
    stated debt to equity ratio and a stated minimum net worth.
    Third, Provident would have required the borrower to provide
    security, collateral, and earnest money and to pay accrued
    interest and principal monthly.   Fourth, Provident would have
    required that ALD have in the first phase of construction at
    least 45 firm contracts to purchase condominium units with a
    total gross sale price of at least $10.8 million and total
    initial earnest money deposits of at least $1.62 million.    Fifth,
    Provident would have required that any earnest money from the
    sales be deposited with Provident.    None of these requirements,
    or anything like them, was contained in the financing arrangement
    between ALSL and HEI.
    -42-
    This factor weighs toward a finding that the transfers did
    not create bona fide debt.
    9.    Subordination
    Subordination of purported debt to the claims of other
    creditors weighs against a finding of bona fide debt.    See Roth
    Steel Tube Co. v. Commissioner, 
    800 F.2d at 631-632
    ; Stinnett’s
    Pontiac Serv., Inc. v. Commissioner, supra at 639; Raymond v.
    United States, 
    511 F.2d at 191
    ; Austin Village, Inc. v. United
    States, supra at 745.
    ALSL has never had any creditors.    Given that the transfers
    were unsecured, however, their right to repayment would have been
    subordinate to the interests of any secured creditors.
    This factor is either inapplicable or does not support a
    finding that the transfers created bona fide debt.
    10.   Use of Funds
    A transfer of funds to meet the transferee’s daily business
    needs weighs toward a finding of debt.    A transfer of funds to
    purchase capital assets weighs against a finding of bona fide
    debt.     See Roth Steel Tube Co. v. Commissioner, supra at 632;
    Stinnett’s Pontiac Serv., Inc. v. Commissioner, supra at 640;
    Raymond v. United States, supra at 191.
    The transfers were not used to pay ALSL’s daily operating
    expenses because ALSL had no operating expenses.    Although the
    transfers also were not used to acquire tangible capital assets,
    -43-
    the transfers were used by ALSL in a similar sense in that they
    were retransferred to ALD to use on the Seasons of Sarasota
    project.     But for the transfers of the funds from HEI to ALSL,
    ALSL would not have been able to make most of the transfers to
    ALD.
    This factor is either inapplicable or does not support a
    finding that the transfers created bona fide debt.
    11.   Presence or Absence of a Sinking Fund
    The failure to establish a sinking fund for repayment weighs
    against a finding of bona fide debt.     See Bayer Corp. v.
    Mascotech, Inc. (In re Autostyle Plastics, Inc.), 
    269 F.3d at 753
    ; Roth Steel Tube Co. v. Commissioner, supra at 632; Lane v.
    United States, 
    742 F.2d at 1317
    ; Raymond v. United States, supra
    at 191; Austin Village, Inc. v. United States, supra at 745.
    ALSL did not establish a sinking fund for repayment of the
    ALSL note.    While petitioners invite this Court to disregard this
    factor, asserting that the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
    “is out of touch with economic reality” in relying upon this
    factor, we decline to do so.     As is true with respect to all of
    these factors, this factor is not controlling in and of itself
    but is merely one factor that we consider in determining the
    objectively indicated intent of ALSL and HEI as to the
    characterization of the transferred funds.
    -44-
    This factor weighs toward a finding that the transfers did
    not create bona fide debt.
    12.   Conclusion
    On the basis of our review of the entire record, we find it
    extremely improbable that an arm’s-length lender at the time of
    the transfers would have lent unsecured, at a low rate of
    interest, and for an unspecified period of time to an entity in
    ALSL’s questionable financial condition.     Security, adequately
    stated interest, and repayment arrangements (or efforts to secure
    the same) are important proofs of intent, and here such proofs
    are notably lacking.     Economic realities require that HEI’s
    transfers be characterized as capital contributions for Federal
    income tax purposes, and we so hold.     Thus, we also hold that HEI
    is not entitled to any bad debt deduction with respect to the
    transfers.
    C.     Petitioners’ Claim to a Deduction for a Loss of Capital
    Petitioners argue alternatively that HEI may deduct the
    transfers as a loss on an abandonment of its equity interest in
    ALSL.     We disagree.   We are unable to find in the record that HEI
    had any equity interest in ALSL, let alone any such interest that
    it may deduct as a loss.
