State v. David Davenport ( 1997 )


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  •             IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT JACKSON
    MAY 1997 SESSION
    STATE OF TENNESSEE,               *      C.C.A. # 02C01-9612-CC-00444
    Appellee,                   *      HENDERSON COUNTY
    VS.                               *      Hon. Whit Lafon, Judge
    DAVID DAVENPORT,                  *      (Theft Over $10,000)
    Appellant.                  *                               FILED
    For Appellant:                           For Appellee:
    Gregory D. Smith, Attorney               John Knox Walkup
    One Public Square, Ste. 321                                     August 14, 1997
    Attorney General & Reporter
    Clarksville, TN 37040
    (on appeal)                              Kenneth W. Rucker
    Assistant Attorney General
    Jeff Mueller                                                    Cecil Crowson, Jr.
    450 James Robertson Parkway
    Assistant Public Defender                Nashville, TN 37243-0493
    Appellate C ourt Clerk
    227 West Baltimore
    Jackson, TN 38301                        James W. Thompson
    (at trial and co-counsel on appeal)      Asst. District Attorney General
    Lowell Thomas State Office Building
    Jackson, TN 38301
    OPINION FILED:_____________________
    AFFIRMED AND REMANDED
    GARY R. WADE, JUDGE
    OPINION
    The defendant, David Davenport, was convicted of automobile
    burglary and theft of property valued over $10,000. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-14-
    402(a)(4) (Class E felony), 39-14-101 and -105(4) (Class C felony). The trial court
    merged the convictions into a single count of theft over $10,000 and imposed a
    Range I sentence of three years.
    In this appeal of right, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the
    evidence and complains that the sentence was improper. We affirm the sentence
    and conviction but remand for the trial court to modify the judgment form to provide
    the correct statutory reference.
    Sometime between 11:30 P.M. on December 8, 1994, and 10:00 A.M.
    on the following morning, a Chevrolet Silverado pickup truck owned by Gregory
    McComick was stolen from the parking lot of his place of employment. Four months
    earlier, the victim had acquired the vehicle for $26,000.00. McComick, who had
    driven the vehicle only 600 miles before the theft, estimated the value of the truck to
    be $23,000.00.
    At about midnight, James Alexander, a co-worker of the victim at the
    Columbus-McKinnon factory in Lexington, observed a stolen vehicle being driven
    out of the parking lot. Tonya Atkinson had seen the defendant and his girlfriend,
    Lisa Colson, and Braxton Hicks in a silver Monte Carlo on the evening before the
    theft. Alexander had seen a silver Monte Carlo parked on a street near the
    Columbus-McKinnon parking lot when the victim's truck was stolen. The Monte
    Carlo was driven away once the stolen vehicle passed by. About three hours later,
    Ms. Colson asked Ms. Atkinson and her fiancé "to take her to Parker's Crossroads
    2
    to see if David had got away okay." Three days later, Linda Allen, the mother of Ms.
    Colson, received a telephone call from the defendant. The defendant asked her if
    she had heard anything and then admitted stealing a truck from a factory parking lot
    in Lexington.
    A jury verdict, approved by the trial judge, accredits the testimony of
    the witnesses for the state and resolves all conflicts in favor of the theory of the
    state. State v. Hatchett, 
    560 S.W.2d 627
    , 630 (Tenn. 1978). On appeal, the state is
    entitled to the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all reasonable or
    legitimate inferences which might be drawn therefrom. State v. Cabbage, 
    571 S.W.2d 832
    , 835 (Tenn. 1978). The credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be
    given their testimony, and the reconciliation of conflicts in the evidence are matters
    entrusted exclusively to the jury as triers of fact. Byrge v. State, 
    575 S.W.2d 292
    ,
    295 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978). This court may not re-evaluate the evidence or
    substitute its inferences for those drawn by the trier of fact from the evidence.
    Farmer v. State, 
    574 S.W.2d 49
    , 51 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978); State v. Grace, 
    493 S.W.2d 474
    , 476 (Tenn. 1973). A conviction may only be set aside when the
    reviewing court finds that the "evidence is insufficient to support the finding by the
    trier of fact of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Tenn. R. App. P. 13 (e).
    A person commits a theft of property if, with intent to deprive the owner
    thereof, he knowingly obtains or exercises control over the property without the
    owner's consent. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-103. If the value is in excess of
    $10,000 but less than $60,000, the theft is a Class C felony. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-
    14-105(4).
    Here, the circumstances clearly linked the defendant to the crime. His
    3
    girlfriend, Ms. Colson, asked Ms. Atkinson to "see if David had got away." Later, the
    defendant admitted to Ms. Colson's mother that he "stole a truck off a parking lot at
    a factory there in Lexington." The value of the stolen vehicle was established by the
    victim. In our view, this evidence demonstrates that a rational trier of fact could
    have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
    Next, the defendant concedes that a Range I, three-year sentence for
    the Class C felony is the minimum possible. He points out that if the trial court had
    not merged the convictions, a three-year sentence would exceed the statutory
    maximum for vehicular burglary, a Class E felony. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-
    402(a)(4). Counsel for the defendant notes that the judgment form mistakenly refers
    to Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-402, the vehicular burglary statute, for the conviction of
    theft over $10,000.00.
    The record demonstrates that the defendant was not sentenced at all
    on the vehicular burglary conviction; thus, the point raised by the defendant is moot.
    See State v. Baby John Doe, 
    813 S.W.2d 150
    , 152 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991). The
    state concedes that the judgment form requires correction. Thus, the conviction and
    sentence are affirmed and the case is remanded for the trial court to correct the
    judgment form to provide for theft of property over $10,000, Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-
    14-103. See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 36 (providing for correction of clerical mistakes on
    judgment forms).
    __________________________________
    Gary R. Wade, Judge
    4
    CONCUR:
    ______________________________
    John H. Peay, Judge
    _______________________________
    Thomas T. Woodall, Judge
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 02C01-9612-CC-00444

Filed Date: 8/14/1997

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014