Diana Morris v. State of Tennessee ( 1999 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE FILED
(HEARD IN CLARKSVILLE)
March 1, 1999
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate Court Clerk
DIANA MORRIS, ) FOR PUBLICATION
)
Plaintiff/Appellant, ) FILED: MARCH 1, 1999
)
v. ) TENNESSEE CLAIMS COMMISSION
)
STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) HON. W. R. BAKER, COMMISSIONER
)
Defendant/Appellee. ) NO. 01-S-01-9804-BC-00076
For Appellant: For Appellee:
BILL HODDE JOHN KNOX WALKUP
Madison, TN Attorney General and Reporter
MICHAEL E. MOORE
Solicitor General
MICHAEL W. CATALANO
Associate Solicitor General
Nashville, TN
OPINION
AFFIRMED BIRCH, J.
This case requires us to determine whether the Tennessee
Claims Commission has subject-matter jurisdiction over actions
filed against the State for the tort of retaliatory discharge.1
Because we conclude that the Claims Commission does not have such
jurisdiction, the judgment of the Court of Appeals vacating the
Claims Commission’s award and dismissing the retaliatory discharge
action is affirmed.
I
The plaintiff was employed as an account clerk in the
pharmacy at the Tennessee State Prison in Nashville. On August 24,
1990, she fell and struck her head on the corner of her desk.
After recuperating for the weekend at home, the plaintiff attempted
to return to work the following Monday morning but could not do so
because her head was swollen. Although she “called in” every day
after this, the plaintiff remained out of work due to continuing
problems from her head injury. The plaintiff filed notice of her
claim for workers’ compensation benefits with the Division of
Claims Administration on September 26, 1990.2 She was subsequently
terminated on October 10, 1990, without ever having returned to
work.3
1
Oral argument was heard in this case on October 15, 1998, in
Clarksville, Tennessee, as part of this Court’s S.C.A.L.E.S.
(Supreme Court Advancing Legal Education for Students) project.
2
Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-8-402(a)(1991 & Supp. 1998) states: “The
claimant must give written notice of the claimant’s claim to the
division of claims administration as a condition precedent to
recovery . . . .”
3
Pursuant to its authority under Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-8-402(c),
the Division of Claims Administration determined that the State
2
On October 15, 1992, the plaintiff filed a formal
complaint in the Claims Commission seeking workers’ compensation
benefits.4 In the petition, she alleged also that her termination
from state employment was the direct result of her having filed a
petition for workers’ compensation benefits. For this alleged
retaliatory discharge, the plaintiff sought damages in the amount
of $300,000.
The Claims Commission, in an order entered December 8,
1993, awarded workers’ compensation benefits to the plaintiff.5 In
a subsequent order dated January 26, 1995, the Claims Commission,
asserting its subject-matter jurisdiction, overruled the State’s
motion to dismiss the retaliatory discharge action and proceeded to
hear the matter. The Commission determined that “[the claimant]
has factually and legally established that she was discharged
because she filed a workers’ compensation claim.” The Commission
later heard evidence on damages and entered judgment for the
plaintiff against the State in the amount of $300,000.
should pay medical expenses for the August 24th injury. The
Division denied a later claim for additional benefits filed by the
plaintiff.
4
The Claims Commission has jurisdiction over workers’
compensation claims by state employees by virtue of Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 9-8-307(a)(1)(K)(1991 & Supp. 1998), which states: “The
commission or each commissioner sitting individually has exclusive
jurisdiction to determine all monetary claims against the state
falling within one (1) or more of the following categories: . . .
(K) Workers’ compensation claims by state employees . . . .”
5
No aspect of the workers’ compensation claim is included in
this appeal.
3
The Court of Appeals vacated the judgment. In its
opinion, the court stated: We need not belabor the point nor
engage in analysis where none is require[d]. The Tennessee Claims
Commission is without jurisdiction to entertain claims against the
State for damages for the tort of retaliatory discharge.”
II
As a preliminary matter, because the State is sovereign,
suit may be brought against the State only in such a manner and in
such courts as the legislature may by law direct. Tenn. Const.
art. I, § 17. In May 1984, the General Assembly enacted
legislation creating the Tennessee Claims Commission. Act of May
24, 1984, ch. 972, 1984 Tenn. Pub. Acts 1026 (codified as amended
at Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 9-8-301 to -307 (1992 & Supp. 1998)). This
legislation authorized the filing of suits against the State under
certain conditions and bestowed exclusive jurisdiction over several
enumerated categories of claims on the Claims Commission. The
Commission’s jurisdiction is limited as specified in the Act; thus,
its jurisdiction cannot be altered except by the General Assembly.
