Ben C. Adams v. Buchanan D. Dunavant v. Watson Burns PLLC ( 2023 )

07/21/2023
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
Submitted on Briefs
BEN C. ADAMS v. BUCHANAN D. DUNAVANT ET AL. v. WATSON
BURNS PLLC ET AL.
Accelerated Appeal by Permission from the Court of Appeals
Probate Court for Shelby County
No. PR-24390 Joe Townsend, Judge
___________________________________
No. W2023-00304-SC-T10B-CV
___________________________________
Before his election to the bench, the probate judge in this interpleader action served as an
expert witness in a 2017 case involving one of the defendants, Watson Burns, PLLC. In
the current case, Watson Burns, PLLC and another law firm defendant moved for the
probate judge’s recusal based on the expert opinions the judge expressed in the 2017 case.
The probate judge denied the motion, and the law firms filed an accelerated interlocutory
appeal as of right to the Court of Appeals pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B.
The Court of Appeals reversed, ordered the probate judge’s recusal, and remanded for
assignment of another judge. Two other parties to the interpleader action then filed an
accelerated application for permission to appeal in this Court pursuant to Rule 10B, section
2.07. We ordered the parties prevailing in the Court of Appeals to file a response to the
application. Having thoroughly reviewed the Rule 10B application for permission to
appeal, the response, all appendices, and the applicable law, we grant the Rule 10B
application, dispense with additional briefing and oral argument, and hold that the probate
judge’s denial of the recusal motion was appropriate in this case. Therefore, we reverse the
judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand for further proceedings consistent with this
decision.
Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B Accelerated Appeal by Permission; Judgment of the
Court of Appeals Reversed; Judgment of the Probate Court Reinstated.
PER CURIAM.
Jeremy G. Alpert and George Joseph Nassar, Jr., Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellants,
Lillian Dunavant and Mary Douglas Dunavant.
Lynn Wilhelm Thompson, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellee Ben C. Adams.
John S. Golwen, Memphis, Tennessee, for appellee Bass, Berry & Sims PLC.
Patrick Glenn Walker, Memphis, Tennessee, for appellees Buchanan D. Dunavant and
Harris Shelton Hanover Walsh, PLLC.
William F. Burns, William Edward Routt, III, and Frank Lee Watson, III, Memphis,
Tennessee, for appellee Watson Burns, PLLC.
OPINION
I. BACKGROUND
Buchanan D. Dunavant is a beneficiary of two trusts established by his father and is
due certain distributions from those trusts. Watson Burns, PLLC and Bass, Berry & Sims
PLC (collectively, “Law Firms”) claim an interest in Mr. Dunavant’s trust distributions to
pay their fees for representing him in litigation that is still pending in the Circuit Court for
Shelby County.1 The Law Firms also claim a statutory lien in the trust funds. See Tenn.
Code Ann. §§ 23-2-102, -103. Mr. Dunavant’s former spouse, Mary Douglas Dunavant,
and the three children from their marriage, Mary Wilkinson Dunavant, Lucy Hughes
Dunavant, and Lillian Gardner Dunavant (collectively, “Dunavant children”), also claim
an interest in the trust distributions due Mr. Dunavant.2 Their interest is based on
settlements they reached with Mr. Dunavant in four probate actions they filed against him.
In these actions, the Dunavant children alleged that Mr. Dunavant breached fiduciary duties
and mishandled certain trusts that were established for their benefit. Mr. Dunavant and the
Dunavant children settled these cases prior to trial. The probate judge approved the four
settlements, including the requirement that consideration for the settlements would be
provided by the trust distributions due Mr. Dunavant.
1
According to a declaration from Mr. Dunavant that the Law Firms filed in the probate court, Mr.
Dunavant agreed to pay the Law Firms forty percent “of any gross recovery (plus expenses) that [he has] a
right to collect from any Trust created by [his] father and/or from any source of funds stemming or coming
from his [father’s] Estate.” Mr. Dunavant also declared that the Law Firms “are entitled to the fees and
expenses sought and outlined in detail in their June 2, 20[2]2, Amended and Verified Attorney Charging
Lien,” which consist of $453,714.00 in attorneys’ fees and $72,448.00 in expenses, for a total of
$526,126.40. Mr. Dunavant acknowledged these fees and expenses should be paid from the trust
distributions at issue in the interpleader action.
