State v. James E. Gayles ( 2010 )


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  •         IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    FILED
    AT KNOXVILLE                          July 6, 1999
    Cecil Crowson, Jr.
    APRIL SESSION, 1999                 Appellate C ourt
    Clerk
    STATE OF TENNESSEE,         )    C.C.A. NO. 03C01-9708-CR-00339
    )
    Appellee,             )
    )
    )    WASHINGTON COUNTY
    VS.                         )
    )    HON. ARDEN L. HILL
    JAMES E. GAYLES,            )    JUDGE
    )
    Appe llant.           )    (Direct Appeal - First Degree M urder)
    FOR THE APPELLANT:               FOR THE APPELLEE:
    DONALD E. SPUR RELL              JOHN KNOX WALKUP
    128 East Market Street           Attorney General and Reporter
    Johnson City, TN 37604
    ERIK W. DAAB
    Assistant Attorney General
    425 Fifth Avenu e North
    Nashville, TN 37243
    DAVID CROCKETT
    District Attorney General
    JOE CRUMLEY
    KENT GARLAND
    Assistant District Attorn eys
    First Judicial District
    Jonesborough, TN 37659
    OPINION FILED ________________________
    AFFIRMED
    JERRY L. SMITH, JUDGE
    OPINION
    On July 7, 1993, Appellant James E. Gayles was charged with one count
    of first degree mu rder. After a jury trial on February 6–7, 1995, Appellant was
    convicted of first degree murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment.
    Appellant challenges his conviction, raising the following issues:
    1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction; and
    2) whethe r the State improperly failed to disclose a leniency agree men t it
    had with one of its witnesses.
    After a revie w of the re cord, we affirm the ju dgme nt of the trial co urt.
    I. FACTS
    Officer Lisa Coppock of the Johnson City Police Department testified that
    on May 2, 1993, she was dispatched to investigate a shooting in the parking lot
    of Pro-Diesel in Johnson City. When she arrived, she found Darrell Sturdivandt
    lying on his ba ck next to a blue veh icle. Sturdivandt was declared dead at the
    scene. It appeared that he had a small caliber gunshot wound in the middle of
    his back. There was also a spent .25 caliber shell casing on the gr ound n ext to
    Sturdivan dt’s right foot.
    Doctor William McCormick testified that he examined Sturdivandt’s body
    on May 2, 1993. Dr. McCormick determined that Sturdivandt had died as a re sult
    of being shot in the back with a .25 caliber bullet.          Dr. McCormick further
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    determined that Sturdivandt had a blood alcohol level of .058 and traces of
    marijua na in his sy stem w hen he died.
    Patrick Hale testified that he was at the Black & Tan Club on May 2, 1993,
    when he heard so me gun shots com ing from the vicinity of Pro-Diesel. When
    Hale looked in the d irection of Pro -Dies el, he saw Appellant run and get in a van
    driven by Steph anie B owm an. Ha le then heard Appe llant yell, “le t’s go, let’s go”
    and the van acc elerated down th e street.
    Anthony Forney testified that he was a passenger in Bowman’s van when
    Appellant jumped in the van and said, “let’s go.” Anthony Forney noticed that
    Appellant smelled like firecrackers or gunpowder and appeared to be acting
    paranoid and frightened. Forney could see the shape of a gun hidden under
    Appe llant’s shirt.
    Dwight Forney testified that the night before the shooting, Appellant had
    stated that “if people didn’t quit messing over him he was going to take somebody
    out—so meone out, or, make a n examp le of someb ody.”
    Charles Dela pp tes tified tha t on Ma y 2, 199 3, he s aw Ap pellan t walk
    toward a blue car in the Pro-Dies el parking lot. Shortly therea fter, Delapp he ard
    a gunshot and saw Appellant jogging away from the area where the sound of the
    gunshot originated. Appellant then got in a van and the van, drove away. Delapp
    could se e that Ap pellant ha d wrapp ed a T -shirt arou nd his ha nd.
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    Jason Beam testified that he was a friend of Sturdivandt. He had seen
    Sturdivandt steal cocaine from drug dealers by taking it out of their hands and
    fleeing or b y giving them less mo ney than the coca ine was worth.
    Alonzo Norman testified that he witn esse d a dru g trans action in which an
    individual gave one do llar to Appe llant for fifty dollars w orth of cocaine. Appellant
    appeared to be upset and stated, “man, I seen him b efore a nd I’ll see him again.”
    According to Norman, on May 2, 1993, Appellant came to his residence
    and told Norman that he wan ted to go to New York with him. Appellant stated,
    “I think I shot som ebody.” Appellant also stated, “the man tried to pull something
    out on me and I shot him.” When Norman asked Appe llant who h e had s hot,
    Appellant stated that he had shot “the man that—that gave [me] the dollar for the
    fifty.”
