State v. Mark Cash ( 1998 )


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  •             IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT NASHVILLE             FILED
    AUGUST 1998 SESSION
    September 22, 1998
    Cecil W. Crowson
    Appellate Court Clerk
    STATE OF TENNESSEE,                 )
    )   C.C.A. No. 01C01-9712-CR-00579
    Appellee,               )
    )   Putnam County
    v.                                  )
    )   Honorable Leon Burns, Jr., Judge
    MARK A. CASH,                       )
    )   (Sentencing)
    Appellant.              )
    FOR THE APPELLANT:                      FOR THE APPELLEE:
    Lionel R. Barrett, Jr.                  John Knox Walkup
    Washington Square Two - Suite 418       Attorney General & Reporter
    222 Second Avenue, North                425 Fifth Avenue, North
    Nashville, TN 37201                     Nashville, TN 37243-0493
    Timothy Behan
    Assistant Attorney General
    425 Fifth Avenue, North
    Nashville, TN 37243-0493
    William Edward Gibson
    District Attorney General
    145 South Jefferson Avenue
    Cookeville, TN 38501-3424
    Shawn C. Fry
    Assistant District Attorney General
    145 South Jefferson Avenue
    Cookeville, TN 38501-3424
    OPINION FILED: ____________________________________
    AFFIRMED
    L. T. LAFFERTY, SPECIAL JUDGE
    OPINION
    The defendant, Mark A. Cash, entered guilty pleas to nine counts of incest. An
    aggravated rape count was dismissed. As part of the plea agreement, the defendant
    agreed for the trial court to run counts two through five concurrently and counts six through
    ten concurrently, but consecutively to counts two through five. The trial court imposed
    sentences of five years for each conviction for an effective sentence of ten years.
    In this appeal of right, the defendant presents two issues: (1) whether the trial court
    erred in not granting some form of alternative sentencing, and (2) whether the trial court
    erred in not imposing a sentence of six to eight years. We affirm the judgment of the trial
    court.
    SENTENCING HEARING
    The victim, S.R.,1 testified her stepfather, the defendant, had sex with her in August,
    1994. The victim testified she had returned from vacation bible school in the evening. Her
    mother was working at O’Charlie’s at the time of this occurrence. The defendant had put
    the victim’s two sisters, ages 6 and 10, to bed.
    The defendant returned to the living room, where the victim was watching TV. The
    defendant removed his clothes and told the victim to take hers off. The victim stated, “He
    told me I had to, so I did.” The victim testified they had sex on the living room floor.
    The victim was unsure if the defendant ejaculated on this occasion, but he had done
    so before on other occasions. Overall, the victim testified she and her stepfather had sex
    about ten or eleven times, and denied she told the Department of Human Services (DHS)
    they had sex only three times.
    1
    In order to protect the identity of minor victims of sexual abuse, it is the policy of this
    Court to refer to the victims by their initials. See State v. Schimpf, 
    782 S.W.2d 186
    , 188,
    n.1 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1989).
    2
    Mrs. Cindy Cash, mother of S.R., testified she married the defendant in October,
    1985 and they had two children. Mrs. Cash testified that her daughter was slow and had
    a learning disability. S.R. attended special education classes. Mrs. Cash testified her
    husband had an alcohol and drug abuse problem and four prior DUI convictions. She had
    also charged him with assault on numerous occasions. The defendant failed to comply
    with his previous conditions of probation. Since the wife and defendant’s separation in
    May, 1995, the defendant has had little contact with his two daughters.
    Tim Cook, Progressive Sentencing, testified he supervised the defendant while on
    probation. The defendant had been convicted of DUI and driving on a revoked license. Mr.
    Cook testified the defendant reported as required, but failed to pay his court costs, for
    which a violation warrant was issued. The defendant failed to pay any costs from April,
    1996 to the date of the sentencing hearing, June, 1997. Mr. Cook testified he could not
    confirm or deny whether the defendant had completed 200 hours of community service as
    a condition of probation.
    Jay Colton, employee of the Department of Correction, testified he was the
    defendant’s supervisor in 1988, when the defendant was placed on pretrial diversion.
    When asked how the defendant did on pretrial diversion, Mr. Colton stated, “He didn’t do
    very well at all.” Mr. Colton testified his biggest problem with the defendant was the
    defendant’s laziness. The defendant would not work, report, or do his community service
    until pushed to do so. The defendant’s pretrial diversion was terminated due to violations.
    Mr. Colton was not aware of any alcohol problems the defendant had until the sentencing
    hearing.