2
Mr. Dunavant’s former spouse, Mary Douglas, sued on her own behalf and as guardian for their
minor children, Mary Wilkinson Dunavant and Lucy Hughes Dunavant. Their adult child, Lillian Gardner
Dunavant, sued on her own behalf.
-2-
The trust distributions due Mr. Dunavant are not sufficient to satisfy the claims of
the Law Firms and of the Dunavant children; therefore, the attorney trustee3 for the trusts
filed an interpleader action in probate court on November 29, 2022, seeking to deposit the
funds with the Shelby County Probate Court. The trustee also requested an award of
attorneys’ fees and costs and an order discharging him from liability and dismissing him
from the case.
On December 6, 2022, the Law Firms moved for disqualification and recusal of the
probate judge. The Law Firms asserted that in 2017, before taking the bench, the probate
judge served as an expert witness for a petitioner in another trust dispute in which one of
the Law Firms, Watson Burns, PLLC (“Watson Burns”), represented the respondent. The
trial court in the earlier case granted the respondent’s motion to dismiss, ruled the
petitioner’s challenge was frivolous, and awarded sanctions and attorneys’ fees to the
respondent. When Watson Burns (and another law firm not involved in this action) filed
their fee applications, the petitioner opposed the fee application and hired the probate
judge, who was a private attorney at that time, to review it.
The Law Firms point out that, in his 2017 expert affidavit, the probate judge opined
that the attorneys’ fee request of $1,933,767.95 was “outrageous and clearly excessive”
under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 8, Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5 because the
“litigation was not complex and basically involved a simple matter of legal interpretation,”
the complaint “was a relatively simple and straightforward request for information that did
not involve any complex legal issues,” “[t]here was no discovery,” and “[t]here were zero
depositions.” He opined that experienced attorneys should have taken no more than forty-
to-sixty hours to prepare and present the motion to dismiss to the trial court. He noted that
Watson Burns and the other law firm were seeking to recover attorneys’ fees for 4,282.7
hours of work, even though the case was filed on June 25, 2015, a hearing on the motion
to dismiss occurred on December 7, 2015, and an order dismissing the case was entered on
February 28, 2016. He also believed, based on his own thirty years’ experience and his
practice of charging $250 per hour for out-of-court time and $300 for in-court time, that
the hourly rates the law firms charged were excessive. They charged $320 for associates
and between $450 and $525 for partners. Regarding a co-defendant law firm that is not
involved here, he suggested that the block billing in the fee application was inadequate,
inappropriate, and not sufficiently specific to enable the trial court to determine whether
the time had been spent on activities for which the trial court had awarded attorneys’ fees.
He further stated that the redacted fee application Watson Burns submitted was
“unintelligible” and failed to describe with sufficient specificity the tasks performed so that
the trial court could determine whether the time had been spent on the matter for which
fees had been awarded.
3
Ben C. Adams is the attorney trustee.
-3-
The Law Firms asserted that the opinions the probate judge expressed in the 2017
affidavit created an actual and apparent bias against Watson Burns, which detrimentally
impacted the interests of Bass, Berry & Sims PLC in the interpleader action.
On December 7, 2022, the day after the Law Firms moved for disqualification, the
probate judge, unaware of their motion, granted the trustee’s request to interplead the
funds, awarded the trustee his attorneys’ fees and court costs, and dismissed him from the
case.
The Law Firms raised the probate judge’s failure to address their recusal motion in
the interpleader action in an interlocutory recusal appeal as of right to the Court of Appeals.
See Adams v. Dunavant, No. W2022-01747-COA-T10B-CV, 2023 WL 1769356, at *2
(Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 2023) [hereinafter Adams I]. The Court of Appeals in Adams I
vacated the probate judge’s order on the interpleader petition and remanded with
instructions for the probate judge to decide the recusal motion promptly and, if the judge
denied the motion, to “state in writing the grounds upon which he denied the motion.” Id.
at *4; see Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B, § 1.03.
