State v. Roy McGriff ( 2010 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE FILED
OCTOBER 1998 SESSION
November 4, 1998
Cecil W. Crowson
Appellate Court Clerk
STATE OF TENNESSEE, )
) NO. 01C01-9709-CR-00426
Appellee, )
) DAVIDSON COUNTY
VS. )
) HON. CHERYL BLACKBURN,
ROY DALE McGRIFF, ) JUDGE
)
Appellant. ) (Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea)
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
ROBERT J. MENDES (AT HEARING) JOHN KNOX WALKUP
Cummins Station, Ste. 507 Attorney General and Reporter
209 Tenth Avenue, South
Nashville, TN 37203 CLINTON J. MORGAN
Assistant Attorney General
Cordell Hull Building, 2nd Floor
PETER D. HEIL (ON APPEAL) 425 Fifth Avenue North
P. O. Box 40651 Nashville, TN 37243-0493
Nashville, TN 37204
VICTOR S. JOHNSON, III
District Attorney General
MARY CAMPBELL
GRADY MOORE
Assistant Dist. Attorneys General
Washington Square, Ste. 500
222 Second Avenue, North
Nashville, TN 37201-1649
OPINION FILED:
AFFIRMED
JOE G. RILEY,
JUDGE
OPINION
The defendant, Roy Dale McGriff, appeals the trial court’s order denying his
motion to withdraw his guilty plea. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the
judgment of the trial court.
I.
On the date defendant was scheduled for jury trial, defendant pled guilty to
attempted robbery and two counts of resisting arrest. Pursuant to the plea
agreement, he received concurrent sentences of four years for attempted robbery
and six months for each offense of resisting arrest. Although the defendant stated
he was not guilty of the offenses, he stated it was in his best interest to enter the
guilty plea. The defendant was extensively questioned by the trial court concerning
his plea.
Approximately one week after the plea, defendant filed a motion to withdraw
the guilty plea. He alleged he was not competent to enter the plea and
subsequently amended the motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel led to
his plea.
At the hearing on his motion, the defendant testified as to his dissatisfaction
with the failure of his counsel to provide him with certain written documents. No
further testimony was offered by the defendant relating to his motion to withdraw the
guilty plea, and counsel stated he was relying upon the written motion.
The trial court noted that the guilty plea was voluntarily entered on the
morning of trial with everyone prepared to go to trial. In fact, the jury was present
awaiting to begin the trial. The trial court concluded that defendant had not proven
withdrawal of the guilty plea was necessary to correct a “manifest injustice.”
II.
A defendant may withdraw a guilty plea “to correct manifest injustice...after
sentence, but before the judgment becomes final...” Tenn. R. Crim. P. 32(f). Upon
entering a plea of guilty pursuant to a plea agreement in which the defendant
waived his right to appeal, the judgment became final on the date of entry of the
plea. See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 37. Therefore, the motion to withdraw the guilty plea
was untimely since it was filed after the judgment became final. See State v.
Quentin L. Hall, C.C.A. No. 02C01-9802-CR-00040, Shelby County (Tenn. Crim.
App. filed August 28, 1998, at Jackson). The only avenue available to a defendant
in such a situation is through post-conviction proceedings. See Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 40-30-201 et seq.
Even if the motion were timely, we would grant no relief. A motion to
withdraw a guilty plea addresses itself to the sound discretion of the trial court and
will not be disturbed on appeal except upon a showing of an abuse of that
discretion. State v. Turner, 919 S.W.2d 346, 355 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). The
defendant presented no evidence to support his allegation of a manifest injustice.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
____________________________
JOE G. RILEY, JUDGE
CONCUR:
____________________________
PAUL G. SUMMERS, JUDGE
____________________________
JOSEPH M. TIPTON, JUDGE