State of Tennessee v. Claude David Powers ( 2017 )


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  •                                                                                             07/24/2017
    IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT NASHVILLE
    Assigned on Briefs May 10, 2017
    STATE OF TENNESSEE v. CLAUDE DAVID POWERS
    Appeal from the Circuit Court for Montgomery County
    No. CC-15-CR-968      William R. Goodman III, Judge
    No. M2016-02019-CCA-R3-CD
    The Defendant, Claude David Powers, pleaded guilty in the Montgomery County Circuit
    Court to aggravated assault, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-102 (2014) (amended
    2015). The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to four
    years, with one year to serve in confinement and the remainder to serve on probation. On
    appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) his four-year sentence is excessive and (2) the
    trial court erred in denying his request for full probation. Because the trial court failed to
    place the appropriate findings of fact and determinations on the record as required by our
    sentencing laws, we remand the case to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing.
    Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Reversed;
    Case Remanded
    ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which NORMA
    MCGEE OGLE and ALAN E. GLENN, JJ., joined.
    Joshua W. Etson, Clarksville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Claude David Powers.
    Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Katherine C. Redding, Assistant
    Attorney General; John W. Carney, Jr., District Attorney General; and Chris Dotson,
    Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
    OPINION
    In September 2015, the Defendant was indicted for attempt to commit first degree
    murder and aggravated assault. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the Defendant pleaded
    guilty to aggravated assault, the State dismissed the attempted murder charge, and the
    trial court would determine the length and manner of service of the sentence. The
    transcript of the guilty plea hearing is not included in the appellate record.
    At the sentencing hearing, the presentence report was received as an exhibit. The
    report showed previous convictions for three counts of public intoxication, two counts of
    driving under the influence of an intoxicant, two counts of vandalism, assault, domestic
    assault, reckless driving, driving with a suspended license, and resisting arrest. The
    report also showed two previous probation violations.
    The presentence report showed that the Defendant obtained his GED, that he
    reported only one previous employer, and that he intended to work for a construction
    company if he received probation. The Defendant had previously completed drug and
    alcohol awareness classes. At the time of the presentence investigation, the Defendant
    was undergoing Suboxone treatment for opiate addiction. He reported good mental
    health and excellent physical health. He reported first drinking alcohol at age fifteen and
    drinking one beer weekly at the time of the presentence investigation. The report noted
    that the investigator believed the Defendant “fabricated” his alcohol-related responses
    because of the Defendant’s history of alcohol-related criminal conduct. The Defendant
    reported first abusing prescription opiates at age twenty-seven.
    The Defendant submitted a written statement to the presentence investigator
    explaining the night of the incident. In the statement, the Defendant explained that earlier
    that evening, he had been at an acquaintance’s home, that he left, and that he walked
    home. He said that after being home for about thirty minutes to one hour, he began
    walking to a nearby convenience store to purchase cigarettes and beer. He said that
    during the walk to the store, he was approached by the victim and another man the
    Defendant identified as Tim. The Defendant explained that the men
    walked up to me and seemed like everything was normal. Then
    immediately they demanded that I give them whatever I had whether it was
    drugs or money. So I said “Hell no.” That’s when [the victim] pulled a
    knife on me. When this happened the other man named Tim ran off to the
    side of the building so I took out my pocket knife in the intent to [persuade]
    him to stop what he was doing and back off. But he did not[. He] took his
    weapon and tried to thrust it into my chest area. So what happened next
    was my first instinct which was stop him to get him off of me. And I did so
    to keep him from coming at me. I believe that I pricked him 2 times in the
    abdomen area. When this happened he dropped to the ground and lay[]
    there. So I was really scared and shaking so I ran to my house. I tried to
    tell my wife what happened but I was hysterical. She was trying to help me
    breathe and calm down. Before I could even get to a phone to explain to
    police what had happened. They were already at my front door knocking,
    looking for me. Then I was escorted downtown. I never wanted any harm
    to come of this man. I wish that I could change the outcome of this offense,
    and maybe handled the situation in a better manner.
    -2-
    Tony Bush, the victim, testified that on the evening of April 25, 2015, he and Tim
    went to his visit their friend, Tammy. The victim said that he, Tim, Tammy, and
    Tammy’s daughter were at Tammy’s home and that the Defendant arrived late that night.
    The victim said that everyone was drinking alcohol and was having fun. He said that the
    Defendant asked if the victim could acquire drugs for the Defendant and that the victim
    made arrangements to obtain cocaine. The victim said that the Defendant gave the victim
    money, that the victim left for about five minutes, that the victim returned with cocaine
    and gave it to the Defendant, and that the Defendant left.
    The victim testified that the Defendant returned to Tammy’s home about twenty-
    five minutes to one hour later, that the Defendant wanted “fifty more” because the
    cocaine “wasn’t that good,” that the victim obtained more cocaine, that the victim gave
    the cocaine to the Defendant, and that the Defendant left. The victim said that the