Following the remand, on February 8, 2023, the probate judge denied the Law
Firms’ December 6, 2022, recusal motion.4 The probate judge first explained the various
reasons and processes that culminated in his being unaware of the pendency of the recusal
motion. He then turned to evaluating the merits of the recusal motion, reasoning as follows:
The 10B motion makes specific factual and legal arguments regarding [the
probate judge’s] decisions in the four related Shelby County Probate Cases.
These factual and legal arguments are moot based upon [Adams I] that denied
the motions to recuse in the four related Shelby County Probate Cases. Even
if the decisions in the four related cases were not moot, case law makes it
clear that the mere fact that a judge has ruled adversely to a party is not
grounds for recusal. Berg v. Berg, [No. M2018-01163-COA-T10B-CV,]
2018 WL 3612845[,] at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. [July 27,] 2018) (quoting
McKenzie v. McKenzie, [No. M2015-00010-COA-T10B-CV,] 2014 WL
575908[,] at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. [Feb. 11,] 2014)). []In fact, [“r]ulings of a
trial judge, even if erroneous, numerous and continuous, do not, without
more, justify disqualification.[”] Id. (quoting[] McKenzie, 2014 WL 575908,
at *4). Consistent adverse rulings may lead a party to wish for another trial
judge, but they do not provide a basis for requiring the trial judge’s recusal
from the case. Runyon v. Runyon, [No. W2013-02651-COA-T10B,] 2014
WL 1285729[,] at *10 (Tenn. Ct. App. [Mar. 31,] 2014). “If the rule were
otherwise, recusal would be required as a matter of course since trial courts
4
Order Denying Rule 10B Motion Related to Interpleader Action (Feb. 8, 2023).
-4-
necessarily rule against parties and witnesses in every case, and litigants
could manipulate the impartiality issue for strategic advantage, which the
courts frown upon.” Davis v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 38 S.W.3d 560, 565
(Tenn. 2001).
The only other specific fact alleged in the 10B motion for recusal concerns a
2017 opinion in an affidavit by [the probate judge,] then [a] private
attorney[,] involving Watson Burns and other attorneys regarding the
reasonableness of fees as a basis for sanctions against a trust beneficiary in
the amount of approximately 1.9 million dollars. The amount appeared to
exceed the amount of fees related to [an] action for which the trust
beneficiary was being sanctioned. The issue regarding the sanctions was
resolved by the trial court, the appellate courts, and the parties years ago.
[When the probate judge was an attorney, he] did not represent a party in that
action. These facts do not appear to be a basis for recusal. A judge’s prior
participation in other litigation as a private attorney adverse to a party in
current litigation does not necessitate disqualification from presiding over
different litigation involving one of the same parties. See[] Balmoral
Shopping [Ctr.], LLC v. City of Memphis, et al., [No. W2022-01488-COA-
T10B-CV,] 2022 WL 17075631[, at *3] (Tenn. Ct. App. [Nov. 18,] 2022).
On February 13, 2023, the probate judge again granted interpleader and ordered the
trustee to deposit the funds due Mr. Dunavant with the Shelby County Probate Court
Clerk.5 The probate judge directed the Clerk to pay the Dunavant children from the funds
the trustee deposited according to the previously approved settlement agreements. He also
ordered the Clerk to pause distribution of any funds remaining after the settlements were
satisfied, pending further orders of the probate judge.
The probate judge made additional findings as well, including that the Law Firms
forfeited their attorney charging lien against Mr. Dunavant. Despite this finding, the
probate judge assumed jurisdiction over a petition for the Law Firms’ attorneys’ fees for
services rendered to Mr. Dunavant in the circuit court proceeding, and declared:
The Firms shall file a Petition for Attorney Fees within Thirty (30) days of
the Trustee’s notice to the Court and the parties that the funds have been
deposited with the Shelby County Probate Court Clerk. If the Firms do not
file a Petition for Attorney Fees within the Thirty (30) day period, the Court
will issue an order directing the Shelby County Probate Clerk to disperse the
balance of funds to Buchanan D. Dunavant.
5
Order Granting Interpleader, Directing Deposit of Funds with Court Clerk and Discharging
Trustee from Liability (Feb. 13, 2023).
-5-
The Law Firms then filed a second accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right in
the Court of Appeals pursuant to Rule 10B. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s
denial of the recusal motion and remanded for assignment to another judge. Adams v.
