Raul Romana & Maria Corazon Romana ( 2022 )


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  •                      United States Tax Court
    
    T.C. Summary Opinion 2022-9
    RAUL ROMANA AND MARIA CORAZON ROMANA,
    Petitioners
    v.
    COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
    Respondent
    —————
    Docket No. 1156-21S.                                           Filed June 16, 2022.
    —————
    Steven S. Chung, for petitioners.
    Chae M. Kim and Michael E. Washburn, for respondent.
    SUMMARY OPINION
    CARLUZZO, Chief Special Trial Judge: This case was heard
    pursuant to the provisions of section 7463 of the Internal Revenue Code
    in effect when the petition was filed. 1 Pursuant to section 7463(b), the
    decision to be entered is not reviewable by any other court, and this
    opinion shall not be treated as precedent for any other case.
    In a notice of deficiency dated December 11, 2020 (notice),
    respondent determined deficiencies in petitioners’ federal income tax
    and section 6662(a) accuracy-related penalties for 2016, 2017, and 2018.
    After concessions, the issues for decision are whether petitioners
    (1) are entitled to a miscellaneous itemized deduction for unreimbursed
    1 Unless otherwise indicated, statutory references are to the Internal Revenue
    Code, Title 26 U.S.C., in effect at all relevant times, regulation references are to the
    Code of Federal Regulations, Title 26 (Treas. Reg.), in effect at all relevant times, and
    Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.
    Served 06/16/22
    2
    employee business expenses for 2017 2 in excess of the amount already
    allowed by respondent and (2) are liable for a section 6662(a) accuracy-
    related penalty for any year in issue.
    Background
    Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found.
    Petitioners lived in California when the Petition was filed.
    During each year in issue Mr. Romana was employed as a
    stationary engineer; Mrs. Romana was employed as a nurse in a plastic
    surgery clinic operated by Kaiser Permanente (Kaiser). Both petitioners
    received most of their formal education in the Philippines although both
    received additional professional and/or vocational training in the United
    States after moving to the United States from the Philippines. Neither
    petitioner had any formal training in accounting or federal income
    taxation.
    Kaiser’s dress code in effect at the location where she worked
    required that Mrs. Romana be dressed in “comfortable” clothes and in a
    manner that reflected her profession as a nurse. Neither Kaiser nor the
    collective bargaining agreement for her nursing union had a policy that
    allowed reimbursement for the expenses she incurred to purchase
    clothing that satisfied her employer’s dress code. While at work, Mrs.
    Romana wore clothing that resembled scrubs that she purchased at her
    own expense from local department stores. In the operating room she
    was required to wear scrubs provided by Kaiser. Routinely, depending
    upon the operation schedule for any given day, she changed back and
    forth between her scrublike clothing and the operating room scrubs her
    employer provided.
    During 2017 Mrs. Romana also purchased, at her own expense, a
    white “lab” coat with “Kaiser Permanente” and her name embroidered
    on it. The purchase was made as part of a bulk purchase along with
    similar items purchased by fellow employees. The lab coat cost
    approximately $45, and it was dry cleaned multiple times during the
    year. Otherwise, the costs that petitioners paid for Mrs. Romana’s work
    clothing cannot be precisely determined.
    2 The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11045, 
    131 Stat. 2054
    , 2088, amended section 67 by suspending miscellaneous itemized deductions for
    any taxable year beginning after December 31, 2017, and before January 1, 2026.
    3
    Petitioners’ federal income tax return for each year in issue was
    prepared by a paid income tax return preparer. Petitioners’ return
    preparer, who began preparing federal income tax returns for
    petitioners around 2003, was hired on the recommendation of
    petitioners’ family and friends. The return preparer assisted petitioners
    with other financial matters as well. For example, the return preparer
    advised petitioners to set up an S corporation to manage their rental
    properties and helped them set up living trusts and living wills.
    The Schedule A, Itemized Deductions, included with petitioners’
    2017 return shows various deductions, including, as relevant here,
    unreimbursed employee business expenses relating to Mrs. Romana’s
    employment with Kaiser and Mr. Romana’s employment as a stationary
    engineer. Attached to the Schedule A is a “TY 2017 Unreimbursed
    Expense Statement” reflecting the detail of the unreimbursed employee
    business expenses as follows:
    Unreimbursed Expense                    Amount
    Union and professional dues                                       $3,616
    Uniforms and protective clothing                                   1,915
    Dry cleaning/laundry                                                399
    Seminars                                                            601
    Tools                                                               250
    Telephone                                                           263
    Internet                                                           1,134
    Total                                                             $8,178
    In the notice and as relevant, respondent allowed the
    miscellaneous itemized deduction for unreimbursed employee business
    expenses claimed on petitioners’ 2017 Schedule A for union and
    professional dues and for seminars. Otherwise, respondent disallowed
    the miscellaneous itemized deduction for unreimbursed employee
    business expenses claimed for uniforms and protective clothing, dry
    cleaning and laundry, tools, telephone, and internet. As noted,
    4
    respondent also imposed a section 6662(a) accuracy-related penalty for
    each year in issue.
    Discussion
    As a general rule, the Commissioner’s determination of a
    taxpayer’s federal income tax liability in a notice of deficiency is
    presumed correct, and the taxpayer bears the burden of proving that the
    determination is erroneous. Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 
    290 U.S. 111
    , 115 (1933). 3
    I.     Unreimbursed Employee Business Expenses
    As we have observed in countless opinions, deductions are a
    matter of legislative grace, and the taxpayer bears the burden of proving
    entitlement to any claimed deduction. Rule 142(a); INDOPCO, Inc. v.
    Commissioner, 
    503 U.S. 79
    , 84 (1992); New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering,
    
