State of Tennessee v. Richard Dale Smith ( 2016 )


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  •          IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT KNOXVILLE
    Assigned on Briefs May 18, 2016
    STATE OF TENNESSEE v. RICHARD DALE SMITH
    Appeal from the Criminal Court for Hamilton County
    No. 288256 Don W. Poole, Judge
    No. E2015-01596-CCA-R3-CD – Filed July 6, 2016
    After the trial court denied his motion to suppress, the Defendant, Richard Dale Smith,
    pled guilty to driving under the influence (“DUI”). See Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-401.
    As a condition of his guilty plea, he sought to reserve the right to appeal a certified
    question of law challenging the trial court‟s denial of his motion to suppress. Following
    our review of the record, we dismiss the appeal because the Defendant failed to properly
    certify his question of law in accordance with Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure
    37(b)(2).
    Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Appeal Dismissed
    D. KELLY THOMAS, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which THOMAS T.
    WOODALL, P.J., and JAMES CURWOOD WITT, JR., J., joined.
    Johnny Houston, Jr., Chattanooga, Tennessee, for the appellant, Richard Dale Smith.
    Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Lacy Wilber, Senior Counsel; M.
    Neal Pinkston, District Attorney General; and Bates W. Bryan, Jr., Assistant District
    Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
    OPINION
    FACTUAL BACKGROUND1
    On May 29, 2013, a Hamilton County grand jury returned a true bill charging the
    Defendant with failure to maintain his lane, DUI, and DUI per se. See Tenn. Code Ann.
    §§ 55-8-123; -10-401. Thereafter, the Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence
    obtained following the stop of his vehicle, arguing that the traffic stop was not supported
    1
    Because the jurisdictional issue raised by the State is determinative, we limit our factual recount to the
    relevant procedural aspects of the case.
    by reasonable suspicion. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the Defendant‟s
    motion to suppress. The Defendant subsequently pled guilty to DUI, and the other two
    counts were dismissed. The Defendant executed a “Petition to Enter Plea of Guilty and
    Waiver of Trial by Jury,” which outlined his plea agreement and noted that the
    Defendant‟s guilty plea was subject to the reservation of a certified question of law.
    Specifically, the petition to plead guilty stated that the State, the trial court, and the
    Defendant consented to the reservation of the certified question and were of the opinion
    that it was dispositive of the case. Also, the following certified question was set forth:
    Whether the trial court erred in denying the Defendant‟s Motion to
    Suppress and/or Dismiss, based on [a]rticle I, [s]ection 7 of the Tennessee
    Constitution and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
    Constitution of the United States holding that [the arresting officer] had
    sufficient legal grounds to stop the Defendant‟s vehicle[.]
    On July 21, 2015, a judgment of conviction was entered, which stated the above
    certified question in the “Special Conditions” box. The judgment contained no statement
    that the parties and court consented to the reservation of a certified question or that they
    were of the opinion that it was dispositive.
    ANALYSIS
    On appeal, the Defendant challenges the denial of his motion to suppress, seeking
    our review of the certified question memorialized on the judgment form. The State
    responds that the Defendant‟s certified question is overly broad, does not reflect that the
    State and the trial court consented to the reservation of the question, or that the
    Defendant, the State, and the trial court agreed that it was dispositive of the case. The
    Defendant has not replied to the State‟s argument.
    Our supreme court first set forth the prerequisites for certifying a question of law
    in State v. Preston, 
    759 S.W.2d 647
    , 650 (Tenn. 1988). In 2002, our legislature amended
    Rule 37 to expressly adopt the Preston requirements. The current version of Rule 37
    states that a criminal defendant may plead guilty and appeal a certified question of law
    when the defendant has entered into a plea agreement under Rule 11(c) of the Rules of
    Criminal Procedure and has “explicitly reserved—with the consent of the [S]tate and of
    the court—the right to appeal a certified question of law that is dispositive of the case,”
    and the following requirements are met:
    (i) the judgment of conviction or order reserving the certified question that
    is filed before the notice of appeal is filed contains a statement of the
    certified question of law that the defendant reserved for appellate review;
    -2-
    (ii) the question of law as stated in the judgment or order reserving the
    certified question identifies clearly the scope and limits of the legal issue
    reserved;
    (iii) the judgment or order reserving the certified question reflects that the
    certified question was expressly reserved with the consent of the [S]tate and
    the trial court; and
    (iv) the judgment or order reserving the certified question reflects that the
    defendant, the [S]tate, and the trial court are of the opinion that the certified
    question is dispositive of the case[.]
    Tenn. R. Crim. P. 37(b)(2)(A). Our supreme court has repeatedly made clear that the
    requirements set forth in Preston, which are now embodied in Rule 37, are “explicit and
    unambiguous.” State v. Armstrong, 
    126 S.W.3d 908
    , 912 (Tenn. 2003) (quoting State v.
    Irwin, 
    962 S.W.2d 477
    , 479 (Tenn. 1998); State v. Pendergrass, 
    937 S.W.2d 834
    , 837
    (Tenn. 1996)).
    The State asserts that the Defendant failed to satisfy three of the four requirements
    for preserving a certified question of law. We are constrained to agree with the State that
    the Defendant‟s effort to preserve a certified question of law is deficient for at least two
    reasons:2 (1) the judgment does not contain a statement that the certified question was
    reserved with the consent of the State and the trial court; and (2) the judgment does not
    reflect that the Defendant, the State, and the trial court are of the opinion that the certified
    question is dispositive of the case.
    We acknowledge that the petition to enter a guilty plea contains the certified
    question along with statements that the trial court, the State, and the Defendant consented
    to the reservation of a certified question and that the question is dispositive. However,
    case law is clear that
    2
    We do not pass upon the State‟s contention that the certified question fails to clearly identify the scope
    and limits of the issue presented because there are other fatal deficiencies to the reservation of the
    question. However, we do note that our supreme court has stated that a certified question without fact-
    specific references may be sufficient to meet the rule‟s requirements. See State v. Springer, 
    406 S.W.3d 526
    , 531 (Tenn. 2013) (citing State v. Colzie, No. M1998-00253-CCA-R3-CD, 
    1999 WL 1044111
    , at *3
    (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 30 1990) (finding that a certified question was sufficient when it was “evidence
    that [the] statement of the issue [reflected] the grounds for suppression that [d]efendant asserted at the
    trial court, even though it could have been more precisely drafted”)); see also State v. Harris, 
    919 S.W.2d 619
    , 621 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) (holding that even though “[t]he issue is not framed according to what
    might be referred to as standard „law-school‟ format,” Preston requires only that a certified question
    “clearly identify the scope and limits of the legal issues reserved”).
    -3-
    regardless of what has appeared in prior petitions, orders, colloquy in open
    court or otherwise, the final order or judgment from which the time begins
    to run to pursue a [Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure] 3 appeal . . .
    must state that the certified question was expressly reserved as part of the
    plea agreement, that the State and the trial judge consented to the
    reservation[,] and that the State and the trial judge are of the opinion that
    the question is dispositive of the case.
    
