State of Tennessee v. James C. Leveye ( 2005 )


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  •          IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT NASHVILLE
    Assigned on Briefs November 17, 2004
    STATE OF TENNESSEE v. JAMES C. LEVEYE
    Direct Appeal from the Criminal Court for Davidson County
    No. 2002-C-1353   Cheryl Blackburn, Judge
    No. M2003-02543-CCA-R3-CD - Filed February 16, 2005
    Defendant, James C. Leveye, entered a plea of nolo contendere to possession of more than 0.5 grams
    of marijuana with intent to sell, a Class E felony. The trial court imposed the recommended sentence
    of four years as a Range III persistent offender. As a part of the plea agreement, Defendant reserved
    a certified question of law under Rule 37(b)(2)(i) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure
    arguing that the trial court erred in not suppressing the marijuana and drug paraphernalia discovered
    during a search of Defendant’s person. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
    Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed
    THOMAS T. WOODALL, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JOSEPH M. TIPTON and ALAN
    E. GLENN , JJ., joined.
    P. Brocklin Parks, Nashville, Tennessee, (on appeal) and Jonathan Richardson, Nashville,
    Tennessee, (at trial) for the appellant, James C. Leveye.
    Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; Richard H. Dunavant, Assistant Attorney
    General; Victor S. (Torry) Johnson, III, District Attorney General; and Bret Gunn, Assistant District
    Attorney General, for the appellee, the State of Tennessee.
    OPINION
    At Defendant’s suppression hearing, Officer Jessie Loy testified that he received a call
    concerning a person who refused to leave the premises of a car dealership on Lafayette Street. The
    dealership was closed at the time of the call. “No trespassing” signs were posted on the property.
    When Officer Loy arrived at the site, he found Defendant sitting on an elevated wall next to the
    dealership’s building. Officer Loy got out of his car, and Defendant approached him. Officer Loy
    immediately smelled a strong odor of fresh marijuana and arrested Defendant. He recognized the
    odor based upon prior experience in making arrests as a police officer. He handcuffed Defendant
    and asked Defendant if he had anything on his person that Officer Loy needed to know about.
    Defendant told Officer Loy that he had a “little bit of marijuana” in his shirt pocket. Officer Loy
    found the marijuana and then searched Defendant’s fanny-pack and duffel bag. He discovered
    approximately 85.8 grams of marijuana, a manual set of scales, and rolling papers. Officer Loy ran
    a computer check for outstanding warrants and discovered that a warrant for Defendant’s arrest was
    outstanding.
    Officer Loy admitted that he did not read Defendant his Miranda rights at any point during
    the arrest. Officer Loy said, however, that even if he had not smelled the marijuana, he would have
    issued Defendant a citation for criminal trespass. Because Officer Loy was required to check
    Defendant’s name before issuing a citation, he said that he would have discovered the outstanding
    warrant even without arresting Defendant for possession of drugs.
    Defendant testified that he was crossing the dealership’s property on his way to the Rescue
    Mission. Defendant said he found the fanny-pack and duffel bag and stopped by the wall to see what
    was inside the bags. Defendant said that Officer Loy handcuffed him before he had a chance to say
    anything. After he searched Defendant, Officer Loy put him in the patrol car and then searched the
    bags. Defendant said that he had lived in the neighborhood for approximately two years and had
    never seen any cars on the property.
    The State conceded that Defendant’s disclosure that he had marijuana in his shirt pocket
    should be suppressed because Officer Loy failed to read Defendant his Miranda rights after
    Defendant was placed in custody. The trial court granted Defendant’s motion to suppress his
    statement that he had marijuana in his shirt pocket. As to the seizure of the drugs and drug
    paraphernalia, the trial court found as follows:
    Here, when Officer [Loy] received the trespassing call, he was obligated to
    investigate the matter. Upon arriving at the site, he observed Defendant and
    approached him to inquire as to his identity and his purpose for being on the
    premises, whether lawful or not. As both Officer [Loy] and the defendant
    approached one another, Officer [Loy] smelled the odor of marijuana, which gave
    him probable cause to search Defendant. However, even had Officer [Loy] not
    detected the odor of marijuana, the evidence would have inevitably been discovered
    because when Officer [Loy] inquired about Defendant’s identity, he ran a record
    check, a standard operating procedure. This check indicated that Defendant had an
    outstanding warrant; thus, Officer [Loy] was required to place Defendant in custody
    and could perform a lawful search incident to the arrest which would have ultimately
    revealed the marijuana and drug paraphernalia. Thus, the Court finds that even
    assuming Officer [Loy] had not detected the marijuana odor, the inevitable discovery
    exception removes any taint connected with the March 9, 2002 search of Defendant’s
    person, and this Court concludes that the evidence obtained in the search should not
    be suppressed. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to suppress is DENIED as to the
    items seized from Defendant.
    -2-
    Following the suppression hearing, Defendant entered into a plea of nolo contendere,
    reserving as a certified question of law the following dispositive issue: “Whether the marijuana and
    drug paraphernalia seized from the defendant by Officer Jessie Loy on March 9, 2002, in the area
    of 660 Lafayette Street in Nashville, Tennessee, should be suppressed because of an unconstitutional
    search or seizure.” The State makes no objection to the form or substance of this reserved question
    of law, and we have determined that it meets the requirements of Rule 37(b) of the Tennessee Rules
    of Criminal Procedure. See State v. Preston, 
    759 S.W.2d 647
    , 650 (Tenn. 1988). Accordingly, we
    will address Defendant’s certified question of law on its merits.
    Defendant argues first that the trial court erred in concluding that the odor of marijuana about
    Defendant’s person provided sufficient probable cause to search Defendant. Secondly, Defendant
    argues that the drugs and drug paraphernalia in Defendant’s bags would not have been inevitably
    discovered as argued by the State because there was no probable cause to believe that Defendant had
    committed the offense of criminal trespass.
    The findings of fact made by the trial court at the hearing on a motion to suppress are binding
    upon this Court unless the evidence contained in the record preponderates against them. State v.
    Ross, 
    49 S.W.3d 833
    , 839 (Tenn. 2001). The prevailing party is entitled to the strongest legitimate
    view of the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence. State v. Hicks, 
    55 S.W.3d 515
    , 521 (Tenn. 2001). However, this Court is not bound by the trial court’s conclusions
    of law. State v. Randolph, 
    74 S.W.3d 330
    , 333 (Tenn. 2002). The application of the law to the facts
    found by the trial court are questions of law this Court reviews de novo. State v. Daniel, 
    12 S.W.3d 420
    , 423 (Tenn. 2000).
    “Under both the United States and Tennessee Constitutions, a search or seizure conducted
    without a warrant is presumed unreasonable.” State v. Smith, 
    21 S.W.3d 251
    , 254 (Tenn. Crim. App.
    1999) (citations omitted). Evidence seized as a result of a warrantless search or seizure must be
    suppressed unless the search or seizure was conducted pursuant to one of the recognized exceptions
    to the warrant requirement. Id. Under one of these exceptions, a warrantless search is permissible
    if it is supported by probable cause and is conducted under exigent circumstances. State v. Shrum,
    
