State of Tennessee v. Joshua Lee Steele ( 2014 )


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  •         IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT KNOXVILLE
    Assigned on Briefs November 18, 2014
    STATE OF TENNESSEE v. JOSHUA LEE STEELE
    Direct Appeal from the Criminal Court for Monroe County
    No. 12-137      Amy A. Reedy, Judge
    No. E2014-00321-CCA-R3-CD - Filed December 4, 2014
    The Defendant, Joshua Lee Steele, pleaded guilty to second degree murder, agreeing to allow
    the trial court to determine his sentence. The trial court sentenced him to serve twenty-five
    years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that
    the trial court erred when it sentenced him because it did not properly consider the mitigating
    factor that the Defendant assisted authorities in detecting or apprehending other persons who
    had committed the offenses. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable
    authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
    Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed
    R OBERT W. W EDEMEYER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which J OHN E VERETT
    W ILLIAMS and T IMOTHY L. E ASTER, JJ., joined.
    Jeanne L. Wiggins, Madisonville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Joshua Lee Steele.
    Herbert H. Slatery, III, Attorney General and Reporter; Renee W. Turner, Senior Counsel;
    Steven Bebb, District Attorney General; and A. Wayne Carter, Assistant District Attorney
    General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
    OPINION
    I. Facts
    This case arises from the Defendant and three co-defendants, Lorenz Freeman, Coty
    Smith, and Jessica Payne, robbing, binding, and beating the victim, Mr. Vineyard. The
    victim died from his injuries. For these offenses, a Monroe County grand jury indicted the
    Defendant for one count of aggravated robbery, one count of conspiracy to commit
    aggravated robbery, and one count of first degree felony murder.
    The Defendant pleaded guilty to second degree murder and agreed that the trial court
    would determine his sentence.1 At the guilty plea submission hearing, the State offered the
    following recitation of the facts in support of the trial court’s acceptance of the guilty plea:
    [The State] would prove that on March the 4, 2012, that Mr. Freeman
    and Mr. Smith and Ms. Payne had an attempt to go and rob the victim in this
    case . . . . That they went to [the victim’s] place of residence, that [] Ms. Payne
    stayed in the vehicle and [Mr. Freeman and Mr. Smith] get out. That they
    approached [the victim’s] residence when another vehicle shows up and they
    get spooked and leave and so there’s no event that happens at that point. They
    go to a residence where they get hold of [the Defendant]. At that point,
    sometime later on, and Ms. Payne does not return with them, but Mr. Freeman,
    Mr. Smith and [the Defendant] go back to [the victim’s] residence, and at that
    point they go in and it is Mr. Freeman and [the Defendant] who are the ones
    that hold on to the victim [] and he’s hit in the head with a piece of iron, a
    piece of wrought iron, and he eventually dies . . . .
    . . . Mr. Smith was present, Mr. Smith was involved in the planning, Mr.
    Smith goes through the house, the house is ransacked looking for what we
    expect [was] cash, there were some rumors going around that the victim [] had
    large amount of cash that was there. After this happens, they leave, go back,
    and there’s some other conversations that goes on. . . . . [T]he defendants that
    went into [the victim’s] residence all put on masks . . . . [T]he detectives and
    the agents advised me that at least, [the Defendant] and Mr. Freeman were
    very cooperative in their statements and forthcoming . . . .
    At the sentencing hearing, the parties presented the following evidence: The State
    offered the presentence report, which the trial court admitted into evidence. Doug Brannon,
    chief detective for the Monroe County Sheriff’s Department, testified that he was the lead
    investigator for this homicide case. He stated that in March of 2012, law enforcement
    responded to a call from the victim’s neighbor. The neighbor reported that he had found the
    victim dead in the victim’s home. Detective Brannon stated that law enforcement
    investigated the crime scene, a “log cabin type home[.]” He stated that the victim’s home
    had been “ransacked” and that the interior walls were “ripped apart, furniture overturned,
    mattresses shredded, sheetrock busted through.” Detective Brannon testified that it was clear
    “someone had been searching for something.”
    1
    The three co-defendants also entered guilty pleas to various charges, none of which are the
    subject of this appeal.
    2
    Detective Brannon testified that investigators found the victim on the floor with his
    wrists bound by “flexible handcuffs.” The victim had a visible injury to his head. Detective
    Brannon stated that he later learned the victim had died from a head wound and that the
    victim had been struck on the head and body with a hard object. Detective Brannon stated
    that investigators interviewed neighbors and witnesses who provided “direct information”
    that led to the Defendant and the co-defendants.
