Mr. Hilton also filed a separate return but reported only the $ 20,192.31 in wages he received from T. L. James.
Mr. Hilton never told anyone, especially petitioner, of his illegal scheme. Moreover, he never kept any records (i.e., bank statements or invoices) pertaining to Industrial at their La Place Street residence until after August 1982.
It was not until November 1982, when two gentlemen from T. L. James came to their La Place Street residence to speak with Mr. Hilton, that petitioner first learned of her husband's illegal activity.
In May 1984 all five properties were returned to American Insurance Co. (herein "American") as part of Mr. Hilton's restitution to T. L. James. Mr. Hilton also deeded the La Place Street residence to American.
On January 23, 1986, Mr. Hilton was indicted for mail fraud and making a false statement on an income tax return. section 66(c)(1), i.e., that petitioners did not file a joint return. Petitioner concedes that she failed to properly include one-half of the total wage income she and her husband earned in 1981. Expiration of Statute of Limitations
The first issue for decision is whether the period of limitations bars respondent's assessment of the deficiency.
The parties agree that the general three-year statute of limitations expired section 6501(e)(1)(A) applies to extend the limitations period to six years. Reis v. Commissioner, 1 T.C. 9">1 T.C. 9, 12-13 (1942), affd. 142 F.2d 900">142 F.2d 900 (6th Cir. 1944). See Burbage v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 546">82 T.C. 546, 553 (1984), affd. 774 F.2d 644">774 F.2d 644 (4th Cir. 1985). In order to satisfy his burden, he must show that the taxpayer omitted from gross income an amount in excess of 25 percent of the gross income required to be shown in the return. Sec. 6501(e)(1)(A). See Burbage v. Commissioner, supra; Davenport v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 921">48 T.C. 921, 928 (1967); Courtney v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 658">28 T.C. 658, 668 (1957).
Accordingly, we must decide whether the misappropriated funds and the interest thereon are properly includable in petitioner's gross income.
Louisiana is a community property state. Therefore, we must look to Louisiana law to determine whether the "income" belonged to the community, or whether it was Mr. Hilton's separate property. United States v. Mitchell, 403 U.S. 190">403 U.S. 190, 197 (1971); Sampson v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 614">81 T.C. 614, 618 (1983), affd. without published opinion 829 F.2d 39">829 F.2d 39 (6th Cir. 1987); Johnson v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 340">72 T.C. 340, 344 (1979); Estate of Williams v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 400">62 T.C. 400, 407 (1974). See cf. Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509">363 U.S. 509, 512-514 (1960); Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103">287 U.S. 103 (1932).
Generally, a spouse residing in a community property state has a vested interest in and is owner of one-half of all of both spouses' community income, and is generally liable for the Federal income tax on one-half thereof.United States v. Mitchell, 403 U.S. at 196; *416 Bender v. Pfaff, 282 U.S. 127 (1930); La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2363 (West 1985). See Bagur v. Commissioner, 603 F.2d 491">603 F.2d 491, 498 (5th Cir. 1979), remanding 66 T.C. 817">66 T.C. 817 (1976). actually "received" or "enjoyed" her share of the income. Cf. Kimes v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 774">55 T.C. 774, 782 (1971).
Louisiana law defines community property as "property acquired during the existence of the legal regime through the effort, skill, or industry of either spouse;" and all other property not classified by law as separate property. La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2338 (West 1985). Although there is a presumption that all property "acquired" or "possessed" during the marital community is community property, this presumption may be overcome upon proper proof. La. Civ. Code Ann. arts. 2338 and 2340 (West 1985); Bridges v. Osborne, 525 So. 2d 337">525 So.2d 337 (La. Ct. App. 1988), writ denied 530 So. 2d 567">530 So.2d 567 (La. 1988).
Petitioner and Mr. Hilton were not parties to a matrimonial agreement excluding the community property regime. Furthermore, there was not a judgment decreeing a separation of their property.
A. Misappropriated Funds
If the misappropriated funds constitute community property, then one-half is properly includable in petitioner's income and taxable to her even though she had no part in its acquisition. Crawford v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1961-224; La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2338 (West 1985).
