State v. Cloyd ( 2010 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE FILED
MARCH 1998 SESSION April 2, 1998
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate C ourt Clerk
STATE OF TENNESSEE, )
) C.C.A. No. 03C01-9704-CR-00153
Appellee, )
) Washington County
V. )
) Honorable Arden L. Hill, Judge
KELVIN WADE CLOYD, )
) (Vehicular Homicide - 2 counts;
Appellant. ) Possession of a Controlled Substance)
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
H. Randolph Fallin John Knox Walkup
Attorney at Law Attorney General & Reporter
303 West Main Street
Mountain City, TN 37683 Clinton J. Morgan
Counsel for the State
425 Fifth Avenue North
2d Floor, Cordell Hull Building
Nashville, TN 37243-0493
David E. Crockett
District Attorney General
Joe C. Crumley and
Michael LaGuardia
Assistant District Attorneys General
P.O. Box 38
Jonesborough, TN 37659
OPINION FILED: ___________________
AFFIRMED
PAUL G. SUMMERS,
Judge
OPINION
Kelvin Wade Cloyd, the appellant, was convicted of two counts of
vehicular homicide and possession of a controlled substance in the Washington
County Criminal Court. The issue on appeal is whether the evidence is
sufficient to sustain the jury’s verdict on the homicide counts. The judgment of
the trial court is affirmed.
On October 8, 1995, the appellant was involved in a head-on collision with
the victims, Paul Lehew and Charles Garland. The collision occurred on Old
State Route 34 in Washington County shortly after midnight. Lehew and
Garland were killed instantly.
For the appellant to be found guilty of vehicular homicide, the state had to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) the appellant was intoxicated when he
struck the victims’ vehicle, and (2) the deaths of the victims were the proximate
result of the appellant’s intoxication. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-213(a)(2) (Supp.
1995).
The proof showed that, on October 7th, the appellant and Randy Loyd
went to Ray’s Market (Ray’s), a beer store and drinking establishment. They
drank beer. Later, the appellant, Loyd, and an employee of Ray’s, Glenda Sue
Sams, went to a restaurant to eat dinner. They ate dinner and had beer or
mixed drinks. They returned to Ray’s at approximately 11 p.m. The victims,
Lehew and Garland, were at Ray’s drinking beer.
Loyd left Ray’s before the appellant. Loyd testified that he tried to
convince the appellant not to drive because the appellant was not “in good
enough shape to drive.” Loyd testified that Ms. Sams and the proprietor of
Ray’s, Laura Prescott, also tried to convince the appellant not to drive. Loyd
rode with Lehew and Garland to the appellant’s house so that Loyd could get his
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vehicle. Lehew and Garland were supposed to meet Loyd at Loyd’s house to go
to a party together. Lehew and Garland never made it.
The appellant plowed head-on into the vehicle occupied by Lehew and
Garland. The appellant was driving a pickup truck. Lehew was driving a Mazda
car. Lehew’s lower body was pinned inside the car. Garland’s body was thrown
approximately twenty feet from the car. The appellant’s truck turned on its side.
He suffered minor injuries.
Although there were no eyewitnesses to the wreck, a neighbor who lived
nearby heard the collision and called 911. Officer Derek Patton of the
Washington County Sheriff’s Department was the first to arrive on the scene. He
was joined by Dexter Lunceford and Jeff Anderson of the Tennessee Highway
Patrol, Officer Todd Davis of the Washington County Sheriff’s Department, and
paramedic Christopher Hitechew. Garland and Lehew were pronounced dead.
The appellant was placed in the back of a patrol car. A plastic bag containing
forty-two blue Valium tablets was found in the appellant’s pocket. The accident
scene was secured and investigated. The appellant did not remember anything
about the accident.
The primary issues at trial were whether the appellant was intoxicated,
and, if so, whether his intoxicated state was the proximate cause of the deaths of
the victims. Dr. Kenneth Ferslew, a forensic toxicologist, testified to the
laboratory reports of the appellant and Lehew, the driver of the Mazda car. The
appellant’s blood-alcohol level when he was tested after the accident was .06.
