State of Tennessee v. Terry R. Cary ( 2010 )


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  •         IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT JACKSON
    Assigned on Briefs December 1, 2009
    STATE OF TENNESSEE v. TERRY R. CARY
    Direct Appeal from the Circuit Court for Madison County
    No. 08-389    Donald H. Allen, Judge
    No. W2009-00583-CCA-R3-CD - Filed March 18, 2010
    The defendant, Terry Cary, was convicted by a Madison County jury of promoting the
    manufacture of methamphetamine, a Class D felony, and sentenced as a career offender to
    twelve years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant raises the single
    issue of sufficiency of the evidence. Following review of the record, we affirm the judgment
    of conviction.
    Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed
    J OHN E VERETT W ILLIAMS, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which T HOMAS T.
    W OODALL and J.C. M CL IN, JJ., joined.
    George Morton Googe, District Public Defender, and Gregory D. Gookin, Assistant Public
    Defender (on appeal); and Roger A. Staton, Jackson, Tennessee (at trial), for the appellant,
    Terry R. Cary.
    Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter; J. Ross Dyer, Senior Counsel; James
    G. (Jerry) Woodall, District Attorney General; and Shaun A. Brown, Assistant District
    Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
    OPINION
    Factual Background
    The instant crime for which the defendant stands convicted arose from his actions
    of buying multiple boxes of over-the-counter medications containing pseudoephedrine.
    Multiple witnesses testified and explained that since a change in Tennessee law, products
    containing pseudoephedrine are now kept behind the pharmacy counter and, in order to
    purchase these products, a customer is required to produce a valid driver’s license and sign
    for the product. These records are kept electronically at each individual store and later
    transmitted to a central database accessible to law enforcement.
    Beth Beard, a pharmacist from Walgreens, testified that on August 15, 2006, the
    defendant purchased a forty-eight-count box of Wal-Act, a generic drug containing 2.88
    grams of pseudoephedrine. The defendant returned to the same Walgreens on August 19,
    2006, and purchased a ten-count box of Sudafed, which contained 2.4 grams of
    pseudoephedrine. Walton Shearin, a Wal-Mart pharmacist, testified that on August 15, 2006,
    the defendant purchased a twenty-count box of Equate brand medication, which contained
    2.4 grams of pseudoephedrine. On August 20, 2006, the defendant again purchased a
    twenty-count box of medication, containing 2.4 grams of pseudoephedrine, from Wal-Mart.
    Finally, on August 22, 2006, the defendant went to a different Walgreens and purchased a
    ninety-six-count box of Wal-Phed D, which contains 2.88 grams of pseudoephedrine,
    according to Megan Cawthon, a certified pharmacy technician. Each witness testified that
    the defendant produced a driver’s license issued in his name and signed for each of the
    purchases.
    During a subsequent investigation, the defendant was interviewed by Investigators
    Jackie Benton of the Jackson Police Department’s Narcotics Unit and Paul Moore of the
    Tennessee Bureau of Investigation. During the interview, the defendant acknowledged that
    he knew how to manufacture methamphetamine and that he knew how “many pills it took
    in order to produce ounces or more of” the drug. The defendant also explained to the
    investigators the process he used for manufacturing methamphetamine.
    Based upon these facts, a Madison County grand jury returned a one-count indictment
    charging the defendant with promoting the manufacture of methamphetamine. Following
    a jury trial, the defendant was convicted as charged. After a subsequent sentencing hearing,
    the trial court imposed a twelve-year sentence to be served in the Department of Correction.
    The court denied the defendant’s motion for new trial, and this timely appeal followed.
    Analysis
    On appeal, the defendant has raised the single issue of sufficiency of the evidence.
    Specifically, he argues that the evidence presented was insufficient to establish that the
    defendant “bought those [specific] boxes of pseudoephedrine with the intent to use them in
    manufacturing methamphetamine.” In considering the issue of sufficiency of the evidence,
    we apply the rule that where the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged, the relevant
    question for the reviewing court is “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most
    favorable to the [State], any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of
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    the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 319, 
    99 S. Ct. 2781
    , 2789 (1979); see also Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e). Moreover, the State is entitled to the
    strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all reasonable inferences which may be drawn
    therefrom. State v. Harris, 
    839 S.W.2d 54
    , 75 (Tenn. 1992). All questions involving the
    credibility of witnesses, the weight and value to be given the evidence, and all factual issues
    are resolved by the trier of fact. State v. Pappas, 
    754 S.W.2d 620
    , 623 (Tenn. Crim. App.
    1987). This court will not reweigh or reevaluate the evidence presented. State v. Cabbage,
    
    571 S.W.2d 832
    , 835 (Tenn. 1978).
    “A guilty verdict by the jury, approved by the trial judge, accredits the testimony of the
    witnesses for the State and resolves all conflicts in favor of the theory of the State.” State
    v. Grace, 
    493 S.W.2d 474
    , 476 (Tenn. 1973). A jury conviction removes the presumption
    of innocence with which a defendant is initially cloaked and replaces it with one of guilt so
    that, on appeal, a convicted defendant has the burden of demonstrating that the evidence is
    insufficient. State v. Tuggle, 
    639 S.W.2d 913
    , 914 (Tenn. 1982). These rules are applicable
    to findings of guilt predicated upon direct evidence, circumstantial evidence, or a
    combination of both. State v. Matthews, 
    805 S.W.2d 776
    , 779 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990).
    Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-433 provides, in relevant part, that:
    (a) It is an offense for a person to promote methamphetamine manufacture.
    A person promotes methamphetamine manufacture who:
    (2)    Purchases or possesses more than nine (9) grams of an
    immediate methamphetamine precursor with the intent to
    manufacture methamphetamine or delivers the precursor
    to another person whom they know intends to
    manufacture methamphetamine, or with reckless
    disregard of the person’s intent. . . .
    T.C.A. § 39-17-433(a)(2) (2006). Again, the defendant argues that no evidence was
    presented which established that he had the intent to manufacture methamphetamine with the
    boxes of pseudoephedrine he purchased in August of 2006. He contends that the only way
    the State was able to “tie” him to any sort of methamphetamine-related criminal activity was
    his statement to investigators that he was familiar with the process of how the drug is
    produced.
    Following review of the record, we do not find the defendant’s argument to be
    persuasive. His argument ignores that proof of intent can and usually does consist of
    circumstantial evidence and the inferences which can reasonably be drawn from the evidence
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    presented. State v. Hall, 
    490 S.W.2d 495
    , 496 (Tenn. 1973). The proof presented
    established that, in five separate transactions in an eight-day period, the defendant purchased
    one hundred and ninety-four over-the-counter tablets containing 12.96 grams of
    pseudoephedrine. Based upon the type of pill purchased, the quantity of pills purchased, and
    the short time period in which they were purchased, it was reasonable for a rational trier of
    fact to infer that the defendant was purchasing such a large quantity of pseudoephedrine with
    the intent to manufacture methamphetamine. That reasonable inference was only bolstered
    by the evidence presented that the defendant gave a statement to investigators admitting that
    he knew how to manufacture methamphetamine, even bragging that he could produce more
    than the normal amount based upon the method he employed. Based upon this evidence, we
    conclude that the evidence presented was more than sufficient to support the conviction.
    CONCLUSION
    Based upon the foregoing, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.
    ___________________________________
    JOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS, JUDGE
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