Braylen Bennett v. State of Tennessee ( 2018 )


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  •                                                                                           01/29/2018
    IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT KNOXVILLE
    October 10, 2017 Session
    BRAYLEN BENNETT v. STATE OF TENNESSEE
    Interlocutory Appeal from the Criminal Court for Knox County
    No. 107676   Steve Sword, Judge
    No. E2016-02276-CCA-R9-PC
    In this interlocutory appeal, the petitioner, Braylen Bennett, appeals the ruling of the
    post-conviction court denying his request for discovery materials from the State. We
    conclude that the plain language of both the Post-Conviction Procedure Act and Rule 28
    of the Rules of the Tennessee Supreme Court impose upon the State an obligation to
    provide discovery materials to the petitioner as part of the post-conviction proceeding.
    We further conclude that the State’s obligation cannot be met by requiring the post-
    conviction petitioner to obtain from his trial counsel those discovery materials disclosed
    by the State as part of the trial proceeding. Finally, we conclude that, because the post-
    conviction court’s ruling contains insufficient analysis to support its conclusion that none
    of the disclosures required by Rule 16 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure are
    relevant to the claims presented by the petitioner, the case must be remanded for
    reconsideration of the petitioner’s request in light of the rulings in this opinion.
    Tenn. R. App. P. 9; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed in Part; Reversed in
    Part; Remanded
    JAMES CURWOOD WITT, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which CAMILLE R.
    MCMULLEN and ROBERT L. HOLLOWAY, JR., JJ., joined.
    Ann C. Short, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Braylen Bennett.
    Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Benjamin A. Ball, Assistant
    Attorney General; Charme P. Allen, District Attorney General; and TaKisha Fitzgerald,
    Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
    OPINION
    In October 2014, the Knox County Grand Jury charged the petitioner and
    co-defendants Melvin King, Roderick Curtis, Dwaine Love, and Charles Byrd with three
    counts of aggravated burglary, one count of possessing a firearm during the commission
    of burglary, six counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, eight counts of felony
    murder, one count of aggravated assault, four counts of especially aggravated robbery,
    and two counts of aggravated animal cruelty related to “an incident at the home of John
    Huddleston during which Mr. Huddleston was shot and killed.” State v. Melvin King,
    No. E2016-01043-CCA-R3-CD, slip op. at 2 (Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxville, May 22,
    2017), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Sept. 20, 2017). On September 14, 2015, the petitioner
    entered pleas of guilty to aggravated burglary, employing a firearm during the
    commission of a felony, three counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, facilitation of
    first degree murder, aggravated assault, two counts of attempted especially aggravated
    robbery, and two counts of aggravated cruelty to animals. 1
    On March 24, 2016, the petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction
    relief, claiming that certain of his convictions are void because “they are in direct
    contravention of” Code section 39-17-1324(c) and that those convictions violate double
    jeopardy and due process principles. The petitioner also claimed that the ineffective
    assistance of his trial counsel rendered his guilty pleas unknowing and involuntary.
    Specifically, the petitioner claimed that trial counsel failed to investigate, failed to
    prepare and speak to potential witnesses, failed to prepare for trial, failed to “investigate
    legitimate justifiable defenses,” failed to dispute the applicability of the terms of Code
    section 39-17-1324, failed to challenge his firearms possession conviction on double
    jeopardy grounds, failed to challenge his attempted aggravated robbery convictions on
    double jeopardy grounds, and failed to challenge his convictions on due process grounds.
    The petitioner also alleged that trial counsel induced him to enter the guilty pleas by
    providing incorrect advice regarding the potential sentence.
    On April 8, 2016, the post-conviction court filed an order appointing
    counsel, ordering the State to respond to the petition, and setting a tentative date for the
    evidentiary hearing. On June 29, 2016, current post-conviction counsel filed a notice of
    appearance and substitution of counsel. On July 14, 2016, the petitioner moved the post-
    1
    Messrs. Curtis, Love, and Byrd entered pleas of guilty “to the offenses as charged in the
    indictment, with the exception of first degree murder, for which they pled guilty to the lesser included
    offense of facilitation of first degree murder.” 
