State v. Nassel Brown ( 1997 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
APRIL 1997 SESSION
FILED
November 13, 1997
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) Appellate C ourt Clerk
)
Appellee, ) No. 02C01-9606-CR-00187
)
) Shelby County
v. )
) Honorable Bernie Weinman, Judge
)
NASSEL BROWN, ) (Rape of a Child)
)
Appellant. )
For the Appellant: For the Appellee:
A. C. Wharton, Jr. Charles W. Burson
District Public Defender Attorney General of Tennessee
and
Diane Thackery Georgia Blythe Felner
Assistant Public Defender Assistant Attorney General of Tennessee
201 Poplar Avenue 450 James Robertson Parkway
Memphis, TN 38103 Nashville, TN 37243-0493
(AT TRIAL)
John W. Pierotti, Jr.
Walker Gwinn District Attorney General
Assistant Public Defender and
201 Poplar Avenue Patience R. Branham
Memphis, TN 38103 Assistant District Attorney General
(ON APPEAL) 201 Poplar Avenue
Memphis, TN 38103
OPINION FILED:____________________
AFFIRMED PURSUANT TO RULE 20
Joseph M. Tipton
Judge
OPINION
The defendant, Nassel Brown, appeals as of right from his conviction for
rape of a child, a Class A felony, in the Shelby County Criminal Court. As a Range I,
standard offender, the defendant received a sentence of fifteen years in the
Department of Correction. In this appeal as of right, he contends that the evidence is
insufficient to support his conviction because the state failed to prove that he
penetrated the victim. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Our standard of review when the sufficiency of the evidence is questioned
on appeal is "whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct.
2781, 2789 (1979). This means that we may not reweigh the evidence, but must
presume that the jury has resolved all conflicts in the testimony and drawn all
reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the state. See State v. Sheffield,
676 S.W.2d 542, 547 (Tenn. 1984); State v. Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn.
1978).
Rape of a child is the reckless, knowing, or intentional, unlawful sexual
penetration of a victim by the defendant or the defendant by a victim, if such victim is
less than thirteen (13) years of age. See T.C.A. §§ 39-11-302(c) and 39-13-522(a);
“Sexual penetration” includes “any intrusion, however slight, of any part of a person’s
body into the [victim’s] genital or anal openings.” T.C.A. § 39-13-501(7).
When viewed in the light most favorable to the state, see Cabbage, 571
S.W.2d at 835, the proof at trial established that the defendant entered the room where
the ten-year-old victim was asleep on the couch, removed her panties, and caused the
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victim pain by touching his penis to her vagina. Although the victim’s hymenal tissue
was not torn as a result of the touching, the victim was missing part of her hymenal
tissue. The victim also had fibrous bands on her labia minora and a dark red area on
the left side of her vagina. Expert testimony reflected that these findings are consistent
with something, such as a finger or the head of a penis, having been inserted and
rubbed against the victim over a period of time. A test performed on swabs from the
victim’s vaginal opening revealed the presence of a small number of sperm cells.
After full consideration of the record, the briefs, and the law governing the
issue presented, we are of the opinion that the evidence is sufficient to support the
defendant’s conviction for rape of a child and that no precedential value would be
derived from the rendering of a full opinion. Therefore we conclude that the judgment
of the trial court should be affirmed pursuant to Rule 20, Tenn Ct. Crim. App. R.
Joseph M. Tipton, Judge
CONCUR:
David G. Hayes, Judge
William M. Barker, Judge
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