    HEI and its owners and advisers were experienced in many
    lines of business conducted in many ways.     In structuring its
    involvement in the Seasons of Sarasota project, HEI chose not to
    -45-
    become an owner of ALSL and never became such an owner.    ALSL’s
    owners, on the other hand, who were themselves indirect owners
    and insiders of HEI, did choose to become ALSL’s owners.    They
    did this not by using their personal funds to pay for their
    equity but by using HEI’s funds.   Distributions by a corporation
    are treated as dividends to a shareholder (to the extent of the
    corporation’s earnings and profits, see Estate of DeNiro v.
    Commissioner, 
    746 F.2d 327
    , 332 (6th Cir. 1984)) if the
    distributions are made for the shareholder’s personal benefit
    without any expectation of repayment.   See Hagaman v.
    Commissioner, 
    958 F.2d 684
    , 690-691 (6th Cir. 1992), affg. and
    remanding 
    T.C. Memo. 1987-549
    ; J.F. Stevenhagen Co. v.
    Commissioner, 
    T.C. Memo. 1975-198
    , affd. 
    551 F.2d 106
     (6th Cir.
    1977); see also Shedd v. Commissioner, 
    T.C. Memo. 2000-292
    ; Davis
    v. Commissioner, 
    T.C. Memo. 1995-283
    .   Such is so even if the
    funds are not distributed directly to the shareholder.    See Rapid
    Elec. Co. v. Commissioner, 
    61 T.C. 232
    , 239 (1973); see also J.F.
    Stevenhagen Co. v. Commissioner, supra.
    HEI had no equity in ALSL, and HEI’s transfers of the funds
    to ALSL enhanced the controlling settlors’ investments in ALSL;
    e.g., the controlling settlors never made any capital
    contributions to ALSL from their personal funds but still
    received interests in ALSL totaling 60 percent.   The transfers
    also were made without a reasonable expectation of repayment.
    -46-
    Instead, we find in the record that the primary purpose of HEI’s
    transfers to ALSL, an entity controlled by the same individuals
    who controlled HEI, was to benefit those individuals, see Sammons
    v. Commissioner, 
    472 F.2d 449
    , 451, 456 (5th Cir. 1972), affg. in
    part, revg. in part on another ground 
    T.C. Memo. 1971-145
    ; Wilkof
    v. Commissioner, 
    T.C. Memo. 1978-496
    , affd. 
    636 F.2d 1139
     (6th
    Cir. 1981); McLemore v. Commissioner, 
    T.C. Memo. 1973-59
    , affd.
    
    494 F.2d 1350
     (6th Cir. 1974), and was without regard to any
    business purpose or benefit to HEI.8
    II.   Losses From Equipment Leasing Activities
    A.   Overview
    During the relevant years, petitioners were connected with
    the following leasing activities:     (1) In 1991, Printographics
    began the activity concerning the 1991 Rapistan conveyor system;
    (2) in 1995, Printographics began the activity concerning the
    1995 computer system; (3) in 1998, LCL began the activities
    concerning the 1998 Amtel equipment; (4) in 1999, LCL began the
    activity concerning the 1999 blisk equipment; (5) in 2000, LCL
    began the activities concerning the 2000 computer equipment and
    the 2000 RFC equipment.
    8
    We need not and do not decide whether the transfers were
    in fact dividends to HEI’s nonparty shareholder. For even if
    they were not, HEI could not deduct the outlay made primarily for
    the benefit of its shareholder rather than for a business or
    investment purpose of its own. See Hood v. Commissioner,
    
    115 T.C. 172
    , 179 (2000).
    -47-
    B.   Aggregation
    Petitioners argue that section 465(c)(2)(B)(i) allows LCL to
    aggregate its 1998, 1999, and 2000 activities into a single
    activity for purposes of the at-risk rules of section 465.    (The
    relevant provisions of section 465(c) are set forth in an
    appendix to this Opinion.)   Petitioners argue that section
    1.465-1T, Temporary Income Tax Regs., 
    50 Fed. Reg. 6014
     (Mar. 11,
    1985), interprets section 465(c)(2)(B)(i) to the contrary and
    assert that these regulations are invalid as inconsistent with
    the statute.   Respondent argues that the referenced regulations
    preclude LCL from aggregating one year’s leasing activities with
    another year’s leasing activities and asserts that the referenced
    regulations are consistent with section 465(c)(2)(B)(i).    We
    agree with respondent that section 465(c)(2)(B)(i) does not allow
    for the aggregation desired by petitioners.   Because we do not
    read the referenced regulations to address the issue at hand, we
    do not discuss them further.
