State of Tennessee v. Barry Hughes ( 1996 )


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  •      IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT KNOXVILLE                 FILED
    MARCH 1996 SESSION
    May 3, 1996
    Cecil Crowson, Jr.
    Appellate Court Clerk
    STATE OF TENNESSEE,            )
    ) C.C.A. No. 03C01-9410-CR-00454
    Appellee,                 )
    ) Bradley County
    V.                             )
    ) Honorable R. Steven Bebb, Judge
    )
    BARRY HUGHES,                  ) (Rule 10 - Denial of Pretrial Diversion)
    )
    Appellant.                )
    FOR THE APPELLANT:                FOR THE APPELLEE:
    Leonard "Mike" Caputo             Charles W. Burson
    Phillips & Caputo                 Attorney General & Reporter
    Attorneys at Law
    312 Vine Street                   Hunt S. Brown
    Chattanooga, TN 37403             Assistant Attorney General
    450 James Robertson Parkway
    Nashville, TN 37243-0493
    Jerry N. Estes
    District Attorney General
    G. Scott Kanavos
    Assistant District Attorney General
    203 E. Madison Avenue
    P.O. Box 647
    Athens, TN 37371
    OPINION FILED: ___________________
    AFFIRMED
    PAUL G. SUMMERS,
    Judge
    OPINION
    The appellant, Barry Hughes, challenges, by extraordinary appeal, the trial
    court's judgment affirming the district attorney general's denial of his application
    for pretrial diversion. The appellant sought to divert two counts of official
    oppression, one count of official misconduct, and one count of fabricating
    evidence. The charges stem from allegations that, while performing his duties as
    a police officer, he planted cocaine in a civilian's car. We affirm.
    An assistant district attorney, and later the district attorney general, denied
    pretrial diversion based upon the following findings:
    1. That the offense was not impulsive but planned and executed in both a
    conscientious and repetitious manner over a significant period of time,
    2. That the conduct substantially deprived two or more citizens of their
    rights to due process,
    3. That appellant's actions substantially undermined the integrity of law
    enforcement officials,
    4. That the offense caused review of nearly 200 criminal cases in which
    the appellant was involved,
    5. That granting diversion would undermine deterrence of other criminal
    activities, and
    6. That the actions constituted violations of public and private trust.
    A district attorney's grant or denial of pretrial diversion is "presumptively
    correct" and the decision shall only be reversed upon a showing of a "patent or
    gross abuse of prosecutorial discretion." State v. Perry, 
    882 S.W.2d 357
    , 359
    (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). To find an abuse of discretion, the record must be
    devoid of "any substantial evidence" supporting the district attorney general's
    decision. Id.; State v. Houston, 
    900 S.W.2d 712
    , 714 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).
    We may not supplant the district attorney's judgment with that of our own. 
    Id.
    -2-
    In assessing whether a defendant is entitled to pretrial diversion, the
    district attorney general must consider: (1) the circumstances of the offense, (2)
    the defendant's criminal record, (3) the defendant's social history, (4) the
    defendant's physical and mental condition, (5) the deterrent effect of
    punishment upon other criminal activity, (6) the defendant's amenability to
    correction, and (7) the likelihood that pretrial diversion will serve the ends of
    justice and the best interest of both the public and the defendant. 
    Id.
     The
    circumstances of the offense and the need for deterrence may, in an appropriate
    case, outweigh all other relevant factors. 
    Id. at 715
    .
    We agree with the district attorney's assessment that the planting of or
    fabrication of evidence calls into doubt the integrity of law enforcement.
    Fabricating evidence not only strikes at the core of law enforcement and police
    integrity, it also strikes at the "very heart" of the judicial process. See Perry, 
    882 S.W.2d at 360
     (affirming denial of diversion noting that perjury strikes at "very
    heart of judicial system"). Acts threatening the vitality of our judicial system
    should neither be countenanced nor rewarded with remedial measures such as
    pretrial diversion. We, therefore, conclude that the circumstances of the
    offenses, the need to deter similar acts affecting the integrity of both the courts
    and law enforcement, and the need to protect the public's interests outweigh all
    factors in favor of pretrial diversion. The trial court's judgment in finding that the
    prosecutor did not abuse his discretion is affirmed.
    -3-
    ______________________________
    PAUL G. SUMMERS, Judge
    CONCUR:
    ________________________________
    JOSEPH M. TIPTON, Judge
    ________________________________
    CHARLES LEE, Special Judge
    -4-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 03C01-9410-CR-00454

Judges: Judge Paul G. Summers

Filed Date: 5/3/1996

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014