    Defendant returned a third time ten or fifteen minutes later and that everyone socialized
    until daylight. The victim said that around 6:00 a.m., the Defendant asked Tim to drive
    the Defendant to purchase beer, that the victim mentioned he saw the Defendant’s wife
    looking out her front door for the Defendant, who lived nearby, and that Tim drove the
    Defendant home.
    The victim testified that the Defendant returned to Tammy’s home about ten
    minutes later, that “the girls” told the victim to tell the Defendant that “he had to leave”
    because the girls were scared of the way the Defendant was talking and behaving, and
    that the Defendant left but returned. The victim said that previously the Defendant had
    entered the home through the front door but knocked on the back door this time. The
    victim said that the girls told him not to allow the Defendant inside, that the Defendant
    said he wanted “thirty more,” and that the victim and the Defendant left the home and
    began walking toward the victim’s friend’s “building.” The victim said that the next
    thing he knew, the Defendant was stabbing him with a knife. The victim said that he and
    the Defendant struggled, that the victim got away, that the Defendant caught him and
    stabbed him again, and that the Defendant stabbed him four times. The victim said the
    Defendant “ran off” toward the Defendant’s home. The victim denied pulling a knife and
    said he did not carry knives.
    The victim testified that after the stabbing, he ran to his home, told his wife what
    occurred, grabbed a towel for the bleeding, and walked to Tammy’s home and told her to
    call the police. He said that when the paramedics were taking him to the ambulance, he
    told them that the Defendant stabbed him and that the Defendant was standing beside the
    police car. The victim denied attempting to rob the Defendant.
    On cross-examination, the victim testified that the last time the Defendant returned
    to Tammy’s home to purchase drugs, the Defendant showed the victim money before the
    victim left the home and began walking with the Defendant. The victim denied knowing
    -3-
    why the Defendant stabbed him. The victim said that although he was bleeding heavily,
    he walked to Tammy’s home to inform her of the stabbing and to ask her to call the
    police. He said that his wife had a telephone and probably called the police but that he
    wanted to let his friends know the Defendant had stabbed him. The victim denied
    possessing cocaine when the stabbing occurred and discussing with his wife what he
    would tell the police. He agreed that he was on probation for a drug-related offense at the
    time of the stabbing and the sentencing hearing and that he had a previous theft
    conviction.
    The victim testified that he was also known as Tommy Bush and that he told the
    investigating officer that his name was Tommy. When counsel suggested that the victim
    told the police his name was Tommy instead of Tony to escape detection that he was on
    probation, the victim said his identification reflected his name as Tommy, not Tony. The
    victim said that he had not socialized much with the Defendant before this incident,
    although they lived in the same area. The victim said he had not sold the Defendant
    drugs before this incident.
    The trial court found that no mitigating and enhancement factors applied. See
    T.C.A. §§ 40-35-113 (2014); 40-35-114 (2014). The court noted that the victim’s
    testimony reflected the victim was, at a minimum, a drug delivery person and was
    possibly a drug dealer. The court found that this case was “perhaps” related to a dispute
    regarding the quality or quantity of the cocaine. The trial court, without explaining its
    rationale, sentenced the Defendant to four years, with one year to serve in confinement
    and the remainder to serve on probation. This appeal followed.
    The Defendant contends that his sentence is excessive and that the trial court
    should have granted his request for full probation. The State responds that no error in
    sentencing occurred. We conclude that a new sentencing hearing is required because the
    trial court failed to place on the record any of its findings and determinations supporting
    the length and manner of service of the Defendant’s sentence.
    This court reviews challenges to the length and manner of service of a sentence
    within the appropriate sentence range “under an abuse of discretion standard with a
    ‘presumption of reasonableness.’” State v. Bise, 
    380 S.W.3d 682
    , 708 (Tenn. 2012). A
    trial court must consider any evidence received at the trial and sentencing hearing, the
    presentence report, the principles of sentencing, counsel’s arguments as to sentencing
    alternatives, the nature and characteristics of the criminal conduct, any mitigating or
    statutory enhancement factors, statistical information provided by the Administrative
    Office of the Courts as to sentencing practices for similar offenses in Tennessee, any
    statement that the defendant made on his own behalf, and the potential for rehabilitation
    or treatment. State v. Ashby, 
    823 S.W.2d 166
    , 168 (Tenn. 1991) (citing T.C.A. §§
    -4-
    40-35-103 (2014), -210 (2014); State v. Moss, 
    727 S.W.2d 229
    , 236 (Tenn. 1986); State
    v. Taylor, 
    744 S.W.2d 919
    (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987)); see T.C.A. § 40-35-102 (2014).
    Likewise, a trial court’s application of enhancement and mitigating factors is
    reviewed for an abuse of discretion with “a presumption of reasonableness to within-
    range sentencing decisions that reflect a proper application of the purposes and principles
    of our Sentencing Act.” 
    Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 706-07
    . “[A] trial court’s misapplication of
    an enhancement or mitigating factor does not invalidate the sentence imposed unless the
    trial court wholly departed from the 1989 Act, as amended in 2005.” 
    Id. at 706.
    “So long
    as there are other reasons consistent with the purposes and principles of sentencing, as
    provided by statute, a sentence imposed . . . within the appropriate range” will be upheld
    on appeal. 
    Id. The standard
    of review for questions related to probation or any other alternative
    sentence is an abuse of discretion with a presumption of reasonableness. State v. Caudle,
    
