State v. Willie Taylor ( 1998 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
JANUARY SESSION, 1998
FILED
STATE OF TENNESSEE, )
) No. 02C01-9702-CR-00080March 10, 1998
Appellee )
) SHELBY COUNTY Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate C ourt Clerk
vs. )
) Hon. JAMES C. BEASLEY, JR., Judge
WILLIE TAYLOR, )
) (Aggravated Burglary)
Appellant )
For the Appellant: For the Appellee:
Brett B. Stein John Knox Walkup
Attorney at Law Attorney General and Reporter
100 N. Main #3102
Memphis, TN 38103 Sarah M. Branch
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Justice Division
450 James Robertson Parkway
Nashville, TN 37243-0493
William L. Gibbons
District Attorney General
Perry Hayes
Asst. District Attorney General
Criminal Justice Complex, Suite 301
201 Poplar Street
Memphis, TN 38103
OPINION FILED:
AFFIRMED
David G. Hayes
Judge
OPINION
The appellant, Willie Taylor, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of
aggravated burglary and received a sentence of five years.1 In this appeal, as of
right, he presents the following issues for our review:
(1) Whether the evidence is sufficient to support the
conviction; and
(2) Whether the reasonable doubt jury instruction, which
included the language "absolute certainty of guilt is not
demanded by the law to convict," created a lesser
standard of proof for conviction than is constitutionally
permissible.
After review, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
On March 10, 1995, at around 1:15 a.m., Kimberly Pointer returned to her
Memphis apartment and found it being burglarized. Ms. Pointer immediately
recognized one of the two burglars, Lafrancine Wright, because they had grown up
in the same neighborhood and were life-long acquaintances. The second burglar
was later identified as the appellant. Ms. Pointer watched as the appellant and
Wright carried her VCR from her apartment and drove away. The police were
notified and arrived at the scene approximately fifteen minutes later. Ms. Pointer
related to the police that she recognized one of the burglars and that this person
lived “right up the street.” Ms. Pointer was requested to accompany the police to
Wright’s residence, where she identified Wright as one of the intruders. Ms. Pointer
identified the second burglar as the appellant, who, at the time, was next door to
Wright’s residence. At this time, the appellant and Wright were taken into custody.
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The appellant received a split confinement sentence of five years in the “local
workhouse” of which one year was to be served in the Shelby County Correction Facility followed
by four years in Community Corrections.
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The police and Ms. Pointer returned to Ms. Pointer’s apartment approximately thirty
minutes later, or around 2:00 a.m., and discovered that her stolen VCR had been
returned and placed on her back porch steps. It was determined that entry into the
victim’s apartment had been gained by breaking a rear window. Again, at trial, Ms.
Pointer identified the appellant and Wright as the two individuals who she saw in her
apartment and the two who left with her VCR and drove away. The defense offered
no proof. Based upon these facts, the jury convicted the appellant of aggravated
burglary.
ANALYSIS
In the appellant’s first issue, he contends that the evidence is insufficient as a
matter of law to support his conviction for aggravated burglary. When reviewing a
trial court’s judgment, the appellate court will not disturb a verdict of guilt, unless the
facts of the record and inferences which may be drawn from it are insufficient as a
matter of law for a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e); State v. Tuggle, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914
(Tenn. 1982). In other words, this court will not reevaluate or reweigh the evidence
brought out at trial. It is presumed that the judge or jury has resolved all conflicts in
the testimony and drawn all reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the
State. See State v. Sheffield, 676 S.W.2d 542, 547 (Tenn. 1984); State v.
Cabbage, 571 S.W. 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978); State v. Grace, 493 S.W.2d 474, 476
(Tenn. 1973).
Specifically, the appellant argues that, due to the time frame presented in this
case, i.e. the time from the arrival of the police at the victim’s apartment until his
arrest, it would have been impossible for the appellant to have returned the VCR.
This argument is flawed for two reasons. First, the time frame of approximately
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thirty minutes (from 1:30 a.m. until approximately 2:00 a.m.) does not exclude the
appellant as the person who returned the VCR. Second, it was unnecessary for the
jury to conclude that the person who returned the VCR was the thief. In order to
prove aggravated burglary, as charged in the indictment in this case, the State was
required to prove that the appellant entered Ms. Pointer’s apartment, without her
consent and with the intent to commit a theft. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-403. The
proof overwhelmingly established that the appellant entered the victim’s residence
without her permission and unlawfully removed her VCR. This issue is without
merit.
Next, the appellant argues that the reasonable doubt instruction provided by
the trial court is constitutionally invalid. In support of this argument, he relies upon
the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 41, 111 S.Ct.
328 (1990). Specifically, the appellant argues that the language “absolute certainty
of guilt” suggests “a higher degree of doubt than is required for aquittal under the
reasonable doubt standard.” Virtually identical language regarding “absolute
certainty” in a reasonable doubt instruction was recently approved as passing
constitutional muster by a panel of this court. See State v. Henning, No. 02C01-
9703-CC-00126 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Jackson, Oct. 24, 1997) (citations omitted);
see T.P.I. Crim. 2.03(a) (4th ed.). We find no reasonable likelihood that the jury
understood the instruction to permit conviction after anything but a process of
careful deliberation or upon less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. This issue
is without merit.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
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____________________________________
DAVID G. HAYES, Judge
CONCUR:
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JOE B. JONES, Presiding Judge
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JOE G. RILEY, Judge
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