    Section 465(c)(2)(A)(ii) generally provides that a taxpayer
    may not aggregate its equipment leasing activities for purposes
    of the at-risk rules.   An exception is found, however, in the
    case of partnerships and S corporations.   Under this exception,
    all activities of a partnership or S corporation with respect to
    section 1245 properties are considered to be a single activity to
    the extent that the “properties are leased or held for lease, and
    -48-
    * * * are placed in service in any taxable year of the
    partnership or S corporation”.    Sec. 465(c)(2)(B)(i).
    Petitioners read the quoted text, with a focus especially on
    the word “any”, to mean that all of LCL’s equipment leasing
    activities are viewed as a single activity, notwithstanding the
    fact that all of the activities did not arise in the same taxable
    year.   We read that text differently.   While petitioners focus
    primarily on the single word “any” to support their
    interpretation, the word “any” may not be construed in isolation
    but must be construed in the context of the statute as a whole.
    See Small v. United States,       U.S.    , 
    125 S. Ct. 1752
     (2005);
    United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 
    511 U.S. 350
    , 357 (1994).
    Statutes should be interpreted as a whole to give effect to every
    clause, sentence, and word therein, see Market Co. v. Hoffman,
    
    101 U.S. 112
    , 115 (1879), and the duty of a court is to render
    that type of interpretation whenever possible, cf. United States
    v. Menasche, 
    348 U.S. 528
    , 538-539 (1955); Montclair v. Ramsdell,
    
    107 U.S. 147
    , 152 (1883).   Such an approach is a “cardinal
    principle of statutory construction”.    Williams v. Taylor,
    
    529 U.S. 362
    , 404 (2000).
    In accordance with that approach, we apply the plain meaning
    of the words set forth in section 465(c)(2)(B), see Venture
    Funding, Ltd. v. Commissioner, 
    110 T.C. 236
    , 241-242 (1998),
    affd. without published opinion 
    198 F.3d 248
     (6th Cir. 1999), and
    -49-
    we do so mindful of the statute as a whole.    We conclude that
    Congress’s use of the word “any” denotes one (i.e., the same)
    taxable year and that LCL’s aggregated activities are only those
    activities that relate to leased personal property placed in
    service in the same taxable year.9    As we understand petitioners’
    contrary interpretation, its effect would be that virtually “all
    activities [of a partnership or S corporation] with respect to
    section 1245 properties which * * * are leased or held for lease
    * * * shall be treated as a single activity.”    Petitioners do not
    explain how that interpretation does not render section
    465(c)(2)(B)(i)(II) surplusage, and we are unable to give such an
    explanation either.   Nor do petitioners explain how their
    interpretation harmonizes with section 465(c)(2)(B)(ii) and, more
    particularly, the reference in that section to section
    465(c)(3)(B).   Under petitioners’ interpretation, section
    465(c)(2)(B)(ii) also would be surplusage in that all equipment
    leasing activities of a partnership or S corporation would
    already be considered to be a single activity under section
    465(c)(2)(B)(i).
    Petitioners’ reliance on the word “any” to reach their
    interpretation also is misplaced.     The word “any” denotes “One,
    some, every, or all without specification”, The American Heritage
    9
    By cross-reference from sec. 465(c)(1)(C), sec. 1245(a)
    provides that the term “section 1245 property” as used in sec.
    465 includes personal property.
    -50-
    Dictionary of the English Language 81 (4th ed. 2000), and
    Congress’s use of the word “any” “can and does mean different
    things depending upon the setting”, Nixon v. Mo. Municipal
    League, 
    541 U.S. 125
    , 132 (2004).    In this setting, we simply do
    not understand Congress’s use of that word to establish its
    intent that section 465(c)(2)(B)(i) allow LCL to treat all of its
    equipment leasing activities as a single activity regardless of
    the year in which the equipment was placed in service.    The fact
    that Congress prescribed in the statute the singular form of the
    word “year” adds to our belief.
    While the legislative history underlying the enactment of
    section 465(c)(2)(B) as applied to section 1245 properties is
    sparse and of little benefit to our inquiry, see H. Conf. Rept.