    Steph anie Bowman testified that she was driving a van on May 2, 1993,
    when Appellant came running across the street with a gun in his hand. Appellant
    got in the van and yelled, “let’s go—let’s go.” Appellant stated, “what the hell are
    you all doing . . . you all are riding around having fun while I just had to do a
    man.” Bowman noticed that when Appellant got in the van, she could smell what
    appea red to be the odo r of firecrack ers or gu npowd er.
    Teresa Gayles, Nico le Friday, Derrick Frida y, Denika H arper, and Jo Hazel
    all testified that A ppellant w as in Ne w York o n May 2 , 1993.
    II. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
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    Appellant conten ds that the evidence w as insu fficient to supp ort his
    conviction for first degre e murd er. Appe llant conc edes th at the evidence was
    sufficient to support a conviction for second degree murder, but conte nds th at it
    was insufficient to support a conviction for first degree murder becau se the S tate
    failed to establish the elements of premeditation and deliberation.
    When an appellant challenges the sufficie ncy of th e evide nce, th is Court
    is obliged to review that challenge according to certain well-settled principles. A
    verdict of guilty by the jury, approved by the trial judge, accredits the testimony
    of the State’s witnesses and resolves all conflicts in the testimony in favor of the
    State. State v. Cazes, 875 S.W .2d 253, 259 (Tenn. 199 4). Although an accused
    is originally cloaked with a p resump tion of innocenc e, a jury verdict remo ves this
    presumption and rep laces it with o ne of gu ilt. State v. Tug gle, 
    639 S.W.2d 913
    ,
    914 (Tenn. 1982). Hence, on appeal, the burden of proof res ts with Ap pellant to
    demo nstrate the insufficie ncy of the convicting evidenc e. 
    Id.
     On appeal, “the
    [S]tate is entitled to the strongest legitimate view of th e evide nce a s well a s all
    reaso nable and legitimate inferences that m ay be drawn therefrom.” 
    Id.
     Wh ere
    the sufficiency of the evidence is contested on appeal, the relevant question for
    the reviewing court is wh ether any rational trier of fact could have found the
    accused guilty of every elemen t of the offense be yond a reaso nable d oubt.
    Jackson v. Virgin ia, 443 U.S . 307, 319, 
    99 S.Ct. 2781
    , 2789, 
    61 L.Ed.2d 560
    (1979). In conducting our evaluation of the convicting evidence, this Co urt is
    precluded from reweighing or recon sidering th e eviden ce. State v. Morgan, 
    929 S.W.2d 380
    , 383 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996).            Moreover, this Court may not
    substitute its own inferences “for those drawn by the trier of fact from
    circumstantial evidence.” State v. Matthews, 
    805 S.W.2d 776
    , 779 (Tenn. Crim.
    -5-
    App. 1990). Finally, Rule 13(e) of the Te nness ee Ru les of Ap pellate Procedure
    provides, “finding s of gu ilt in crim inal actions whether by the trial court or jury
    shall be set aside if the evide nce is insufficient to sup port the findings by the trier
    of fact beyo nd a rea sonab le doub t.”
    When Sturdivandt was killed in 1993, Tennessee’s first degree murder
    statute provided that “[f]irst degree murder is: [a]n intentional, premeditated and
    deliberate killing of another.”             Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-1 3-202 (199 3). 1
    Premeditation requires a showing of a previously formed design or intent to kill.
    State v. West, 
    844 S.W.2d 144
    , 147 (Tenn. 1992). Deliberation requires that the
    offense be committed with cool purpose, free of the p assions of the m omen t. 
    Id.
    Although premeditation “may be formed in an instant, deliberation requires some
    period of reflection, during which the mind is ‘free from the influence of
    excitem ent, or pas sion.’” State v. Brown, 
    836 S.W.2d 530
    , 538 (Tenn. 1992)
    (citation omitte d). W hile it remains true that no specific length of time is required
    for the formation of a cool, dispassionate intent to kill, more than a “split-second”
    of reflection is required in order to satisfy the elements of premeditation and
    deliberatio n. 
    Id. at 543
    .
    The elements of premeditation and deliberation are questions for the jury
    which may be established by proof of the circumstances surrounding the killing.
    State v. Bland, 958 S.W .2d 651, 660 (Tenn. 199 7); State v. Bord is, 
    905 S.W.2d 214
    , 222 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). Tennessee courts have delineated several
    circumstances that may be indicative of premeditation and deliberation, including
    1
    A 1995 ame ndm ent elim inated de liberation as an elem ent of first de gree m urder. See 
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202
    (a)(1) (Supp. 1998) (“First degree murder is: A premeditated and intentional killing
    of another.”).