    388 S.W.3d 273
    , 278-79 (Tenn. 2012). Generally, probation is available to a defendant
    sentenced to ten years or less. T.C.A. § 40-35-303(a) (2014). The burden of establishing
    suitability for probation rests with a defendant, who must demonstrate that probation will
    “‘subserve the ends of justice and the best interest of both the public and the defendant.’”
    State v. Souder, 
    105 S.W.3d 602
    , 607 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2002) (quoting State v. Dykes,
    
    803 S.W.2d 250
    , 259 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990)); see T.C.A. § 40-35-303(b); State v.
    Carter, 
    254 S.W.3d 335
    , 347 (Tenn. 2008).
    A sentence is based upon “the nature of the offense and the totality of the
    circumstances,” including a defendant’s background. State v. Ashby, 
    823 S.W.2d 166
    ,
    168 (Tenn. 1991); see State v. Trotter, 
    201 S.W.3d 651
    , 653 (Tenn. 2006). A trial court
    is permitted to sentence a defendant who otherwise qualifies for probation or alternative
    sentencing to incarceration when:
    (A) [c]onfinement is necessary to protect society by restraining a defendant
    who has a long history of criminal conduct;
    (B) [c]onfinement is necessary to avoid depreciating the seriousness of the
    offense or confinement is particularly suited to provide an effective
    deterrence to others likely to commit similar offenses; or
    (C) [m]easures less restrictive than confinement have frequently or recently
    been applied unsuccessfully to the defendant[.]
    T.C.A. § 40-35-103(1)(A)-(C) (2014); see 
    Trotter, 201 S.W.3d at 654
    .
    -5-
    The record does not reflect that the trial court considered any of the purposes and
    principles of sentencing in determining the length and manner of service of the
    Defendant’s sentence. Although the trial court thought the offense was the result of a
    drug-related dispute and found, without elaboration, that no mitigating and enhancing
    factors applied, the court made no findings supporting its imposition of a four-year
    sentence with split confinement. The record does not reflect that the court considered the
    presentence report, the evidence presented at the guilty plea hearing, counsel’s
    arguments, the nature of the Defendant’s conduct, his statement during the presentence
    investigation, his social history, his physical and mental health, his potential for
    rehabilitation, or the deterrent effect of the sentence. See T.C.A. §§ 40-35-102, -103, -
    210; 
    Ashby, 823 S.W.2d at 168
    ; 
    Moss, 727 S.W.2d at 236
    . In essence, the court failed to
    state its reasoning for imposing the Defendant’s sentence “in order to ensure fair and
    consistent sentencing.” T.C.A. § 40-35-210(e).
    Furthermore, the record reflects that the Defendant was eligible for probation
    because the sentence imposed was less than ten years. See 
    id. § 40-35-303(a).
    Likewise,
    he was a favorable candidate for probation based upon his standard offender
    classification, although a trial court is not bound by this advisory sentencing guideline.
    See 
    id. § 40-35-102(6)(A),
    (D). However, the record does not reflect that the court
    considered any of the appropriate principles in denying the Defendant’s request for full
    probation. See 
    id. § 40-35-103(1)(A)-(C).
    The court did not discuss the Defendant’s
    criminal history, whether confinement was necessary to avoid depreciating the
    seriousness of the offense, or whether measures less restrictive than confinement had
    been applied unsuccessfully to the Defendant. See 
    id. Based upon
    the trial court’s failure to state on the record the relevant findings of
    fact and conclusions of law in determining the length and manner of service of the
    Defendant’s sentence, we cannot afford the court’s determinations a presumption of
    reasonableness. 
    Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 705
    . Our supreme court has stated that when a trial
    court fails to place on the record its reasons for imposing a sentence pursuant to
    Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-210(e), as we have concluded in this case, “the
    more appropriate course of action . . . may be to remand to the trial court” for a new
    sentencing hearing because proper appellate review is prevented. 
    Id. at 705
    n.41.
    Therefore, we conclude that it is necessary to remand this case in order for the trial court
    to consider all of the purposes and principles of sentencing and to place its findings of
    fact and reasoning on the record for imposing a particular sentence.
    In consideration of the foregoing and the record as a whole, we affirm the
    Defendant’s conviction but remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings
    consistent with this opinion.
    ____________________________________
    ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY, JR., JUDGE
    -6-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: M2016-02019-CCA-R3-CD

Judges: Judge Robert H. Montgomery, Jr.

Filed Date: 7/24/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 7/24/2017