Sanjines v. Ortwein & Assoc. ( 1998 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
FILED
December 21, 1998
JORGE ARIEL SANJINES ) FOR PUBLICATION
Cecil W. Crowson
)
Appellate Court Clerk
Plaintiff-Appellee ) FILED: DECEMBER 21, 1998
)
v. ) HAMILTON COUNTY
)
ORTWEIN AND ASSOCIATES, P.C., ) HON. DOUGLAS A. MEYER,
WILLIAM H. ORTWEIN, and ) JUDGE, sitting by interchange
J. CRIS HELTON )
) NO. 03-S-01-9712-CV-00139
Defendants-Appellants )
For Appellee: For Appellants:
J. ARIEL SANJINES, M.D. SAMUEL R. ANDERSON
Pro se SHANE USARY
Chattanooga, TN
OPINION
REVERSED BIRCH, J.
Jorge Ariel Sanjines, M.D., the plaintiff, is currently
in the custody of the Department of Correction.1 On February 12,
1996, the plaintiff filed a pro se complaint alleging legal
malpractice against Ortwein & Associates, William Ortwein, J. Cris
Helton, and John Morgan,2 the attorneys who had previously
represented him in a criminal proceeding. The essential allegation
of this civil action was that the attorneys had been ill-prepared
and had failed to represent the plaintiff adequately. These
“shortcomings,” he alleged, forced him to enter guilty pleas to
first-degree murder, attempted first-degree murder, and conspiracy
to commit first-degree murder. The trial court granted summary
judgment to the attorneys because the plaintiff failed to file any
response to their motions for summary judgment. On the same day
that the plaintiff filed the malpractice case, he also filed a pro
se petition under the Post-Conviction Procedure Act.3 In it, the
plaintiff alleged that he did not receive the effective assistance
of counsel in the above-described criminal proceeding.
I
At issue here is whether the trial court abused its
discretion in refusing to grant the plaintiff’s motion to stay
1
The plaintiff is serving an effective sentence of life
imprisonment plus twenty-five years for first-degree murder,
attempted first-degree murder, and conspiracy to commit first-
degree murder.
2
Morgan is not a party to this appeal. His application for
permission to appeal was dismissed by order of this Court on
December 8, 1997.
3
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-201 et seq. (Supp. 1996). The trial
court denied the petition; it has been argued and is now under
consideration by the Court of Criminal Appeals.
2
proceedings in the malpractice case until the conclusion of the
post-conviction matter.4 The Court of Appeals concluded that the
refusal constituted an abuse of discretion. For the reasons stated
herein, we find no abuse of discretion and conclude that the trial
court properly refused to stay the proceedings in the malpractice
case.
The matter before us is a simple inquiry into the trial
court’s discretion in refusing to stay the civil action. Although
framed in the context of summary judgment, the plaintiff does not
contest the trial court’s grant of summary judgment; however, he
challenges the denial of his motion to stay. Thus, our review is
not under the de novo standard prescribed for application in
summary judgment cases. See Carvell v. Bottoms, 900 S.W.2d 23, 26
(Tenn. 1995). Instead, questions of stay or continuance are
matters entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial judge. See
Blake v. Plus Mark, Inc., 952 S.W.2d 413, 415 (Tenn. 1997). An
appellate court cannot interfere with the trial court’s decision
unless such decision constitutes an abuse of discretion and causes
prejudice to the party seeking the stay or continuance. Id.; see
also Rachels v. Steele, 633 S.W.2d 473, 475 (Tenn. App. 1981).
Though the issue seems simple, it is complicated by the
procedural tension occasioned by the malpractice and post-
conviction claims moving through the legal system at the same time
4
As grounds, the plaintiff suggested the “inherent conflict
and possible prejudice” in proceeding in the malpractice case prior
to the conclusion of the post-conviction matter.
3
on different tracks and by the fact that the same evidence is
relevant to both cases.