    Preston, 759 S.W.2d at 650
    ; see also State v. Danny Harold Ogle, No. E2000-00421-
    CCA-R3-CD, 
    2001 WL 38755
    , at *1-2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 17, 2001) (dismissing
    appeal due to failure to properly certify question even though transcript of the guilty plea
    hearing “clearly reveal[ed] that all parties understood that the guilty plea was conditional
    upon the reservation of a certified question of law” but the same was not reflected on the
    judgment). Additionally, “the burden is on [the] defendant to see that these prerequisites
    are in the final order . . . .” 
    Preston, 759 S.W.2d at 650
    (emphasis added). The judgment
    does not contain the requisite statements that the State and the trial court agree to the
    reservation of a certified question or that the Defendant, the State, and the trial court are
    of the opinion that the certified question is dispositive of the case, and there is likewise
    no order stating the same. Our supreme court has refused to apply a “substantial
    compliance” standard to the requirements of Rule 37(b)(2). 
    Armstrong, 126 S.W.3d at 912
    . Consequently, we have no choice but to add this case “to the growing heap of
    appellate fatalities that have resulted when would-be appellants failed to heed the
    Preston-Pendergrass litany of requirements for certified-question appeals.” State v.
    Harris, 
    280 S.W.3d 832
    , 836-37 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2008) (citation omitted). Having no
    jurisdiction to hear the appeal, it must be dismissed.
    CONCLUSION
    Based upon the foregoing and the record as a whole, the appeal is dismissed.
    _________________________________
    D. KELLY THOMAS, JR., JUDGE
    -4-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: E2015-01596-CCA-R3-CD

Judges: Judge D. Kelly Thomas, Jr.

Filed Date: 7/6/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 7/6/2016