Coy Williams v. State ( 2010 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE FILED
NOVEMBER 1998 SESSION
February 9, 1999
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appe llate Court C lerk
COY D. WILLIAMS, )
) C.C.A. No. 03C01-9801-CC-00013
Appellant, )
) Blount County
v. )
) Honorable D. Kelly Thomas, Jr., Judge
STATE OF TENNESSEE, )
) (Post-Conviction Relief)
Appellee. )
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
Steve Merritt John Knox Walkup
116 East Harper Avenue Attorney General & Reporter
Maryville, TN 37804 425 Fifth Avenue, North
Nashville, TN 37243-0493
Elizabeth B. Marney
Assistant Attorney General
425 Fifth Avenue, North
Nashville, TN 37243-0493
Michael L. Flynn
District Attorney General
363 Court Street
Maryville, TN 37804-5906
Edward P. Bailey, Jr.
Assistant District Attorney General
363 Court Street
Maryville, TN 37804-5906
OPINION FILED: __________________________________
AFFIRMED
L. T. LAFFERTY, SENIOR JUDGE
OPINION
The appellant, Coy D. Williams, referred herein as “petitioner,” appeals as of right fromthetrial court’s
dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. Petitioner entered guilty pleas in 1992to murder first degree,
aggravated burglary, and theft under $500. Pursuant to a plea agreement, petitioner received a life sentence
for the murder conviction and concurrent sentences of ten years and eleven months, twenty-nine days for the
burglary and theft convictions. The petitioner filed for post-conviction relief, alleging his guilty pleas were not
knowingly and voluntarily made and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Following an
evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied relief. After areviewof the record, w AFFIRM the judgm of the
e ent
post-conviction court.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
After the commencem of a jury trial on October 14, 1992, the petitioner elected to plead guilty to
ent
murder first degree, aggravated burglary, and theft of property under $500 on October 16, 1992. We glean
from the guilty plea proceedings that the petitioner and a co-defendant, Frank Whitmore, broke into the
residence of one of W ore’s relativesand killedtherelative. Two days after the murder, the petitioner gave
hitm
a detailed tape-recorded statement to police officers as to how the offense occurred. The state gave notice
to the petitioner that it intended to seek the death penalty. Petitioner’s counsel filed a motion to determine
whether the state could seek the death penalty, due to the petitioner’s mental retardation. At the conclusion
of a hearing on October 14, 1992 to determ the merits of the petitioner’s m
ine otion, the trial court found by,
a preponderance of the evidence, the petitioner’s functional intelligence quotient was 70 or below and that the
petitioner had defects in adaptive behavior. This behavior was manifestedby age 18, and existed at thetime
of theoffense. The trial court granted the petitioner’s motion to exclude the death penalty, and the stategave
indications of an appeal. Subsequently, the petitioner entered his guilty pleas.
Thepetitioner timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging involuntary guilty pleas, ineffective
assistance of counsel, and prosecutorial misconduct. The petitioner filed an amended petition alleging: (1)
his mental disease or defect prevented him frommeeting the knowing and voluntary requirements for entry
of a guilty plea; (2) petitioner’s counsel and the prosecutor allowed the petitioner to enter such pleas while
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aware of his mental condition; (3) counsel and prosecutor failed to request a hearing to determine the
petitioner’s competence to enter a guilty plea; (4) petitioner’s counsel should have filed a motion to suppress
petitioner’s statement given to the police on several additional grounds that were available; and (5)
prosecutorial misconduct in the procurem of the guilty pleas by intimidation.
ent
POST-CONVICTION HEARING
A. Guilty Plea
The petitioner, age 35 at the tim of the hearing, testified he pled guilty because the state intended
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to seek the death penalty on him, and he was “scared to death.” The petitioner understood pleading guilty to
mean an “easy way out” for the court and himself. The petitioner could not recall the specific details the trial
judge discussedwith him at the guilty plea hearing. The petitioner did not believe he deserved a life sentence
and wanted a new trial.
Charles B. Dungan, Jr., licensed attorney since 1965, testified he was appointed to represent the
petitioner at the preliminary hearingand continued to do so through thetrial stage, until thepetitioner entered
his guilty pleas. After talkingto the petitioner, defensecounsel discoveredthepetitioner could not reador write
and was of obvious lowintelligence. Thus, counsel begananintensiveinvestigationintothe petitioner’s mental
background. The petitioner was sent to Middle Tennessee Mental Health Institute for an evaluation as to
competency and an insanity defense. The petitioner was found competent to stand trial, and an insanity
defense was not available.