    Detective Brannon stated that he located the Defendant first and that, initially, the
    Defendant denied any role in the crime. The Defendant later acknowledged his involvement.
    The Defendant “expressed remorse” about the victim’s death. The Defendant explained to
    the investigators that he was not part of the original plan devised by Mr. Freeman, Mr. Smith,
    and Ms. Payne but that he “agreed to participate” in their plan. The Defendant stated that he,
    Mr. Freeman, and Mr. Smith went to the victim’s residence and gained entry by kicking open
    the door. The Defendant stated that the three men held down the victim and assaulted him
    with a piece of “rebar” about two feet long. Detective Brannon explained that “rebar” is a
    piece of steel “normally used to reinforce concrete” and is very sturdy. The Defendant
    described the events “step by step,” including the assault, tearing apart the walls, and stated
    that the three men were looking for narcotics and money because they believed the victim
    had a lot of cash. The Defendant identified the co-participants, which led to investigators
    locating them.
    Detective Brannon stated that, “[i]n total from what we learned from speaking to all
    the parties, . . . it seemed that Mr. Smith [] had directed, initiated, was the man behind the
    idea. . . .”
    On cross-examination, Detective Brannon stated that the Defendant was in possession
    of the “rebar” inside the victim’s home and that the Defendant acknowledged using it to
    strike the victim. Detective Brannon recalled that the autopsy showed that contributing to
    the victim’s death were his injuries as well as “positional asphyxiation,” which Detective
    Brannon stated he interpreted as the victim “drown[ing] in his own blood.” He stated that
    the autopsy showed that the victim did not die immediately and remained alive for “some
    time” after he was beaten.
    Detective Brannon agreed that the Defendant cooperated with the authorities and
    acknowledged his participation in the crime. Detective Brannon recalled that the
    Defendant’s remorse was sincere. He reiterated his statement that it was the Defendant who
    struck the victim in the head.
    On redirect-examination, Detective Brannon recalled that the victim’s hands were
    “cuffed” behind his back, and this restricted his movement and may have led to him not
    3
    being able to breathe.
    Larry Vineyard testified that he was the victim’s brother. He testified that the victim
    was a non-violent person who did not own a gun. He described arriving at the crime scene
    and walking inside the victim’s house. He recalled that there was a “foot or foot and a half”
    deep puddle of blood where the victim’s face had been. Mr. Vineyard testified that he and
    his two sons cleaned up the victim’s house and boarded it up. He described the victim’s
    generous and kind personality. Mr. Vineyard testified that he had spoken with the District
    Attorney and agreed that the Defendant and his co-defendants should be offered a deal to
    plead guilty to second degree murder.
    On behalf of the Defendant, Candy Clark, the Defendant’s sister, testified that the
    Defendant did not know his father until he was eight years old and that the Defendant’s
    mother was killed in a car wreck when he was eleven years old. Ms. Clark said the
    Defendant had a wonderful relationship with his mother and that her death was very hard on
    him. Ms. Clark testified that the Defendant was in the car wreck with his mother. Ms. Clark
    and her sister “raised” the Defendant after his mother’s death. She described the Defendant
    as angry and stated that he would get mad easily.
    Ms. Clark testified that, as an adult, the Defendant had a “big heart” but made a lot
    of bad decisions. She described him as a “follower,” and she said he could be dared by
    someone to do anything. She stated that she had never known him to be violent toward
    anyone, but she reiterated that he had a temper. She stated that the Defendant was “very
    remorseful” for the victim’s death.
    On cross-examination, Ms. Clark agreed that the Defendant had a prior criminal
    history and that he had been convicted of multiple drug offenses and other crimes. She
    agreed that he was on probation when this crime was committed.
    Amber Ratledge testified that she was the Defendant’s older sister and that life had
    “been really hard” on the Defendant, Ms. Clark, and herself because they had lost their
    mother. She stated that the Defendant had a drug problem but had never been a violent
    person.