T h e p l a i n t i f f c o n t e n d s t h a t h e i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y
e n t i t l e d t o a n a u t o m a t i c s t a y o f t h e m a l p r a c t i c e c a s e u n t i l t h e
p o s t - c o n v i c t i o n m a t t e r h a s b e e n c o n c l u d e d . I n c o n t r a s t , t h e
d e f e n d a n t s i n s i s t t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f ’ s r i g h t t o a t r i a l d o e s n o t
i n c l u d e t h e r i g h t t o a v o i d a l l p r e - t r i a l m a t t e r s , s u c h a s s u m m a r y
j u d g m e n t o r d i s m i s s a l m o t i o n s , a n d t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t ’ s r u l i n g i n
t h i s c a s e w a s a p p r o p r i a t e b e c a u s e t h e p l a i n t i f f h a d a n o p p o r t u n i t y
t o r e s p o n d t o t h e s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t m o t i o n s b u t f a i l e d t o d o s o .
I I
We first address the question of the plaintiff’s right to
prosecute a civil action. In Whisnant v. Byrd, 525 S.W.2d 152, 153
(Tenn. 1975),5 we held that an inmate “has a constitutional right
to institute and prosecute a civil action seeking redress for . . .
the vindication of any . . . legal right.” We noted, however, that
such right of action is “qualified and restricted.” Id. The
qualification addressed by Whisnant is the limited right of inmates
to present their cases in court. Whisnant held that absent unusual
circumstances, inmates who file civil actions unrelated to the
legality of their convictions “will not be afforded the opportunity
to appear in court to present their cases during their prison
5
Whisnant was a civil action filed by an inmate for the return
of some personal property. Although we know that Whisnant was
convicted of armed robbery and concealing stolen property, we are
unable to determine his effective sentence.
4
terms.” Id. at 154. Trial courts were directed to hold such
matters in abeyance until the inmate is released from prison,
unless an “appropriate directive” is issued requiring the
attendance of the inmate. Id.
The Court of Appeals’s decision in this case, while not
citing Whisnant, followed its rationale in holding that the trial
court abused its discretion in refusing to stay the malpractice
case. The Court of Appeals reasoned that a failure to stay the
action until the conclusion of the post-conviction proceeding would
result in prejudice to the judicial process. We cannot agree.
While the Court in Whisnant was concerned with the rights
of inmates to file civil complaints, the Court did not hold that a
stay is necessary in all civil actions filed by incarcerated
persons in order to prevent prejudice to the judicial process.
Neither did the Court hold that such persons have a constitutional
right to a stay of their civil actions. The Court was concerned
only with the rights and qualifications of an inmate to appear in
court for trial. Whisnant does not discuss how a trial court
should handle pre-trial matters such as stays of proceedings in
inmate civil actions. That is the question thrust upon us today by
the case under submission.
III
Before discussing how a trial court should handle an
inmate’s claim for legal malpractice, we must examine the
differences between a civil action alleging malpractice on the one
5
hand and a post-conviction action alleging ineffective assistance
of counsel on the other. While the conduct underlying both may be
identical, the causes of action are distinctive. A malpractice
case is a pure civil claim for damages. An ineffective assistance
of counsel claim, however, arises in the context of a criminal
proceeding and suggests that because of the deprivation of the
petitioner’s constitutional right to counsel, t h e p e t i t i o n e r i s , i n
t h e u s u a l c a s e , e n t i t l e d t o a n e w t r i a l .
T h e e l e m e n t s t h a t m u s t b e p r o v e d a r e a l s o d i f f e r e n t . T h e
p l a i n t i f f in a malpractice case must prove that the attorney’s
conduct fell below that degree of care, skill, and diligence which
is commonly possessed and exercised by attorneys practicing in the
same jurisdiction. Spalding v. Davis, 674 S.W.2d 710, 714 (Tenn.