Based upon the findings of Middle TennesseeMental Health Instituteasto the petitioner’s low IQ, due
to mental retardation, counsel fileda motion to prevent the state fromseeking the death penalty. On October
14, 1992, counsel submittedtwo experts to thetrial court to support his position. In rebuttal, the state offered
an expert from Middle Tennessee Mental Health Institute. Prior to this hearing, the experts interviewed the
petitioner and found no incompetency.
Counsel believed the trial court’s decision to disallowthe death penalty could possibly be overturned
on appeal. Counsel advised the petitioner that his chances in a trial were zero, and it was in his best interest
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to enter a plea of guilty to avoid any chance of the death penalty. The primary focus of the defense was to
avoid the death penalty. Counsel testified, based upon various times and various circumstances in the past,
the petitioner’s responses wereappropriate, and he seem to understand. Counsel was of the opinion that,
ed
in the absence of the petitioner’s confession, the state could convict him As a result of their several
.
conversations, counsel believed the petitioner understood he was entering a plea of guilty and that his
sentence would be life imprisonment.
Craig L. Garrett, alicensedattorney since 1983, testified he wasappointed torepresent thepetitioner
as co-counsel, since the state was seeking the death penalty. Mr. Garrett testified he and Mr. Dungan talked
to the petitioner after the competency hearing and explained what had happened. Counsel had further
conversations with the petitioner the next day. M Garrett described the case as being very difficult to w
r. in,
and, if thepetitioner pledguilty, the statecouldnot appeal, and innowaycouldthepetitioner receive the death
penalty. M Garrett testified the petitioner understood what he was doing at the guilty plea.
r.
Mrs. Shirley Williams, one of the petitioner’s sisters, testified her brother is of low intelligence, has
difficulty understanding things, and cannot read or write. The petitioner w hit by a car at age 6.
as
Mrs. Nancy Cinnamon testified she is one of the petitioner’ sisters and that her brother has the mind
of a 9-year-old. In her opinion, the petitioner did not understand his charges or w he was in court.
hy
In its findings of fact, the post-conviction court held the petitioner understoodthenature of the charge,
the strength of the proof against him, and the advice of his attorneys. The court found the petitioner made a
knowing and voluntary decision to plead guilty.
Findings of the post-conviction court are binding on appeal unless the evidence preponderates
otherwise. Butler v. State, 789 S.W.2d 898, 899 (Tenn. 1990); Harries v. State, 958 S.W.2d 799, 802
(Tenn. Crim. App.), per. app. denied (Tenn. 1997). This Court may not reweigh or reevaluate the evidence
or substitute its inferences for those drawn by the post-conviction court. Moreover, questions concerning the
credibility of witnesses and weight and value to be given their testimony are for resolution by the post-
conviction court. Black v. State, 794 S.W.2d 752, 755 (Tenn. Crim. App.), per. app. denied (Tenn.
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1990).
Whenthe accused opts to plead guilty, the plea must be voluntarily, understandingly, and knowingly
entered to pass constitutional muster. Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 47 S.Ct. 582, 71 L.Ed.
1009 (1927); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1712, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969); Parke
v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 29, 113 S.Ct. 517, 523, 121 L.Ed. 2d 391 (1992); Brooks v. State, 187 Tenn. 67,
72, 213 S.W.2d 7, 9 (1948). As our Suprem Court stated in State ex rel. Barnes v. Henderson, 220
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Tenn. 719, 727, 423 S.W.2d 497, 501 (Tenn. 1968), “It is recognized in this State, as in all jurisdictions, that
a plea of guilty must be made voluntarily and with full understanding of its consequences.”
If the accused is to makea “voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action”
available to him, counsel must advise the accused, am other things, of the choices that are available to
ong
him as well as the probable outcome of these choices. I A.B.A. Standards for Criminal Justice § 4-5.1
commentary (2ded. 1986). If counsel isconvinced that theaccused shouldaccept a plea bargain agreement
and plead guilty, counsel should recommend that the accused opt for this choice. Counsel may use
reasonablepersuasionwhen makingtherecommendation. Parham v. State, 885 S.W.2d 375, 384 (Tenn.
Crim. App.), per. app. denied (Tenn. 1994).
Fromour review of the record, thepetitioner hasfailed to demonstrate in this appeal that the evidence
preponderates against the post-conviction court’s findings. Harries v. State, 958 S.W.2d at 802; Clenny
v. State, 576 S.W.2d 12, 14 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 947, 99 S.Ct. 2170, 60
L.Ed.2d 1050 (1979); Long v. State, 510 S.W 83, 86 (Tenn. Crim. App.), cert. denied (Tenn. 1974).