    Id. Following a
    jury trial at which Messrs. Byrd and Curtis
    testified for the State, a Knox County Criminal Court jury convicted Mr. King of “first degree murder,
    aggravated burglary, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, three counts of
    especially aggravated kidnapping, reckless aggravated assault, attempted especially aggravated robbery,
    and aggravated animal cruelty.” 
    Id., slip op.
    at 1.
    -2-
    conviction court to reset the deadline for filing amendments to the petition to allow his
    new counsel adequate time to investigate all colorable claims. In the motion, the
    petitioner’s counsel indicated an intent to pursue “discovery and disclosures provided for
    in Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 28, Section 6(C)(7)” by “filing a formal motion for
    discovery in this matter.” On that same date, the petitioner moved the court to
    “determine and declare the State’s discovery obligations” in the case. The State
    responded not by providing discovery but instead by moving the court “for an order
    directing the defendant’s previous counsel to turn over to his new counsel all of the
    discovery provided in 104304 by the State,” noting that “the [c]ourt file reflects the
    discovery that was provided to the defendant in 104304.”
    At the hearing on the petitioner’s motion regarding the provision of
    discovery materials, the petitioner argued that the terms of Rule 28 obligated the State to
    provide discovery materials to the petitioner in the post-conviction proceeding and not
    merely prior to trial. The State argued that it had complied with the terms of Rule 28 by
    providing discovery materials to the petitioner’s trial counsel prior to trial and that the
    petitioner should obtain the discovery materials from trial counsel. The post-conviction
    court took the matter under advisement and, in a written order, concluded that although
    Rule 28 did oblige the State to provide discovery materials in the post-conviction
    proceeding, the State’s obligation extended only to those materials relevant to the claims
    raised in the post-conviction petition. The post-conviction court concluded “that
    discovery required under Rule 16 is not relevant to the issues raised in the petition” and
    held that, as a result, “the State is not required to provide any discovery to the petitioner
    at this time.” The record on appeal does not show that the post-conviction court reviewed
    any discovery materials in this case prior to expressing this holding.
    The petitioner moved the post-conviction court to grant interlocutory
    appeal of the ruling pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure,
    arguing that interlocutory review was necessary because both the post-conviction court’s
    ruling that the State “does have the responsibility of providing discovery in post-
    conviction matters” and the court’s ruling that “as a matter of law, . . . Rule 16 ‘is not
    relevant’ to the pro se post-conviction allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel
    were both issues of first impression.” The State opposed the motion, but the trial court
    granted it.
    This court granted the request for interlocutory appeal. In this appeal, the
    petitioner asks this court to determine whether the law governing post-conviction
    procedure imposes upon the State an obligation to provide discovery materials to a post-
    conviction petitioner in the post-conviction proceeding. The petitioner also asks that, in
    the event we find a discovery obligation, we define the parameters of that burden. The
    State argues that the post-conviction court correctly determined that the State had no
    -3-
    further discovery obligation in this case because the State had previously provided
    discovery materials to the petitioner prior to his entering guilty pleas in the underlying
    criminal proceeding and because the State “was not obligated to furnish the petitioner
    with information, evidence, or material which was accessible to him or which he could
    obtain through reasonable diligence.”
    “[T]he availability and scope of post-conviction relief lies within the
    discretion of the General Assembly because post-conviction relief is entirely a creature of
    statute.” Bush v. State, 
    428 S.W.3d 1
    , 15 (Tenn. 2014) (citing Pike v. State, 
    164 S.W.3d 257
    , 262 (Tenn. 2005)). Code section 40-30-118 empowers the supreme court to
    “promulgate rules of practice and procedure consistent with this part, including rules
    prescribing the form and contents of the petition, the preparation and filing of the record
    and assignments of error for simple appeal and for delayed appeal in the nature of a writ
    of error.” 
    Id. § 40-30-118.