    At the sentencing hearing, the defendant testified he was 35 years old and was
    presently living in Nashville. After dropping out of high school in the eleventh grade, the
    defendant obtained a GED. Also, the defendant received an honorable discharge from the
    U.S. Coast Guard. At the age of 13, the defendant’s parents divorced and he was raised
    by his mother in Atlanta, Georgia.
    3
    As to the use of alcohol, the defendant testified alcoholism runs heavy in his family
    and “it’s just been very devastating.” Prior to these offenses, the defendant was a part-time
    entertainer in country music and worked in various restaurants and night clubs. The
    defendant was employed up until two weeks before the sentencing hearing. After being
    arrested on these charges, the defendant entered an alcohol treatment program at
    Cumberland Heights in Nashville. After four days, the defendant was flown to Father
    Martin’s Ashley Treatment Center in Baltimore, Maryland. The defendant underwent a 33-
    day intensive treatment in a program similar to the Betty Ford Treatment Center in
    California. In response to a question about the center in Baltimore, the defendant stated:
    They specialize in people that just can’t stay sober. They
    specialize—I could always stay sober maybe 90 days, four
    months, and then would relapse and continue drinking. And
    they, they specialize in finding out why that happens and went
    into areas of my life that have not been dealt with before.
    Although not a defense, the defendant testified that alcohol and drugs were
    responsible for his situation with his stepdaughter. The defendant testified he was
    attending Alcoholics Anonymous meetings once a day, sometimes twice a day. He further
    testified he wanted to restore his relationship with his family and expressed remorse to the
    victim and her family for any pain he caused.
    Tommy Cash, father of the defendant, testified that he is a professional entertainer
    and licensed realtor. Mr. Cash testified he became aware of his son’s drinking problem
    when his son moved to Atlanta with his mother, after their divorce. Mr. Cash described his
    son’s abuse of alcohol as “the worst I’ve ever seen.” Mr. Cash advised the trial court he
    has been a recovering alcoholic for the past ten years. Also, Mr. Cash described Father
    Martin’s Treatment Center as one of the best in the nation. Mr. Cash testified his son
    stayed sober and clean for almost a year after treatment. Although his son did relapse,
    he bounced back. Mr. Cash advised the trial court he would work with his son regardless
    of the outcome.
    Mr. Johnny Moore, a family friend, testified that in his opinion, if the defendant was
    4
    given the opportunity, he could really shine in the music world. Also, Mr. Moore was aware
    of the defendant’s many DUI convictions.
    The presentence report, a letter from Father Martin’s Ashley Center, an evaluation
    of the victim by the DHS, and a psychological report of Vanderbilt University on the victim
    were submitted to the trial court for consideration. Based upon this evidence, the trial court
    imposed sentences of five years for each offense and, as part of the plea agreement, ran
    five counts consecutively and denied any alternative relief.
    MANNER OF SERVICE
    When a defendant complains of the imposition of his or her sentence, we must
    conduct a de novo review with a presumption of correctness. Tenn. Code Ann. 40-35-
    401(d). Therefore, the burden of showing that the sentence is improper is upon the
    appealing party. 
    Id. The presumption that
    determinations made by the trial court are
    correct is conditioned upon the affirmative showing in the record that the trial court
    considered the sentencing principles and all relevant facts and circumstances. State v.
    Ashby, 
    823 S.W.2d 166
    (Tenn. 1991); State v. Smith, 
    898 S.W.2d 742
    (Tenn. Crim. App.
    1994).
    If appellate review reflects the trial court properly considered all relevant facts and
    its findings of fact are adequately supported by the record, this Court must affirm the
    sentence “even if we would have preferred a different result.” State v. Fletcher, 
    805 S.W.2d 785
    , 789 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991). In arriving at the proper determination of an
    appropriate sentence, the trial court must consider: (1) the evidence, if any, received at
    the guilty plea and the sentencing hearing; (2) the presentence report; (3) the principles of
    sentencing and arguments as to sentencing alternatives; (4) the nature and characteristics
    of the criminal conduct involved; (5) evidence and information offered by the parties on
    enhancement and mitigating factors; (6) any statements the defendant wishes to make in
    the defendant’s behalf about the sentencing; and (7) the potential for rehabilitation and
    5
    treatment. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210(a) and (b); Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-103(5);
    State v. Holland, 
    860 S.W.2d 53
    , 60 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993).
    The record in this case demonstrates the trial court made adequate findings of fact.
    We, therefore, conduct a review of these facts with a presumption of correctness. At the
    sentencing hearing, the trial court found the defendant had a history of criminal convictions
    and a history of criminal behavior. These convictions consisted of four driving under the
    influence of alcohol and several assaults on his wife. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114(1).
    The trial court considered this factor to be important. In addition, the trial court found that
    the defendant abused the position of a private trust. Tenn. Code. Ann. § 40-35-114(15).
