State of Tennessee v. Michael Eugene Rhodes, Jr. ( 2018 )


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  •                                                                                       01/26/2018
    IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT NASHVILLE
    Assigned on Briefs November 14, 2017
    STATE OF TENNESSEE v. MICHAEL EUGENE RHODES, JR.
    Appeal from the Criminal Court for Davidson County
    No. 2015-B-1330 Mark J. Fishburn, Judge
    ___________________________________
    No. M2016-02558-CCA-R3-CD
    ___________________________________
    The Defendant, Michael Eugene Rhodes, Jr., appeals the trial court’s revocation of his
    community corrections sentence and resentencing him to ten years in the Department of
    Correction. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in revoking his community
    corrections sentence and in increasing his sentence to ten years. Following our review,
    we affirm the sentencing decision of the trial court.
    Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed
    ALAN E. GLENN, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JOHN EVERETT
    WILLIAMS and NORMA MCGEE OGLE, JJ., joined.
    Michael A. Colavecchio, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Michael Eugene
    Rhodes, Jr..
    Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Sophia S. Lee, Senior Counsel;
    Glenn R. Funk, District Attorney General; and Brian Ewald, Assistant District Attorney
    General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
    OPINION
    FACTS
    In 2015, the Davidson County Grand Jury returned a two-count indictment against
    the Defendant, charging him with aggravated burglary in Count 1 and theft of property
    valued at $500 or less in Count 2. On January 13, 2016, the Defendant pled guilty to the
    lesser-included offense of attempted aggravated burglary, a Class D felony, in Count 1,
    with an agreed-upon sentence of eight years as a persistent offender and with the manner
    of service to be determined by the trial court. Count 2 was dismissed. Subsequently, on
    March 21, 2016, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve one year in confinement,
    with the remainder on community corrections, and to pay restitution to the victim.
    On May 11, 2016, a community corrections violation warrant was issued based on
    the Defendant’s testing positive for cocaine on April 28, 2016. Thereafter, an amended
    warrant was issued on May 26, 2016, based on the Defendant’s failure to report to his
    case officer since May 9, 2016. A resentencing hearing was conducted on December 13,
    2016, at which the Defendant’s case officer and the Defendant testified. The Defendant’s
    presentence report was admitted as an exhibit to the hearing.
    Douglas Murphy, the Defendant’s case officer with the Community Corrections
    Program in Davidson County, testified that the Defendant had conceded to the allegations
    contained in both warrants. In addition, the Defendant had failed to provide proof of
    employment, complete his community service work, pay his supervision fees or court
    costs, or make any restitution payments. Mr. Murphy said that the Defendant was
    released on April 14, 2016, and failed his drug test two weeks later on April 28.
    The Defendant testified that he served the one-year part of his sentence and was
    released on April 14, 2016. He said that he tested positive for cocaine because he was
    “[b]eing selfish, thinking about [him]self.” The Defendant admitted that he had stopped
    reporting to his case officer, explaining that he was working and trying to help his mother
    who suffered from congestive heart failure. He said that he began working at a Captain
    D’s restaurant three days after he was released but could not provide a paystub to Mr.
    Murphy because he had not received a paycheck at the time of his arrest. The Defendant
    said that his case manager and his brother had called treatment programs on his behalf,
    but he did not have insurance and none of the programs would come to the jail to perform
    an assessment. The Defendant admitted that he knew where to make the restitution
    payments but had not paid any.
    On cross-examination, the Defendant recalled telling the trial court at his first
    sentencing hearing that he “wouldn’t be back, that [he] would change [his] life . . . [and]
    “wouldn’t do [drugs] anymore.” He also recalled the trial court’s informing him that “if
    [he] came back[,] [the court] would send [him] to the penitentiary . . . [and] enhance [his
    sentence] to 12 years.” The Defendant admitted that it only took him eleven days to
    violate his community corrections sentence. The Defendant asked the trial court for help
    with his drug habit and said that most of his crimes were drug-related. He admitted that
    he had prior convictions for simple possession, possession of drug paraphernalia, and
    selling counterfeit drugs.
    -2-
    Upon questioning by the trial court, the Defendant admitted that he previously had
    been placed on probation four to five times but had never successfully completed any
    term of probation. He also admitted that he was on parole at the time of the offense in
    this case. Asked about his work history, the forty-two-year-old Defendant said that he
    had worked for “[m]aybe” ten years of his adult life and that he had been “locked up a
    lot.”
    At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s
    community corrections sentence and resentenced him as a Range III, persistent offender
    to ten years in the Department of Correction.
    ANALYSIS
    The Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his
    community corrections sentence and by imposing a ten-year sentence in confinement.
    The Defendant asserts that the trial court’s reasoning for increasing his sentence to ten
    years was improper because “there were no allegations of new charges or of any other
    violations of the law.” In light of the evidence presented, we find this argument without
    merit.
    The primary purpose of the Community Corrections Act of 1985 is to “[e]stablish
    a policy within the state to punish selected, nonviolent felony offenders in front-end
    community based alternatives to incarceration, thereby reserving secure confinement
    facilities for violent felony offenders.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-36-103(1). The program
    offers a flexible alternative beneficial to both the defendant and society. State v. Griffith,
    