    To this end, the supreme court has adopted Rule 28 of the
    rules of the supreme court to “supplement the remedies and procedures set forth in the
    Post-Conviction Procedure Act.” Tenn. R. Sup. Ct. R. 28, §1. Because the determination
    of the scope of the State’s discovery obligation in a post-conviction proceeding depends
    upon the interpretation of the Post-Conviction Procedure Act (“the Act”) and the rules of
    our supreme court that facilitate its implementation, our review is de novo with no
    presumption of correctness afforded to the ruling of the trial court. See, e.g., State v.
    Howard, 
    504 S.W.3d 260
    , 267 (Tenn. 2016).
    The most basic principle of statutory construction is “‘to ascertain and give
    effect to the legislative intent without unduly restricting or expanding a statute’s coverage
    beyond its intended scope.’” Houghton v. Aramark Educ. Res., Inc., 
    90 S.W.3d 676
    , 678
    (Tenn. 2002) (quoting Owens v. State, 
    908 S.W.2d 923
    , 926 (Tenn. 1995)). “Legislative
    intent is determined ‘from the natural and ordinary meaning of the statutory language
    within the context of the entire statute without any forced or subtle construction that
    would extend or limit the statute’s meaning.’” Osborn v. Marr, 
    127 S.W.3d 737
    , 740
    (Tenn. 2004) (quoting State v. Flemming, 
    19 S.W.3d 195
    , 197 (Tenn. 2000)). “When the
    statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we apply the plain language in its normal
    and accepted use.” Boarman v. Jaynes, 
    109 S.W.3d 286
    , 291 (Tenn. 2003) (citing State
    v. Nelson, 
    23 S.W.3d 270
    , 271 (Tenn. 2000)). “It is only when a statute is ambiguous
    that we may reference the broader statutory scheme, the history of the legislation, or other
    sources.” In re Estate of Davis, 
    308 S.W.3d 832
    , 837 (Tenn. 2010) (citing Parks v. Tenn.
    Mun. League Risk Mgmt. Pool, 
    974 S.W.2d 677
    , 679 (Tenn. 1998)).
    The statute and rule governing this case are clear and unambiguous. Code
    section 40-30-109 and Rule 28 “[t]ogether . . . provide both what is discoverable and how
    it is discoverable in a Tennessee post-conviction proceeding.” Waller v. Bryan, 
    16 S.W.3d 770
    , 776-77 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999); see also House v. State, 
    44 S.W.3d 508
    , 516
    -4-
    (Tenn. 2001); Swift v. Campbell, 
    159 S.W.3d 565
    , 575 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004); George T.
    Haynie v. State, No. M2009-01167-CCA-R3-PC (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, Sept. 16,
    2010); Jason Blake Bryant v. State, No. E2002-00907-CCA-R3-PC (Tenn. Crim. App.,
    Knoxville, Mar. 11, 2004); Darrell Wayne Taylor v. State, No. W2001-01806-CCA-R9-
    PD (Tenn. Crim. App., Jackson, May 2, 2003). Code section 40-30-109 provides that
    “[d]iscovery is not available in a proceeding under this section except as provided under
    Rule 16 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure.” T.C.A. § 40-30-109(b). To
    facilitate discovery in the post-conviction proceeding, Supreme Court Rule 28, section 6,
    subsection 3 provides that “[i]n the event a colorable claim is stated,” the post-conviction
    court “shall enter a preliminary order which,” among other things, “directs disclosure by
    the [S]tate of all that is required to be disclosed under Rule 16 of the Tennessee Rules of
    Criminal Procedure, to the extent relevant to the grounds alleged in the petition, and any
    other disclosure required by the state or federal constitution.”2 Tenn. R. Sup. Ct. R. 28,
    §6(3)(c). Section 6, subsection 7 provides:
    Upon receiving the court’s preliminary order, the [S]tate shall
    provide to petitioner discovery of all those items deemed
    discoverable under Rule 16, Tennessee Rules of Criminal
    Procedure, if relevant to the issues raised in the post-
    conviction petition, and shall provide any other disclosure
    required by the state or federal constitution.
    Tenn. R. Sup. Ct. R. 28, §6(7). Section 7 provides that “[t]he [S]tate shall provide
    discovery in accordance with Section 6(C)(7).” Tenn. R. Sup. Ct. R. 28, §7.
