Huffman v. Commissioner , 41 T.C.M. 619 ( 1980 )

JIMMY J. HUFFMAN, Petitioner v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent

Huffman v. Commissioner

Docket No. 7491-79.

United States Tax Court

T.C. Memo 1980-574; 1980 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 3; 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 619; T.C.M. (RIA) 80574;

December 30, 1980

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Jimmy J. Huffman, pro se.

Linda L. Wong, for the respondent.

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FEATHERSTON

MEMORANDUM OPINION

FEATHERSTON, Judge: Respondent determined a deficiency in the amount of $ 963.62 in petitioner's self-employment tax for 1977. The only issue for decision is whether the self-employment tax is constitutional.

At the time the petition was filed, petitioner was a legal resident of Irving, Texas. Petitioner and his wife, Ramona A. Huffman, filed a joint Federal income tax return for 1977 with the Internal Revenue Service Center, Austin, Texas.

During 1977 petitioner was engaged in the business of manufacturing picture frames. On the joint Federal income tax return for 1977, petitioner reported $ 12,197.67 as income from that business but failed to report any self-employment income. Petitioner's sole contention is that the self-employment tax imposed by section 1401(a) ^{*5 and said as to which were the wiser views, from the standpoint of policy and judgment, those of the majority or those of the minority in the Davis case, we certainly can find no warrant in law for holding that, considered from the standpoint of its power, congress could not do what was in question there. Neither can we find any for the view that it cannot do what it has done and is doing here, legally impose and legally collect an additional income tax on income derived from self employment, just as it can do, and has long been doing, legally impose and as legally collect an additional income tax from persons otherwise employed.}

As to petitioner's civil service employment argument, the court's comments () are pertinent:

Congress can constitutionally, in imposing income taxes, distinguish between earned and unearned income and between income from various kinds of property and occupations and has often done so.

We do not think the provisions of section 1402(g) for the exemption of members of certain religious faiths are constitutionally infirm. , affg. a Memorandum Opinion of this Court, cert. denied ; ; .

We are aware that petitioner is deeply sincere in his views with respect to the disputed tax but we are compelled to sustain respondent's determination.

To reflect the foregoing,

Decision will be entered for the respondent.

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Footnotes

• 1. All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as in effect during the tax year in issue, unless otherwise noted.↩