State v. Blanton ( 1998 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE
FILED
June 15, 1998
STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) FOR PUBLICATION
) Cecil W. Crowson
Appellee, ) FILED: Appellate Court Clerk
)
v. ) CHEATHAM COUNTY
)
JAMES BLANTON ) HON. ALLEN W. WALLACE, JUDGE
)
Appellant. ) NO. 01-S-01-9605-CC-00093
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
I join the majority in affirming the conviction of the
defendant on two counts of premeditated first-degree murder, three
counts of grand larceny, and three counts of first-degree burglary.
However, because I conclude that the punishment of death is
disproportionate under the record in this case, I respectfully
dissent.
The defendant argues that the “heinous, atrocious, and
cruel” aggravating circumstance cannot apply to him because there
is no evidence that he shot or stabbed Mrs. Vester. The majority
disposes of his argument by concluding that the evidence was
clearly sufficient to support the convictions. However, the
“sufficiency of the evidence” analysis, utilized to determine
whether to uphold a conviction, should not also be utilized to
uphold imposition of the death penalty. Clearly, its standard of
review is too deferential for use in this context. See State v.
Sutton, 761 S.W.2d 763, 764-65 (Tenn. 1988), cert. denied, 497 U.S.
1031, 110 S. Ct. 3287, 111 L. Ed. 2d 796 (1990) (when determining
the sufficiency of the evidence, the standard of review is whether,
after considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the
State, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt). The death
penalty involves the most serious of all constitutional issues.
Consequently, evidence should be scrutinized closely when a court
is reviewing its imposition.
As stated, I agree with the majority’s conclusion that
the evidence is clearly sufficient to support the convictions, even
though there is no direct evidence that the defendant shot or
stabbed either victim. With respect to the sentence, however, I am
unwilling to acquiesce in the imposition of the death penalty
without a closer link between the defendant and the perpetration of
the crime. As Justice Reid noted in his dissent, the evidence does
not even necessarily place the defendant at the scene of the
killings as they were occurring. For this reason, I conclude that
“the defendant’s involvement or role in the murder[s],” a factor of
proportionality, is dispositive here. Because there is no direct
evidence that the defendant was present at the time of the
killings, I conclude that the penalty of death is disproportionate,
and indeed unconstitutional. See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137,
107 S. Ct. 1676, 95 L. Ed. 2d 127 (1987); State v. Branam, 855
S.W.2d 563, 570-71 (Tenn. 1993). Accordingly, I respectfully
dissent.
___________________________________
ADOLPHO A. BIRCH, JR., Justice
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