    292 U.S. 435
    , 440 (1934). This burden requires the taxpayer to
    substantiate expenses underlying deductions claimed by keeping and
    producing adequate records that enable the Commissioner to determine
    the taxpayer’s correct tax liability. § 6001; Hradesky v. Commissioner,
    
    65 T.C. 87
    , 89–90 (1975), aff’d per curiam, 
    540 F.2d 821
     (5th Cir. 1976);
    Meneguzzo v. Commissioner, 
    43 T.C. 824
    , 831–32 (1965). A taxpayer
    claiming a deduction on a federal income tax return must demonstrate
    that the deduction is allowable pursuant to some statutory provision and
    must further substantiate that the expense to which the deduction
    relates has been paid or incurred. See § 6001; Hradesky, 
    65 T.C. at 89
    –90; 
    Treas. Reg. § 1.6001-1
    (a).
    Taxpayers may deduct ordinary and necessary expenses paid in
    connection with operating a trade or business. § 162(a); Boyd v.
    Commissioner, 
    122 T.C. 305
    , 313 (2004). Generally, the performance of
    services as an employee constitutes a trade or business. Primuth v.
    Commissioner, 
    54 T.C. 374
    , 377 (1970). If, as a condition of employment,
    an employee is required to incur certain expenses, then the employee is
    entitled to a deduction for those expenses unless entitled to
    reimbursement from his or her employer.               See Fountain v.
    Commissioner, 
    59 T.C. 696
    , 708 (1973); Spielbauer v. Commissioner,
    