Dunavant, No. W2023-00304-COA-T10B-CV, 2023 WL 3066511, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App.
Apr. 25, 2023). The Court of Appeals explained its ruling as follows:
As the probate judge correctly noted, a judge is generally not required to
recuse simply because he advocated against one of the parties while in private
practice. Balmoral Shopping Ctr., LLC [], 2022 WL 17075631, at *3 []
(holding recusal unnecessary even though the judge, before taking the bench,
served as opposing counsel against one of the parties); see also Hon. Virginia
A. Phillips & Hon. Karen L. Stevenson, Rutter Group Practice Guide:
Federal Civil Procedure Before Trial-National Edition, Ch. 16-D, (The
Rutter Group 2022) (recognizing “[a] judge’s prior career is generally not
ground for disqualification in cases in which the judge has no knowledge of
the facts or interest”). But serving as a lawyer in a case is not the same as
serving as an expert witness in a case. A lawyer’s “duty [is] to advance a
client’s objectives diligently through all lawful measures.” ABA Comm. on
Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 407 (1997) [hereinafter Formal Op. 407].
The lawyer’s representation “does not constitute an endorsement of the
client’s political, economic, social, or moral views or activities.” Tenn. Sup.
Ct. R. 10, Rule 1.2(b). The expert witness offers his own views. A “testifying
expert provides evidence that lies within his special knowledge by reason of
training and experience and has a duty to provide the court . . . truthful and
accurate information.” Formal Op. 407.
We presume the judge’s prior expert testimony about Watson Burns’[]
billing statements and fees was truthful. Of course, the judge’s prior opinions
might be assumed to be limited to the billing statements submitted and fees
requested in the case for which he was hired as an expert. And the
circumstances under which the [Law] Firms are seeking recovery of a fee are
different here. This is an interpleader action; the [Law] Firms are not seeking
an award of fees from the court. So the opinions the judge offered as expert
witness might be insufficient alone to justify recusal.
Here, the [Law] Firms also point to other actions of the probate court judge
that they claim indicate bias. Among other things, they complain that the
court’s order on their motion for disqualification and recusal “does not
address or explain how or whether he can act with impartiality in connection
with Watson Burns’ lien and claim for legal fees in light of the inflammatory
opinions he lodged against Watson Burns just a few years ago in connection
-6-
with a fee request.” They also complain that the court’s order “summarily
extinguish[ed] [the Firms’] liens by finding that . . . such liens are forfeited.”
The court did so “without allowing any party to file answers and preserve
defenses and without holding any hearings.”
Taking all these facts together, we find “a reasonable basis for questioning
the judge’s impartiality.” Davis, 38 S.W.3d at 564 (citation omitted). We
agree that the court’s order does not address the probate judge’s prior opinion
testimony. Instead, it summarily concludes that opinion testimony is not a
proper basis for recusal. And, under the circumstances, the relief the probate
court granted on the petition for interpleader provides an additional basis for
questioning impartiality. Usually, adverse rulings alone do not establish bias.
[State v.] Cannon, 254 S.W.3d [287,] 308 [(Tenn. 2008)]. But here the court
forfeited the [Law] Firms’ “charging lien” in its initial order even though no
party had answered the petition for interpleader and the trustee had not
requested that relief in his petition. The court seemingly made factual
findings without holding an evidentiary hearing. And it ordered distribution
of the interpleaded funds to some claimants without hearing from all the
competing claimants.
Id. at *3–4 (some alterations in original) (emphasis in original).
After the Court of Appeals decision, the Dunavant children then filed a Rule 10B
application for permission to appeal in this Court. Having thoroughly reviewed the Rule
10B application, the Law Firms’ response, all appendices, and the applicable law, we grant
the Rule 10B application, dispense with additional briefing and oral argument, and hold
that the probate judge’s denial of the recusal motion was appropriate in this case.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
De novo review applies to our resolution of this Rule 10B appeal. Tenn. Sup. Ct. R.
10B, § 2.07 (“The Supreme Court shall decide the appeal . . . upon a de novo standard of
review.”). “The provisions of [Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure] 11 . . . do not apply
to such appeals.” Id. Thus, the Law Firms’ assertion that the issues in this appeal do not
merit review under the standards of Rule 11 misses the mark.