    98-861, at 1122 (1984), 1984-3 C.B. (Vol.2) 1, 376, we believe
    that the setting surrounding the enactment of section
    465(c)(2)(B) also is consistent with our conclusion.    Section
    465(c)(2) was enacted as part of the Deficit Reduction Act of
    1984 (DEFRA), Pub. L. 98-369, sec. 432(b), 
    98 Stat. 814
    , which
    changed the aggregation rules for partnerships and S corporations
    with respect to equipment leasing activities (as well as the
    other activities listed in section 465(c)(1)) for taxable years
    beginning after December 31, 1983.   Before DEFRA, partnerships
    and S corporations aggregated all activities within each of five
    specified categories for purposes of section 465.   Thus, a
    -51-
    partnership or S corporation could aggregate all of its leased
    section 1245 property, while other taxpayers treated each of
    their properties in that category as a separate activity.   As
    amended by DEFRA, section 465(c)(2) generally requires, except as
    provided in section 465(c)(2)(B), that partnerships and S
    corporations separate equipment leasing activities (and the other
    activities listed in section 465(c)(1)) on a property-by-property
    basis, as do other taxpayers.   If petitioners’ interpretation
    were adopted, permitting all leased section 1245 properties of a
    partnership or S corporation to be aggregated into one activity
    for purposes of the at-risk rules, section 465(c)(2), as amended
    by DEFRA, would largely be ineffective.
    We conclude by noting that our interpretation of section
    465(c)(2)(B)(i) to refer to a single taxable year rather than all
    of a taxpayer’s taxable years coincides with the views of
    commentators.   Since the enactment of section 465(c)(2)(B),
    commentators have consistently agreed with the interpretation
    that we espouse today.   See, e.g., Starczewski, 550-2nd Tax
    Management Portfolio (BNA), "At-Risk Rules" A-18 n.153 (“For the
    leasing of § 1245 property that is all placed in service in a
    single taxable year, § 465(c)(2)(B)(i) specifically provides for
    aggregation.”) & A-19 (“The partnership aggregation rule
    apparently does not apply to a partnership or S corporation that
    leases equipment that is placed in service in different years.”)
    -52-
    (2003); McGovern, “Liabilities of the Firm, Member Guaranties,
    and the At Risk Rules: Some Practical and Policy Considerations”,
    
    7 J. Small & Emerging Bus. L. 63
    , 81 (Spring 2003) (“Section 465
    [more specifically identified in a footnote as section
    465(c)(2)(B)] provides that if equipment leasing is carried on by
    a partnership or subchapter S corporation, all items of equipment
    that are placed in service during the same taxable year are
    treated as constituting a single activity.”); Pennell, “Separate
    Treatment of At-Risk Activities Under Section 465 Delayed”, 62 J.
    Taxn. 372 (1985) (“For that category [section 1245 property],
    aggregation based on the taxable year the properties were placed
    in service is allowed under the special rule in Section
    465(c)(2)(B).”).   We have not found (nor have petitioners cited)
    any treatise or article that sets forth a contrary
    interpretation.
    C.   At-Risk Amounts
    Petitioners argue that the deficit capital account
    restoration provision in the revised LCL operating agreement
    exposed LCL’s members to liability for their respective shares of
    LCL’s recourse debt.   Respondent argues that this provision was
    not operative during the relevant years because it required that
    an LCL member first liquidate its interest in LCL, an event that
    never occurred during the relevant years.   Respondent argues
    alternatively that the provision, if operative, did not make the
    -53-
    members liable for LCL’s recourse obligations in that a third
    party lender did not under the revised LCL operating agreement
    have the right to force the members to abide by any obligation
    that LCL failed to honor.    We agree with respondent that LCL’s
    members were not at risk for any of the disputed amounts.
    Congress enacted section 465 to limit the use of artificial
    losses created by deductions from certain leveraged investment
    activities.    Such losses may be used only to the extent the
    taxpayer is at risk economically.      Generally, the amount at risk
    includes (1) the amount of money and the adjusted basis of
    property contributed to the activity by the taxpayer and
    (2) borrowed amounts for which the taxpayer is personally liable.
    Sec. 465(b).