    -6-
    facts from wh ich mo tive may b e inferred , Bord is, 
    905 S.W.2d at 222
    ; declarations
    by the defen dant of an intent to kill, State v. P ike, 
    978 S.W.2d 904
    , 914 (Tenn.
    1998); the us e of a d eadly weapon upon a n unarm ed victim, Brown, 
    836 S.W.2d at 841
    ; an d facts ab out the na ture of the k illing, Bord is, 
    905 S.W.2d at 222
    .
    Initially, we conclude that when the evidence is viewed in the light most
    favora ble to the State, the evid ence was c learly sufficient for a rational jury to find
    beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant was the person who killed Sturdivan dt.
    Hale and Delapp both saw Appellant run away from the scene of the murder and
    get in a van shortly after they heard gunshots. Bowman and Anthony Forney
    both smelled the odor of firecrackers or gunpowder when Appellant got in the
    van. Further, Antho ny Forney could see the shape of a gun hidden under
    Appellant’s shirt, and Bowman actually saw a gun in Appellant’s hand.                  In
    addition, Appellant told Bowman that he “just had to do a man.” Finally, Appellant
    told Norman on the night of the shooting that he had just shot the man who had
    previously given him one dollar for fifty dollar’s worth of cocaine.
    W e also co nclud e that w hen th e evide nce is v iewed in the light most
    favora ble to the State, the evidence was sufficient for a rational jury to find
    beyond a reas onab le dou bt that A ppella nt inten tionally killed Sturd ivandt with
    premeditation and deliberation.         First, the State presented evidence that
    Appellant had a motive to kill Sturdivandt beca use S turdiva ndt ha d che ated h im
    during a drug transaction. Norman witnessed an individual pay one dollar to
    Appellant for fifty dollar’s worth of cocaine and Norm an heard Appellant say that
    he had seen that individual before and he would see him again. Norman also
    believed that Appellant appeared to be u pset a t the tim e. Furth er, Ap pellan t told
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    Dwight Forney the night b efore the shooting that “if people didn’t quit messing
    over him he was going to take somebody out—someone out, or, make an
    exam ple of somebody.” Shortly after the shoo ting, Ap pellan t told Norman that he
    had shot the individual who had paid him one dollar for fifty dollar’s worth of
    cocaine .
    Second, while there was no evidence that Appellant had previo usly
    expressed an intent to kill Sturdivan dt, there was clearly evidence that Appellant
    had expressed an intent to get revenge on Sturdivandt. As previously stated,
    Appellant told Norman that he would see the person who had cheated him in the
    drug transaction again and told Dwight Forney that he was going to make an
    exam ple out of s omeo ne.
    Third, the evidence showed that Sturdivandt was unarmed when Appellant
    shot him. Beam testified that he had never known Sturdivandt to carry a gun or
    a knife and Coppock testified that Sturdivandt did no t have a ny wea pons on his
    person and no weapo ns were found a t the scen e of the sh ooting.
    Fourth, the natur e of the killing indicates that it was deliberate and
    premeditated. Indeed, the evidence showed that Appellant shot Sturdivandt
    when Sturdivandt was facing away from him. Further, the fac t that Ap pellan t did
    not kill Sturdivandt until sometime after the drug transaction indicates that he had
    time to refle ct on his d ecision to take reve nge on Sturdivan dt.
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    In short, we conclude that this evidence was sufficient for a rational jury to
    find the essential elem ents of first degree m urder beyon d a reasonable doubt.
    This issu e has n o merit.
    III. LENIENCY AGREEMENT
    Appellant contends that he is entitled to a new trial because the State failed
    to disclose that it had an implicit agreement with Norman that it would drop
    certain charg es ag ainst h im an d wou ld be lenient with respect to other charges
    if he testified a gainst A ppellant.
    In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S . 83, 83 S .Ct. 1194, 
    10 L.Ed.2d 21
     5 (1963),
    the United S tates Suprem e Court held that the prosecution has a constitutional
    duty to furnish the accused with exculpatory evidence pertaining to either the
    accu sed’s guilt or innocence and the potential punishment that may be imposed.
    Failure to reveal exculpatory evidence violates due process where the evidence
    is materia l either to guilt or punishment, irrespective of good faith or bad faith of
    the prosec ution. 
    Id.
     373 U .S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. at 1196–97. The prosecution must
    also disclose evidence which may be used by the defense to impeach a witness.
    Giglio v. United States, 
    405 U.S. 150
    , 154–55, 
    92 S.Ct. 763
    , 766, 31 L Ed.2d 104
    (1972); Wo rkman v. State, 
    868 S.W.2d 705
    , 709 (T enn. Crim. A pp. 1993).
