State v. Robinson ( 2010 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE FILED
MAY 1998 SESSION June 3, 1998
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate C ourt Clerk
STATE OF TENNESSEE, )
) NO. 03C01-9709-CR-00405
Appellee, )
) KNOX COUNTY
VS. )
) HON. RICHARD R.
) BAUMGARTNER, JUDGE
AUGUSTA THOMAS ROBINSON, )
)
Appellant. ) (Probation Revocation)
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
MARK E. STEPHENS JOHN KNOX WALKUP
District Public Defender Attorney General and Reporter
PAULA R. VOSS TODD R. KELLEY
JAMIE NILAND Assistant Attorney General
Assistant Public Defenders Cordell Hull Building, 2nd Floor
1209 Euclid Avenue 425 Fifth Avenue North
Knoxville, TN 37921 Nashville, TN 37243-0493
RANDALL E. NICHOLS
District Attorney General
MARSHA SELECMAN
Assistant District Attorney General
400 Main Avenue
P.O. Box 1468
Knoxville, TN 37901-1468
OPINION FILED:
AFFIRMED
JOE G. RILEY,
JUDGE
OPINION
The defendant, Augusta Thomas Robinson, appeals the order of the Knox
County Criminal Court revoking his probation. On appeal, he claims (1) there
was insufficient evidence to support the trial court's ruling, and (2) he was denied
the minimum level of due process required in a probation revocation hearing.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
FACTS
The defendant was initially convicted of criminal impersonation and
sentenced to six (6) months probation. Subsequently, the defendant was
arrested on two (2) counts of burglary. A probation violation warrant was issued
because of the arrest and the failure to report the charges.
The state presented the testimony of one of the automobile burglary
victims, Paul Russell, at the revocation hearing. Russell testified he observed
the defendant steal tools out of a toolbox in the back of Russell's truck. Russell
had previously identified the defendant in a photo line-up as the person who
stole his tools.
The defendant testified in his own behalf. He stated he had no
involvement in the offense.
The trial court found sufficient proof had been presented to establish the
defendant committed the offense. The trial court concluded, therefore, that the
defendant violated his probation and ordered his sentence for criminal
impersonation to be served in custody.
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SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
A trial court may revoke probation and order the imposition of the original
sentence upon a finding by a preponderance of the evidence that the person has
violated a condition of probation. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-311(d). The
decision to revoke probation rests within the sound discretion of the trial court.
State v. Mitchell, 810 S.W.2d 733, 735 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991). Revocation of
probation is subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review, rather than a
de novo standard. State v. Harkins, 811 S.W.2d 79 (Tenn. 1991). Discretion is
abused only if the record contains no substantial evidence to support the
conclusion of the trial court that a violation of probation has occurred. Id.; State
v. Gregory, 946 S.W.2d 829, 832 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997). Proof of a violation
need not be established beyond a reasonable doubt, and the evidence need only
show that the trial judge exercised a conscientious and intelligent judgment,
rather than acting arbitrarily. Gregory, 946 S.W.2d at 832; State v. Leach, 914
S.W.2d 104, 106 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).
The evidence fully supports the trial court's revocation order. The state
presented testimony that the defendant committed a criminal offense in violation
of the terms of his probation. The defendant denied any involvement. The trial
court was in a position to judge the appearance, demeanor and credibility of the
witnesses. There was certainly substantial evidence to support the trial court’s
findings.
This issue is without merit.
DUE PROCESS
The defendant contends that his due process rights were violated
because the state did not disclose to him all of the evidence it had regarding his
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pending burglary charges. He argues this lack of disclosure prevented him from
presenting an adequate defense at the revocation hearing.
Probation revocation proceedings are subject to constitutionally-mandated
procedural due process standards. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93
S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973)(adopting the procedural requirements for
parole revocation set forth in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593,
33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972)). Disclosure of the nature of the evidence against the
probationer is among these standards. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. at 489, 92
S.Ct. at 2604, 33 L.Ed.2d at 499. Nothing in this record indicates the state failed
to disclose exculpatory evidence to the defendant. Nor is there a showing that
the defendant requested the right to examine certain evidence and was denied
this right by the state. There is no requirement that the state introduce all proof
at its disposal. The state may properly introduce only enough evidence that it
believes will satisfy its burden of proof, provided it does not withhold exculpatory
evidence. The defendant was given prior notice of the revocation hearing where
he was allowed counsel, the right to cross-examine witnesses against him, call
witnesses on his own, and testify in his own defense. Due process was satisfied.
This issue is without merit.
CONCLUSION
The evidence adduced at the revocation hearing is sufficient to support
the trial court's conclusion that the defendant violated his probation. Therefore,
the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
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_________________________
JOE G. RILEY, JUDGE
CONCUR:
_________________________
JOSEPH M. TIPTON, JUDGE
________________________
CURWOOD WITT, JUDGE
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