State of Tennessee v. Ike O. Nwangwa ( 2016 )


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  •        IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT KNOXVILLE
    Assigned on Briefs February 17, 2016
    STATE OF TENNESSEE v. IKE O. NWANGWA
    Appeal from the Circuit Court for Blount County
    No. C-22635     Tammy Harrington, Judge
    No. E2015-01086-CCA-R3-CD – Filed April 20, 2016
    _____________________________
    A Blount County jury convicted the Defendant, Ike O. Nwangwa, of Count 2, operating a
    motor vehicle while his blood alcohol concentration was .08% or more but acquitted him
    of Count 1 Driving Under the Influence (“DUI”). The trial court sentenced the
    Defendant to eleven months and twenty-nine days, with two days to be served in jail
    followed by supervised probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court
    erred by accepting the guilty verdict to Count 2 when the jury acquitted him of Count 1.
    After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
    Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed
    ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which THOMAS T.
    WOODALL, P.J., and ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY, JR., J., joined.
    Mack Garner, District Public Defender; Ryan Desmond and Mark Garner, Assistant
    Public Defenders, Maryville, Tennessee (at trial); J. Liddell Kirk, Knoxville, Tennessee
    (on appeal), for the appellant, Ike O. Nwangwa.
    Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Clarence E. Lutz, Senior Counsel;
    Michael L. Flynn, District Attorney General; and Ryan Desmond, Assistant District
    Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
    OPINION
    I. Facts
    This case arises from the Defendant’s arrest for DUI on March 27, 2013. A
    Blount County grand jury indicted the Defendant on two counts: Count 1, was DUI; and
    Count 2, operating a motor vehicle while the alcohol concentration was 0.08% ore more.
    1
    At his trial on these charges, the parties presented the following evidence: Israel
    Hernandez, an officer with the Alcoa Police Department, testified that on March 27,
    2013, he was dispatched to the K&S Market in response to a caller who reported that
    there were two men who seemed impaired and were in a blue and gray van with a license
    tag of E62-94X. When he arrived at the market, Officer Hernandez saw a vehicle
    matching that description exiting the parking lot. The vehicle was located at a stop sign,
    and Officer Hernandez noted that one of the brake lights appeared inoperative. Officer
    Hernandez testified that he initiated a traffic stop, and, when the vehicle stopped, it
    blocked the entrance to a shopping center. Officer Hernandez found this unusual.
    Officer Hernandez testified that as he approached the vehicle he noted that the
    Defendant was driving. The officer informed the Defendant about the reason for the stop
    and asked the Defendant for his driver’s license, insurance, and registration. The
    Defendant did not have his driver’s license with him but was able to produce the
    remaining documents. Officer Hernandez noted that the Defendant had glassy eyes,
    slurred speech, and the officer smelled the strong odor of alcohol emanating from the
    Defendant.
    The Defendant told Officer Hernandez that he had consumed one glass of wine.
    Officer Hernandez asked the Defendant to exit his vehicle, and he noticed that the
    Defendant was unsteady on his feet. Officer Hernandez conducted three field sobriety
    tasks, upon all of which the Defendant performed “poorly.” 1 Officer Hernandez arrested
    the Defendant and asked the Defendant to submit to a blood alcohol test. The Defendant
    signed the Implied Consent Advisement indicating that he consented to a blood alcohol
    test.
    During cross-examination, Officer Hernandez testified that the Defendant was
    cooperative and attempted to comply with the officer’s requests. The officer agreed that
    the Defendant spoke with a foreign accent and appeared to have trouble understanding all
    of the officer’s instructions. He agreed that some people not under the influence have
    trouble performing field sobriety tasks.
    Margaret Massengill, an agent with the Tennessee Bureau of Investigations crime
    laboratory, testified that she analyzed the Defendant’s blood in this case. She said that
    her analysis showed that the Defendant’s blood alcohol level was 0.16%. She estimated
    that a 180-pound male would need to consume between five and seven drinks to reach
    that blood alcohol level, keeping in mind that the amount would vary depending upon the
    time frame in which the drinks were consumed. Agent Massengill stated that cold
    medication would not alter the alcohol analysis. The agent said that this level of blood
    1
    The officer video recorded the field sobriety tasks, and the recording was played for the jury. The recording is not,
    however, included in the record.
    2
    alcohol content would likely cause impairment.
    During cross-examination, Agent Massengill agreed that some cough syrup
    contained alcohol. The agent confirmed that “most” of the population would be impaired
    at 0.16% blood alcohol content.
    The Defendant testified that, before his arrest in this case, he had been at a
    restaurant in Alcoa, Tennessee. He arrived at the restaurant between 7:00 and 8:00 p.m.
    and had not consumed any alcohol before arriving. The Defendant said that he consumed
    two glasses of red wine and ordered food. After eating with his friend “Libby,” whom he
    had only known for a week, the two left the restaurant to return to the Defendant’s home.
    The Defendant agreed that he had trouble performing the field sobriety tasks, but he
    explained that he had lower back pain and difficulty standing on one leg. The Defendant
    said that he asked the officer if he could take a breath test at the scene, because he wanted
    to prove he was not intoxicated. The Defendant said that, after he was arrested, he agreed
    to take the blood alcohol test because he knew that he had only consumed two glasses of
    wine so he “was confident [to] take the test.”
    The Defendant explained why he did not have his wallet with him that evening.
    He stated that “Libby” had asked him to go out, but he declined, using the excuse that he
    did not have his wallet. She called back saying that she had “coupons” she must spend,
    so he agreed to meet her. He said that, because he told her he did not have his wallet, he
    did not bring it with him. The Defendant said that he did not know that one of his
    taillights was not working and that he would not have driven if he was impaired.
    During cross-examination, the Defendant testified that he was at the restaurant for
    close to three hours.
    Based upon this evidence, the jury convicted the Defendant of Count 2, operating
    a motor vehicle while the alcohol concentration in his blood was 0.08% or more, and
    acquitted him of Count 1, DUI. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to eleven months
    and twenty-nine days, two days of which was to be served in jail followed by supervised
    probation.
    It is from this judgment that the Defendant now appeals.
    II. Analysis
    On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it accepted the
    jury’s verdict of guilt as to Count 2 because the jury had found him not guilty of Count 1.
    He contends that, because these verdicts are inconsistent, his conviction cannot stand.
    3
    The State counters that a jury’s inconsistent verdict may stand if the Court determines
    that the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction. The State further asserts that the
    evidence is sufficient to support the Defendant’s conviction. We agree.
    Inconsistent verdicts are unassailable absent a legal insufficiency. State v. Davis,
    