Petitioner alleges that she did not acquire a vested interest in one-half of the funds because her husband never acquired title to them. Thus, the funds did not constitute community income and, therefore, are not properly includable in her income for purposes of section 6501(e)(1)(A) or section 66.*419 On the other hand, respondent contends that the misappropriated funds are presumed to constitute community property under La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2340 (West 1985). *418 T. L. James intended to pass both possession and title to Mr. Hilton, the funds constitute community property. See Johnson v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 340 (1979). We disagree with respondent's contentions.
Although we have not found a Louisiana Supreme Court case interpreting the term "acquired," we believe Louisiana, like Texas, Johnson v. Commissioner, supra.Cf. Cosey v. Cosey, 376 So. 2d 486">376 So.2d 486 (La. 1979) (for real property to be classified as community property there must be an act of sale transferring title). Therefore, we believe that, as a general principle, property is not "acquired" within the meaning of Louisiana's community property law until the spouse making the acquisition acquires some legal title thereto. See Wrightsman v. Commissioner, 111 F.2d 227">111 F.2d 227, 228 (5th Cir. 1940), affg. 40 B.T.A. 502">40 B.T.A. 502 (1939). Accordingly, if a spouse acquires possession of property without title, the property remains the separate property of the spouse who has possession, and for Federal tax purposes, is properly taxed to the person who has "control." Wrightsman v. Commissioner, supra.See Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376">281 U.S. 376 (1930); Grimm v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 747">89 T.C. 747, 753 (1987), affd. 894 F.2d 1165">894 F.2d 1165 (10th Cir. 1990).
Our decision, therefore, turns on whether Mr. Hilton acquired title to the misappropriated funds.
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. sec. 14:67 (West 1986) defines "theft" as the "misappropriation or taking of anything of value which belongs to another * * * by means of fraudulent conduct, practices, or representations."
Where property is acquired by theft, whether title to such property passes depends on whether the owner intended to pass both possession and title to the illegal taker. See Johnson v. Commissioner, supra; Wrightsman v. Commissioner, supra.It is clear that T. L. James did not intend to pass title to Mr. Hilton, but rather to Industrial, the fictitious company. Accordingly, we find that, under Louisiana law, like that of Texas, title to the misappropriated funds did not pass to Mr. Hilton. Succession of Onorato, 219 La. 1">219 La. 1, 51 So. 2d 804">51 So.2d 804 (1951). See Wrightsman v. Commissioner, supra.
Since Mr. Hilton did not acquire title to the misappropriated funds, a fortiori, the funds were not "acquired" for purposes of vesting a one-half interest in petitioner. See Johnson v. Commissioner, supra.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the $ 87,674.16 (one-half of the misappropriated funds) is not properly includable in petitioner's gross income. Sec. 6501(e)1)(A). See Sec. 66(c)(2).
B. Interest Income
Respondent contends that the natural and civil fruits of separate property of a spouse are community property. See La. Civ. Code Ann. arts. 2338 and 2339 (West 1985). On the other hand, petitioner alleges that since the interest was earned from the misappropriated funds, then it should be considered the separate property of Mr. Hilton and not "properly includable" in petitioner's gross income. We agree with respondent.
Petitioner's name appeared on the Form 1090 and on the bank's statements indicating that $ 2,969.24 interest was earned during 1981. Petitioner failed to go forward with additional evidence to rebut respondent's contention, and failed to convince this Court that the interest earned on the Southern accounts was other than community income. Therefore, we find the interest earned on the Southern accounts constitutes community income. See Poole v. Poole, 270 So. 2d 218">270 So.2d 218 (La. Ct. App. 1972); La. Civ. Code Ann. arts. 2338 and 2339 (West 1985).
We hold that one-half of the interest income, or $ 1,484.62, was properly includable in petitioner's separate return. Sec. 6501(e)(1)(A).
Based on the foregoing, petitioner omitted $ 3,892.11, i.e., $ 2,407.49 of additional wage income and $ 1,484.62 of interest income, which is in excess of 25 percent of $ 15,377.32, or $ 3,844.33, the amount stated in her return. Accordingly, the six-year period of limitations under section 6501(e)(1)(A) applies.
Section 66(c)
We must next determine whether petitioner qualifies for relief under section 66(c). Petitioner bears the burden of proof. Rule 142(a).