III. ANALYSIS
“Tennessee litigants are entitled to have cases resolved by fair and impartial judges.”
Cook v. State, 606 S.W.3d 247, 253 (Tenn. 2020) (citing Davis, 38 S.W.3d at 564); see
also State v. Griffin, 610 S.W.3d 752, 757–58 (Tenn. 2020). To preserve public confidence
-7-
in judicial neutrality, judges must be fair and impartial, both in fact and in perception. Cook,
606 S.W.3d at 253; Kinard v. Kinard, 986 S.W.2d 220, 228 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). To
these ends, the Tennessee Rules of Judicial Conduct (“RJC”) declare that judges must “act
at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the independence, integrity, and
impartiality of the judiciary, and shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety.” Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10, RJC 1.2. Another provision declares that judges “shall
uphold and apply the law, and shall perform all duties of judicial office fairly and
impartially.” Id., RJC 2.2.
To act “impartially” is to act in “absence of bias or prejudice in favor of, or against,
particular parties or classes of parties, as well as maintenance of an open mind in
considering issues that may come before a judge.” Id., Terminology. “A judge shall
disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might
reasonably be questioned.” Id., RJC 2.11(A).
Rule of Judicial Conduct 2.11 “incorporates the objective standard Tennessee
judges have long used to evaluate recusal motions.” Cook, 606 S.W.3d at 255. “Under this
objective test, recusal is required if ‘a person of ordinary prudence in the judge’s position,
knowing all of the facts known to the judge, would find a reasonable basis for questioning
the judge’s impartiality.’” Id. (quoting Davis, 38 S.W.3d at 564–65).
The intermediate appellate courts have explained that the proponent of a recusal
motion bears the burden of establishing that recusal is appropriate and that any alleged acts
of bias or prejudice arise from extrajudicial sources rather than from events or observations
during the litigation of the case. Tarver v. Tarver, No. W2022-00343-COA-T10B-CV,
2022 WL 1115016, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 14, 2022). A trial judge has a duty to serve
unless the proponent establishes a factual basis warranting recusal. Raccoon Mtn. Caverns
and Campground, LLC v. Nelson, No. E2022-00989-COA-T10B-CV, 2022 WL 3100606,
at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 4, 2022) (quoting Rose v. Cookeville Reg’l Med. Ctr., No.
M2007-02368-COA-R3-CV, 2008 WL 2078056, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 14, 2008)).
Furthermore, rulings adverse to the proponent of a recusal motion are not, standing
alone, grounds for recusal. Cannon, 254 S.W.3d at 308; Davis, 38 S.W.3d at 564; Duke v.
Duke, 398 S.W.3d 665, 671 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012). “Rulings of a trial judge, even if
erroneous, numerous and continuous, do not, without more, justify disqualification.” Alley
v. State, 882 S.W.2d 810, 821 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). “[T]he mere fact that a judge has
ruled adversely to a party or witness in a prior judicial proceeding is not grounds for
recusal.” Davis, 38 S.W.3d at 565 (citing State v. Hines, 919 S.W.2d 573, 578 (Tenn.
1995)). The “adversarial nature of litigation” makes it necessary for trial judges to “assess
the credibility of those who testify before them, whether in person or by some other
means,” and “the mere fact that a witness takes offense at the court’s assessment of the
witness cannot serve as a valid basis for a motion to recuse.” Id. “If the rule were otherwise,
-8-
recusal would be required as a matter of course since trial courts necessarily rule against
parties and witnesses in every case, and litigants could manipulate the impartial[it]y issue
for strategic advantage, which the courts frown upon.” Id.Applying these standards de novo to the facts of this case, we cannot conclude that
a person of ordinary prudence in the probate judge’s position, knowing all the facts known
to him, would find a reasonable basis for questioning his impartiality. The opinions he
expressed in the 2017 affidavit concerned a different case and distinct legal questions,
specifically whether the fees requested in that unrelated case were reasonable and whether
the fee application was sufficiently detailed and specific to enable the trial judge in that
case to determine if the work for which fees were claimed related to the matter for which
fees had been awarded. This matter involves neither the reasonableness of fees nor the
sufficiency of any fee application. Even assuming that expressing an opinion on a matter
as an expert witness could constitute grounds for recusal in some situations, the 2017
affidavit does not indicate bias because it is not sufficiently related to the issues in this
case.