    The trial court stated, “I can’t think of any other position that would be more appropriate for
    a position of private trust where a mother leaves the child or children with the step-father
    as she goes and earns a living for the family. So I think that is certainly an important factor,
    and it was abused in this case.”         Also, the trial court gave limited weight to the
    enhancement factors of vulnerability and gratification, due to the number of offenses.
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114(4) and (7).
    In assessing the appropriate sentences, the trial court also considered the mitigating
    factors submitted by the defendant. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-113; Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-
    35-210. As to the mitigating factor that the defendant’s conduct neither caused nor
    threatened bodily injury, the trial court gave little weight to this factor. As to the mitigating
    factor of previous counseling, the trial court was not impressed. The trial court found that
    the defendant had failed to respond to counseling for his multiple DUI convictions, which
    was during the commission of many of these offenses. In addition, the trial court found
    that remorse should be given little weight. Therefore, the trial court assessed sentences
    of five years for each offense as the appropriate sentence. We affirm the trial court’s
    judgment as to the period of confinement for each offense.
    DENIAL OF ALTERNATIVE SENTENCE
    6
    The defendant argues that community corrections with the condition of alcohol
    treatment would be the most appropriate sentence. In addition, the defendant submits he
    was eligible for probation for each of these offenses, including the possibility of split
    confinement. The State contends the defendant is not worthy of any alternative sentence.
    In its ruling, the trial court held:
    The Court does not believe that it would be appropriate for a
    Community Corrections sentence to be given. That being an
    offense against persons, Community Corrections would be
    inappropriate unless there is some showing that he fits some
    special need, and under the circumstances I see none and
    could not grant that.
    Since the defendant entered a plea of guilty to incest, a Class C felony, ordinarily
    the defendant would be presumed to be a favorable candidate for probation or an
    alternative sentence, in the absence of evidence to the contrary. Tenn. Code. Ann. § 40-
    35-102(6). However, the record of the sentencing hearing establishes the defendant, at
    the entry of the guilty pleas, would receive some consecutive sentences, to be determined
    by the trial court. Since the range of punishment for Class C felonies, Range I, is three to
    six years, there is a legitimate question if the defendant would be eligible for probation for
    a total sentence of ten years. The defendant’s application for community corrections was
    the defendant’s only viable option. Thus, the defendant has the burden of establishing that
    he is a favorable candidate for alternative relief.
    Those defendants, who are convicted of violent felony offenses and those convicted
    of felony offenses involving offenses against the person, are normally statutorily excluded
    from community corrections sentences. State v. Braden, 
    867 S.W.2d 750
    (Tenn. Crim.
    App.), per. app. denied (Tenn. 1993); State v. Birge, 
    792 S.W.2d 723
    (Tenn. Crim. App.),
    per. app. denied (Tenn. 1990). Since violent offenders are not statutorily eligible for
    community corrections, Section (c) of Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-36-106, however, provides
    as follows:
    Felony offenders not otherwise eligible under subsection (a),
    and who would be usually considered unfit for probation due
    7
    to histories of chronic alcohol, drug abuse, or mental health
    problems, but whose special needs are treatable and could be
    served best in the community rather than in a correctional
    institution, may be considered eligible for punishment in the
    community under the provisions of this chapter.
    A trial court, in its determination for placing a defendant in the community
    corrections program under Section (c), must consider: (1) the offender has a history of
    chronic alcohol, drug abuse, or mental health problems; (2) these factors were reasonably
    related to and contributed to the offender’s criminal conduct; (3) the identifiable special
    need (or needs) are treatable; and (4) the treatment of the special need could be served
    best in the community rather than in a correctional institution. State v. Boston, 
    938 S.W.2d 435
    , 439 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996).
    Although the trial court did not specifically address this criteria in denying community
    corrections, the trial court did articulate in the record its reasons for denying community
    corrections. Our analysis of the record supports the trial court’s findings. As the trial court
    pointed out, a charge of aggravated rape, alleged to have occurred in 1990 involving the
    same victim, was dismissed. The trial court found the number of acts of incest between
    February, 1992 and July, 1995 was quite extensive. As a result of four DUI convictions,
    the defendant had been given many opportunities to seek and benefit from alcohol
    treatment. Also, the defendant committed many of these offenses during periods of
    probation. The defendant was given opportunities to be on probation (including pretrial
    diversion) and failed to comply with the conditions of probation. We affirm the trial court’s
    8
    judgment.
    _____________________________________
    L. T. LAFFERTY, SPECIAL JUDGE
    CONCUR:
    ___________________________________
    JOHN H. PEAY, JUDGE
    ___________________________________
    THOMAS T. WOODALL, JUDGE
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