The purpose of section 66(c) is to provide relief from unreported community income which, pursuant to the rules of section 879(a), is more appropriately attributable to the other spouse. To qualify under section 66(c) petitioner must satisfy all four of the following conditions:
(1) she must not have filed a joint return with Mr. Hilton for 1981,
(2) she must not have included in her gross income for 1981 an item of community income properly includable therein which, in accordance with the rules contained in section 879(a), would be treated as the income of Mr. Hilton,
(3) she must establish that she did not know, and had no reason to know, of the item of community income, and,
(4) taking into account all facts and circumstances, it is inequitable to include such item of community income in her gross income.If all four of these prerequisites are satisfied, then the item of unreported community income is includable in the income of the other spouse.
Respondent concedes petitioner has satisfied the first prerequisite. Additionally, the first part of the second requirement is also satisfied, since petitioner failed to include two items of community income that were properly includable on her 1981 separate return; i.e., one-half of the interest income (community income) and one-half of the total community wage income.
A. Section 66(c)(2), second part
Section 879(a) attributes (1) "earned income" to the spouse who performed the services [sec. 897(a)(1)], (2) trade or business income in accordance with section 1402(a)(5) [sec. 879(a)(2)], (3) community income not described in either (1) or (2) which is derived from the spouse's separate property, to such spouse [sec. 879(a)(3)], and (4) all other community income in accordance with the applicable community property law [sec. 879(a)(4)].
We have already found that the misappropriated funds were the "separate property" of Mr. Hilton, a fortiori, the interest earned from those funds falls within section 879(a)(3). We therefore, conclude that the interest income is properly attributable to Mr. Hilton, not petitioner.
Additionally, the $ 2,407.49 community wage income petitioner failed to report is likewise attributable to Mr. Hilton in accordance with section 879(a)(1).
B. Section 66(c)(3)
In our opinion, this prerequisite for relief has been satisfied with respect to the interest income. It is clear that petitioner neither knew of, nor had reason to know of Industrial's existence, the misappropriated funds, the Southern accounts, or the interest earned thereon.
However, with respect to the wage income, we find that petitioner knew her husband had "earned income." Thus, we find that section 66(c)(3) is not satisfied as to the $ 2,047.49, and petitioner remains liable for the taxes thereon.
C. Section 66(c)(4)
Lastly, in accordance with the fourth prerequisite, we believe that under all the circumstances, it would be inequitable to include the interest income in petitioner's income. There is no evidence that petitioner ever "benefited," significantly or otherwise, from this interest income.
Additions to tax
The last issue for decision is whether petitioner is liable for negligence and additional interest under section 6653(a)(1) and (2).
Under the circumstances, we find petitioner was not negligent and is, therefore, not liable for the additions to tax.
To reflect the foregoing,
Decision will be entered under Rule 155.
Document Info
Docket Number: Docket No. 20857-87
Citation Numbers: 60 T.C.M. 217, 1990 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 397, 1990 T.C. Memo. 379
Judges: PARR
Filed Date: 7/24/1990
Precedential Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 11/20/2020
Authorities (15)
Goodell v. Koch , 51 S. Ct. 62 ( 1930 )
Succession of Wiener , 203 La. 649 ( 1943 )
United States v. Mitchell , 91 S. Ct. 1763 ( 1971 )
Wrightsman v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue , 111 F.2d 227 ( 1940 )
Corliss v. Bowers , 50 S. Ct. 336 ( 1930 )
James v. United States , 81 S. Ct. 1052 ( 1961 )
John Howard Burbage, and Rosalind A. Burbage v. ... , 774 F.2d 644 ( 1985 )
Hopkins v. Bacon , 51 S. Ct. 62 ( 1930 )
Burnet v. Harmel , 53 S. Ct. 74 ( 1932 )
Poe v. Seaborn , 51 S. Ct. 58 ( 1930 )
Reis v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue , 142 F.2d 900 ( 1944 )
Bridges v. Osborne , 525 So. 2d 337 ( 1988 )
Bender v. Pfaff , 51 S. Ct. 64 ( 1930 )
Aimee D. Bagur v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Barbara ... , 603 F.2d 491 ( 1979 )
Maxine T. Grimm v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue , 894 F.2d 1165 ( 1990 )
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