    Read together, the plain language of Code section 40-30-109 and Rule 28
    clearly imposes upon the State an affirmative duty to provide discovery materials to the
    petitioner as part of the post-conviction proceeding. Nothing in either the statute or the
    rule suggests that the State fulfills its obligations in the post-conviction proceeding by
    disclosures that occurred prior to the commencement of the post-conviction proceeding.
    Said differently, that the State fully complied with its discovery obligations prior to trial
    does not absolve it of the discovery obligation imposed by the law governing post-
    conviction proceedings.
    Similarly, neither the statute nor the rule supports the State’s assertion that
    it is not required to provide the petitioner with discovery materials that it previously
    disclosed to his trial counsel because the petitioner could obtain those materials from trial
    counsel. The State does not rely on either the statute or the rule and instead cites State v.
    2
    The preliminary order issued in this case did not contain language directing the State to provide
    discovery in accordance with Rule 16.
    -5-
    Dickerson in support of its argument. Dickerson, however, involved the resolution of a
    pretrial discovery question. In Dickerson, we held that the State did not violate the terms
    of Rule 16 by failing to disclose to Dickerson the records of Dickerson’s treatment at the
    Helen Ross McNabb Center, even though the State had a copy of the records in its
    possession, because the records were not within the exclusive possession and control of
    the State and were, instead, equally available to both parties and could have been
    obtained by Dickerson with the exercise of due diligence. State v. Dickerson, 
    885 S.W.2d 90
    (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993). The holding in Dickerson does not alter the general
    discovery obligation imposed upon the State by Code section 40-30-109 and Rule 28.
    We point out that, although a post-conviction proceeding is generally criminal in nature,
    see Carter v. Bell, 
    279 S.W.3d 560
    , 565 (Tenn. 2009) (“Post-conviction proceedings are
    best described as proceedings arising out of a criminal case.”), the post-conviction
    proceeding is not a continuation of the original criminal case brought by the State against
    a defendant, see T.C.A. § 16-5-108 (distinguishing between “[c]riminal cases, both
    felony and misdemeanor” and “[h]abeas corpus and Post-Conviction Procedure Act
    proceedings”); rather, the post-conviction proceeding begins with a new filing, a
    collateral attack brought by the defendant – now the petitioner – against the State, cf.
    Murray v. Giarratano, 
    492 U.S. 1
    , 10 (1989) (“State collateral proceedings are not
    constitutionally required as an adjunct to the state criminal proceedings and serve a
    different and more limited purpose than either the trial or appeal.”).
    Because we find that the State has an affirmative duty to provide discovery
    materials to the petitioner in the post-conviction proceeding, we affirm that portion of the
    post-conviction court’s ruling that held similarly. We next consider the post-conviction
    court’s conclusion “that discovery required under Rule 16 is not relevant to the issues
    raised in the petition.”
    To begin, we must address the petitioner’s claim that the relevancy
    requirement of Rule 28 improperly limits the scope of Code section 40-30-109. As
    indicated above, Rule 28 imposes upon the State an affirmative duty to disclose those
    materials that are discoverable under Rule 16 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure and that
    are “relevant to the grounds alleged in the petition.” Tenn. R. Sup. Ct. R. 28, §6(3)(c);
    see also 
    id. §6(7) (“[T]he
    [S]tate shall provide to petitioner discovery of all those items
    deemed discoverable under Rule 16, Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, if relevant
    to the issues raised in the post-conviction petition . . . .”). The petitioner asks this court to
    ignore the relevancy requirement entirely and, instead, find that the State must disclose to
    the post-conviction petitioner all those materials discoverable under Rule 16 and not only
    those materials deemed relevant to the post-conviction petition.
    The language of Rule 28 arguably limits the State’s discovery obligation in
    a way that Code section 40-30-109 does not. It does not follow, however, that the
    -6-
    limitation should be disregarded. The Act specifically authorizes the supreme court to
    “promulgate rules of practice and procedure consistent with this part, including rules
    prescribing the form and contents of the petition, the preparation and filing of the record
    and assignments of error for simple appeal and for delayed appeal in the nature of a writ
    of error.” 
