State v. Timothy Walton ( 1999 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
DECEMBER 1998 SESSION FILED
STATE OF TENNESSEE, * C.C.A. # 02C01-9807-CC-00210
Appellee, * DYER COUNTY
April 23, 1999
VS. * Hon. R. Lee Moore, Jr., Judge
TIMOTHY WALTON, * (Certified Question of Law)
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellant. *
Appellate C ourt Clerk
For Appellant: For Appellee:
Charles S. Kelly, Attorney John Knox Walkup
Kelly, Millar, Strawn & Kelly Attorney General and Reporter
P.O. Box 507
802 Troy Avenue Peter M. Coughlan
Dyersburg, TN 38025-0507 Assistant Attorney General
425 Fifth Avenue North
Cordell Hull Building, Second Floor
Nashville, TN 37243-0493
C. Phillip Bivens
District Attorney General
P.O. Box E
Dyersburg, TN 38025-0220
OPINION FILED:__________________________
REVERSED AND DISMISSED
GARY R. WADE, PRESIDING JUDGE
OPINION
The defendant, Timothy Walton, was indicted for burglary, aggravated
burglary, and two counts of theft over $500.00. When the trial court overruled the
motion to suppress evidence, the defendant entered pleas of guilt to burglary and
aggravated burglary and, with the approval of the state, reserved a certified question
of law under Rule 37(b)(2)(i) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure.
In this appeal, the issue presented for review is whether the trial court
erred by failing to exclude evidence obtained from incriminating statements made by
the defendant after his arrest. Because the officers making the arrest failed to
provide Miranda warnings despite extended opportunities to do so, the defendant's
statements should have been excluded. We must, therefore, reverse the judgment
of the trial court and dismiss the charges against the defendant.
The defendant complains that he was "surprised at his home by the
arrival of five law enforcement officers (one ... went to the rear of his property and,
without a warrant, allegedly found some propane heaters...), questioned on his
porch and in the yard, handcuffed and placed in the backseat of a patrol car and, in
spite of the officers' testimony to the contrary, intimidated, urged, coaxed, coerced,
questioned, and interrogated into revealing the location of other stolen property,
which he retrieved and turned over to the officers [without ever] having been advised
of his rights under Miranda...." The defendant insists that the statements he made
as a result of the custodial interrogation should have been suppressed. He argues
that it is "inconceivable that the officers ... did not ask any questions whatsoever"
and that his incriminating statements were neither voluntarily nor spontaneously
made.
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At the suppression hearing, it was established that on May 22, 1997,
Officers Jeff Burns, Terry McCreight, and Calvin Johnson of the Dyer County
Sheriff's Department, while in the company of two federal postal inspectors, Chuck
Demont and Henry Cooper, traveled in separate vehicles to the mobile home
residence of the defendant to investigate his possible involvement in post office
burglaries. As the other officers went to the front door, Officer Burns walked into the
backyard to secure the rear of the residence. While there, he discovered a pathway
which eventually led to ten or fifteen marijuana plants. He also discovered several
propane heaters near the residence. No charges were placed against the
defendant in regard to either the marijuana plants or the propane heaters.
Upon confronting the defendant, one of the postal inspectors advised
that he was investigating a burglary within the post office and asked the defendant
to accompany him to the sheriff's department for further questioning. Officer
McCreight, who was aware that the defendant could neither read nor write and was
of low intelligence, testified that the defendant was not under arrest and consented
to being transported to the sheriff's department. The officers handcuffed the
defendant and placed him in the backseat of an unmarked vehicle. Officer Johnson,
an investigator for the sheriff's department, accompanied the defendant and Officer
McCreight. The other officers traveled in different cars. Before entering the police
vehicle, the defendant told Officer Johnson that a man named Charles Thompson
had been "telling lies" and was out to "get him." According to Officer Johnson, the
defendant claimed that he knew that Thompson had stolen and hidden several
items and volunteered to tell the officer where to find the property.