1984), overruled on other grounds by Meadows v. State, 849 S.W.2d
748, 752 (Tenn. 1993). In addition, the plaintiff must demonstrate
a nexus between the negligence and the injury. Lazy Seven Coal
Sales, Inc. v. Stone & Hines, P.C., 813 S.W.2d 400, 406 (Tenn.
1991).
In contrast, the petitioner in an ineffective assistance
of counsel claim must prove that counsel’s performance was
deficient and that the deficiency caused prejudice. Henley v.
State, 960 S.W.2d 572, 579 (Tenn. 1997); Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693
(1984). To prove a deficiency, the petitioner must show that
counsel’s acts or omissions were so serious as to fall below an
objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional
6
norms. Henley, 960 S.W.2d at 579; Goad v. State, 938 S.W.2d 363,
369 (Tenn. 1996); see also Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930, 936
(Tenn. 1975). Moreover, to prove prejudice, “a petitioner must
show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.” Goad, 938 S.W.2d at 370 (emphasis added)(quoting
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068, 80 L. Ed. 2d at
698).
Because the elements for legal malpractice and
ineffective assistance of counsel are different, we cannot agree
with the plaintiff that the mere simultaneous prosecution of these
claims results in an inherent conflict mandating a stay of pre-
trial proceedings. Thus, the Court of Appeals erred in finding
that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to grant the
plaintiff a stay of the malpractice case.
IV
Our decision today should not be construed as prohibiting
the trial court, in an appropriate case, from staying a legal
malpractice action during the pendency of a post-conviction matter
alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. For guidance as to
which cases should be stayed and which cases should be allowed to
proceed, we turn to other jurisdictions.
Many of our sister states have considered this very
question. See, e.g., Shaw v. State Dep’t of Admin., 816 P.2d 1358,
1360 (Alaska 1991); Gebhart v. O’Rourke, 510 N.W.2d 900, 905 (Mich.
7
1994). These cases differ from the case under submission, however,
because they were decided in the context of a statute of
limitations question.6 Although we are not faced with such a
question here, we find that the concerns raised by these courts
provide a measure of guidance. Those concerns include:
(1) whether a stay would promote
judicial economy and the
conservation of judicial resources
by reducing the duplication of legal
issues to be litigated; and
(2) whether the attorney defending
a legal malpractice claim is likely
to reveal privileged or other
evidence that might hurt the
criminal defendant’s chances for
post-conviction relief.
Courts should consider these factors on a case-by-case basis, while
at the same time weighing the competing interests of the inmate-
petitioner and the attorney-defendant.
In weighing these competing interests, the trial court
should also consider whether there are alternatives to a stay that
will still protect the parties’ interests. For example, the trial
court should examine the following types of trial management
techniques:
(1) the feasibility of proceeding
by affidavit or deposition;
(2) the possibility of accelerating
one case; and
6
The statute of limitations question addressed by these other
jurisdictions is whether the limitations period begins to run upon
the occurrence of the professional conduct giving rise to the
malpractice case or whether the statute is tolled until the
criminal defendant’s post-conviction matter has been successfully
litigated.
8
(3) the creative use of
stipulations.
The use of such trial management techniques is also within the
trial court’s discretion.
V
Accordingly, we hold that an inmate who is the plaintiff
in a legal malpractice case and who contemporaneously is the
petitioner in a post-conviction matter involving the same facts is
not entitled to an automatic stay of the malpractice case until the
outcome of the post-conviction matter.7 It is within the trial
court’s discretion to determine, on a case-by-case basis, how to
effectively move both cases through the system at the same time.
Thus, in the case under submission, we reverse the Court of
Appeals’s holding that the trial court abused its discretion in
refusing to grant a stay of the malpractice case. Accordingly, we
reinstate the summary judgment.
Costs of this appeal are taxed against Sanjines, for
which execution may issue if necessary.
______________________________
ADOLPHO A. BIRCH, JR., Justice
CONCUR:
Anderson, C.J.
Drowota, Holder, JJ.
7
To the extent that Whisnant can be interpreted as mandating
an automatic stay in these cases, it is overruled.
9