    Because promises the State makes to a witness in exchange for his or her
    testimony relate directly to the credibility of the witness, th e State h as a du ty to
    disclose evidence of any promises it has m ade to a pros ecutio n witne ss in
    exchange for his or her testimon y. Hartm an v. State , 
    896 S.W.2d 94
    , 101 (Tenn.
    1995) (citation om itted).
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    Before a reviewing court may find a due proce ss violation under Brady, all
    of the following four prerequisites must be satisfied:
    1) The defendant must have requested the information (unless the
    evidence is obviously exculpatory, in which case the S tate is bou nd to
    release the inform ation whethe r requested o r not);
    2) The State must have suppressed the information;
    3) The information must have been favorable to the accused; and
    4) The informa tion mu st have b een m aterial.
    State v. Evans, 838 S.W .2d 185 , 196 (T enn. 19 92). In Kyles v. Whitley, 
    514 U.S. 419
    , 434, 
    115 S.Ct. 1555
    , 1566, 
    131 L.Ed.2d 490
     (1995), the United States
    Supreme Court stated that in determining whether information is material, “[t]he
    question is not whether the defendant would more likely than not have received
    a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its abs ence he rec eived a fair
    trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of co nfidence.”
    During the hearing on Appellant’s motion for a new trial, Norman testified
    that when he tes tified at tria l, he was sca red bec ause h e had b een ch arged w ith
    coercion of a witness, being an accessory after the fact to first degree m urder,
    and multip le drug offens es. No rman also te stified th at his a ttorney s told him that
    the prose cutor c ould n ot ma ke an y deals with him before he testified, but if he did
    testify, the prosecutor would have to drop the charges for being an accessory
    after the fact and coercion of a witness and the prosecutor would also be lenient
    with respec t to the drug charge s. Howe ver, Norman ad mitted that he had o nly
    met with the prosecutor one time before he testified and expressly stated that the
    prosecutor h ad never offere d him anything in return for his testimon y.
    Mike Kellum, one of Norman’s attorneys, provided an affidavit in which he
    stated that the prosecutor had approached him and said that if Norman testified
    -10-
    truthfu lly in Appellant’s trial, the “testimony would be appreciated and considered
    in any future plea offers regarding” the charges against Norman of being an
    accessory after the fact and coercion of a witness. However, Kellum did not
    testify du ring the hearin g on th e mo tion for a new tria l.
    Deborah Huskin s, anothe r of Norm an’s attorneys, testified during the
    hearing on the motion for a new trial that she had believed that if Norman testified
    truthfu lly at Appe llant’s trial, it would make a difference in any sentence he
    subs eque ntly received in the drug case. However, Huskins also testified that
    although she be lieved it would benefit Norman to testify truthfully, “we had
    abso lutely no agreement as to what plea if any we would be entering, the number
    of years, ranges, we—we did not discuss an y specifics like that, not an ything.”
    Further, Huskins testified that she and Kellum had explained to Norman that the
    prosecutor had not made any definite offer of leniency in return for his tes timony.
    The trial court found that there was no merit to Appellant’s claim that he
    was entitled to a new trial because the State had failed to disclose that it had a
    leniency agreement with Norman. Although the trial court made no express
    findings of fact, th e cou rt did no te that N orma n’s credibility was qu estionab le. In
    addition, the court’s ruling necessarily implies a finding that there had been no
    implic it leniency agreement between the State and Norman. The evidence does
    not preponderate against that finding. Indeed, Appellant failed to introduce any
    evidence that the prosecutor promised Norman anything definite in return for his
    testimony. 2 At mos t, Appellant merely established that the prosecutor would take
    2
    Appellant contends that the subsequent dismissal of the charges against Norman for being an
    acces sory after th e fact an d coerc ion of a witne ss prov es that N orm an did ha ve a lenien cy agree men t with
    the State. However, the record indicates that the charge for being an accessory after the fact was
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    Norm an’s decision to testify truthfully into “conside ration” in any future plea
    negotiations. An indefinite offer of “consideration” falls far short of constituting an
    agreem ent. In addition, although Norman may well ha ve belie ved tha t he wo uld
    receive leniency in return for his testimony, the unilateral belief o f one p erson is
    insufficient to create an agreement. In short, Appellant had failed to show that
    there was an y agreem ent betw een the State and N orma n in regard to Nor man ’s
    testimon y. This issu e has n o merit.
    Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
    ____________________________________
    JERRY L. SMITH, JUDGE
    CONCUR:
    ___________________________________
    JOE G. RILEY, JUDGE
    ___________________________________
    NORMA MCGEE OGLE, JUDGE
    dismissed because there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction, and the charge for coercion of
    a witness was dismissed because the victim did not want the case to be prosecuted. Further, the
    prosecutor expressly informed the jury that if Norman testified truthfully, the charge for being an accessory
    after the fa ct would b e dropp ed.
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