Dr. Ferslew testified that the appellant’s blood-alcohol level at the time of the
accident was between .097 and .108. The appellant also had a blood-level
concentration of diazepam or Valium in his system. Dr. Ferslew testified that the
concentration of diazepam in the appellant’s blood was in the therapeutic range
as opposed to a toxic range. The therapeutic effects of diazepam include
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reduced anxiety, muscle relaxation and sedation. He further testified that mixing
alcohol with diazepam would have increased the effects of both drugs on the
appellant, causing a greater impairment than either substance alone would have
caused. Dr. Ferslew testified that, in his opinion, the appellant would have been
impaired from the alcohol and diazepam at the time of the collision.
Paramedic Hitechew testified that he smelled alcohol on the appellant,
but that the appellant’s demeanor was “normal.” Officer Davis testified that the
he did not smell a strong odor of alcohol on the appellant, but that the appellant
did appear to be under the influence of something. Officer Davis testified that
the appellant appeared dazed and confused, that his speech was slow and
slurred, and that he was sluggish and slightly unsteady on his feet. Trooper
Lunceford testified that he detected a slight odor of alcohol on the appellant, and
the appellant appeared to be under the influence of something. Trooper
Lunceford testified that the appellant’s eyes were glassy and that his speech was
somewhat slurred. Trooper Anderson testified that he thought that the appellant
was in an intoxicated state.
Lehew’s blood-alcohol level was .03. Lehew’s blood drug screen was
positive for marijuana, cocaine, and a therapeutic level of diazepam. Marijuana
was found in Lehew’s possession.
The state produced evidence to establish that the appellant’s truck
crossed the center line on the highway, entered the victims’ lane, and collided
head-on with the car. The state’s reconstruction of the accident was based
primarily on gouge marks and scratches in the pavement, the damage to both
vehicles, the location of the damage to the vehicles, and debris left at the scene.
The defense presented expert testimony to establish that the state’s theory was
flawed. The expert testified that in his opinion there was no way to tell which
vehicle crossed the center line.
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The parties stipulated that the headlights on one side of the Lehew
vehicle were not operating at the time of the collision. The defense presented
evidence from which the jury could have concluded that none of the headlights
on the Lehew vehicle were operating. There was evidence that the appellant
was speeding at the time of the collision.
When an accused challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence,
we must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution in
determining whether "any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443
U.S. 307, 319 (1979). We do not reweigh or re-evaluate the evidence and are
required to afford the state the strongest legitimate view of the proof contained in
the record as well as all reasonable and legitimate inferences which may be
drawn therefrom. State v. Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978).
Questions concerning the credibility of witnesses, the weight and value to
be given to the evidence, as well as factual issues raised by the evidence are
resolved by the trier of fact, not this Court. Id. A guilty verdict rendered by the
jury and approved by the trial judge accredits the testimony of the witnesses for
the state, and a presumption of guilt replaces the presumption of innocence.
State v. Grace, 493 S.W.2d 474, 476 (Tenn. 1973). It is the appellant’s burden
to illustrate to this Court that the evidence preponderates against the guilty
verdict in favor of his or her innocence. Id.
The appellant essentially argues that the evidence is insufficient to
establish that he was intoxicated, and, that even if he were intoxicated, his
intoxication was not the proximate cause of the deaths of the victims. He points
to the testimony of the proprietor of Ray’s, Laura Prescott, and Ms. Sams who
both testified that the appellant did not appear intoxicated at the time in question.
The appellant argues that the jury should have believed his expert’s opinion that
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there was no way to determine which vehicle crossed the center line. The
appellant points out that the state’s expert was not certified as an accident
reconstructionist until after the collision. He argues that the credentials of his
expert are better than the credentials of the state’s reconstructionist. The
appellant also points to the intoxicants found in Lehew’s system and the
evidence that none of the headlights on the Lehew vehicle were operative.
We reviewed this record thoroughly, paying close attention to the
evidence of how the collision occurred. Both the defense attorney and the
assistant district attorney did an excellent job of presenting the proof to the jury in
this tragic case. It was the jury’s duty to decide which witnesses were credible.
It was the their duty to determine how much weight to place on particular
evidence. There was competent evidence in the record from which the jury
could have found that the appellant was intoxicated at the time of the collision,
and, that the appellant’s intoxication was the proximate cause of the victims’
deaths.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
__________________________
PAUL G. SUMMERS, Judge
CONCUR:
______________________________
JOHN H. PEAY, Judge
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______________________________
CORNELIA A. CLARK, Special Judge
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