Officers McCreight and Johnson testified that they did not ask the
defendant any questions after he was handcuffed and placed into their vehicle. The
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officers explained that they did not administer Miranda warnings because they did
not consider him to be under arrest or otherwise in their custody. They contended
that the defendant, without any encouragement on their part, led the officers to
several areas where the officers were able to recover a computer, monitor and
keyboard, and a rifle. According to the officers, the defendant provided directions to
a point along a public road where a piece of plastic had been tied to a barbed wire
fence. The officers then allowed the defendant, who was still in handcuffs, to walk
into a ravine and take possession of the monitor, the keyboard, and computer, all of
which had been wrapped in a plastic garbage bag. From there, the officers were
directed to the home of the defendant's father and mother where a rifle, wrapped in
a pair of coveralls, had been hidden in a nearby barn. The officers determined that
a rifle matched the description of one that had been stolen from the residence of
Gene Bryson, except that it had no scope. The defendant told officers that he had
the scope at his residence. After returning to the defendant's residence, the officers
discovered not only the scope but also an electric heater and stepladder which had
been stolen during a burglary at the Dyersburg warehouse. The defendant was
employed at the warehouse.
At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the trial court ruled, in
pertinent part, as follows:
The defendant was handcuffed before being transported.
He remained in handcuffs throughout the process of
retrieving stolen property from two different locations and
then returning back to his house where he retrieved
further stolen property and then back to the sheriff's
department. Viewing this matter under the totality of the
circumstances, the court finds that a reasonable person
in the suspect's position would have considered himself
deprived of freedom of movement to a degree associated
with a formal arrest.... [Any] interrogation from the time
the defendant was handcuffed and placed in the officer's
vehicle would be a custodial interrogation. The court
finds, however, that under the proof elicited at the
suppression hearing that there is no evidence that there
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was any interrogation of the defendant after he was
handcuffed. The only testimony available to the court for
consideration is the testimony of the three officers
mentioned above.... Officer McCreight and Investigator
Johnson testified that there was no interrogation and that
all of the information given by the defendant was
spontaneous and voluntary and not elicited as a result of
any interrogation or suggestion by either officer.
Consequently, although the ... defendant was in custody
at the time the information was obtained, ... the
information was given voluntarily by the defendant and
not in response to interrogation by either officer. The
need for formal Miranda warnings presumes that the
statements are elicited through interrogation or
questioning.
(Emphasis added).
The state concedes that no waivers were obtained before the
defendant provided this information and that the defendant had not been advised of
his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The state argues,
however, that the stolen goods were recovered "as a result of the defendant's own
unsolicited statements" rather than through the police interrogation.
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that
"[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself...." Article I, § 9 of the Tennessee Constitution provides that "in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused ... shall not be compelled to give evidence against
himself." See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). Generally, one must
affirmatively invoke these protections. An exception is when a government agent
makes a custodial interrogation. Statements made during the course of custodial
police interrogation are inadmissible unless the state establishes that the defendant
was advised of his constitutional rights as identified in Miranda and then waived
those rights. Miranda requires that police inform the defendant as follows: (1) he
has the right to remain silent; (2) any statement may be used against him; (3) he has
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the right to the presence of an attorney; and (4) if he cannot hire an attorney, one
will be appointed prior to the interrogation, if he so desires. Miranda, 384 U.S. at
444.
This court must examine the "totality of the circumstances" to
ascertain whether the particular defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his
constitutional rights prior to making self-incriminating statements. State v. Bush,
942 S.W.2d 489, 500 (Tenn. 1997). Factors relevant in determining whether the
statements are voluntary include (1) the length of time between the arrest and the
confession; (2) the occurrence of intervening events between the arrest and
confession; (3) the giving of Miranda warnings; and (4) the purpose and flagrancy of
the official misconduct. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975); State v.
Chandler, 547 S.W.2d 918, 920 (Tenn. 1977). The overriding question, however, is
whether the behavior of law enforcement officials served to overbear the
defendant's will to resist. State v. Kelly, 603 S.W.2d 726, 728 (Tenn. 1980); see
State v. Howard, 617 S.W.2d 656, 658-59 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981).
Our scope of review is limited. The findings of fact made by the trial
judge at a hearing on a motion to suppress "will be upheld unless the evidence
preponderates otherwise." State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996).