    After considering this evidence, the trial court stated that it had considered the
    sentencing guidelines enumerated in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-102. The trial
    court stated that the Defendant was a Range I offender and had a prior criminal record
    spanning from 2007 to 2011. The trial court acknowledged that the Defendant had a “very
    sad background” and had suffered during his life. The trial court went on to say:
    4
    This is a case where considering enhancement factors we have two
    leaders. . . . . There are four people and two leaders and I find that [the
    Defendant] was a leader. He did strike the victim. Maybe he didn’t go there
    to kill, but you don’t hit a man in the head with a piece of rebar without
    advancing that quality of leadership in a criminal enterprise. When you take
    that step you have taken a leadership role and he did that. So I do find in this
    case that [the Defendant] was a leader in the commission of an offense
    involving two or more criminal actors. . . . . I also find that the [D]efendant
    treated or allowed a victim to be treated with exceptional cruelty during the
    commission of the offense, and in his case I also find that tying him up with
    those one time handcuffs, striking him and allowing him to lay there in a
    helpless position, and the proof is that he didn’t die immediately but that he
    bled what sounds like rather profusely based on the [] horrific cleanup efforts
    of the victim’s brother and his two sons . . . . So I find all that proof taken
    together is proof of that enhancement factor, that the [D]efendant treated or
    allowed a victim to be treated with exceptional cruelty during the commission
    of the offense. I do not find that the personal injuries inflicted upon or the
    amount of damage to property sustained by or taken from the victim was
    particularly great. That doesn’t mean it wasn’t great, that just means the Court
    is finding it’s part of second degree murder. . . . . So in this case I also do not
    find that any mitigation has been proven. There’s just not enough proof here
    that fits in with those mitigating factors. Sympathetic issues, sad stories, but
    not proof of mitigation in this crime. . . . . Having found those enhancement
    factors, having consider[ed] what the law requires that I consider, and that is
    that [the Defendant] shall be punished in relation to the seriousness of the
    offense, . . . to prevent crime based on the testimony we have had in the record
    today, and promote respect for the law which provides an effective general
    deterrent, and in that case I sentence [the Defendant] to 25 years in the
    Tennessee Department of Corrections.
    It is from this judgment that the Defendant now appeals.
    II. Analysis
    On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it sentenced him
    because it failed to consider the mitigating factor that the Defendant “assisted the authorities”
    in investigating this crime. See T.C.A. § 40-35-113(9) (2014). The Defendant argues that
    the trial court erred when it found that no evidence was presented to establish this mitigating
    factor. The State counters that the record supports the trial court’s sentencing
    5
    determinations. We agree with the State.
    In State v. Bise, the Tennessee Supreme Court reviewed changes in sentencing law
    and the impact on appellate review of sentencing decisions. The Tennessee Supreme Court
    announced that “sentences imposed by the trial court within the appropriate statutory range
    are to be reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard with a ‘presumption of
    reasonableness.’” State v. Bise, 
    380 S.W.3d 682
    (Tenn. 2012). A finding of abuse of
    discretion “‘reflects that the trial court’s logic and reasoning was improper when viewed in
    light of the factual circumstances and relevant legal principles involved in a particular case.’”
    State v. Shaffer, 
    45 S.W.3d 553
    , 555 (Tenn. 2001) (quoting State v. Moore, 
    6 S.W.3d 235
    ,
    242 (Tenn. 1999)). To find an abuse of discretion, the record must be void of any substantial
    evidence that would support the trial court’s decision. 
    Id. at 554-55;
    State v. Grear, 
    568 S.W.2d 285
    , 286 (Tenn. 1978); State v. Delp, 
    614 S.W.2d 395
    , 398 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980).
    The reviewing court should uphold the sentence “so long as it is within the appropriate range
    and the record demonstrates that the sentence is otherwise in compliance with the purposes
    and principles listed by statute.” 
    Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 709-10
    . So long as the trial court
    sentences within the appropriate range and properly applies the purposes and principles of
    the Sentencing Act, its decision will be granted a presumption of reasonableness. 
    Id. at 707.
    The defendant bears “[t]he burden of demonstrating that the sentence is improper.” State v.
    Ashby, 
    823 S.W.2d 166
    , 169 (Tenn. 1991).
    In determining a specific sentence within a range of punishment, the trial court should
    consider, but is not bound by, the following advisory guidelines:
    (1) The minimum sentence within the range of punishment is the sentence that
    should be imposed, because the general assembly set the minimum length of
    sentence for each felony class to reflect the relative seriousness of each
    criminal offense in the felony classifications; and
    (2) The sentence length within the range should be adjusted, as appropriate, by
    the presence or absence of mitigating and enhancement factors set out in §§
    40-35-113 and 40-35-114.
