State of Tennessee v. Felicia Mae Langford ( 2011 )


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  •            IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT NASHVILLE
    Assigned on Briefs September 28, 2010
    STATE OF TENNESSEE v. FELICIA MAE LANGFORD
    Direct Appeal from the Circuit Court for Macon County
    No. 07-61 David Durham, Judge
    No. M2010-00340-CCA-R3-CD - Filed January 12, 2011
    The Defendant-Appellant, Felicia Mae Langford, appeals the revocation of her probation.
    She pled guilty in the Circuit Court of Macon County to aggravated burglary, a Class C
    felony. Langford received a probationary sentence of six years. The trial court revoked her
    probation following an arrest for shoplifting. On appeal, Langford admits that she violated
    her probation. She claims, however, that the trial court erred by revoking her probation and
    imposing her original sentence of confinement. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the
    trial court.
    Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed
    C AMILLE R. M CM ULLEN, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which J AMES C URWOOD
    W ITT, J R., and N ORMA M CG EE O GLE, JJ., joined.
    Comer L. Donnell, District Public Defender; Joe McClerran, Assistant Public Defender,
    Lebanon, Tennessee for the Defendant-Appellant, Felicia Mae Langford.
    Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter; Brent C. Cherry, Assistant Attorney
    General; James G. (Jerry) Woodall, District Attorney General; and Justin Harris, Assistant
    District Attorney General, for the Appellee, State of Tennessee.
    OPINION
    Background. The record on appeal is limited. It contains the judgment form for the
    aggravated burglary conviction, an affidavit addressing the probation violation, the arrest
    warrant, and the revocation order. The record does not include a transcript of the revocation
    hearing.1
    1
    The record does show that Langford submitted a “Notice of Filing Transcript.” The notice informs
    (continued...)
    Langford’s conviction for aggravated burglary was entered on June 8, 2009. She was
    placed on probation for a term of six years. On August 17, 2009, Langford’s probation
    officer signed an affidavit which alleged that Langford violated her probation. Specifically,
    the probation officer alleged that Langford failed to “obey all local, state, and federal laws
    and ordinances.” Langford was purportedly arrested for shoplifting on August 3, 2009.2
    Based on this alleged violation, the trial court issued a warrant for Langford’s arrest. The
    warrant was executed on August 24, 2009.
    On October 28, 2010, the trial court entered a revocation order. It fully revoked
    Langford’s probation and imposed the original sentence of confinement. The order does not
    specify the basis for the revocation. Langford filed a timely notice of appeal.
    ANALYSIS
    Langford concedes that she violated her probation. She claims, however, that the trial
    court abused its discretion by revoking her probation and ordering confinement. Langford
    contends that confinement was improper because the probation officer and the assistant
    district attorney arranged for Langford to enter a drug treatment program. Langford also
    asserts that the trial court should have inquired about her substance abuse issues. In
    response, the State argues that the trial court acted within its discretion by revoking
    Langford’s probation and ordering confinement. The State claims we should presume the
    trial court’s findings are correct because Langford failed to prepare an adequate record for
    review. Specifically, it refers to the absence of the transcript of the revocation hearing. The
    State asserts that the record provides no support for Langford’s claim about the arrangement
    with the drug treatment program. Upon review, we agree with the State.
    Our law states that a trial court may revoke probation and order the imposition of the
    original sentence upon a finding by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant has
    violated a condition of probation. T.C.A. §§ 40-35-310, -311(e) (2009). Probation
    revocation rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Kendrick, 
    178 S.W.3d 734
    , 738 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2005) (citing State v. Mitchell, 
    810 S.W.2d 733
    , 735 (Tenn.
    Crim. App. 1991)). A trial court’s decision to revoke probation will be upheld absent an
    abuse of discretion. State v. Beard, 
    189 S.W.3d 730
    , 735 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2005). In order
    to establish an abuse of discretion, the defendant must show that there is no substantial
    1
    (...continued)
    the State that Langford filed a transcript of the proceedings on May 28, 2010. The transcript was not,
    however, included in the record. We note that the State discussed the absence of the transcript in its
    appellate brief. Langford did not file a reply brief addressing the absence.
    2
    Langford claims in her appellate brief that she pled guilty to shoplifting on October 28, 2009.
    -2-
    evidence in the record to support the trial court’s determination that he violated his probation.
    Id. (citations omitted).
    Once a trial judge has determined a violation of probation has occurred, the trial judge
    retains discretionary authority to order the defendant to: (1) serve his sentence in
    incarceration; (2) serve the probationary term, beginning anew; or (3) serve a probationary
    period that is extended for up to an additional two years. State v. Hunter, 
    1 S.W.3d 643
    , 647
    (Tenn. 1999). Additionally, under Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-310(b), the trial
    court
    may also resentence the defendant for the remainder of the unexpired term to
    any community-based alternative to incarceration authorized by chapter 36 of
    this title; provided, that the violation of the defendant’s suspension of sentence
    is a technical one and does not involve the commission of a new offense.
    The determination of the proper consequence of the probation violation embodies a separate
    exercise of discretion. Id. at 647; State v. Reams, 
    265 S.W.3d 423
    , 430 (Tenn. Crim. App.
    2007).
    Our review is hampered by the absence of the transcript from the revocation hearing.
    Langford was responsible for providing a record that conveys a fair, accurate and complete
    account of what transpired with regard to the probation revocation. See T.R.A.P. 24(b); State
    v. Taylor, 
    992 S.W.2d 941
    , 944 (Tenn. 1999). The Tennessee Supreme Court has stated,
    “Where the record is incomplete and does not contain a transcript of the proceedings relevant
    to an issue presented for review, or portions of the record upon which the party relies, an
    appellate court is precluded from considering the issue.” State v. Ballard, 
    855 S.W.2d 557
    ,
    560-61 (Tenn. 1993) (citing State v. Roberts, 
    755 S.W.2d 833
    , 836 (Tenn. Crim. App.
    1988)). We are to presume the trial court’s findings are correct if a relevant transcript is not
    included in the record. See State v. Ivy, 
    868 S.W.2d 724
    , 728 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993);
    State v. Oody, 
    823 S.W.2d 554
    , 559 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991). Certainly, the revocation
    hearing was relevant to the trial court’s decision to revoke Langford’s probation and impose
    the original sentence. The hearing was particularly relevant to Langford’s claim that the
    probation officer and the assistant district attorney arranged for Langford to enter a drug
    treatment program. Without the transcript of the revocation hearing, we are precluded from
    reviewing this issue and we must presume that the trial court’s decision was correct.
    Langford is not entitled to relief.
    CONCLUSION
    Based on the foregoing, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
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    ___________________________________
    CAMILLE R. McMULLEN, JUDGE
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