Questions about witness credibility and "resolution of conflicts in the evidence are
matters entrusted to the trial judge." Id. If the "greater weight" of the evidence
supports the court's ruling, it will be upheld. Id.
Custodial interrogation has three components: (1) that the defendant
be in custody; (2) that interrogation occur; and (3) that the interrogation be
conducted by a state agent. State v. Smith, 933 S.W.2d 450, 453 (Tenn. 1996).
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Initially, the trial court correctly determined that the defendant was in custody. The
evidence supports the conclusion that there was a sufficient restraint upon the
freedom of movement of the defendant to qualify as an arrest. The trial court
included in its findings of fact that officers believed that the defendant "might have
some marijuana plants there and might know something regarding the postal
burglaries." That marijuana had been found near his residence was communicated
to the defendant by the officers. All of this supports the trial court's conclusion that
the defendant was in custody.
Whether the defendant may have been the focus of the officer's
investigation is not relevant to the question. The "test is whether ... a reasonable
person in the suspect's position would consider himself ... deprived of freedom of
movement to a degree associated with a formal arrest." State v. Anderson, 937
S.W.2d 851, 855 (Tenn. 1996); see Stansberry v. California, 511 U.S. 318 (1994)
(by adopting the reasonable person objective test to determine whether a defendant
was in custody, the Supreme Court abolished the "focus" factor in determining that
the officer's undisclosed, subjective view was irrelevant). In Anderson, our supreme
court ruled as follows:
Some factors relevant to that objective assessment
include the time and location of the interrogation; the
duration and character of the questioning; the officer's
tone of voice and general demeanor; the suspect's
method of transportation to the place of questioning; the
number of police officers present; any limitation on
movement or other form of restraint imposed on the
suspect during the interrogation; any interactions
between the officer and the suspect, including the words
spoken by the officer to the suspect, and the suspect's
verbal or non-verbal responses; the extent to which the
suspect is confronted with the law enforcement officer's
suspicions of guilt or evidence of guilt; and finally, the
extent to which the suspect is made aware that he or she
is free to refrain from answering questions or to end the
interview at will.
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937 S.W.2d at 855. Anderson established a totality of the circumstances test. The
factors listed are not intended to be exclusive and must be applied on a case-by-
case basis. See State v. Cooper, 912 S.W.2d 756 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).
In our view, evidence in the record preponderates against the trial
court's finding that there was no interrogation after the defendant was handcuffed
and placed under arrest. There are several reasons for our reaching a different
conclusion from that reached by the trial judge. Initially, the officer's intent was to
investigate one or more burglaries. Acting on a tip provided by an informant, five
officers were involved in the investigation. Four confronted the defendant at the
front door of his residence while a fifth secured the rear of the residence. The
officers involved, who expressed their intention to question the defendant about the
crimes, found several marijuana plants and propane tanks which they believed had
been stolen. The defendant was confronted by officers with this additional
information, handcuffed, and placed inside a vehicle driven by Officer McCreight.
Afterward, the defendant led two of the officers to three different locations and
provided them with evidence which indicated that he had participated in several
crimes. While blaming a Charles Thompson for the misconduct and perhaps hoping
for lenient treatment, the defendant provided the officers all they needed for these
convictions.
Although the officers generally asserted that the defendant
spontaneously volunteered the information, Officer Johnson did acknowledge asking
the defendant to show him where the stolen goods were. For example, when the
rifle was recovered, Officer Johnson recalled that the officers asked the defendant if
"there was anything else to go to this...." Any such inquiry would qualify as an
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interrogation. So would a request for driving directions to a place where stolen
property was hidden.
Despite several obvious opportunities to do so, the officers never
administered the required Miranda warnings, a widely-recognized prerequisite for a
custodial interrogation. Officer McCreight drove the vehicle throughout the course of
the search for stolen goods. Officers acknowledged that the defendant was illiterate
and of limited intelligence. There was testimony at the suppression hearing by
Officer Burns that Charles Thompson or Billy McNeely, co-defendants in this case,
had provided information that had led to the investigation of the defendant. Before
their arrival at the scene, officers were aware that the defendant "had some of the
goods" and "disposed of some of it." Officer Burns conceded that he had the
opportunity to obtain a search warrant but explained that the real purpose of the visit
was for the federal officers "to question him about another incident." After the
lengthy search for the goods, the officers questioned the defendant at the jail. Even
then, the defendant had not been provided with the Miranda warnings.
