Brunswick L. Robinson v. State of Tennessee ( 2017 )


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  •                                                                                             04/21/2017
    IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT KNOXVILLE
    Assigned on Briefs March 21, 2017
    BRUNSWICK L. ROBINSON v. STATE OF TENNESSEE
    Appeal from the Criminal Court for Johnson County
    No. CC-16-CR-144 Stacy L. Street, Judge
    ___________________________________
    No. E2016-02429-CCA-R3-HC
    ___________________________________
    The pro se petitioner, Brunswick L. Robinson, appeals the denial of his petition for writ
    of habeas corpus by the Johnson County Criminal Court, arguing the trial court erred in
    summarily dismissing the petition as his sentence has expired. After our review, we
    affirm the summary dismissal of the petition pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the
    Court of Criminal Appeals.
    Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed
    J. ROSS DYER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS
    and TIMOTHY L. EASTER, JJ., joined.
    Brunswick L. Robinson, Mountain City, Tennessee, Pro Se.
    Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Courtney N. Orr, Assistant
    Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    In 2005, the petitioner pled guilty to the attempted sale of a Schedule II substance
    for which he received a five-year suspended sentence, with one hundred and eighty days
    to serve. According to the judgment form entered on February 14, 2006, and made a part
    of the appellate record, the petitioner did not receive any pretrial jail credits and the five-
    year sentence was to run consecutively to “all current cases” of the petitioner. However,
    on November 13, 2014, the Rutherford County Circuit Court revoked the petitioner’s
    probation and he was ordered to serve the five-year sentence in confinement. According
    to the November 13, 2014, Violation of Probation Order, four hundred and ninety-seven
    days of jail credits were to be applied to the five-year sentence.
    On October 28, 2016, the petitioner filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas
    corpus alleging the trial court failed to apply the ordered jail credits to his sentence,
    rendering it illegal and, furthermore, expired. The petitioner also asserted that the
    October 28, 2016, petition was his first application for the writ. The State filed a motion
    to dismiss the October 28, 2016, petition arguing the petitioner previously filed an
    application for the writ, and, therefore, it failed to satisfy the procedural requirements of
    Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-21-107. The State also argued the trial court’s
    alleged failure to apply jail credits to the petitioner’s sentence did not present a colorable
    claim and the petitioner failed to show that his sentence had expired. The court granted
    the State’s motion and summarily dismissed the petition. The petitioner then filed a pro
    se appeal arguing the habeas court erred by summarily dismissing the petition “due to his
    sentence being expired.”
    It is well-settled that habeas corpus relief is limited in scope and may only be
    invoked where the judgment is void or the petitioner’s term of imprisonment has expired.
    Faulkner v. State, 
    226 S.W.3d 358
    , 361 (Tenn. 2007); State v. Ritchie, 
    20 S.W.3d 624
    ,
    629 (Tenn. 2000); State v. Davenport, 
    980 S.W.2d 407
    , 409 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998). A
    void, rather than a voidable, judgment is “one that is facially invalid because the court did
    not have the statutory authority to render such judgment.” Summers v. State, 
    212 S.W.3d 251
    , 256 (Tenn. 2007) (citing Dykes v. Compton, 
    978 S.W.2d 528
    , 529 (Tenn. 1998)).
    A petitioner must establish a void judgment or illegal confinement by a
    preponderance of the evidence. Wyatt v. State, 
    24 S.W.3d 319
    , 322 (Tenn. 2000).
    However, when a “habeas corpus petition fails to establish that a judgment is void, a trial
    court may dismiss the petition without a hearing.” 
    Summers, 212 S.W.3d at 260
    (citing
    Hogan v. Mills, 
    168 S.W.3d 753
    , 755 (Tenn. 2005)). Whether the petitioner is entitled to
    habeas corpus relief is a question of law. 
    Id. at 255;
    Hart v. State, 
    21 S.W.3d 901
    , 903
    (Tenn. 2000). As such, this Court reviews the habeas court’s findings de novo with no
    presumption of correctness. 
    Id. The appellate
    record makes clear the petitioner has failed to satisfy both the
    procedural and substantive requirements necessary for habeas corpus relief. The
    petitioner filed an initial petition for writ of habeas corpus on October 12, 2016. The
    Rutherford County Circuit Court denied the petition for lack of jurisdiction on October
    17, 2016.1 The petitioner then filed a second petition for writ of habeas corpus on
    1
    Though the October 12, 2016 petition is not a part of the appellate record, the order dismissing it
    makes clear that at the time of the application for the writ, the petitioner was incarcerated in Johnson
    County, Tennessee. As such, the Rutherford County Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction pursuant to
    Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-21-105, which states: “The application should be made to the court
    -2-
    October 28, 2016, in Johnson County wherein he alleged “[t]his is the first application for
    the writ.” Pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-21-107, “if a previous
    application has been made, a copy of the petition and proceedings thereon shall be
    produced, or satisfactory reasons be given for the failure so to do.” Tenn. Code Ann. §
    29-21-107(b)(4). Here, the petitioner failed to attach a copy of the October 12, 2016,
    petition or the “proceedings thereon” to his second application, and he provided no
    explanation for the same. 
    Id. We, therefore,
    conclude that the habeas court’s summary
    dismissal of the petition was proper and the petitioner is not entitled to relief from this
    Court.
    Additionally, as noted by the State and found by the trial court, the petitioner has
    failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the judgment at issue was void or
    that his sentence has expired. On appeal, the petitioner argues his sentence is illegal
    based upon the trial court’s failure to apply jail credits to his sentence. However, this
    Court has previously held that “[a] trial court’s failure to award pretrial or post-judgment
    jail credits does not render a sentence illegal and is, therefore, insufficient to establish a
    colorable claim for habeas corpus . . . relief.” Cory O’Brien Johnson v. State, No.
    W2016-00087-CCA-R3-HC, 
    2016 WL 4545876
    , at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 30,
    2016), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Dec. 15, 2016) (citations omitted). This issue is without
    merit.
    Finally, no evidence exists in the record to support the petitioner’s claim that his
    five-year sentence has expired. The record does not include the judgment forms for the
    petitioner’s prior cases to which the present sentence was set to run consecutively.
    Accordingly, nothing in the record indicates the date upon which the petitioner began
    serving the present sentence. The petitioner has failed to provide “an adequate record”
    for our review and, as such, has failed to show his sentence has expired.2 
    Summers, 212 S.W.3d at 261
    . Accordingly, the petitioner is not entitled to relief.
    When an opinion would have no precedential value, the Court of Criminal
    Appeals may affirm the judgment or action of the trial court by memorandum opinion
    when the judgment is rendered or the action taken in a proceeding without a jury and
    such judgment or action is not a determination of guilt, and the evidence does not
    preponderate against the finding of the trial judge. See Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. R. 20. We
    conclude that this case satisfies the criteria of Rule 20. Accordingly, the judgment of the
    or judge most convenient in point of distance to the applicant, unless a sufficient reason be given in the
    petition for not applying to such court or judge.”
    2
    However, assuming as the State did in its motion to dismiss, if the petitioner’s five-year sentence
    began on November 13, 2014 when the Violation of Probation Order was filed, even with the four
    hundred and ninety-seven days of jail credits, the sentence has not expired.
    -3-
    trial court is affirmed in accordance with Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal
    Appeals.
    ____________________________________
    J. ROSS DYER, JUDGE
    -4-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: E2016-02429-CCA-R3-HC

Judges: Judge J. Ross Dyer

Filed Date: 4/21/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/21/2017