State of Tennessee v. Samuel Jacob Webb ( 2010 )


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  •         IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT NASHVILLE
    Assigned on Briefs September 22, 2010
    STATE OF TENNESSEE v. SAMUEL JACOB WEBB
    Direct Appeal from the Criminal Court for Sumner County
    No. 110-2008     Dee David Gay, Judge
    No. M2009-01364-CCA-R3-CD - Filed December 14, 2010
    Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Defendant, Samuel Jacob Webb, pled guilty to one count
    of sexual exploitation of a minor, and the trial court sentenced him to eight years in the
    Department of Correction. The Petitioner filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea,
    claiming that he understood that he would be placed on parole for his eight-year sentence and
    returned to federal custody to serve his federal sentence for another charge. The trial court
    denied relief after a hearing, and the Defendant now appeals. After a thorough review of the
    record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
    Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed
    R OBERT W. W EDEMEYER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which D AVID H. W ELLES
    and J ERRY L. S MITH, JJ., joined.
    Samuel Jacob Webb, Lawrenceburg, Tennessee, pro se, for the Appellant.
    Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter; Benjamin A. Ball, Assistant Attorney
    General; L. Ray Whitley, District Attorney General, and Sallie Wade Brown, Assistant
    District Attorney General, for the Appellee, State of Tennessee.
    OPINION
    I. Facts
    A. Guilty Plea
    This case arises from the recovery of child pornography from the Defendant’s
    computer. A Sumner County grand jury indicted the Defendant for eight counts of sexual
    exploitation of a minor. The State, at the guilty plea submission hearing, provided the
    following facts underlying the charges in this case:
    Detective Vaughn, he had done [sic] several interviews with people in the
    neighborhood that went to [the Defendant’s] address. They had a search
    warrant. [The Defendant] was actually charged originally with some drug
    offenses and paraphernalia. As part of that search they also did a search
    warrant for his computers. Those were sent to the lab and as a result of the
    forensics report from the lab, Your Honor, the child pornography was found.
    Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Petitioner pled guilty to one count of sexual
    exploitation of a minor in an amount of more than 100 images, a Class B felony, with the
    remaining counts dismissed. The Defendant agreed to serve an eight year sentence at 100%,
    in confinement to be served concurrently with two previous sentences.
    During the plea hearing, the Defendant testified that he had graduated from high
    school, was in good physical and mental health, and was not taking medications or under the
    influence of any substance that might impair his ability to understand the plea. Further, the
    Defendant testified that he understood that he must answer the court’s questions truthfully or
    he would be subject to prosecution for perjury. The trial court reviewed the Petitioner’s
    charges and the possible punishment for each charge. The trial court then reviewed the terms
    of the plea agreement with the Petitioner. The Petitioner confirmed that he agreed to serve
    an eight-year sentence at 100% and that he had signed the Petition for a Waiver of a trial by
    jury and the request for acceptance of a guilty plea forms.
    The trial court listed and explained the Petitioner’s rights and asked the Petitioner
    whether he understood his rights, including the right to appeal, and whether the Petitioner
    wanted to waive those rights and enter the plea agreement with the State. The Petitioner
    responded that he understood his rights and wanted to enter the plea agreement. The
    Petitioner testified that no one had forced him to give up his rights to a jury trial and plead
    guilty. The Petitioner stated that he was satisfied with the services of his attorney and had
    discussed the plea agreement with his attorney “fully.”
    B. Hearing on the Motion to Withdraw the Plea
    The trial court held a hearing based on receipt of a letter from the Defendant. In
    pertinent part, the letter stated the following:
    I respectfully request that Your Honor withdraw the guilty plea I signed in
    Your Honorable Court on February 19, 2009, until such time that I can be
    made to understand it. I did not know the full ramifications of what I signed.
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    I respectfully assert and submit that said plea agreement is not indicative of
    what my appointed attorney explained to me.
    After the trial court read this portion of the letter aloud during the hearing, the Defendant
    agreed that these were his concerns warranting a withdrawal of his guilty plea. The trial court
    passed the plea agreement form to the Defendant, which contained the Defendant’s signature
    and the following agreed upon sentence:
    Count number one, sexual exploitation of minor over 100 images, class B
    felony, possession of pornography material. Must register as a sex offender.
    No Internet use for purposes of pornography. No contact with minors. The
    sentence is to run concurrent with case 507-2007 and federal sentence still
    being served. Total of eight years at 100 percent TDOC.
    The Defendant agreed that he had read this sentence and that it was his signature on the
    document. He told the trial court, however, that it was his understanding that he would be
    “eligible for parole from the [Tennessee Department of Correction] to the Bureau of Prisons
    to begin my federal sentence because it is to run concurrent with the sentence.” Further, he
    complained that his jail credit was not correct. The trial court agreed to review and correct
    any errors in the assessment of the Defendant’s jail credit, but would not grant the
    Defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The trial court explained that the
    Defendant’s claim that he understood he would be eligible for parole was contrary to the
    evidence and the plea agreement. It is from this judgment that the Defendant now appeals.
    II. Analysis
    On appeal, the Defendant argues that it was error for the trial court to deny his motion
    to withdraw his guilty plea. Additionally, the Defendant raises for the first time on appeal
    three other issues: (1) the conviction was based upon an unconstitutional search and seizure;
    (2) the conviction was based upon a violation of his right against self-incrimination; and (3)
    the Defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel. We will first address these three
    issues that are raised for the first time on appeal.
    An appeal does not generally lie from a guilty plea conviction. Ray v. State, 
    224 Tenn. 164
    , 
    451 S.W.2d 854
     (1970). Nevertheless, the Rules of Criminal Procedure do allow an
    appeal from a guilty plea in certain cases under very narrow circumstances. Tenn. R. Crim.
    P. 37. Under this rule, the only avenue for the Defendant to appeal from his guilty plea would
    be if, at the time he entered his guilty pleas, he had “explicitly reserved with the consent of
    the state and of the court the right to appeal a certified question of law that is dispositive of
    the case.” Tenn. R. Crim. P. 37(b)(2)(i). The Defendant did not do this. The record is absent
    -3-
    any showing that there was a compliance with the formal steps required by Rule 37(b)(2)(i).
    Therefore, the Defendant has waived review of his claims that the conviction was based upon
    an unconstitutional search and seizure and that the conviction was based upon a violation of
    his right against self-incrimination. As to the Defendant’s complaint of the ineffective
    assistance of counsel, because this issue is now being raised for the first time, there is no
    evidence in the record that addresses this complaint. Therefore, we cannot review this issue.
    We now address the Defendant’s appeal from the trial court’s denial of his motion to
    withdraw his guilty plea. Once a defendant enters a guilty plea, it “cannot later be withdrawn
    as a matter of right.” State v. Mellon, 
    118 S.W.3d 340
    , 345 (Tenn. 2003) (citing State v.
    Turner, 
    919 S.W.2d 346
    , 355 (Tenn. Crim. App.1995)); State v. Crowe, 
    168 S.W.3d 731
    , 740
    (Tenn. 2005). Whether a defendant should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea is within
    the sound discretion of the trial court. Mellon, 
    118 S.W.3d at
    345-46 (citing Henning v. State,
    