Furthermore, the officers took a total of three vehicles to the
defendant's premises. They indicated a subjective view that the defendant was not
under arrest even after he was handcuffed and placed inside the officer's vehicle.
While Officer McCreight denied questioning the defendant, he acknowledged that
the defendant "told us where we needed to go." The defendant walked only about
thirty feet from the police vehicle into the ravine and was still handcuffed when he
recovered the garbage bag with the stolen items. He remained in handcuffs when
taken to his parents' residence. Upon their eventual return to the police station,
Officer McCreight checked with other agencies to determine whether the returned
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items had been stolen. One exchange between the defense attorney and Officer
McCreight during the suppression hearing was as follows:
Q. You went from fetching ... the computer goods to
his parents' home to an outbuilding where he graciously
dug out a rifle for you. Still handcuffed at this time?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Still free to go though.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Still not under arrest.
A. After retrieving goods from the ravine and the
defendant's parents' residence, they returned to the
defendant's residence where he led them to a rifle scope,
an electric heater, and a stepladder.
Even then, Officer McCreight described the defendant as "not under arrest and still
free to go." The officer testified that had the defendant demanded the removal of
the handcuffs or his outright release, he would have done so. Officers arrived at the
defendant's residence in mid-morning and, although not discernible from the record,
obviously took a considerable amount of time to complete their travels.
The greater weight of the evidence does not support the conclusions
made by the trial court that the statements were admissible because they were
spontaneously made. In our view, the officers' subjective view that the defendant
was not in custody lacked any plausible foundation. Because the defendant was not
"free to go," the officers had a duty to advise of the rights guaranteed in the Miranda
decision. Despite a lengthy opportunity to have done so, the officers chose to rely
upon the defendant to give more and more incriminating information. There was at
least a limited amount of questions as to the whereabouts of the stolen goods and
how to get there. Moreover, the circumstances of the detention called for an
explanation. The purpose of the visit to the defendant's residence, the number of
officers and police vehicles involved, the limitation on the defendant's movement,
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the method of transportation, the duration and character of his detention as the
stolen goods were being produced, and the extent to which the defendant was
confronted with suspicions of guilt are circumstances which suggested not only an
arrest but also a custodial expedition for incriminating evidence.
Although Tennessee appellate courts have not addressed the issue in
depth, the United States Supreme Court has held that an interrogation is not limited
to formal questioning but may include the functional equivalent of formal
questioning. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980). This is one of
those situations. Interrogation "refers not only to express questioning, but also to
any words or actions on the part of the police ... that the police should know are
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect." Id. at 301.
The Supreme Court continued, "A practice that the police should know is reasonably
likely to evoke an incriminating response from a suspect thus amounts to
interrogation." Id. See also Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520 (1987).
In Mauro, the high court commented as follows:
In deciding whether particular police conduct is
interrogation, we must remember the purpose behind our
decision[] in Miranda ... : preventing government officials
from using the coercive nature of confinement to extract
confessions that would not be given in an unrestrained
environment.
481 U.S. at 529-30. In our assessment, the "coercive nature" of the arrest produced
the incriminating information. The greater weight of the evidence established that.
The trial court's analysis focused on the voluntary nature of the
statements. While the statements may have been voluntary, there were not made
by the defendant with the full knowledge of his rights. Had the officers taken the
time to properly advise the defendant of his rights, the fruits of their interrogation
would have been admissible as evidence. Because of their failure to do so and the
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particular nature of their interrogation, the circumstances require suppression.
Accordingly, the judgment is reversed, the evidence suppressed, and the charges
dismissed.
________________________________
Gary R. Wade, Presiding Judge
CONCUR:
_____________________________
Thomas T. W oodall, Judge
_____________________________
John Everett Williams, Judge
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