Donald R. Jones v. State ( 2010 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE FILED
FEBRUARY SESS ION, 1998 May 5, 1999
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate C ourt Clerk
DONALD R. JONES, ) C.C.A. NO. 03C01-9706-CR-00206
)
Appe llant, )
)
) CARTER COUNTY
VS. )
) HON. LYNN W. BROWN
STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) JUDGE
)
Appellee. ) (Habea s Corpu s Relief)
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
DONALD R. JONES JOHN KNOX WALKUP
Pro Se Attorney General and Reporter
Carter County Annex
Caller #1 ELLEN H. POLLACK
Roan Mountain, TN 37687 Assistant Attorney General
425 Fifth Avenu e North
Nashville, TN 37243-0493
DAVID CROCKETT
District Attorney General
KEN NET H C. B ALDW IN
Assistant District Attorney
Carter County Justice Center
Elizabethton, TN 37643
OPINION FILED ________________________
AFFIRMED
JERRY L. SMITH, JUDGE
OPINION
On February 10, 1997, Appellant Donald R. Jones filed a petition for
habeas corpus relief in the Carter County Criminal Court. On February 25,
1997 , the trial c ourt dis miss ed the petition beca use it fa iled to s tate a c laim
upon which relief co uld be grante d. App ellant c hallen ges th e dism issal of h is
petition. Afte r a review o f the record , we affirm th e judgm ent of the tria l court.
I. BACKGROUND
On January 9, 1969, Appellant was convicted of first degree murder and
was given a n inety-nine year sen tence. Appe llant appealed a nd this Court
revers ed Ap pellan t’s con viction b ased on erro neou s jury ins truction s. On A pril
22, 197 0, Appe llant pled g uilty to first degre e murd er and w as given a life
sentence. Appellant did not appeal this conviction or sentence.
Appellant filed his petition for habeas corpus relief on February 10,
1997, alleging that he was the victim of prosecutorial and judicial
vindictiveness. Specifically, Appellant claimed that he was the victim of
prosecutorial vindictiveness because the assistant prosecutor was a relative of
the victim. Appellant alleges the trial judge was vindictive because Appellant
received a longer senten ce after a s uccess ful appea l.
The trial court dismissed the petition on February 25, 1997, because
habeas corpus relief is only available when it appears on the face of the
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record that the court was without jurisdiction to convict or sentence a
defendant or that the sentence had expired. The trial court also concluded
that alth ough Appe llant’s cla ims w ould b e app ropria te for de termin ation if h is
petition was considered to be a petition for post-conviction relief, Appellant
would still not be entitled to any relief because his claims were barred by the
statute of lim itations.
II. HABEAS CORPUS RELIEF
It is well-e stablis hed in Ten ness ee tha t habe as co rpus re lief is only
available when a conviction is void because the convicting court was without
jurisdic tion or a uthority to sen tence a defe ndan t, or that a defen dant’s
senten ce has expired a nd the d efenda nt is being illegally restrain ed. Archer v.
State, 851 S.W .2d 157 , 164 (T enn. 19 93); Johns v. Bowlen, 942 S.W.2d 544,
546 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). As this Court has previously stated:
A judgment of a court of general jurisdiction is presumed to be valid.
This p resum ption is said to be co nclus ive unle ss the judgm ent is
impeached by the record. If the court rendering a judgment has
jurisdiction o f the perso n, the sub ject-ma tter, and ha s the auth ority to
make the challenged judgment, the judgment is voidable, not void; and
the judgment may not be collaterally attacked in a suit for habeas
corpus relief.
Passa rella v. State, 891 S.W.2d 619, 627 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) (citations
omitted).
Appellant’s petition for habeas corpus relief simply does not contain any
allegation that the se ntencing court wa s without ju risdiction to a ccept his guilty
plea or to sentence him neither is there any allegation that his sentence has
expired. Ind eed, no thing in the record w ould sup port any s uch alleg ations.
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Here, Appellant’s claims that he was the victim of prosecutorial and judicial
vindictiveness amount at most to an assertion that the judgment was voidable,
not that the judgment was void. Therefore, the trial court correctly determined
that Appellant had failed to either allege or present a ground that was
cogniza ble in a su it for habea s corpu s relief.
III. POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
Initially, we note that the trial court properly determined whether
Appellant would have been entitled to relief if his petition for habeas corpus
relief was tre ated as a petition for post-con viction relief. See Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 40-30 -205(c) (1 997); Fredrick v. State, 906 S.W.2d 927, 929 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 1993 ).
W e also conc lude th at the tria l court p roper ly deter mine d that A ppella nt
would not have been entitled to relief even if his petition was treated as a
petition for post-conviction relief. At the time of Appellant’s guilty plea and
sentencing in 1970, there was no limitation as to when a post-conviction
petition could be filed. However, in 1986, The Tennessee Legislature enacted
a statute of limitations which stated that
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court of this state must
petition for post-conviction relief under this chap ter within three (3) years
of the date of the final ac tion of the h ighest sta te appe llate court to
which an appeal is taken or consideration of such petition shall be
barred.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-102 (1986) (effective July 1, 1986). This new
limitations period ap plied to existing cause s prospectively from the effective
date of the statute. Carter v. S tate, 952 S.W .2d 417, 418 (Tenn. 199 7);
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Abston v. State, 749 S.W.2d 487, 488 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988). Because
Appellant’s conviction and sentence became final in 1970, the statute of
limitations expired in Appellant’s case on July 1, 1989.1 Therefore, the trial
court cor rectly deter mined that even if Appellan t’s petition wa s consid ered to
be a p ost-co nviction petition , he wo uld no t be en titled to re lief bec ause his
claims were barred by the statute of limitations.
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
____________________________________
JERRY L. SMITH, JUDGE
CONCUR:
___________________________________
THOMAS T. WOODALL, JUDGE
___________________________________
WILLIAM B. ACREE, SENIOR JUDGE
1
On May 10, 1995, the legislature enacted the Post-Conviction Procedure Act of 1995, which
included a one year statute of limitations and limited the number of petitions that could be filed in any
particular c ase. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-202 (1995). The Tennessee Supreme Court has held that
the new post-conviction act did not provide petitioners for whom the statute of limitations had expired
under th e old pos t-conviction act any ad ditional time in which to file p etitions for p ost-con viction relief.
Carter, 952 S.W.2d at 418.
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