The Court of Appeals seemed to suggest that expressing an opinion as an expert
witness is more problematic than acting in a representative capacity as a lawyer. But the
fact remains that the expert opinion at issue did not constitute evidence of actual or
perceived bias. In any event, the Rule of Judicial Conduct that requires disqualification for
previous public statements applies only to statements made “while a judge or judicial
candidate . . . other than in a court proceeding, judicial decision, or opinion.” Tenn. Sup.
Ct. R. 10, RJC 2.11(A)(5). No rule contemplates disqualification for public statements
made before becoming a judge or judicial candidate or while serving as an expert witness.
Davis v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company is instructive. In Davis, the trial judge
previously resolved a workers’ compensation case and expressed negative opinions about
the credibility of an expert witness. Id. at 563–64. The employee in Davis moved for the
trial judge’s recusal because the employee planned to call the same expert witness to testify.
Id. at 562–64. The employee alleged that the trial judge’s negative assessment of the expert
witness’s credibility in the earlier case amounted to bias against the expert requiring the
trial judge’s recusal. Id. at 564–65. The trial court disagreed and denied the recusal motion.
Id. at 565. The employee appealed, and this Court affirmed. Id.The Davis Court declared: “the mere fact that a judge has ruled adversely to a party
or witness in a prior judicial proceeding is not grounds for recusal.” Id. The Davis Court
opined that the trial court’s statements in the prior case concerning the expert witness’s
credibility were not “an objectively reasonable basis for questioning the judge’s
impartiality” in a subsequent case. Id.-9-
Although Davis involved a previous ruling made by a trial judge, rather than
statements made by an expert witness, we reach the same conclusion here. The opinions
the probate judge expressed in the 2017 affidavit about the fee application at issue in the
2017 case are not an objectively reasonable basis for questioning the probate judge’s
impartiality. The probate judge’s 2017 opinions related specifically to the fee application
and legal issues in that separate case. His opinions were not inherently hostile to or biased
against Watson Burns6 but were his assessment of the particular fee application in that case.
The probate judge’s adverse rulings in the interpleader action and in the four probate
cases the Dunavant children filed do not create an objectively reasonable basis for
questioning the probate judge’s impartiality. As noted in Davis, Alley, and many other
Tennessee decisions, “[r]ulings of a trial judge, even if erroneous, numerous and
continuous, do not, without more, justify disqualification.” Alley, 882 S.W.2d at 821. “If
the rule were otherwise, recusal would be required as a matter of course since trial courts
necessarily rule against parties and witnesses in every case, and litigants could manipulate
the impartial[it]y issue for strategic advantage, which the courts frown upon.” Davis, 38
S.W.3d at 565.
In a Rule 10B appeal, the only order properly before the reviewing court is the
recusal order. Therefore, we express no opinion on the legal propriety of the probate
judge’s rulings in the interpleader action or in the four other probate actions. We simply
hold that these adverse rulings are not sufficient to support a conclusion that “a person of
ordinary prudence in the judge’s position, knowing all of the facts known to the judge,
would find a reasonable basis for questioning the judge’s impartiality.” Cook, 606 S.W.3d
at 255 (quoting Davis, 38 S.W.3d at 565–65 (quoting Alley, 882 S.W.2d at 820)).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and
the judgment of the probate judge denying the recusal motion is reinstated. This matter is
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this decision. Mandate shall issue
immediately, as a petition for rehearing is not permitted. Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B, § 2.07.
6
The trial court in the 2017 case “expressed its displeasure with the considerable amount of fees
expended in the case and declined to award the trust the full amount of its attorneys’ fees.” In re Willard R.
Sparks Revocable Tr. 2004, No. W2017-01497-COA-R3-CV, 2018 WL 6720687, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App.
Dec. 20, 2018). An appeal followed. Id. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision awarding
an attorneys’ fee award of $200,000, just over ten percent of the approximately $1.9 million the attorneys’
fee application requested. Id. at *3, *6.
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PER CURIAM
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