Margaret Benton, Admin.- Est.of Davis Benton v. City of Springfiled , 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 351 ( 1998 )


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  •                  IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE
    AT NASHVILLE
    FILED
    June 15, 1998                  FOR PUBLICATION
    Cecil W. Crowson                 Filed:      June 15, 1998
    Appellate Court Clerk
    MARTHA BENTON, Administratrix of   )
    the Estate of DAVIS RAY BENTON,    )
    )
    PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,         )   ROBERTSON CIRCUIT
    )
    v.                                 )   Hon. John H. Gasaway III, Judge
    )
    CITY OF SPRINGFIELD,               )   No. 01S01-9505-CV-00076
    )
    DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.        )
    FOR APPELLANT:                         FOR APPELLEE:
    JAMES C. SUMMERS                       JEFF K. WALKER
    NASHVILLE                              SPRINGFIELD
    OPINION
    TRIAL COURT AND SPECIAL WORKERS'
    COMPENSATION PANEL REVERSED                                HOLDER, J.
    OPINION
    We granted review of this workers’ compensation case to determine
    whether a police officer's coronary heart disease arose out of his employment
    with the Springfield Police Department. A Special Workers' Compensation Panel
    held that the plaintiff's injury was compensable. W e agree with the panel's
    findings that the plaintiff met the criteria in Tenn. Code Ann. § 7-51-201(a)(1) and
    that the presumption afforded by § 7-51-201 was sufficiently rebutted by expert
    testimony. We, however, hold that the plaintiff failed to show the presence of a
    specific acute or sudden stressful event immediately preceding his heart attack
    in accordance with our recent holding in Krick v. City of Lawrenceburg, 
    945 S.W.2d 709
     (Tenn. 1997). The plaintiff's case is dismissed.
    The plaintiff was a police officer for the Springfield Police Department and
    was assigned to the Drug Task Division. The plaintiff's last day of work was on
    Friday, February 16, 1990. The plaintiff was awakened by chest pain early
    Sunday morning, February 18, 1990, and was admitted to a hospital with a
    diagnosis of a heart attack. He was released approximately eight days later and
    sustained another heart attack on his way home. He was readmitted to the
    hospital and underwent open-heart surgery. He did not return to his job as a
    drug task force officer for the Springfield Police Department.
    The plaintiff's treating physician, Dr. Loyda Tacoque, testified by
    deposition that two risk factors contributed to the plaintiff's heart attack, smoking
    and stress. Dr. Tacoque stated that the plaintiff's cholesterol was not unusually
    high and there was no family history of heart disease. Prior examination had not
    revealed any evidence of heart disease. Dr. Tacoque opined that stress related
    2
    to the plaintiff's job as a drug task force officer likely contributed to the plaintiff's
    heart condition.
    The plaintiff testified concerning work-related stress and stress associated
    with pending litigation arising out of a lawsuit involving a work-related search.
    The plaintiff was served with the lawsuit in January of 1990. He stated that the
    first time he had ever experienced heart-related symptoms was a few days prior
    to his heart attack while speaking with his attorney regarding the pending lawsuit.
    The defendant offered the testimony of Dr. Taylor Wray, a cardiologist
    who reviewed the plaintiff's medical records. Dr. Wray opined that plaintiff's
    heart condition was not job-related. Dr. Wray attributed the plaintiff's heart
    condition to "the fact that [the plaintiff] smoked two packs a day of cigarettes."
    Dr. Wray opined that stress related to the plaintiff's work as a drug task force
    officer did not contribute "the least little bit" to the plaintiff's heart attacks.
    This Court recently held in Krick v. City of Lawrenceburg, 
    945 S.W.2d 709
    (Tenn. 1997), that a medical opinion provided by a competent medical expert
    was sufficient to rebut the presumption in Tenn. Code Ann. § 7-51-201.
    According to Krick, the rebuttal of the statutory presumption removes analysis of
    a law enforcement officer's disability claim from the purview of § 7-51-201. Krick
    then held that a law enforcement officer's claim shall be analyzed under the
    general statutory provision defining occupational injuries in the Workers'
    Compensation Act. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 50-6-102(a)(5), -301; Id. at. 713. Once
    a law enforcement officer's claim is outside the purview of the "[l]aw enforcement
    and firefighters" statute, we must find the heart attack was "immediately
    precipitated by a specific acute or sudden stressful event." Id. at 713-714.
    3
    The plaintiff has not shown a specific acute or sudden stressful event
    immediately preceding his heart attack. The plaintiff's meeting with an attorney
    concerning a civil lawsuit several days prior to the heart attack was neither acute
    nor sudden. Pursuant to Krick, the workers' compensation panel's decision
    affirming the trial court's finding of compensability is reversed. Costs of this
    appeal shall be taxed against the plaintiff, Martha Benton, the administratrix of
    the estate of Davis Ray Benton, for which execution may issue if necessary.
    JANICE M. HOLDER, JUSTICE
    Concurring:
    Anderson, C.J.
    Birch and Reid, J.J.
    Drowota, J. Not Participating
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 01S01-9505-CV-00076

Citation Numbers: 973 S.W.2d 936, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 351

Judges: Anderson, Birch, Drowota, Holder, Reid

Filed Date: 6/15/1998

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/14/2024