State v. Ronald Cox ( 2010 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
DECEMBER SESSION, 1996
RONALD L. COX, ) C.C.A. NO. 02C01-9508-CR-00221
Appellant, )
)
) SHELBY COUNTY
VS. )
) HON. JOSEPH B. DAILEY
STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) JUDGE
)
Appellee. ) (Habeas Corpus)
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
RONALD COX CHARLES W. BURSON
Pro Se Attorney General and Reporter
Unit 3B/Route 1
T.C.I.P CLINTON J. MORGAN
Only, TN 37140 Assistant Attorney General
450 James Robertson Parkway
Nashville, TN 37243
WILLIAM L. GIBBONS
District Attorney General
ROBERT CARTER
Assistant District Attorney
201 Poplar Avenue
Memphis, TN 38103
OPINION FILED ________________________
AFFIRMED
JERRY L. SMITH, JUDGE
OPINION
Appellant Ronald L. Cox appeals from the trial court’s dismissal of his pro
se petition for the writ of habeas corpus. In May 1995, Appellant filed a petition
for the writ of habeas corpus alleging that in October 1989 he entered into a plea
agreement with the State wh ereby he pled guilty to two counts of robbery, one
count of aggravated robbery, and one count of aggravated assault in exchange
for an effective sentence of ten years, Range 1, at thirty percent. He alleged that
the State bre ached the agre emen t becau se he w as not pa roled after hav ing
served thirty percent of his sentence. In his petition for the writ of habeas corpus,
Appellant further claimed that when he pled guilty he did not understand that
service of the thirty percent of his sentence merely made him eligible for release
but did not mandate it. On June 21, 1995, the trial court summarily dismissed
Appe llant’s petition. The trial court dismissed the petition stating that Appellant
failed to state ap propriate grounds for e ither hab eas co rpus relief o r post-
conviction relief and that the petition, treated as a petition for post-conviction
relief, was time-barred. On appeal, Appellant raises two issues: 1) whether the
trial court erred in dismissing his petition for the writ of habeas corpus, and 2)
whether coun sel sho uld ha ve bee n app ointed and a n evide ntiary hearing he ld
before the petition was dism issed. For the rea sons stated b elow, we affirm the
decision of the trial cou rt.
Breach of a plea agreement by the State is grounds for post-conviction
relief and has been recognized as such in several of this Cou rt’s cases . See e.g.
Brown v. State, 928 S.W.2d 453 (Tenn. Crim. A pp. 199 6); Tem pleton v. S tate,
1995 WL 2995, a t *1 (Ten n. Crim. A pp. Jan . 5, 1995) . Moreover , Appella nt’s
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claim is essentially an involuntary plea claim, cognizable under the Po st-
Conviction Procedure Act. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30 -203 (S upp. 19 96). A
challenge to the validity of a guilty plea can be made only by a p etition for po st-
conviction relief and not by a petition for the w rit of habea s corpu s. Archer v.
State, 851 S.W.2d 157, 164 (Tenn. 1993). We have also held, at least by
implication, that claims of brea ched prom ises regarding a release da te are
cognizab le only under the Post-Conviction Procedure Act and not as a petition
for the writ of habeas corpu s. See Templeton, 1995 WL 2995 , at *1. W hile
Appe llant’s claim is cogniza ble in a pe tition for post-c onviction re lief, we find, as
the trial court did, that the claim is time-barred by the statute of limitations found
at Tenn. C ode Ann . Sec. 40-30-1 02 (1990).
Appellant’s guilty plea was entered in November 1989. Under the 1986
Post-Conviction Procedure Act, Appellant had three years fr om th is date w ithin
which to file a petition. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-102. Therefore, his time period
for filing a petition for post-conviction relief exp ired in November 1992. Appellant
argues that the statute of lim itations sho uld not ap ply to him because he did not
have grounds for relief until after the parole board denied his parole at which
point the limitations period had expired. It is true that in some cases due process
prohibits the stric t applic ation o f the sta tute of lim itations period found in
Tennessee Code Annotated Section 40-30-105. In Burford v. State, 845 SW.2d
204, 208 (Tenn. 1992), the Tennessee Supreme Court held that due process
prohibits the strict application of the statute of limitations when the grounds for
relief arise after the final action of the highest state appellate court to which an
appeal is taken, or in other words, when the grounds for relief arise after the
statute of limitatio ns pe riod be gins to run. H owev er, Ap pellan t’s claim for relief
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existed from the time o f his con viction. T his Co urt has held th at a pe titioner’s
professed lack of knowledge that he had grounds for relief until after the statute
of limitations had run is not “later arising” under the Burford decision and cannot
defeat the app lication of the statute of limitations. Templeton, 1995 WL 2995, at
*1; Brown, 928 S.W.2d at 457. Finally, the fact that Appellant filed under the
amended Post-Conviction Procedure Act, Tenn. Code Ann. Sec. 40-30-205, does
not chang e the ou tcome . Petitions barred by the statute of limitations contained
in the 198 6 Act m ay not be revived by filing under th e ame nded a ct. See e.g.
State v. Brum mit, 1997 W L 1066 79 (Te nn. Crim . App. M ar. 11, 19 97), applic . filed
(Tenn. Mar. 17, 1997 ); Carter v. S tate, 1997 WL 59422 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb.
12, 1997); Pend leton v. Sta te, 1997 W L 59501 (T enn. Crim. A pp. Feb. 12, 1 997),
applic . filed (Tenn. Ma r. 24, 1997).
Next, we addres s whether it was proper for the trial judge to dismiss
Appe llant’s petition without appointing counsel and without conducting an
evidentiary hearing. W here a com petently drafted petition and all pleadings, files,
and records of a case conclusively establish that the petitioner is entitled to no
relief, appointment of counsel and an evidentiary hearing are not required . Lane
v. State, 906 S.W .2d 1, 3 (Tenn. Crim . App. 1993 ). Because Appellant’s petition
was clearly tim e-bar red, the trial court properly dismissed the petition without
appointing counsel or conducting an evidentiary hearing.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
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____________________________________
JERRY L. SMITH, JUDGE
CONCUR:
___________________________________
JOE B. JONES, PRESIDING JUDGE
___________________________________
JOSEPH M. TIPTON, JUDGE
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