    Id. § 40-30-118.
    The discovery limitation imposed by Rule 28 is best
    understood as a rule of procedure, and, as such, it falls within the ambit of the
    authorization provided to the supreme court in Code section 40-30-118.
    Furthermore, as a general matter, our supreme court “has the authority to
    oversee the practice and procedure in Tennessee’s courts.” 
    Bush, 428 S.W.3d at 16
    (citing Mansell v. Bridgestone Firestone N. Am. Tire, LLC, 
    417 S.W.3d 393
    , 402 (Tenn.
    2013)); see State v. Mallard, 
    40 S.W.3d 473
    , 480-81 (Tenn. 2001) (“Only the Supreme
    Court has the inherent power to promulgate rules governing the practice and procedure of
    the courts of this state . . . .”). In the exercise of that power, the concept of relevancy is a
    common and useful tool for achieving judicial efficiency and efficacy. See 
    Mallard, 40 S.W.3d at 483
    (stating that the “determination of what evidence is relevant, either
    logically or legally, to a fact at issue in litigation is a power that is entrusted solely to the
    care and exercise of the judiciary”). Thus, the expression of a logical, if not inherent,
    gate-keeping requirement of relevancy in Rule 28 emanates from judicial power.3
    Therefore, because Rule 28 governs the practice and procedure in post-conviction
    proceedings, the supreme court did not usurp the authority of the legislature by passing it.
    Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the limitation imposed by Rule 28
    actually gives “effect to the legislative intent” of the Act “without unduly restricting or
    expanding [the] statute’s coverage beyond its intended scope.’” 
    Houghton, 90 S.W.3d at 678
    . The Act “was designed to hasten the final resolution of criminal appeals.” 
    Bush, 428 S.W.3d at 14
    . Post-conviction relief is available only to address claims that a
    conviction is void or voidable due to the abridgment of a constitutional right, see, e.g.,
    Porterfield v. State, 
    897 S.W.2d 672
    , 676 (Tenn. 1995), and may not be used to relitigate
    issues previously determined, see, e.g., T.C.A. § 40-30-102; Cone v. State, 
    927 S.W.2d 579
    , 582 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) (“A petitioner may not relitigate a previously
    determined issue by presenting additional factual allegations.”). Given the limited scope
    of relief available under the Act, a commensurate limit on the scope of discovery
    3
    As an aside, we note that Rule 16 itself expresses a gate-keeping requirement of materiality for
    various aspects of discovery. See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 16(1)(F)(i) (providing that “the [S]tate shall permit
    the defendant to inspect and copy or photograph books, papers, documents, photographs, tangible objects,
    buildings, or places, or copies or portions thereof, if,” among other things, “the item is material to
    preparing the defense”); 
    id. 16(1)(G)(iii) (providing
    that “the [S]tate shall permit the defendant to inspect
    and copy or photograph the results or reports of physical or mental examinations, and of scientific tests or
    experiments if,” among other requirements, “the item is material to preparing the defense or the [S]tate
    intends to use the item in its case-in-chief at trial”).
    -7-
    available in a post-conviction action gives effect to the intent of the legislature.
    Accordingly, we decline the defendant’s invitation to read Rule 28’s relevancy
    requirement as ultra vires.
    We turn, then, to the question of the appropriate standard and procedure to
    be applied to determine whether discovery materials are relevant to the claims raised in
    the post-conviction petition. The petitioner urges this court to adopt the definition of
    relevance contained in evidence rule 401, whether the potential evidence has “any
    tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of
    the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Tenn.
    R. Evid. 401. The State does not address the petitioner’s argument.
    Black’s Law Dictionary defines “relevant” as “[l]ogically connected and
    tending to prove or disprove a matter in issue; having appreciable probative value — that
    is, rationally tending to persuade people of the probability or possibility of some alleged
    fact.” Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). This definition is very similar to that
    contained in evidence rule 401, and it corresponds with the common law understanding
    of the term. See Tenn. R. Evid. 401, Advisory Comm’n Commt. (“This proposal does
    not change Tennessee common law.”). We can fathom no reason to ascribe to the term a
    definition different from that it enjoys in every other legal context.
