State of Tennessee v. Lucy Caitlin Alford and Jeremie Alford ( 2017 )


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  •                                                                                           05/17/2017
    IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT NASHVILLE
    Assigned on Briefs March 21, 2017
    STATE OF TENNESSEE v. LUCY CAITLIN ALFORD AND JEREMIE
    ALFORD
    Appeal from the Circuit Court for Franklin County
    Nos. 2016-CR-105-B, 2016-CR-105-C Thomas W. Graham, Judge
    ___________________________________
    No. M2016-01764-CCA-R3-CD
    ___________________________________
    Following the denial of suppression motions, the defendants, Lucy Caitlin Alford and
    Jeremie Alford, entered guilty pleas in Franklin County Circuit Court to felony
    possession of methamphetamine and reserved the right to appeal certified questions of
    law relating to the sufficiency of the affidavit supporting the search warrant issued in this
    case. The defendants assert the affidavit, which was based on information provided by a
    confidential informant, failed to meet the two-pronged Aguilar-Spinelli test for probable
    cause, lacked independent police corroboration, and was materially misleading. The
    State contends the affidavit was sufficient. Following our review of the record and
    pertinent authorities, including the recent Tennessee Supreme Court decision of State v.
    Jerry Lewis Tuttle, ___S.W.3d ___, No. M2014-00566-SC-R11-CD, 
    2017 WL 1246855
    (Tenn. Apr. 5, 2017), we affirm the judgments of the trial court.
    Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Circuit Court Affirmed
    J. ROSS DYER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS
    and TIMOTHY L. EASTER, JJ., joined.
    Glen A. Isbell, Winchester, Tennessee, for the appellant, Lucy Caitlin Alford.
    B. Jeffery Harmon, District Public Defender, and Kandi Nunley, Assistant Public
    Defender, for the appellant, Jeremie Jackson Alford.
    Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Brent C. Cherry, Assistant
    Attorney General; J. Michael Taylor, District Attorney General; and Courtney C. Lynch,
    Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
    OPINION
    Facts and Procedural History
    The defendants were arrested following the execution of a search warrant obtained
    by Detective Kelly Gass with the Winchester Police Department. The supporting
    affidavit stated, in relevant part, as follows:
    On September 15, 2015 Investigator James Sherrill with the Coffee County
    Sheriff’s Department came to me advising he had spoken with an informant
    in reference to narcotic traffic involving Jeremie Alford. Investigator
    Sherrill has only known this informant for a short time, but advised he has
    had several conversations with this informant in reference to narcotic
    traffic. Investigator Sherrill advised the information given by this
    informant has been true and correct due to Investigator Sherrill’s
    investigations into the informants (sic) information. The informant has also
    given information leading to an arrest and conviction in a marijuana case
    involving Investigator Chad Partin, former Coffee County Sheriff’s
    Investigator.
    Investigator Sherrill advised he spoke with this informant on September 15,
    2015 and the informant advised he/she had been to the residence of Jeremie
    Alford at 500 South Jefferson [Street] in Winchester, TN and did see a
    quantity of methamphetamine within the past 48 hours. The informant
    advised he/she observed methamphetamine being weighed out. The
    informant knew this to be meth due to Jeremie Alford referring to it as meth
    and the informants (sic) past experience with meth use. The informant
    advised that he/she has purchased meth from Jeremie Alford in the past.
    A Franklin County Grand Jury returned a four count indictment charging the
    defendants and Jonathan Lynn Cornelison with: theft of a handgun valued at more than
    $1000 but less than $10,000; possession of methamphetamine, a Schedule II controlled
    substance, with intent to sell or deliver; possession of Buprenorphine, a Schedule II
    controlled substance; and possession of drug paraphernalia. The defendants subsequently
    filed a motion to suppress the evidence collected after the execution of the warrant,
    arguing the warrant did not meet the requisite minimum standards of credibility and/or
    reliability as to the confidential informant providing the supporting information.
    Detective Gass testified as the only witnesses at the hearing on the motion to
    suppress. Detective Gass confirmed he received the information leading to the search
    warrant from Investigator James Sherrill with the Coffee County Sheriff’s Department.
    Investigator Sherrill came to the Winchester Police Department on September 15, 2015,
    to relay the information because the address was out of his jurisdiction. Investigator
    -2-
    Sherrill told Detective Gass that a confidential informant reported drug activity at 500
    South Jefferson Street in Winchester, Tennessee. The informant recognized the
    substance as methamphetamine and reported it was being weighed by a man named
    Jeremie. Investigator Sherrill had worked with this informant in this past, and the
    information given resulted in a marijuana conviction. Detective Gass researched the
    address and confirmed a person named Jeremie Alford resided there. Agent Gass then
    obtained a search warrant while agents from the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation and
    Federal Bureau of Investigation conducted surveillance on the residence.
    The trial court reserved its ruling but ultimately denied the motion, finding:
    1)     The [d]efendant’s full name was discovered based on the
    informant’s testimony and the investigation of the residence of 500
    [South] Jefferson Street made by Detective Gass. There is nothing
    inconsistent in the affidavit wherein the full name Jeremy (sic)
    Alford is used. The affiant, as well as the other investigators, are not
    criminal informants and their investigative findings may be
    presumed reliable for the purpose of the affidavit.