    466 S.W.3d 49
    , 73 (Tenn. 2015) (concluding that this rule applied when the jury, in one
    count, convicted the defendant of second degree murder, thereby establishing that he
    committed a knowing killing and then, on the second count, the jury acquitted the
    defendant of second degree murder, choosing instead to convict the defendant of reckless
    homicide). The Tennessee Supreme Court stated, “We continue to agree with the
    significant majority of jurisdictions that inconsistent jury verdicts are not a basis for
    relief.” 
    Id. The verdicts
    are still subject, however, to analysis of whether the evidence is
    sufficient to sustain them. 
    Id. at 72.
    When an accused challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court’s standard
    of review is whether, after considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the
    State, “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
    beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 319 (1979); see Tenn. R.
    App. P. 13(e), State v. Goodwin, 
    143 S.W.3d 771
    , 775 (Tenn. 2004) (citing State v. Reid,
    
    91 S.W.3d 247
    , 276 (Tenn. 2002)). This rule applies to findings of guilt based upon
    direct evidence, circumstantial evidence, or a combination of both direct and
    circumstantial evidence. State v. Pendergrass, 
    13 S.W.3d 389
    , 392-93 (Tenn. Crim. App.
    1999).
    In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court should not re-weigh or
    reevaluate the evidence. State v. Matthews, 
    805 S.W.2d 776
    , 779 (Tenn. Crim. App.
    1990). Nor may this Court substitute its inferences for those drawn by the trier of fact
    from the evidence. State v. Buggs, 
    995 S.W.2d 102
    , 105 (Tenn. 1999); Liakas v. State,
    
    286 S.W.2d 856
    , 859 (Tenn. 1956). “Questions concerning the credibility of the
    witnesses, the weight and value of the evidence, as well as all factual issues raised by the
    evidence are resolved by the trier of fact.” State v. Bland, 
    958 S.W.2d 651
    , 659 (Tenn.
    1997); 
    Liakas, 286 S.W.2d at 859
    . “A guilty verdict by the jury, approved by the trial
    judge, accredits the testimony of the witnesses for the State and resolves all conflicts in
    favor of the theory of the State.” State v. Cabbage, 
    571 S.W.2d 832
    , 835 (Tenn. 1978);
    State v. Grace, 
    493 S.W.2d 474
    , 479 (Tenn. 1973). The Tennessee Supreme Court stated
    the rationale for this rule:
    This well-settled rule rests on a sound foundation. The trial judge
    and the jury see the witnesses face to face, hear their testimony and observe
    their demeanor on the stand. Thus the trial judge and jury are the primary
    instrumentality of justice to determine the weight and credibility to be
    4
    given to the testimony of witnesses. In the trial forum alone is there human
    atmosphere and the totality of the evidence cannot be reproduced with a
    written record in this Court.
    Bolin v. State, 
    405 S.W.2d 768
    , 771 (Tenn. 1996) (citing Carroll v. State, 
    370 S.W.2d 523
    (Tenn. 1963)). This Court must afford the State of Tennessee the strongest
    legitimate view of the evidence contained in the record, as well as all reasonable
    inferences that may be drawn from the evidence. Goodwin, 143 S .W.3d at 775 (citing
    State v. Smith, 
    24 S.W.3d 274
    , 279 (Tenn. 2000)). Because a verdict of guilt against a
    defendant removes the presumption of innocence and raises a presumption of guilt, the
    convicted criminal defendant bears the burden of showing that the evidence was legally
    insufficient to sustain a guilty verdict. State v. Carruthers, 
    35 S.W.3d 516
    , 557-58
    (Tenn. 2000).
    The Defendant in this case was convicted of operating a motor vehicle when: “The
    alcohol concentration in [his] blood or breath is eight-hundredths of one percent (0.08%)
    or more.” T.C.A. § 55-10-401. Officer Hernandez stopped the Defendant while he was
    operating his motor vehicle. The officer asked the Defendant to submit to a blood
    alcohol test, and the Defendant agreed. Agent Massengill testified that the blood test
    revealed that the Defendant’s blood alcohol content was 0.16%, greater than the required
    0.08%. The evidence is sufficient to support the Defendant’s conviction. He is not
    entitled to relief on this issue.
    III. Conclusion
    In accordance with the foregoing reasoning and authorities, we affirm the trial
    court’s judgment.
    _________________________________
    ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, JUDGE
    5