    Having found an affirmative duty to disclose and having defined the
    parameters of that duty, we now address the post-conviction court’s finding “that
    discovery required under Rule 16 is not relevant to the issues raised in the petition.” The
    petitioner asserts that the post-conviction court erred by finding that none of the materials
    discoverable under Rule 16 were relevant to the claims raised in the original pro se
    petition. The State argues that the post-conviction court “properly determined that only
    the discovery materials actually provided to the petitioner prior to the entry of his plea
    were relevant to the issues raised in the post-conviction petition” and that because the
    State had already provided pretrial discovery materials to trial counsel, it was not
    obligated to provide additional discovery.
    Rule 16 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure provides, in
    pertinent part, as follows:
    (a) Disclosure of Evidence by the State.
    (1) Information Subject to Disclosure.
    (A) Defendant’s Oral Statement. Upon a defendant’s
    request, the state shall disclose to the defendant the
    -8-
    substance of any of the defendant’s oral statements made
    before or after arrest in response to interrogation by any
    person the defendant knew was a law-enforcement officer
    if the state intends to offer the statement in evidence at the
    trial;
    (B) Defendant’s Written or Recorded Statement. Upon a
    defendant’s request, the state shall disclose to the
    defendant, and make available for inspection, copying, or
    photographing, all of the following:
    (i) the defendant’s relevant written or recorded
    statements, or copies thereof, if:
    (I) the statement is within the state’s possession,
    custody, or control; and
    (II) the district attorney general knows--or through due
    diligence could know--that the statement exists; and
    (ii) the defendant’s recorded grand jury testimony
    which relates to the offense charged.
    (C) Organizational Defendant.       Upon a defendant’s
    motion, if the defendant is a corporation, limited liability
    company, limited liability partnership, partnership,
    association, or labor union, the court may grant the
    defendant discovery of relevant recorded testimony of any
    witness before a grand jury who was:
    (i) at the time of the testimony, so situated as an officer
    or employee as to have been able legally to bind the
    defendant regarding conduct constituting the offense;
    or
    (ii) at the time of the offense, personally involved in
    the alleged conduct constituting the offense and so
    situated as an officer or employee as to have been able
    legally to bind the defendant regarding that alleged
    conduct in which the witness was involved.
    -9-
    (D) Codefendants. Upon a defendant’s request, when the
    state decides to place codefendants on trial jointly, the
    state shall promptly furnish each defendant who has
    moved for discovery under this subdivision with all
    information discoverable under Rule 16(a)(1)(A), (B), and
    (C) as to each codefendant.
    (E) Defendant’s Prior Record. Upon a defendant’s
    request, the state shall furnish the defendant with a copy
    of the defendant’s prior criminal record, if any, that is
    within the state’s possession, custody, or control if the
    district attorney general knows--or through due diligence
    could know--that the record exists.
    (F) Documents and Objects. Upon a defendant’s request,
    the state shall permit the defendant to inspect and copy or
    photograph books, papers, documents, photographs,
    tangible objects, buildings, or places, or copies or portions
    thereof, if the item is within the state’s possession,
    custody, or control and:
    (i) the item is material to preparing the defense;
    (ii) the government intends to use the item in its case-
    in-chief at trial; or
    (iii) the item was obtained from or belongs to the
    defendant.
    (G) Reports of Examinations and Tests.              Upon a
    defendant’s request, the state shall permit the defendant to
    inspect and copy or photograph the results or reports of
    physical or mental examinations, and of scientific tests or
    experiments if:
    (i) the item is within the state’s possession, custody, or
    control;
    (ii) the district attorney general knows--or through due
    diligence could know--that the item exists; and
    -10-
    (iii) the item is material to preparing the defense or the
    state intends to use the item in its case-in-chief at trial.
