State v. Clarence C. Nesbit ( 1998 )


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  •                   IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE
    AT JACKSON
    FILED
    September 28, 1998
    STATE OF TENNESSEE,                )     For Publication
    )
    Cecil Crowson, Jr.
    Appellee,                     )     Filed:          Appellate C ourt Clerk
    )
    v.                                 )     Shelby County
    )
    CLARENCE C. NESBIT                 )     Hon. Arthur T. Bennett, Judge
    )
    Appellant.                    )     No. 02-S-01-9705-CR-00043
    DISSENTING OPINION
    I must respectfully dissent from the part of the majority
    opinion concerning victim impact evidence.         Because I acknowledge
    that Payne v. Tennessee, 
    501 U.S. 808
    , 
    111 S. Ct. 2597
    , 115 L.
    Ed.2d 720 (1991), controls, I agree with the majority’s statement
    that victim impact evidence is admissible if adduced within the
    constraints of due process and Tenn. R. Evid. 403.                 I disagree,
    however, with the majority’s conclusion that the victim impact
    evidence used in this case was adduced within those constraints.
    Although legally admissible, the reasons for excluding
    victim   impact   evidence   are       still   compelling     in     my    view.
    Particularly troublesome is the issue of relevance.             This is true
    because the character of the victim and the effect on the victim’s
    family may be wholly unrelated to the blameworthiness of the
    defendant.   Booth v. Maryland, 
    482 U.S. 496
    , 504, 
    107 S. Ct. 2529
    ,
    2534, 
    96 L. Ed. 2d 440
    , 449 (1987).             Generally, victim impact
    evidence is unsettling because its use encourages the jury to
    quantify the value of the victim’s life and urges the finding that
    murder is more reprehensible if the victim is survived by a
    bereaved family than if the victim had no family at all.                      See id.
    at 505, 107 S. Ct. at 2534, 96 L. Ed.2d at 450.
    Addressing the particular evidence introduced in this
    case, the majority describes the five pages of victim impact
    evidence as “clear and concise.”                However, as Judge Gary R. Wade
    explained     in    his   partial   dissent       from    the   Court   of   Criminal
    Appeals’s ruling below, the victim impact evidence allowed in Payne
    and other Tennessee cases comprises only a few lines of testimony.
    I therefore view the victim impact evidence in this case as
    protracted and, consequently, prone to be unfairly prejudicial. In
    addition, the State’s rebuttal argument was based on the impact of
    the victim’s death upon her family.                In this argument, the State
    pervasively        characterized     the       victim    impact   evidence    as   an
    aggravating factor to be weighed against the mitigating proof. The
    majority concedes that the argument was error but finds that the
    error   did    not    appear   to    have       affected    the   verdict     to   the
    defendant’s prejudice.
    I, like Judge Wade, cannot conclude that the State’s
    argument, considered with the lengthy victim impact testimony, did
    not affect the verdict.             In so stating, I draw no conclusions
    regarding the penalty imposed.             I find only that a jury should be
    allowed to reconsider the penalty under the correct sentencing
    guidelines. I would remand this case for a new sentencing hearing.
    _______________________________
    ADOLPHO A. BIRCH, JR., Justice
    2
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 02S01-9705-CR-00043

Filed Date: 9/28/1998

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014