State v. Gerald Webster ( 2010 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
NOVEMBER 1997 SESSION FILED
STATE OF TENNESSEE, * C.C.A. # 02C01-9703-CR-00119
Appellee, * SHELBY COUNTY
January 5, 1998
VS. * Hon. Chris Craft, Judge
GERALD L. WEBSTER, * (Motor Vehicle Habitual Offender)
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellant. *
Appellate C ourt Clerk
For Appellant: For Appellee:
Thomas M. Veteto John Knox Walkup
Attorney Attorney General and Reporter
100 North Main Street, Suite 1922
Memphis, TN 38103 Kenneth W. Rucker
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Justice Division
Cordell Hull Building, Second Floor
425 Fifth Avenue North
Nashville, TN 37243-0493
Dan Byer
Assistant District Attorney General
201 Poplar Avenue, Third Floor
Memphis, TN 38103
OPINION FILED:__________________________
AFFIRMED
GARY R. WADE, JUDGE
OPINION
The defendant, Gerald L. W ebster, was found to be a motor vehicle
habitual offender. Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-603(2)(a). The trial court barred the
defendant from operating a motor vehicle in the State of Tennessee. In this appeal
of right, the defendant claims that the trial court erred in its determination.
We find no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
On July 26, 1995, the state filed a petition asking that the defendant be
declared a motor vehicle habitual offender. At trial, the defendant stipulated the
evidence relied upon by the state:
(1) an October 18, 1989, conviction for driving under the
influence in the General Sessions Court of Shelby
County for an offense occurring February 15, 1989;
(2) an October 12, 1992, conviction for driving under the
influence in the Criminal Court of Shelby County for an
offense occurring January 21, 1991; and
(3) a May 4, 1995, conviction for reckless driving in the
Criminal Court of Shelby County for an offense occurring
July 23, 1994.
See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 55-10-401 and 55-10-205.
The Motor Vehicle Habitual Offenders Act defines a habitual offender
as follows:
Any person who, during a three-year period, is convicted
in a Tennessee court or courts of three (3) or more of the
following offenses; any person who, during a five-year
period, is convicted in a Tennessee court or courts of
three (3) or more of the following offenses; or any person
who, during a ten-year period, is convicted in a
Tennessee court or courts of five (5) or more of the
following offenses; provided, that if the five- or ten-year
period is used, one (1) of such offenses occurred after
July 1, 1991:
(viii) Violation of § 55-10-401, prohibiting intoxicated or
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drugged persons from driving;
***
(xi) Violation of § 55-10-205, relative to reckless
driving....
***
Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-603(2) (Supp. 1996).
Tennessee Code Annotated Section 55-10-604 controls as to the
computation of convictions within the prescribed time period:
(c) For the purposes of making the computation of
convictions, the date of entry of conviction in the court of
original jurisdiction shall control, except that offenses
committed during the applicable period with regard to
which convictions are imposed shall also be counted,
even though such convictions are not actually entered on
the records of the courts imposing them within the
applicable period.
(d) The start of the applicable period is the date of entry
of conviction in the court of original jurisdiction of the first
offense to be counted.
The defendant claims that he does not qualify as a habitual offender
because the time between the earliest conviction date of October 18, 1989, and the
last conviction date, entered May 5, 1995, exceeds five years. In addition, he claims
that the sanctions within the statute should not apply because the first offense
occurred on February 15, 1989, and the last offense occurred on July 23, 1994,
more than five years apart.
By using the computational guidelines provided in the statute, the trial
court determined that the five-year time period began on October 18, 1989, the date
of the initial conviction, and encompassed July 23, 1994, the date the last offense
was committed; the time between the first conviction and commission of last offense
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spanned an interval of only four years and nine months. Therefore, the trial court
found in favor of the state.
The defendant claims in this appeal that the computation guidelines
conflict with the definition of habitual offender which is limited to "any person who,
during a five-year period, is convicted ... of three (3) or more" of the qualifying
offenses. Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-603(2)(A). The defendant complains that these
statutory sections create an ambiguity which should be given its most restrictive
interpretation.
In matters of statutory construction the role of this court is to ascertain
and give effect to the intent of the legislature. State v. Williams, 623 S.W.2d 121,
124 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981). A basic principle of due process is that an enactment
whose prohibitions are not sufficiently defined is void for vagueness. State v.
Lakatos, 900 S.W.2d 699, 701 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). Generally, the language of
a penal statute must be clear and concise to give adequate warning so that
individuals might avoid the forbidden conduct. State v. Boyd, 925 S.W.2d 237, 242-
43 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). Yet, legislative enactments must be interpreted in their
natural and ordinary sense without a forced construction to either limit or expand
their meaning. State v. Thomas, 635 S.W.2d 114, 116 (Tenn. 1982). Courts must
construe statutes as a whole and in conjunction with their surrounding parts; the
interpretation should be consistent with their legislative purpose. State v. Turner,
913 S.W.2d 158, 160 (Tenn. 1995). The meaning of a statute is to be determined
not from specific words in a single sentence or section but from the act in its entirety
in light of the general purpose of the legislation; any interpretations should express
the intent and purpose of the legislation. Loftin v. Langsdon, 813 S.W.2d 475, 478-
79 (Tenn. App. 1991); National Gas Distrib., Inc. v. State, 804 S.W.2d 66, 67 (Tenn.
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1991).
It is well established that a specific provision relating to a particular
subject controls and takes precedent over a general provision applicable to a
multitude of subjects. State v. Black, 897 S.W.2d 680, 683 (Tenn. 1995). "The
special provision [is] 'deemed an exception, and the general provision [is] construed
to operate on all the subjects therein except the particular one which is the subject
of the special provision.'" State ex rel. v. Safley, 112 S.W.2d 831, 833 (Tenn. 1938)
(quoting Board of Park Comm'rs v. City of Nashville, 185 S.W. 694, 698 (Tenn.
1916)).
In our view, Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-604 is the more specific statute.
While Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-603 generally addresses the three, five, and ten-
year periods qualifying those subject to the Motor Vehicle Habitual Offenders Act,
the statute directing the method by which that time is specifically computed must
control. The natural and ordinary meaning of the language of Tenn. Code Ann. §
55-10-604(c) requires the time interval to begin on the date of the first qualifying
conviction; by the terms of the specific statute, any offenses committed within a
period of five years thereafter, even if no conviction takes place until later, are
included.
Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.
________________________________
Gary R. Wade, Judge
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CONCUR:
_____________________________
David G. Hayes, Judge
_____________________________
Joe G. Riley, Judge
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