    (2) Information Not Subject to Disclosure. Except as
    provided in paragraphs (A), (B), (E), and (G) of subdivision
    (a)(1), this rule does not authorize the discovery or inspection
    of reports, memoranda, or other internal state documents
    made by the district attorney general or other state agents or
    law enforcement officers in connection with investigating or
    prosecuting the case. Nor does this rule authorize discovery
    of statements made by state witnesses or prospective state
    witnesses.
    (3) Grand Jury Transcripts. This rule does not apply to the
    discovery or inspection of a grand jury’s recorded
    proceedings, except as provided in Rule 6 and Rule
    16(a)(1)(A), (B), and (C).
    (4) Failure to Call Witness. The fact that a witness’s name is
    furnished under this rule is not grounds for comment on a
    failure to call the witness.
    Tenn. R. Crim. P. 16(a).
    Initially, we note that the State’s argument misconstrues the ruling of the
    post-conviction court. The post-conviction court did not conclude, as the State asserts,
    that “only the discovery materials actually provided to the petitioner prior to the entry of
    his plea were relevant” to the issues raised by the petitioner in the post-conviction
    proceeding. Instead, the post-conviction court stated, without any apparent review or
    analysis of the relationship between the various disclosures required by Rule 16 and the
    specific claims raised in the petition for post-conviction relief, “that discovery required
    under Rule 16 is not relevant to the issues raised in the petition.”
    The petitioner construes the post-conviction court’s statement as a general
    legal conclusion that Rule 16 discovery materials would never be relevant to a claim of
    ineffective assistance of counsel. Given the lack of analysis, we cannot discern whether
    the post-conviction court intended to make such a conclusion. If, indeed, the post-
    conviction court intended to conclude that, as a matter of law, Rule 16 discovery
    materials are irrelevant to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we would reverse
    because such a conclusion finds no support in the law.
    -11-
    The post-conviction court’s lack of analysis makes a review of its
    conclusion difficult because it is impossible to discern why the court ruled as it did. Rule
    16 requires the disclosure of a wide variety of materials, some of which are clearly
    irrelevant to the claims raised in the original petition. For example, because the petitioner
    is not an organizational defendant, the disclosures required by Rule 16(C) do not apply.
    It should be noted that nothing in the rules limits post-conviction discovery materials to
    materials that existed prior to or during the trial; it is possible that materials developed
    after the trial may become discoverable as relevant to the issues in a given post-
    conviction proceeding. Additionally, Rule 16 discovery would not be relevant to the
    petitioner’s claims that his convictions contravene the applicable statutes and that they
    violate double jeopardy or due process principles because those claims rely entirely on
    the interpretation of the statutes and case law. Some of the items discoverable under Rule
    16, like test results or co-defendant’s statements, however, might be relevant to the
    petitioner’s claims that his counsel failed to investigate the case, failed to interview
    potential witnesses, failed to prepare for trial, and failed to “investigate legitimate
    justifiable defenses” before he recommended that the petitioner enter his guilty pleas.
    Additionally, it is not clear that the post-conviction court applied the appropriate standard
    of leniency when reviewing the claims made in the initial, pro se petition, see Stewart v.
    Schofield, 
    368 S.W.3d 457
    , 462 (Tenn. 2012) (“Pleadings prepared by pro se litigants
    untrained in the law should be measured by less stringent standards than those applied to
    pleadings prepared by lawyers.”), or whether the court applied the appropriate standard of
    relevancy. For these reasons, we reverse the post-conviction court’s categorical
    conclusion that none of the materials subject to disclosure pursuant to Rule 16 are
    relevant to the claims raised in the original petition for post-conviction relief and remand
    that claim to the post-conviction court for reconsideration in light of the holdings in this
    opinion.
    Accordingly, we affirm the post-conviction court’s conclusion that the State
    has an affirmative duty to provide Rule 16 discovery materials within the context of the
    post-conviction proceeding and reverse and remand for reconsideration the post-
    conviction court’s holding that Rule 16 discovery was not relevant to any issue raised in
    the initial pro se post-conviction petition.
    _________________________________
    JAMES CURWOOD WITT, JR., JUDGE
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