State of Tennessee v. Brian E. Dodson ( 2016 )


Menu:
  •         IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT KNOXVILLE
    Assigned on Briefs April 27, 2016
    STATE OF TENNESSEE v. BRIAN E. DODSON
    Appeal from the Criminal Court for Bradley County
    Nos. 13-CR-050, -051    Sandra Donaghy, Judge
    No. E2016-00037-CCA-R3-CD – Filed May 26, 2016
    The defendant, Brian E. Dodson, appeals the denial of his motion, filed pursuant to
    Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, to correct what he believes to be an illegal
    sentence. Because the defendant has failed to state a colorable claim for relief under Rule
    36.1, the interests of justice do not require that we waive the timely filing of the notice of
    appeal in this case. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.
    Tenn. R. App. P. 3; Appeal Dismissed
    JAMES CURWOOD WITT, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which D. KELLY
    THOMAS, JR., and ROBERT L. HOLLOWAY, JR., JJ., joined.
    Brian E. Dodson, Tiptonville, Tennessee, pro se.
    Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Nicholas W. Spangler, Assistant
    Attorney General; Stephen Crump, District Attorney General; and Cynthia A. LeCroy-
    Schemel, Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
    OPINION
    The defendant twice assaulted his wife, Melissa Dodson, in December
    2012, and, on May 6, 2013, he pleaded guilty to two counts of aggravated assault, and the
    State agreed to dismiss charges of resisting arrest and violating an order of protection.
    The trial court imposed consecutive sentences of 6 years‟ incarceration for the aggravated
    assault convictions. The defendant did not appeal the sentence, and he did not pursue
    post-conviction relief. On October 9, 2015, the defendant moved the trial court pursuant
    to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 to correct what he believed to be an illegal
    sentence. The pro se defendant argued that his 12-year effective sentence was illegal
    because the six-year sentences imposed for his Class C felony convictions exceeded that
    imposed on other offenders with Class C felony convictions, because the trial court
    improperly imposed consecutive sentences, and because he had been improperly denied
    “186 behavior credits, 171 days program credits, and 134 pretrial jail credits.”
    Specifically, the defendant asked that the trial court resentence him to concurrent terms of
    three years and reduce his sentence by 491 days.
    Via an order filed on October 28, 2015, the trial court dismissed the motion
    without a hearing, finding that the petitioner had failed to state a cognizable claim for
    relief under Rule 36.1. The court noted that because the defendant committed the
    December 23, 2012 assault on his wife while on bond for the December 2, 2012 assault
    of his wife, consecutive alignment of the sentences was mandatory. The court also noted
    that the defendant was granted pretrial jail credits from December 23, 2012, until May 6,
    2013. Finally, the court observed that it was without authority to grant the defendant any
    sentence reduction credits because those credits lie strictly within the purview of the
    Department of Correction.
    In this appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred by
    summarily dismissing his motion, arguing again that his sentence is illegal because the
    trial court imposed greater than the minimum term for both convictions. The State argues
    that this court should dismiss the appeal because the pro se defendant failed to file a
    timely notice of appeal, asserting that the interests of justice do not require the waiver of
    the timely filing of the notice of appeal because the defendant has failed to state a
    cognizable claim for Rule 36.1 relief.
    As indicated, the trial court denied the defendant‟s motion via order entered
    on October 28, 2015. On December 2, 2015, the defendant mailed to this court a
    pleading that can best be described as both the notice of appeal and his brief before this
    court. The appellate court clerk returned the document to the defendant with a notice that
    the notice of appeal must be filed directly with the trial court clerk. On January 5, 2016,
    the defendant filed a similar document in the Bradley County Criminal Court. The State
    contends that both the December 2, 2015 and January 5, 2016 filings are untimely. We
    agree. See Tenn. R. App. P. 4(c) (“In a criminal action, if a timely motion or petition
    under the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure is filed in the trial court by the
    defendant: (1) under Rule 29(c) for a judgment of acquittal; (2) under Rule 32(a) for a
    suspended sentence; (3) under Rule 32(f) for withdrawal of a plea of guilty; (4) under
    Rule 33(a) for a new trial; or (5) under Rule 34 for arrest of judgment, the time for appeal
    for all parties shall run from entry of the order denying a new trial or granting or denying
    any other such motion or petition.”). In criminal cases, however, the notice of appeal
    document is not jurisdictional and may be waived by this court in the interests of justice.
    Tenn. R. App. P. 4. For the reasons set forth more fully below, the interests of justice do
    not require the waiver of the timely filing of the notice of appeal in this case.
    -2-
    Rule 36.1 provides the defendant and the State an avenue to “seek the
    correction of an illegal sentence,” defined as a sentence “that is not authorized by the
    applicable statutes or that directly contravenes an applicable statute.” Tenn R. Crim. P.
    36.1; see also State v. Wooden, 
    478 S.W.3d 585
    , 594-95 (Tenn. 2015) (holding that “the
    definition of „illegal sentence‟ in Rule 36.1 is coextensive with, and not broader than, the
    definition of the term in the habeas corpus context”). To avoid summary denial of an
    illegal sentence claim brought under Rule 36.1, a defendant must “state with particularity
    the factual allegations,” 
    Wooden, 478 S.W.3d at 594
    , establishing “a colorable claim that
    the sentence is illegal,” Tenn. R. Crim. P. 36.1(b). “[F]or purposes of Rule 36.1 . . .
    „colorable claim‟ means a claim that, if taken as true and viewed in a light most favorable
    to the moving party, would entitle the moving party to relief under Rule 36.1.” 
    Wooden, 478 S.W.3d at 593
    . The determination whether a Rule 36.1 “motion states a colorable
    claim for correction of an illegal sentence under Rule 36.1 is a question of law, to which
    de novo review applies.” 
    Id. at 589
    (citing Summers v. State, 
    212 S.W.3d 251
    , 255
    (Tenn. 2007)).
    The defendant‟s consecutive six-year sentences were authorized at the time
    of his conviction, see T.C.A. 40-35-112(a)(3), and were not imposed in contravention of
    any statute. His claim that his sentence is excessive is not a cognizable claim for Rule
    36.1 relief. In consequence, the interests of justice do not support the waiver of the
    timely filing of the notice of appeal in this case.
    Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.
    _________________________________
    JAMES CURWOOD WITT, JR., JUDGE
    -3-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: E2016-00037-CCA-R3-CD

Judges: Judge James Curwood Witt, Jr.

Filed Date: 5/26/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 5/26/2016