State v. Ronald Strickland ( 1997 )


Menu:
  •              IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT JACKSON
    DECEMBER 1996 SESSION
    FILED
    July 24, 1997
    Cecil Crowson, Jr.
    STATE OF TENNESSEE,     )                           Appellate C ourt Clerk
    )
    Appellee,      )       No. 02C01-9608-CC-00290
    )
    )        Tipton County
    v.                      )
    )        Hon. Joseph H. Walker, Judge
    )
    RONALD WAYNE STRICKLAND,)        (Aggravated Sexual Battery)
    )
    Appellant.     )
    For the Appellant:              For the Appellee:
    Frank Deslauriers               Charles W. Burson
    P.O. Box 1156                   Attorney General of Tennessee
    Covington, TN 38019                    and
    Deborah A. Tullis
    Assistant Attorney General of Tennessee
    450 James Robertson Parkway
    Nashville, TN 37243-0493
    Elizabeth T. Rice
    District Attorney General
    and
    Walt Freeland
    Assistant District Attorney General
    302 Market Street
    Somerville, TN 38068
    OPINION FILED:____________________
    AFFIRMED
    Joseph M. Tipton
    Judge
    OPINION
    The defendant, Ronald Wayne Strickland, was convicted of aggravated
    sexual battery, a Class B felony, pursuant to a guilty plea in the Tipton County Circuit
    Court. He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender, to eight years in the
    Department of Correction. In this appeal as of right, he contends that the trial court
    erred when it concluded that he was not eligible to be sentenced under the Community
    Corrections Act. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
    The defendant contends that he is eligible for a community corrections
    sentence under the special needs provision of the Community Corrections Act of 1985,
    T.C.A. § 40-36-106(c). 1 That section states:
    Felony offenders not otherwise eligible under subsection (a),
    and who would be usually considered unfit for probation due
    to histories of chronic alcohol, drug abuse, or mental health
    problems, but whose special needs are treatable and could be
    served best in the community rather than in a correctional
    institution may be considered eligible for punishment in the
    community under the provisions of this chapter.
    T.C.A. § 40-36-106(c). The defendant acknowledges that this court has interpreted the
    phrase “who would be usually considered unfit for probation” to mean that a defendant
    must be otherwise eligible for probation to qualify to receive a sentence under this
    provision. State v. Staten, 
    787 S.W.2d 934
    , 936 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1989). However, he
    argues that the 1993 amendments to T.C.A. § 40-35-303(a) and T.C.A. § 40-36-
    106(e)(3) change the law in a way that a defendant with special needs is now eligible
    for a community corrections sentence even if he is initially ineligible for probation.
    Under T.C.A. § 40-35-303(a), a defendant is eligible for probation if his
    sentence is eight years or less and he is not convicted of aggravated sexual battery or
    one of the other enumerated offenses. In 1993, the legislature added a sentence to the
    1
    Having been convicted of aggravated sexual battery, a crime against a person, the
    defend ant does not otherw ise qu alify for a com m unity corrections s ente nce . See T.C.A. § 40-36-
    106(a)(2).
    2
    statute which states, “A defendant shall also be eligible for probation pursuant to § 40-
    36-106(e)(3).” In relevant part, T.C.A. § 40-36-106(e)(3) grants the trial court the
    authority to place an offender that it terminates from a community corrections program
    on probation. “This authority of the court extends to offenders not originally eligible for
    probation after service of at least one (1) year.” T.C.A. § 40-36-106(e)(3). The
    defendant argues that under these provisions, a community corrections sentence must
    be available to a defendant who is initially ineligible for probation.
    Although we agree with the defendant that some offenders who are
    initially ineligible for probation are eligible for a community corrections sentence, see
    T.C.A. § 40-36-106(a), we do not believe that the 1993 amendments to T.C.A. § 40-36-
    106(3) and T.C.A. § 40-35-303(a) were intended to alter the requirements a defendant
    must meet to fit within the special needs provision. To qualify to be sentenced pursuant
    to T.C.A. § 40-36-106(c), a defendant must be eligible for probation. Staten, 787
    S.W.2d at 936. The amendments do not address qualifying under this subsection.
    Thus, having been convicted of an offense for which probation is statutorily prohibited,
    the defendant does not meet this requirement. See T.C.A. § 40-35-303(a).
    In addition to his statutory argument, the defendant relies on State v.
    Robert Bryant Rhodes, No 03C01-9405-CR-00174, Blount County, slip op. at 7 (Tenn.
    Crim. App. July 20, 1995), to support his contention that he is eligible for a community
    corrections sentence. Rhodes, convicted of rape, was not eligible for probation
    because he received a sentence greater than eight years. See T.C.A. § 40-36-
    106(e)(3). This court concluded that he was ineligible for a community corrections
    sentence for the sexual offense under T.C.A. § 40-36-106(a)(2), but also added,
    “absent a showing that he has special needs that can best be treated in the
    community.” It concluded, though, that such needs were not proven.
    3
    Although Rhodes indicates that a defendant who is ineligible for probation
    because of the length of his sentence may be eligible to be sentenced under the special
    needs provision of the Community Corrections Act, the defendant does not fit within this
    category. Unlike Rhodes, the defendant in this case was convicted of an offense for
    which probation is statutorily prohibited. See T.C.A. § 40-35-303(a). In any event, the
    language from Rhodes upon which the defendant relies has not been followed by this
    court. Other opinions have failed to recognize any distinction between ineligibility for
    probation due to the crime committed and ineligibility because of the length of the
    sentence imposed. See State v. Lanny Crowe, No. 01-C-01-9503-CC-00064, Wayne
    County, slip op. at 2 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 6, 1995); State v. Scotty G. Kilgore, 03C01-
    9408-CR-00278, Washington County, slip op. at 2-3 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 13, 1995);
    State v. Robert Roy Atnip, 01C01-9002-CC-00035, Dekalb County, slip op. at 5 (Tenn.
    Crim. App. June 20, 1990), app. denied (Tenn. Sept. 24, 1990); see also State v.
    Boston, 
    938 S.W.2d 435
    , 438 n.4 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996); State v. Haynes, No.
    01C01-9512-CC-00412, Giles County, slip op. at 5 n.3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 13,
    1996); State v. Robert Wilson, Alias Tiny, No. 03C01-9209-CR-00305, Blount County,
    slip op. at 11-12 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 22, 1993).
    To qualify for a community corrections sentence under T.C.A. § 40-36-
    106(c), a defendant must be eligible for probation. Staten, 787 S.W.2d at 936.
    Because the defendant does not meet this requirement, see T.C.A. § 40-35-303(a), the
    trial court properly concluded that he is not eligible to receive a community corrections
    sentence under the special needs provision.
    4
    Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
    Joseph M. Tipton, Judge
    CONCUR:
    Joe B. Jones, Presiding Judge
    Jerry L. Smith, Judge
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 02C01-9608-CC-00290

Filed Date: 7/24/1997

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014