In Re: Estate of Raymond L. Smallman - Concur and Dissent ( 2013 )


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  •                   IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE
    AT KNOXVILLE
    October 5, 2012 Session Heard at Athens
    IN RE: ESTATE OF RAYMOND L. SMALLMAN
    Appeal by Permission from the Court of Appeals, Eastern Section
    Chancery Court for Hamblen County
    No. 2009P120, 2009-440    Thomas R. Frierson, II, Chancellor
    No. E2010-02344-SC-R11-CV - Filed February 26, 2013
    W ILLIAM C. K OCH, J R., J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
    I concur with the Court’s decision to remand this case for a new trial because the trial
    court erred by admitting into evidence testimony regarding Ms. Caraway’s real estate
    holdings and regarding the execution and substance of Ms. Caraway’s late mother’s will.
    However, I disagree with the Court’s refusal to address Ms. Caraway’s challenge to the
    standing of Mr. Smallman’s sons to contest the validity of her marriage to their father and
    with the Court’s decision that Ms. Caraway may not raise the standing issue on remand.
    Standing is an indispensable element of a plaintiff’s case. See Petty v.
    Daimler/Chrysler Corp., 
    91 S.W.3d 765
    , 767 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002). Under Tennessee law,
    when a plaintiff lacks standing, the courts are precluded from adjudicating the plaintiff’s
    claims. ACLU v. Darnell, 
    195 S.W.3d 612
    , 619 (Tenn. 2006). Thus, “no case or controversy
    is presented where the plaintiff lacks standing to sue.” Mayhew v. Wilder, 
    46 S.W.3d 760
    ,
    767 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001).
    A case must be justiciable at every stage of the proceeding, and if a case is not
    justiciable, it should be dismissed. Because a plaintiff’s standing is integrally related to the
    proper exercise of judicial power, I would find that a challenge to standing is one of those
    issues that may be raised for the first time on appeal under Tenn. R. App. P. 13(b).
    Accordingly, I believe that this Court can and should address the standing question in this
    case.
    In addition, a challenge to standing is not an affirmative defense under Tenn. R. Civ.
    P. 8.03. Knierim v. Leatherwood, 
    542 S.W.2d 806
    , 808 (Tenn. 1976). Accordingly, it is not
    waived if it is not properly pleaded. Because this case is being remanded for a new trial, I
    see no sound basis for preventing Ms. Caraway from challenging the standing of Mr.
    Smallman’s sons to contest the validity of her marriage to their father. The proceedings will
    not be unduly delayed and the parties will not be prejudiced by a full airing of this issue in
    the trial court.
    ______________________________
    WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JUSTICE
    -2-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: E2010-02344-SC-R11-CV

Judges: Justice William C. Koch, Jr.

Filed Date: 2/26/2013

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014