State of Tennessee v. Charles Fowlkes - concurring ( 2017 )


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  •                                                                                            09/05/2017
    IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT KNOXVILLE
    Assigned on Briefs June 27, 2017
    STATE OF TENNESSEE v. CHARLES FOWLKES
    Appeal from the Criminal Court for Hamilton County
    No. 297534 Don W. Poole, Judge
    ___________________________________
    No. E2016-02386-CCA-R3-CD
    ___________________________________
    ROBERT L. HOLLOWAY, JR., J., concurring.
    I concur with the majority’s opinion affirming the trial court’s judgment based on
    the failure of the Defendant to strictly comply with the prerequisites established in State
    v. Preston, 
    759 S.W.2d 647
    (Tenn. 1988).
    Based on the record before us, the trial court and the State did not expressly state
    that the certified question was dispositive as required by Preston. See 
    id. at 650.
    However, the petition to enter plea of guilty, which was signed by the Defendant, the
    Defendant’s counsel and an Assistant District Attorney General, specifically notes that
    the Defendant is reserving a certified question “on the basis of the lack of probable cause
    for the stop and seizure of the Defendant before arrest.” The judgment has handwritten
    on its face, “This question is expressly reserved as part of the plea agreement. Both the
    State and the court consent to this reservation. Certified question is attached [as] Exhibit
    1.” Exhibit 1 states the certified question and is signed by the trial judge.
    Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(A)(iv) requires only that “the
    judgment or order reserving the certified question reflects that the defendant, the state,
    and the trial court are of the opinion that the certified question is dispositive of the
    case[.]” (emphasis added). In my opinion, the statements in the documents listed in the
    above paragraph “reflect” that the parties and the trial court are of the opinion that the
    certified question is dispositive. If the trial court or the State did not think the question
    was dispositive, why go through this process? In my experience, what often happens
    after an appeal involving a certified question is dismissed other than on the merits is that
    the defendant files a post-conviction relief petition alleging that he or she received
    ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel was deficient in drafting or
    reserving the certified question. If the defendant is indigent, post-conviction counsel
    must be appointed. During the hearing, trial counsel usually has to admit that his or her
    legal performance was deficient in drafting or reserving a certified question. The post-
    conviction court then grants post-conviction relief, setting aside the guilty plea because it
    was not knowingly entered due to ineffective assistance of counsel. Then, there is a
    second guilty plea in which a new certified question is reserved that everyone hopes
    complies with Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b) and Preston.
    Even if the State and the trial court had expressly stated that the certified question
    is dispositive, this court is still required to “make an independent determination that the
    certified question is dispositive.” State v. Dailey, 
    235 S.W.3d 131
    , 135 (Tenn. 2007)
    (citing 
    Preston, 759 S.W.2d at 651
    ). In my review of this record, I “independently
    determine” that the certified question in this case is dispositive. Nevertheless, strict
    compliance with the prerequisites established in Preston requires that I concur in
    affirming the trial court based on a hypertechnical error, rather than deciding the certified
    question based on the record on appeal which includes the transcript from the suppression
    hearing.
    Drafting and reserving a certified question should not be a minefield ready to
    explode if you step slightly off course but rather an efficient means of avoiding the time
    and expense of a trial when the only issue is a legal one. Far too often, it is the former
    and not the latter.
    _________________________________
    ROBERT L. HOLLOWAY, JR., JUDGE
    -2-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: E2016-02386-CCA-R3-CD

Judges: Judge Robert L. Holloway, Jr.

Filed Date: 9/5/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/6/2017