    T.C.A. § 40-35-210(c) (2014). The trial court must consider: (1) the evidence, if any,
    received at the trial and the sentencing hearing; (2) the presentence report; (3) the principles
    of sentencing and arguments as to sentencing alternatives; (4) the nature and characteristics
    of the criminal conduct involved; (5) evidence and information offered by the parties on the
    mitigating and enhancement factors set out in Tennessee Code Annotated sections 40-35-113
    and -114; (6) any statistical information provided by the administrative office of the courts
    as to sentencing practices for similar offenses in Tennessee; and (7) any statement the
    6
    defendant made in the defendant’s own behalf about sentencing. See T.C.A. § 40-35-210
    (2014); State v. Taylor, 
    63 S.W.3d 400
    , 411 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001).
    Section 40-35-113 contains a non-exclusive list of mitigating factors that a trial court
    may apply to a defendant’s sentence “if appropriate for the offense.” T.C.A. § 40-35-113
    (2014). We, however, recognize that a trial court’s weighing of applicable mitigating factors
    is “left to the trial court’s sound discretion.” State v. Carter, 
    254 S.W.3d 335
    , 345 (Tenn.
    2008). “[T]he trial court is free to select any sentence within the applicable range so long as
    the length of the sentence is ‘consistent with the purposes and principles of [the Sentencing
    Act].’” 
    Id. at 343.
    The burden of proving applicable mitigating factors rests upon the
    defendant. State v. Mark Moore, No. 03C01-9403-CR-00098, 
    1995 WL 548786
    , at *6
    (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Sept. 18, 1995), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Feb. 5, 1996).
    Moreover, the trial court’s “misapplication of an enhancement or mitigating factor does not
    invalidate the sentence imposed unless the trial court wholly departed from the 1989 Act, as
    amended in 2005.” 
    Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 706
    . “[Appellate Courts are] bound by a trial court’s
    decision as to the length of the sentence imposed so long as it is imposed in a manner
    consistent with the purposes and principles set out in sections -102 and -103 of the
    Sentencing Act.” 
    Carter, 254 S.W.3d at 346
    .
    The Defendant contends that the trial court erred by failing to consider the evidence
    presented in support of mitigating factor (9), that the Defendant “assisted the authorities in
    uncovering offenses committed by other persons or in detecting or apprehending other
    persons who had committed the offenses[.]” T.C.A. § 40-35-113(9) (2014). The trial court
    did consider whether there was any proof at the sentencing hearing of mitigating factors and
    stated that it found that there was none. Our review of the record indicates that Detective
    Brannon testified that the Defendant did give information to the authorities that aided them
    in identifying other persons who had been involved in the crime.
    We agree that this is proof of mitigating factor (9), that the Defendant “assisted the
    authorities in uncovering offenses committed by other persons or in detecting or
    apprehending other persons who had committed the offenses[.]” 
    Id. However, as
    previously
    stated, enhancing and mitigating factors are advisory only. See T.C.A. § 40-35-114 (2014);
    see also 
    Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 699
    n.33, 704; 
    Carter, 254 S.W.3d at 343
    . This Court is “bound
    by [the] trial court’s decision as to the length of the sentence imposed so long as it is imposed
    in a manner consistent with the purposes and principles set out in sections -102 and -103 of
    the Sentencing Act.” 
    Carter, 254 S.W.3d at 346
    . The trial court stated that it considered the
    Defendant’s role in the crime, and the circumstances of the victim’s death, particularly that
    the Defendant left the victim to die after beating him in the head with an iron pole.
    Accordingly, the trial court applied two enhancement factors, that the Defendant was a leader
    in the commission of an offense involving two or more criminal actors and that the
    7
    Defendant treated the victim with exceptional cruelty during the commission of the offense.
    T.C.A. § 40-35-114(2), (5) (2014). For these reasons, the trial court sentenced the Defendant
    to a within range sentence of twenty-five years for second degree murder.
    We conclude that the Defendant’s within range sentence is consistent with the
    purposes set out in the Sentencing Act and that it was within the trial court’s broad discretion
    not to apply mitigating factor (9) when sentencing him. See State v. Pollard, 
    432 S.W.3d 851
    , 861 (Tenn. 2013) (citing 
    Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 709-10
    ). The Defendant is not entitled to
    relief on this issue.
    III. Conclusion
    In accordance with the aforementioned reasoning and authorities, we affirm the trial
    court’s judgments.
    ________________________________
    ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, JUDGE
    8
    

Document Info

Docket Number: E2014-00321-CCA-R3-CD

Judges: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer

Filed Date: 12/4/2014

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/4/2014