.2d
The guilty plea proceedings reveal the trial court, in view of the petitioner’s mental condition, carefully
questioned the petitioner as to what he was doing and his understanding of the consequences thereof in
compliance with Rule 11, Tenn. R. Crim. P. His trial counsel testified that, after their conversations, the
petitioner appeared to understand their advice and made his own decision to plead guilty. W find the
e
evidence in this record supports the post-convictioncourt’s finding that the petitioner’s pleas were voluntarily,
understandingly, and knowingly entered. There is no m to this issue.
erit
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
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The petitioner contends that hiscounsel’s decision not to pursue a motion to suppress his confession
prior to trial was not a reasonable decision and not within the range of competence demanded by attorneys
in criminal cases. The state counters by alleging that the petitioner has failed to carry his burden of proof, and
the evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion.
As to the facts surrounding his confession, the petitioner testified his attorneys showed him a copy of
his statem but he did not knowwhat a m
ent, otion to suppress was. The petitioner advised his counsel that he
was on drugs, cocaine, at the time of the confession. The petitioner testified that, during his interview, police
officers brought his charge partner in the room, laid a pistol on the desk, and told themthat if either of them
moved or tried to attack each other, the officers would shoot them The petitioner w afraid because the
. as
officers turned the tape-recorder on and off and acted crazy.
Mr. Dungan agreed the petitioner informed him of the details of the police interview and about the
pistol, but did not recall if the petitioner told him about being under the influence of cocaine at the time.
However, counsel was aware of drug involvement from the petitioner’s statement. Counsel filed a motion to
suppress the confession, but no hearing was held on the motion.
As to the motion to suppress, co-counsel, M Garrett, testified he could not recall if the motion was
r.
heard, but heand M Dungan determined the m
r. otion hadnomerit. M Garrett described his relationshipwith
r.
the petitioner as “very good,” and they discussed the petitioner’s statem several tim Mr. Garrett found
ent es.
the petitioner’s statem to be detailed and contained a good grasp of what was occurring. As to the
ent
petitioner being on drugs at the time of the confession, Mr. Garrett testified:
It just didn’t sound that way. And it didn’t read that way. And it just -- there’s
nothing to bear that out, is the problem that we had. You know, he was
properly Mirandized. You know, the way the statement went, that was what
concerned us so much. They had both Defendants together and they would
ask one and then the other would chime in andsay, well, now, hold on, don’t
you remember thus and such, and the other one would say, oh, yeah, that’s
right. And it just had such a ring of, you know, of authenticity to it because
of the way it was taken.
In its findings of fact, the post-conviction court found the motion to suppress was timely filed, but trial
counsel decided that the facts and law did not support the motion. Thus, counsel’s decision was within the
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range of reasonable competence.
In order for the petitioner to be granted relief on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel, the
petitioner must establish that the advice given or services rendered were not within the range of competence
demandedof attorneys in criminal cases and that, but for his counsel’s deficient performance, theresult of his
trial would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2068, 80
L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975). The burden is on the petitioner
to show that the evidence preponderates against the findings of the trial court. Clenny v. State, 576
S.W 12, 13 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 947 (1979). Otherwise, the findings of fact
.2d
made by the trial court at the evidentiary hearing are conclusive on appeal. Black v. State, 794 S.W.2d
752, 755 (Tenn. Crim. App.), per. app. denied (Tenn. 1990). Moreover, this Court cannot second-guess
trial counsel’s tactical and strategic choices, unless those choices are uninformed due to inadequate
preparation. Hellard v. State, 629 S.W.2d 4, 9 (Tenn. 1982).
We agree with the post-conviction court finding the decision by trial counsel to forgo the motion to
suppress thepetitioner’s confession was within the range of reasonable competence demanded of attorneys
in criminal cases. From a totality of circumstances, defense counsel found the petitioner had been properly
Mirandized; the details of the confession indicated the petitioner was not under the influence of any drug; the
coercive nature of placing the pistol on the desk was to keep thepetitioner and charge partner from attacking
one another; and the manner in which each defendant corrected the other indicated the confession was
voluntary. There is no m to this issue.
erit
________________________________________
L. T. LAFFERTY, SENIOR JUDGE
CONCUR:
___________________________________
DAVID H. WELLES, JUDGE
___________________________________
JAMES CURWOOD WITT, JR., JUDGE
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