    643 S.W.2d 891
    , 893 (Tenn. 1982); State v. Blakely, 
    677 S.W.2d 12
    , 16 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983).
    Officer Loy initially investigated the premises of the dealership after receiving a call that an
    individual refused to leave the property. He stopped his vehicle when he spotted Defendant, and he
    and Defendant approached one another. Officer Loy detected, based upon his law enforcement
    experience, a strong odor of marijuana emanating from Defendant’s person. Although Defendant
    strenuously argues that Officer Loy did not have probable cause to arrest him for criminal trespass,
    that is not necessary to support the warrantless search.
    This Court has previously concluded that the detection of a strong odor of marijuana around
    an individual gives a law enforcement officer probable cause for a warrantless search, which is a
    “‘reasonable ground for suspicion, supported by circumstances indicative of an illegal act,’” together
    with the existence of exigent circumstances. State v. Reginald Allan Gillespie, No. 03C01-9706-CR-
    -3-
    00222, 
    1999 WL 391560
     at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, June 16, 1999), perm. to appeal
    denied (Tenn. 1999)(quoting State v. Henning, 
    975 S.W.2d 290
    , 294 (Tenn. 1998)). In Gillespie,
    a police officer observed three men standing on a sidewalk. As he drove by, he detected the odor
    of marijuana and stopped his police car. The officer approached the men and saw smoke lingering
    about them. A panel of this Court concluded that the police officer had a reasonable ground of
    suspicion that the men were committing an illegal act, and there were exigent circumstances caused
    by the ability of the suspects to flee or dispose of the contraband even in the presence of the officer
    which justified the search of the defendants’ persons. Gillespie, 1999 WL at *3.
    We see little, if any, difference between the facts in Gillespie and the facts in the case sub
    judice. Therefore, whether or not the contraband would have been “inevitably discovered” absent
    the statement by Defendant is irrelevant. Accordingly, Defendant is not entitled to relief in this
    appeal.
    CONCLUSION
    The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
    ___________________________________
    THOMAS T. WOODALL, JUDGE
    -4-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: M2003-02543-CCA-R3-CD

Judges: Judge Thomas T. Woodall

Filed Date: 2/16/2005

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021