Hill v. Beeler, 199 Tenn. 325, 328-29, 286 S.W.2d 868, 869 (1956)
(legislative acts conferring jurisdiction upon the Board of Claims
to adjudicate claims against the State of Tennessee must be
strictly construed).
As stated, the issue presented for our review is whether
the Claims Commission has subject-matter jurisdiction to hear and
determine suits for retaliatory discharge filed by former state
4
employees. The plaintiff contends that jurisdiction is derived
from three sources, the first of which is Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-8-
307(a)(1).
Tennessee Code Annotated § 9-8-307(a)(1) confers
jurisdiction on the Tennessee Claims Commission “to determine all
monetary claims against the state based on the acts or omissions of
‘state employees . . . .’” The statute lists the types of claims
that may be brought before the Claims Commission. The tort of
retaliatory discharge is not included on this list.
The plaintiff contends that the second source of
jurisdiction is the provisions of Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-8-310 (Supp.
1998), which state: “(a) An entity of state government may not
terminate a state employee for filing a workers’ compensation claim
with the claims commission. (b) Any employee terminated for
filing a workers’ compensation claim may file a grievance in
accordance with § 8-30-328, alleging a violation of subsection
(a).” The language of this statute, on its face, clearly does not
authorize a retaliatory discharge action to be filed with the
Claims Commission. Instead, the remedy provided for retaliatory
discharge for a state employee who is terminated for filing a
workers’ compensation claim with the Claims Commission is to
utilize the grievance procedure in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 8-30-328.6 Under this statute, the Civil Service Commission may
order the employee to be reinstated, or made whole, or both,
6
Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-30-328 (1993 & Supp. 1998) provides for
grievance procedures under the Civil Service Commission.
5
without loss of pay or benefits. Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-30-328(e).
The Civil Service Commission may also award attorney’s fees and
costs to a successful appealing employee. Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-30-
328(f).
Despite the admittedly clear and unambiguous language of
Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-8-310, the plaintiff contends that the
legislative history reveals the intent of the General Assembly to
invest the Claims Commission with subject-matter jurisdiction over
retaliatory discharge actions. When the language of an act is
clear and unambiguous, resort to the legislative history is
ordinarily unwarranted. See Anderson v. Outland, 360 S.W.2d 44, 47
(Tenn. 1962) (stating that “[w]here the words of a statute are
clear and plain and fully express the legislative intent, there is
no room to resort to auxiliary rules of construction.”). As stated
above, we find the language of Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-8-310 to be
clear and unambiguous; thus, there is no need to resort to the
legislative history.
For the third source, the plaintiff contends that the
Claims Commission’s jurisdiction over retaliatory discharge actions
vests by virtue of its express jurisdiction over workers’
compensation claims filed by state employees. See Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 9-8-307(a)(1)(K). It is true that the workers’ compensation law
prohibiting retaliatory discharge as a device to avoid compensation
claims7 is applicable to the State under Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-8-
7
Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-114 (Supp. 1998) states: “No contract
or agreement, written or implied, or rule, regulation or other
device, shall in any matter operate to relieve any employer in
6
307(a)(1)(K)(i).8 However, it does not follow, as the plaintiff
contends, that jurisdiction over a retaliatory discharge action is
thereby conferred on the Claims Commission. In Van Cleave v. McKee
Baking Co., 712 S.W.2d 94, 95 (Tenn. 1986), this Court specifically
held that a retaliatory discharge action is a common law tort claim
that is a separate cause of action from a workers’ compensation
claim. Because it is a separate tort action, the two claims cannot
be joined together. See Smith v. Lincoln Brass Works Inc., 712
S.W.2d 470, 472 (Tenn. 1986) (“A claim for damages for retaliatory
discharge is a tort action and cannot be joined with a workers’
compensation claim.”). Thus, a retaliatory discharge action
against the State must have its own basis of jurisdiction in the
Claims Commission separate and apart from the Claims Commission’s
jurisdiction over workers’ compensation claims.
III
Because actions for retaliatory discharge are separate
tort actions from workers’ compensation cases, and because the
General Assembly has not expressly or implicitly included such
actions within the Claims Commission’s statutory jurisdiction, we
hold that the Claims Commission does not have subject-matter
jurisdiction over these actions.
whole or in part of any obligation created by this chapter except
as herein provided.” The Court has stated that retaliatory
discharge is considered a prohibited “device.” Clanton v. Cain-
Sloan Co., 677 S.W.2d 441, 445 (Tenn. 1984).
8
Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-8-307(a)(1)(K)(i) states, in pertinent
part, that “[s]ection 50-6-114 shall apply to workers’ compensation
claims against the state.”
7
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. The
costs of this appeal are taxed to the plaintiff.
_______________________________
ADOLPHO A. BIRCH, JR., Justice
CONCUR:
Anderson, C.J.
Drowota, Holder, Barker, JJ.
8