    The aspect of petitioners’ dispute with respondent’s
    application of the at-risk rules rests on whether LCL’s members
    may take into account any part of LCL’s recourse obligations.      We
    agree with respondent that they may not.     The recourse notes
    signed by LCL were not personally guaranteed by LCL’s members,
    and applicable State (Wyoming) law provides that the members of a
    limited liability company are not personally liable for the
    debts, obligations, or liabilities of the company.     See Wyo.
    Stat. Ann. sec. 17-15-113 (LexisNexis 2005).     The agreements of
    LCL also contain no provisions obligating its members to pay
    LCL’s debts, obligations, or expenses.     Because LCL’s members did
    -54-
    not assume personal liability for the notes, the members are not
    at risk under section 465(b)(1)(B) and (2)(A) with respect to
    LCL’s recourse obligations.    Cf. Emershaw v. Commissioner,
    
    949 F.2d 841
     (6th Cir. 1991), affg. 
    T.C. Memo. 1990-246
    .
    Petitioners seek a contrary result, focusing on the deficit
    capital account restoration provision in section 7.7 of the
    revised LCL operating agreement.    Petitioners argue that this
    provision made LCL’s members personally liable for LCL’s recourse
    obligations for purposes of applying the at-risk rules.      We
    disagree.    As observed by respondent, section 7.7 contains a
    condition that must be met before the deficit capital account
    restoration obligation arises.    In accordance with that
    condition, an LCL member must first liquidate its interest in LCL
    before the member has any obligation to the entity.       Neither HBW
    nor HCC liquidated its interest in LCL during the relevant years.
    III.    Conclusion
    We sustain respondent’s determinations.    We have considered
    all of petitioners’ arguments for holdings contrary to those set
    forth in this Opinion and have rejected those arguments not
    discussed herein as meritless.    We have considered respondent’s
    arguments only to the extent discussed herein.
    Decisions will be entered
    for respondent.
    -55-
    APPENDIX
    SEC. 465(c).   Activities to Which Section Applies.--
    (1) Types of activities.--This section applies to
    any taxpayer engaged in the activity of--
    (A) holding, producing, or distributing
    motion picture films or video tapes,
    (B) farming (as defined in section 464(e)),
    (C) leasing any section 1245 property
    (as defined in section 1245(a)(3)),
    (D) exploring for, or exploiting, oil
    and gas resources or
    (E) exploring for, or exploiting,
    geothermal deposits (as defined in section
    613(e)(2))
    as a trade or business or for the production of income.
    (2) Separate activities.--For purposes of this
    section--
    (A) In general.--Except as provided in
    subparagraph (B), a taxpayer's activity with
    respect to each--
    (i) film or video tape,
    (ii) section 1245 property
    which is leased or held for
    leasing,
    (iii) farm,
    (iv) oil and gas property (as
    defined under section 614), or
    (v) geothermal property (as
    defined under section 614),
    shall be treated as a separate activity.
    -56-
    (B) Aggregation rules.--
    (i) Special rule for leases of
    section 1245 property by
    partnerships or S corporations.--In
    the case of any partnership or S
    corporation, all activities with
    respect to section 1245 properties
    which--
    (I) are leased or
    held for lease, and
    (II) are placed in
    service in any taxable
    year of the partnership
    or S corporation,
    shall be treated as a single activity.
    (ii) Other aggregation
    rules.--Rules similar to the rules
    of subparagraphs (B) and (C) of
    paragraph (3) shall apply for
    purposes of this paragraph.
    (3) Extension to other activities.--
    (A) In general.--In the case of taxable
    years beginning after December 31, 1978, this
    section also applies to each activity--
    (i) engaged in by the taxpayer
    in carrying on a trade or business
    or for the production of income,
    and
    (ii) which is not described in
    paragraph (1).
    (B) Aggregation of activities where
    taxpayer actively participates in management
    of trade or business.--Except as provided in
    subparagraph (C), for purposes of this
    section, activities described in subparagraph
    (A) which constitute a trade or business
    shall be treated as one activity if --
    -57-
    (i) the taxpayer actively
    participates in the management of
    such trade or business, or
    (ii) such trade or business is
    carried on by a partnership or an S
    corporation and 65 percent or more
    of the losses for the taxable year
    is allocable to persons who
    actively participate in the
    management of the trade or
    business.
    (C) Aggregation or separation of
    activities under regulations.--the secretary
    shall prescribe regulations under which
    activities described in subparagraph (A)
    shall be aggregated or treated as separate
    activities.