    2)     With regard to the facts Detective Gass otherwise made part of the
    affidavit he certainly has the right to transmit hearsay so long as the
    same is from a reliable source. However, information relayed to
    Detective Gass by the other investigators and which came from the
    criminal informant must pass the two-prong Aguilar and Spinelli
    test. In this regard, the criminal informant’s information and his
    reliability were corroborated by Investigator Sherrill who found
    same to be “true and correct” and further supported by the fact that
    the informant had previously given information to support a
    marijuana case wherein the subject in that case was both arrested and
    convicted. With regard to the basis of knowledge prong, clearly the
    criminal informant had a sufficient basis of knowledge since he was
    aware of the appearance of methamphetamine and he had observed it
    at the place to be searched within forty-eight (48) hours of the
    application for search warrant.
    Since the criminal informant’s information meets both the basis of
    knowledge and the reliability/credibility test required under Article I,
    Section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution, same may be transmitted by
    Investigators Sherrill and Partin to Detective Gass who may include same
    as was done in this Affidavit In Support of Search Warrant.
    -3-
    Shortly thereafter, both defendants pled guilty to one count of felony possession of
    a Schedule II narcotic and certified five questions of law concerning the sufficiency of
    the affidavit underlying the search warrant leading to their arrest. This timely appeal
    followed. Of the five questions initially certified for appeal,1 only those listed below
    have been raised:
    1.     Whether the affidavit used to obtain the search warrant at issue
    establishes the probable cause necessary for the issuance of a search
    warrant as required by the 4th and 14th Amendments to the United States
    Constitution and Article I[,] sections 7 and 8 of the Tennessee Constitution?
    2.      Whether the affidavit used to obtain the search warrant at issue fails
    to establish sufficient evidence of independent police corroboration in order
    to compensate for the fact that the affidavit fails to establish the informant’s
    reliability on its face as required in Jacumin and Article I[,] Section 7 of the
    Tennessee Constitution?
    3.     Whether the affidavit used to obtain the search warrant at issue in
    this case contained factual allegations which were materially misleading?
    Analysis
    On appeal, the defendants contend the affidavit submitted in support of the search
    warrant was insufficient because it did not demonstrate the confidential informant’s basis
    of knowledge and the reliability of the information provided, it did not include
    independent police corroboration of the information provided by the informant, and it
    was materially misleading. The State contends the information contained in the affidavit
    was sufficient for the magistrate to determine the existence of probable cause, thereby
    making police corroboration unnecessary. Regardless, the police did corroborate the
    informant’s identification of Jeremie Alford by identifying him as the resident of 500
    South Jefferson Street. For this reason, the inclusion of the name “Jeremie Alford” in the
    affidavit, despite the informant’s provision of the name “Jeremie” only, was not
    misleading. Following our review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the
    judgments of the trial court.
    When reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, “[q]uestions of
    credibility of the witnesses, the weight and value of the evidence, and resolutions of
    conflicts in the evidence are matters entrusted to the trial judge as the trier of fact.” State
    1
    To the extent the remaining two questions certified for appeal raise additional issues,
    they have been waived.
    -4-
    v. Odom, 
    928 S.W.2d 18
    , 23 (Tenn. 1996). Accordingly, “a trial court’s findings of fact
    in a suppression hearing will be upheld unless the evidence preponderates otherwise.” 
    Id. Appellate courts
    conduct a de novo review of questions of law and the trial court’s
    application of law to facts. State v. Walton, 
    41 S.W.3d 75
    , 81 (Tenn. 2001). As the
    prevailing party, the State is “entitled to the strongest legitimate view of the evidence
    adduced at the suppression hearing as well as all reasonable and legitimate inferences that
    may be drawn from that evidence.” 
    Odom, 928 S.W.2d at 23
    .
    Under both the Tennessee and United States Constitutions, no search warrant may
    be issued except upon probable cause, which has been defined as “a reasonable ground
    for suspicion, supported by circumstances indicative of an illegal act.” State v. Henning,
    
    975 S.W.2d 290
    , 294 (Tenn. 1998). Tennessee requires a written and sworn affidavit,
    “containing allegations from which the magistrate can determine whether probable cause
    exists,” as “an indispensable prerequisite to the issuance of a search warrant.” 
    Id. The magistrate
    is then tasked with reading this affidavit “in a commonsense and practical
    manner.” State v. Saine, 
    297 S.W.3d 199
    , 206 (Tenn. 2009). A finding of probable cause
    made by an issuing magistrate is entitled to great deference. State v. Yeomans, 
    10 S.W.3d 293
    , 296 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999) (citations omitted). Accordingly, the standard to be
    employed in reviewing the issuance of a search warrant is “whether, in light of all the
    evidence available, the magistrate had a substantial basis for finding probable cause.”
    State v. Meeks, 
    876 S.W.2d 121
    , 124 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993) (citation omitted).
