State v. Lester ( 1998 )


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  •              IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT KNOXVILLE             FILED
    JANUARY 1998 SESSION
    June 25, 1998
    Cecil Crowson, Jr.
    Appellate C ourt Clerk
    STATE OF TENNESSEE,                   )    No. 03C01-9702-CR-00069
    )
    Appellee                        )
    )    HAMILTON COUNTY
    V.                                    )
    )    HON. DOUGLAS A. MEYER,
    THOMAS EUGENE LESTER,                 )    JUDGE
    )
    Appellant.                      )    (Aggravated Assault)
    )
    )
    For the Appellant:                         For the Appellee:
    Ardena J. Garth                            John Knox Walkup
    District Public Defender                   Attorney General and Reporter
    Rich A. Heinsman, Jr.                      Clinton J. Morgan
    Assistant Public Defender                  Assistant Attorney General
    (At trial)                                 425 Fifth Avenue North
    Nashville, TN 37243-0493
    Donna R. Miller
    Assistant Public Defender
    701 Cherry Street, Suite 301               William H. Cox, III
    Chattanooga, TN 37402                      District Attorney General
    (On appeal)
    C. Leland Davis
    Assistant District Attorney
    600 Market Street, Suite 310
    Chattanooga, TN 37402
    OPINION FILED: ___________________
    AFFIRMED
    William M. Barker, Judge
    OPINION
    The appellant, Thomas Eugene Lester, appeals as of right his conviction in the
    Hamilton County Criminal Court of aggravated assault. He received a sentence of six
    years to be served on intensive probation as a Range I offender. On appeal, he
    challenges only the sufficiency of the evidence. We affirm appellant’s conviction.
    Appellant was indicted for the aggravated assault of Stanley Holland as a result
    of an altercation that occurred on July 18, 1995 in Hamilton County. On that evening,
    the victim came to appellant’s home on Citico Avenue in Chattanooga. Appellant met
    the victim outside on the porch. Apparently, the victim wanted to discuss the
    appellant’s alleged assault on the victim’s sister earlier that evening. Appellant and
    the victim, who was accompanied by several other people, began talking and an
    argument ensued. The argument escalated and appellant and the victim began
    fighting. There was conflicting testimony about who threw the first punch.
    As the altercation progressed, the victim was prevailing over appellant. The
    victim picked up the appellant and was about to throw him to the ground when
    appellant stabbed the victim in the eye.1 The victim stated that he was enraged when
    he felt his eye “pop” and he asked his wife for his gun. The victim’s wife retrieved a
    gun from their vehicle parked nearby. As she was handing the weapon to the victim, it
    discharged and the bullet struck the victim in the groin area. Appellant extricated
    himself from the victim and ran away as several more shots were fired.
    As a result of the eye injury, the victim permanently lost vision in his right eye.
    While there initially was some question as to whether appellant shot the victim, the
    State stipulated at trial that the victim’s wife accidentally fired the shot.
    Appellant’s theory at trial was that he acted in self-defense. He testified that
    the victim came to his door and asked him to come outside and talk. The victim
    1
    The w itnesses for the Sta te testified tha t appellant s tabbed the victim with a scre wdriver.
    However, appellant testified that he hit the victim with a piece of aluminum.
    2
    promised there would be no trouble. W hen he went outside, appellant stated that five
    other people were with the victim. The victim’s sister shouted, “Kick his ass, Stanley”
    and the victim threw the first punch. They began fighting and the victim threw
    appellant to the ground. According to appellant, the victim “got in some good licks.”
    Appellant stated that he picked up a piece of aluminum from the ground and started
    hitting the victim with it.2 Appellant then stated that he heard the victim tell his wife to
    shoot appellant. Appellant heard the shot, which struck the victim, and was able to
    run away. Appellant testified that someone was shooting at him as he ran.
    On cross-examination, appellant denied arming himself with a screwdriver
    before he went outside to talk to the victim. While admitting that he probably caused
    the injury to the victim’s eye, appellant denied stabbing the victim directly in the eye.
    Appellant’s brother, Anthony Lester, who was present when the altercation occurred,
    testified and corroborated appellant’s version of the events. Appellant’s girlfriend also
    confirmed that appellant went outside to speak to the victim at his request. After the
    fight began, she testified that she called 911. She stated that she did not witness the
    altercation, but did hear several gunshots fired.
    At the conclusion of the proof in this bench trial, the trial court found the
    appellant guilty of aggravated assault. The trial court specifically noted that it
    considered self-defense, but found that appellant used excessive force. Appellant
    was later sentenced to six years intensive probation for the offense.
    In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, appellant alleges that the trial
    court failed to properly weigh the proof supporting his theory of self-defense.
    Specifically, he argues that the trial court erred in finding that appellant used
    excessive force. Appellant’s issue is without merit.
    2
    Appellant explained that he had been installing a window air conditioner in his bedroom that day
    and there were several long pieces of aluminum on the ground that he had cut away from the window
    frame.
    3
    When an accused challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence, we
    must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution in determining
    whether “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
    beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 319, 
    99 S.Ct. 2781
    ,
    