    787 S.W.2d 340
    , 342 (Tenn. 1990).
    Revocation of a community corrections sentence occurs upon finding by a
    preponderance of the evidence that the defendant has violated the conditions of the
    agreement. State v. Harkins, 
    811 S.W.2d 79
    , 82 (Tenn. 1991). “The judgment of a trial
    court in this regard will not be disturbed on appeal unless it appears that there has been an
    abuse of discretion.” 
    Id. For a
    reviewing court to find an abuse of discretion, it must be
    shown that the record contains no substantial evidence to support the trial judge’s
    conclusion. 
    Id. When a
    defendant’s community corrections sentence is revoked, the court “may
    resentence the defendant to any appropriate sentencing alternative, including
    incarceration, for any period of time up to the maximum sentence provided for the
    offense committed . . . . The resentencing shall be conducted in compliance with § 40-
    35-210.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-36-106(e)(4). A trial court is to consider the following
    -3-
    when determining a defendant’s sentence and the appropriate combination of sentencing
    alternatives:
    (1) The evidence, if any, received at the trial and the sentencing
    hearing;
    (2) The presentence report;
    (3) The principles of sentencing and arguments as to sentencing
    alternatives;
    (4) The nature and characteristics of the criminal conduct involved;
    (5) Evidence and information offered by the parties on the mitigating
    and enhancement factors set out in §§ 40-35-113 and 40-35-114;
    (6) Any statistical information provided by the administrative office
    of the courts as to sentencing practices for similar offenses in Tennessee;
    and
    (7) Any statement the defendant wishes to make in the defendant’s
    own behalf about sentencing.
    
    Id. § 40-35-210(b).
    The trial court is granted broad discretion to impose a sentence anywhere within
    the applicable range, regardless of the presence or absence of enhancement or mitigating
    factors, and the sentencing decision of the trial court will be upheld “so long as it is
    within the appropriate range and the record demonstrates that the sentence is otherwise in
    compliance with the purposes and principles listed by statute.” State v. Bise, 
    380 S.W.3d 682
    , 709-10 (Tenn. 2012). Accordingly, we review a trial court’s sentencing
    determinations under an abuse of discretion standard, “granting a presumption of
    reasonableness to within-range sentencing decisions that reflect a proper application of
    the purposes and principles of our Sentencing Act.” 
    Id. at 707.
    At the resentencing hearing, the Defendant admitted that he had violated the
    conditions of his community corrections sentence by testing positive for cocaine, not
    reporting to his case officer, and failing to make restitution payments to the victim.
    Additionally, the Defendant’s case officer testified that the Defendant had failed to
    provide proof of employment, complete his community service work, or pay his
    supervision fees, court costs, and restitution. Therefore, the record contains abundant
    -4-
    evidence showing that the Defendant violated the terms of his community corrections
    sentence.
    As a Range III, persistent offender convicted of a Class D felony, the Defendant’s
    range of punishment was eight to twelve years. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-112(c)(4). In
    determining the length of the Defendant’s sentence, the trial court applied two
    enhancement factors, the Defendant had a previous history criminal convictions or
    behavior in addition to those necessary to establish the appropriate range, and the
    Defendant committed the convicted offense while on parole, 
    id. § 40-35-114(1),
    (13)(B),
    and one mitigating factor, the Defendant’s conduct neither caused nor threatened serious
    bodily injury, 
    id. § 40-35-113(1).
    The trial court noted that the Defendant had “an
    extremely lengthy criminal history that goes back into the early 90’s and has gathered
    like a snowball, . . . as it rolls along, it just keeps getting bigger and bigger. The only
    thing that has slowed it down at all is the stints that he’s had while incarcerated.” The
    court found that the Defendant’s previous history, which included five felony and
    numerous misdemeanor convictions, “in and of itself justifie[d] a sentence greater than
    the minimum of his range.”
    The trial court further noted that within eleven days of the Defendant’s release
    from jail, “he was already engaging in criminal activity again by possessing and using
    cocaine.” By his own admission, the Defendant previously had been placed on probation
    four to five times but never successfully completed it. Accordingly, we conclude that the
    trial court did not abuse its discretion by revoking the Defendant’s community
    corrections sentence, increasing his sentence to ten years, or ordering that it be served in
    confinement.
    CONCLUSION
    Based upon the foregoing authorities and reasoning, the judgment of the trial court
    is affirmed.
    ______________________________________
    ALAN E. GLENN, JUDGE
    -5-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: M2016-02558-CCA-R3-CD

Judges: Judge Alan E. Glenn

Filed Date: 1/26/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/26/2018