    Prior to State v. Jerry Lewis Tuttle, Tennessee courts determined whether
    information provided by a criminal informant gave rise to probable cause using the two-
    prong test adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Aguilar v. Texas, 
    378 U.S. 108
    (1964) and Spinelli v. United States, 
    393 U.S. 410
    (1969). See State v. Jacumin, 
    778 S.W.2d 430
    , 436 (Tenn. 1989) (adopting the two-pronged Aguilar-Spinelli test “as the
    standard by which probable cause will be measured to see if the issuance of a search
    warrant is proper under Article I, Section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution”). The
    Aguilar-Spinelli test required the supporting affidavit to show: (1) the informant’s basis
    of knowledge; and (2) the veracity of the informant or the reliability of the informant’s
    information. 
    Id. We expounded
    on this two-prong test in State v. Moon, 
    841 S.W.3d 336
    (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992), stating:
    Under the first or “basis of knowledge” prong, facts must be revealed
    which permit the magistrate to determine whether the informant had a basis
    for his or her information that a certain person had been, was or would be
    involved in criminal conduct or that evidence of crime would be found at a
    certain place. Under the second or “veracity” prong, facts must be revealed
    which permit the magistrate to determine either the inherent credibility of
    the informant or the reliability of his information on the particular occasion.
    -5-
    
    Id. at 338.
    While the affidavit need not give a large amount of detail regarding the
    informant’s credibility, it had to contain “some concrete reason why the magistrate
    should believe the informant.” State v. Lowe, 
    949 S.W.2d 300
    , 305 (Tenn. Crim. App.
    1996). Independent police corroboration could make up for deficiencies in either the
    “basis of knowledge” or the “veracity” prong. 
    Moon, 841 S.W.3d at 341
    .
    In Jerry Lewis Tuttle, our Supreme Court considered the continuing viability of
    Jacumin, the Tennessee Supreme Court decision embracing the two-prong Aguilar-
    Spinelli test, and overruled it, instead adopting the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis
    established by the United States Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates, 
    462 U.S. 213
    (1983).
    Jerry Lewis Tuttle, 
    2017 WL 1246855
    at *13. When doing so, the Court reiterated:
    [U]nder the totality-of-the circumstances analysis, the informant’s basis of
    knowledge and veracity or credibility remain highly relevant
    considerations. Rather than separate and independent considerations, they
    “should [now] be understood simply as closely intertwined issues that may
    usefully illuminate the commonsense, practical question [of] whether there
    is ‘probable cause’ to believe that contraband or evidence is located in a
    particular place.”
    
    Id. at *15
    (quoting 
    Gates, 462 U.S. at 230
    ). Under this analysis, bare-bones affidavits
    containing only conclusory statements remain insufficient, and independent police
    corroboration of the details provided by the informant continues to add value to the
    affidavit. 
    Id. at *13.
    Here, the affidavit indicated the informant had been to the residence located at 500
    South Jefferson Street within the past forty-eight hours and witnessed methamphetamine
    being weighed by Jeremie Alford. The informant recognized the substance as
    methamphetamine because Jeremie Alford identified it as such, and he had purchased the
    narcotic from Mr. Alford on prior occasions. The affidavit indicted “Investigator Sherrill
    advised the information given by this informant has been true and correct” in prior
    investigations, and “[t]he informant has also given information leading to an arrest and
    conviction in a marijuana case involving Investigator Chad Partin, former Coffee County
    Sheriff’s Investigator.”
    After reviewing the affidavit and applicable law, we conclude the trial court
    properly denied the defendants’ motion to suppress. The facts set forth in the affidavit
    established the informant’s veracity and basis of knowledge, both of which remain highly
    relevant considerations under the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis. Affording the
    State the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and viewing the totality of the
    -6-
    circumstances detailed in the affidavit in a commonsense and practical manner, we
    conclude the affidavit provided the magistrate with a substantial basis for determining the
    issuance of a search warrant for 500 South Jefferson Street would result in the discovery
    of methamphetamine on the premises. Accordingly, the defendants are not entitled to
    relief on this issue.
    The defendants further contend the affidavit used to secure the search warrant at
    issue contained insufficient police corroboration, and the inclusion of Jeremie Alford’s
    last name in the affidavit made it materially misleading. At the suppression hearing,
    Detective Gass testified that the confidential informant advised Investigator Sherrill of
    criminal drug activity occurring at 500 South Jefferson Street in Winchester, Tennessee
    by a man named Jeremie. Detective Gass subsequently corroborated this tip by verifying
    an individual named Jeremie Alford resided at that address. This independent police
    corroboration further validates the reliability of the informant. Moreover, the inclusion of
    this additional and accurate information in the affidavit that was uncovered through an
    independent investigation conducted by law enforcement prior to the execution of the
    warrant does not make the affidavit misleading. The defendants are also not entitled to
    relief on these issues.
    Conclusion
    Based upon the foregoing authorities and reasoning, the judgments of the trial
    court are affirmed.
    ____________________________________
    J. ROSS DYER, JUDGE
    -7-