    201 S.W.2d 669
    , 671 (Tenn. 1947)). On appeal, “[t]he trial court’s decision ‘will not be
    reversed unless it clearly appears that there was an abuse of discretion.’” Crowe, 
    168 S.W.3d at 740
     (quoting Henning, 
    201 S.W.2d at 671
    ). “An abuse of discretion exists if the record
    lacks substantial evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion.” 
    Id.
     (citing Goosby v. State,
    
    917 S.W.2d 700
    , 705 (Tenn. Crim. App.1995)).
    Rule 32(f) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure provides the standards
    governing the withdrawal of a guilty plea. Turner, 919 S.W.2d at 354. The rule is as follows:
    (1) Before Sentence Imposed. Before sentence is imposed, the court may grant
    a motion to withdraw a guilty plea for any fair and just reason.
    (2) After Sentence But Before Judgment Final. After sentence is imposed but
    before the judgment becomes final, the court may set aside the judgment of
    conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw the plea to correct manifest
    injustice.
    Tenn. R. Crim. P. 32(f). The rule dictates that one of two standards is to be applied, and
    which standard governs depends on whether a defendant moves to withdraw his guilty plea
    before or after sentence is imposed. Crowe, 
    168 S.W.3d at 740-41
    . As the Defendant in the
    present case moved to withdraw his guilty plea after the sentence was imposed, the latter,
    more stringent standard applies. Accordingly, the trial court should have allowed the guilty
    plea to be withdrawn only to correct a “manifest injustice.” See id.; see also Tenn. R. Crim.
    P. 32(f)(2). Moreover, the Defendant had the burden of establishing that he should be allowed
    to withdraw his guilty plea to prevent a manifest injustice. Turner, 919 S.W.2d at 355.
    In Crowe, our Supreme Court provided guidance as to when courts should find a
    -4-
    manifest injustice and allow the withdrawal of a guilty plea after sentence has been imposed:
    Although Rule 32(f) does not define “manifest injustice,” courts have
    identified on a case by case basis circumstances that meet the manifest
    injustice standard necessary for withdrawal of a plea. See Turner, 919 S.W.2d
    at 355; State v. Evans, 
    265 Ga. 332
    , 
    454 S.E.2d 468
    , 473 (Ga. 1995).
    Withdrawal to correct manifest injustice is warranted where: (1) the plea was
    entered through a misunderstanding as to its effect, or through fear and fraud,
    or where it was not made voluntarily; (2) the prosecution failed to disclose
    exculpatory evidence as required by Brady v. Maryland, 
    373 U.S. 83
    , 
    83 S. Ct. 1194
    , 
    10 L. Ed.2d 215
     (1963), and this failure to disclose influenced the entry
    of the plea; (3) the plea was not knowingly, voluntarily, and understandingly
    entered; and (4) the defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel
    in connection with the entry of the plea. Although manifest injustice may exist
    in the absence of a constitutional violation, we agree with the Court of
    Criminal appeals that “[w]here there is a denial of due process, there is a
    ‘manifest injustice’ as a matter of law.” State v. Davis, 
    823 S.W.2d 217
    , 220
    (Tenn. Crim. App.1991) (quoting United States v. Crusco, 
    536 F.2d 21
    , 26
    (3rd Cir. 1976)). In contrast, a defendant’s change of heart about pleading
    guilty or a defendant’s dissatisfaction with the punishment ultimately imposed
    does not constitute manifest injustice warranting withdrawal. Turner, 919
    S.W.2d at 355.
    
    168 S.W.3d at 741-43
     (some citations, footnotes, and internal quotations omitted).
    Based upon our review of the record, we conclude that the trial court acted within its
    discretion in denying the Defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea. The trial court conducted
    a thorough inquiry into the Defendant’s educational background, interaction with his attorney,
    current state of mind, and understanding of both the charges and consequences associated
    with entering a guilty plea. The Defendant testified that his attorney discussed and reviewed
    the charges and punishment with him. During the plea submission hearing, the Defendant
    twice acknowledged that his sentence was eight years to be served at 100%. At the hearing
    on the motion to withdraw, the only evidence submitted was the Defendant’s assertion that
    he was dissatisfied with the sentence and wanted to serve his time in a federal prison rather
    than TDOC. The Defendant’s issue with where he is serving his sentence is an administrative
    matter and does not constitute “manifest injustice” requiring the trial court to allow the
    Defendant to withdraw his guilty plea. Crowe, 
    168 S.W.3d at 740-41
    . Therefore, the trial
    court did not err in denying the Defendant’s motion and the Defendant is not entitled to relief
    as to this issue.
    -5-
    III. Conclusion
    After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we conclude that the
    trial court properly denied the Defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea. Accordingly, we
    affirm the judgment of the trial court.
    _________________________________
    ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, JUDGE
    -6-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: M2009-01364-CCA-R3-CD

Judges: Judge Robert J. Wedemeyer

Filed Date: 12/14/2010

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021