    T.C. Memo. 1998-80
    .
    3 Petitioners do not claim and the record does not otherwise demonstrate that
    the provisions of section 7491(a) need be applied here, and we proceed as though they
    do not.
    5
    The deduction for unreimbursed employee business expenses is a
    miscellaneous itemized deduction. §§ 67(b), 63(d)(1), 62. During the
    relevant period miscellaneous itemized deductions were allowable only
    to the extent that the total of such deductions exceeded 2% of adjusted
    gross income (AGI). § 67(a) and (b). Petitioners’ total miscellaneous
    itemized deductions for 2017, as allowed by respondent in the notice,
    exceed 2% of their AGI.
    As a general rule, if a taxpayer provides sufficient evidence that
    the taxpayer has incurred a trade or business expense contemplated by
    section 162(a) but is unable to adequately substantiate the amount, the
    Court may estimate the amount and allow a deduction to that extent.
    Cohan v. Commissioner, 
    39 F.2d 540
    , 543–44 (2d Cir. 1930). However,
    in order for the Court to estimate the amount of an expense, there must
    be some basis upon which an estimate may be made. Vanicek v.
    Commissioner, 
    85 T.C. 731
    , 742–43 (1985).
    All of the disputed deductions relate to Mrs. Romana’s
    employment with Kaiser or Mr. Romana’s employment as a stationary
    engineer. According to petitioners, they are entitled to unreimbursed
    employee business expense deductions of $1,526 for clothing, $250 for
    tools, $263 for telephone, and $1,134 for internet. According to
    petitioners, each expense qualifies as an ordinary and necessary
    business expense paid by petitioners but not reimbursable by their
    employers. See § 162(a). According to respondent, petitioners have
    failed to establish that (1) the expenses were paid or, if paid, (2) the
    expenses were ordinary and necessary business expenses, and if
    business related, (3) they were not reimbursable by petitioners’
    employers.
    A.     Clothing
    On their 2017 return petitioners claimed $1,915 in expenses for
    “Uniforms and protective clothing” and $399 for “dry cleaning/laundry.”
    Petitioners now assert that they are entitled to deduct $1,526 for those
    items.
    Generally, the cost of a business wardrobe, even if required as a
    condition of employment, is considered a nondeductible personal
    expense within the meaning of section 262. See, e.g., Hynes v.
    Commissioner, 
    74 T.C. 1266
    , 1290 (1980). Those costs are not deductible
    even when it has been shown that the particular clothes would not have
    been purchased but for the employment. 
    Id.
     Clothing costs are
    6
    deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses under section
    162 only if (1) the clothing is of a type specifically required as a condition
    of employment, (2) it is not adaptable to general use as ordinary
    clothing, and (3) it is not so worn. See Yeomans v. Commissioner, 
    30 T.C. 757
    , 767 (1958); see also Deihl v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2005-
    287.
    Mrs. Romana was required to dress professionally and
    comfortably for her job as a nurse. To do so, she purchased shirts and
    pants at department stores. Because the clothing resembled scrubs, we
    find that the clothing was not adaptable to general use as ordinary
    clothing outside of her employment. Consequently, the cost of the
    clothing and the cost to dry clean the clothing are deductible. Mrs.
    Romana also purchased a white lab coat with “Kaiser Permanente” and
    her name embroidered on it. This lab coat was not appropriate for
    general use.
    According to Mrs. Romana, the lab coat cost around $45.
    Petitioners provided only generalized estimates for the costs of the
    scrublike clothing that Mrs. Romana wore at work and the dry cleaning
    costs paid to dry clean those items. After a careful review of the
    evidence, and as best we can estimate from what has been submitted,
    we find that petitioners are entitled to a $500 deduction for the
    purchases of the clothing that Mrs. Romana was required to wear as a
    condition of her employment and the related dry cleaning costs paid with
    respect to those items. See Cohan v. Commissioner, 
    39 F.2d at
    543–44.
    B.     Tools
    Petitioners claimed a deduction of $250 for tools for 2017. They
    did not offer any evidence that identifies the type of tools, the cost of the
    tools, or the business use of the tools. Furthermore, there is insufficient
    evidence that would allow for a deduction based on an estimate. See
    Vanicek, 
    85 T.C. at 742
    –43. Accordingly, petitioners are not entitled to
    a deduction for unreimbursed employee business expenses for tools for
    2017.
    C.     Phone and Internet
    Petitioners claimed deductions of $264 for phone expenses and
    $1,134 for internet expenses. Petitioners did not offer documentary
    evidence or testimony regarding their business use of the phone and
    internet, nor did they explain how they arrived at their estimate of
    business versus personal use. Without such evidence the Court does not
    7
    have a reasonable basis to estimate the amounts of the expenses related
    to business use. See 
    id.
     Accordingly, petitioners are not entitled to a
    deduction for unreimbursed employee business expenses for phone and
    internet for 2017.
    II.   Accuracy-Related Penalties
    Lastly, we consider whether petitioners are liable for a section
    6662(a) accuracy-related penalty for any year in issue. Relying upon
    various grounds, respondent argues that petitioners are liable for the
    penalty for each year. See § 6662(a)-(d).
    Petitioners’ paid income tax return preparer prepared petitioners’
    2016, 2017, and 2018 returns. Petitioners had retained the same return
    preparer since approximately 2003 to prepare their returns. Routinely,
    petitioners met with the return preparer two or three times each year.
    As was petitioners’ practice with respect to their joint federal income tax
    returns filed for other years, Mrs. Romana assembled petitioners’
    personal and employment information, tax documents, and source
    documents underlying the deductions shown on their returns and
    provided them to the return preparer. Mrs. Romana also provided the
    return preparer with various financial statements related to their rental
    properties.
    Petitioners’ presentation at trial satisfies us that petitioners
    reasonably relied upon their return preparer to do what they paid their
    return preparer to do. Neither petitioner had any formal training in
    accounting or matters of federal income taxation. To the extent that
    petitioners claimed disallowed deductions that they now concede, we
    find that these deductions were claimed on the advice of their return
    preparer and further find that it was not unreasonable for petitioners
    not to have questioned that advice.
    Under the circumstances, we find that petitioners had reasonable
    cause for the underpayment of tax required to be shown on their return
    for each year in issue and that they acted in good faith with respect to
    those underpayments. See § 6664(c); Higbee v. Commissioner, 
    116 T.C. 438
    , 446–47 (2001). Petitioners are not liable for the section 6662(a)
    accuracy-related penalty for any year in issue.
    To reflect the foregoing,
    Decision will be entered under Rule 155.