    61 L.Ed.2d 560
     (1979). We do not reweigh or re-evaluate the evidence and are
    required to afford the State the strongest legitimate view of the proof contained in the
    record, as well as all reasonable and legitimate inferences which may be drawn
    therefrom. State v. Cabbage, 
    571 S.W.2d 832
    , 835 (Tenn. 1979). The findings of a
    trial judge in a bench trial carry the same weight as a jury verdict. State v. Hatchett,
    
    560 S.W.2d 627
    , 630 (Tenn. 1978).
    With regard to self-defense, Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-11-611(a)
    provides as follows:
    A person is justified in threatening or using force against another person
    when and to the degree the person reasonably believes the force is
    immediately necessary to protect against the other’s use or attempted
    use of unlawful force. The person must have a reasonable belief that
    there is an imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury. The
    danger creating the belief of imminent death or serious bodily injury must
    be real, or honestly believed to be real at the time, and must be founded
    upon reasonable grounds. There is no duty to retreat before a person
    threatens or uses force.
    Consistent with common law, the statute only permits a person to use the force
    reasonably necessary to protect himself/herself. See 
    Tenn. Code Ann. §39-11-611
    Sentencing Commission Comments; Long v. State, 
    443 S.W.2d 476
    , 479 (Tenn.
    1969). As a result, the defense is not available if the defendant uses excessive force.
    
    Id.
    Whether or not a defendant acted in self-defense is a question for the trier of
    fact to determine. See Arterburn v. State, 
    391 S.W.2d 648
    , 653 (Tenn. 1965); State v.
    Fugate, 
    776 S.W.2d 541
    , 545 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988). Encompassed within that
    determination is whether the defendant's belief in imminent danger was reasonable,
    whether the force used was reasonable, and whether the defendant was without fault.
    State v. Renner, 
    912 S.W.2d 701
    , 704 (Tenn. 1995).
    4
    When it rendered the verdict in appellant’s case, the trial court specifically
    stated that it accredited the testimony of the State’s witnesses. The trial court did not
    find appellant to be a credible witness, stating that it did not believe appellant’s
    testimony that he was in danger of death or serious bodily injury. The issue of
    excessive force which the appellant contests was a determination within the exclusive
    purview of the trier of fact. As an appellate court, we will not disturb such a finding on
    appeal. State v. Cabbage, 
    571 S.W.2d 832
    , 835 (Tenn. 1979).
    We hold that appellant’s conviction was supported by the evidence presented
    at trial. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
    _______________________________
    William M. Barker, Judge
    CONCUR:
    ____________________________
    Joseph M. Tipton, Judge
    ____________________________
    Curwood Witt, Judge
    5