State v. Drinnon ( 2010 )


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  •       IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT KNOXVILLE                FILED
    AUGUST 1997 SESSION
    September 5, 1997
    Cecil Crowson, Jr.
    Appellate C ourt Clerk
    STATE OF TENNESSEE,               )
    )   C.C.A. No. 03C01-9611-CR-00431
    Appellee,                   )
    )   Hamblen County
    V.                                )
    )   Honorable Ben K. Wexler, Judge
    )
    MICHAEL DRINNON,                  )   (DUI)
    )
    Appellant.                  )
    FOR THE APPELLANT:                    FOR THE APPELLEE:
    George W. Eichelman                   Charles W. Burson
    District Public Defender              Attorney General & Reporter
    D. Clifton Barnes                     Peter M. Coughlan
    Assistant Public Defender             Assistant Attorney General
    1609 College Park Drive               Criminal Justice Division
    P.O. Box 11                           450 James Robertson Parkway
    Morristown, TN 37813-1618             Nashville, TN 37243-0493
    C. Berkeley Bell, Jr.
    District Attorney General
    John F. Dugger, Jr.
    Victor J. Vaughn
    Assistant District Attorneys General
    Hamblen County Justice Center
    510 Allison Street
    Morristown, TN 37814
    OPINION FILED: ___________________
    AFFIRMED
    PAUL G. SUMMERS,
    Judge
    OPINION
    The appellant, Michael Drinnon, was convicted by a jury of driving under
    the influence (DUI) and driving on a revoked license. Both convictions were for
    second offenses for each individual crime. He received 11 months and 29 days,
    with a 50% release eligibility date for the DUI conviction and 11 months and 29
    days for driving on a revoked license.1 He appeals challenging the sufficiency of
    the convicting evidence and his sentence. Upon review, we affirm.
    FACTS
    At approximately one in the morning a Morristown police officer observed
    the appellant driving 30 miles an hour in a 45 mile-an-hour zone. The officer
    noticed that the appellant was riding his brakes and weaving within his lane. The
    officer pulled the appellant over and requested his driver's license. The
    appellant was unable to produce a driver's license. When asked if he had been
    drinking, the appellant stated that he had consumed two beers.
    The officer requested that the appellant perform a series of field sobriety
    tests. Based upon the officer's observations and experience, he felt the
    appellant failed each of these tests. The officer asked the appellant to take a
    chemical test to determine his blood alcohol content. He refused stating that he
    had taken two pain pills. Based upon the foregoing information, the officer
    placed the appellant under arrest.
    I
    1
    Th e ap pellan t wa s to se rve 4 5 da ys on this co nvictio n w ith the re m aind er serv ed o n pro batio n.
    -2-
    In his first issue the appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient
    to support his conviction for DUI. He argues that no rational jury could have
    found him guilty of DUI beyond a reasonable doubt. We disagree.
    Great weight is accorded jury verdicts in criminal trials. Jury verdicts
    accredit state's witnesses and resolve all evidentiary conflicts in the state's favor.
    State v. Williams, 
    657 S.W.2d 405
    , 410 (Tenn. 1983); State v. Banes, 
    874 S.W.2d 73
    , 78 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993). On appeal, the state is entitled to both
    the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all reasonable inferences which
    may be drawn therefrom. State v. Cabbage, 
    571 S.W.2d 832
     (Tenn. 1978).
    Guilty verdicts remove the presumption of innocence, enjoyed by defendants at
    trial, and replace it with a presumption of guilt. State v. Grace, 
    493 S.W.2d 474
    (Tenn. 1973). Appellants, therefore, carry the burden of overcoming a
    presumption of guilt when appealing jury convictions. 
    Id.
    When appellants challenge the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court
    must determine whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to
    the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements
    of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
     (1979);
    State v. Duncan, 
    698 S.W.2d 63
     (Tenn. 1985); Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e). The
    weight and credibility of a witness' testimony are matters entrusted exclusively to
    the jury as the triers of fact. State v. Sheffield, 
    676 S.W.2d 542
     (Tenn. 1984);
    Byrge v. State, 
    575 S.W.2d 292
     (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978).
    The appellant admitted that he had consumed alcohol the evening of his
    arrest. He also admitted he had taken two pain pills. The arresting officer
    testified that the appellant failed three field sobriety tests and refused to take a
    chemical test. Furthermore, at trial, the state presented a videotape of the stop
    and arrest. The jury was able to view the tape and determine for themselves
    whether the appellant passed or failed the field sobriety tests. A rational jury
    -3-
    could, and indeed did, find the appellant guilty of DUI. This issue is without
    merit.
    II
    The appellant next contends that the trial court erred in setting a 50%
    release eligibility date for his DUI conviction. He argues that considering the
    mitigating factors in this case, he should have received a minimum sentence.
    We disagree.
    Although the appellant argues that due to mitigating factors he should
    have received a minimum sentence, he fails to bring any evidence of mitigation
    to the attention of this Court. Upon review of the record, we find that none
    exists. The appellant's presentence report did reveal that he had an extensive
    criminal history.2 We find nothing in the record to suggest that the appellant was
    improperly sentenced. This issue is without merit.
    CONCLUSION
    After considering the appellant's issues, we find no error of law mandating
    reversal. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
    __________________________
    PAUL G. SUMMERS, Judge
    2
    Th e pre sen tenc e rep ort rev eals th at the app ellant h ad b een arreste d an d/or co nvicte d of o ver 3 0 differe nt crim es.
    His past offenses include fraud, possession of a weapon, possession of a controlled substance, shoplifting, theft, assault on
    an officer, vandalism, public intoxication, felony escape, introducing drugs into jail, DUI, disorderly conduct, parole violations,
    disturb ing the pea ce, a nd m any o ther crim es. T he trial ju dge eve n rem arke d tha t bec aus e the app ellant’s p rior reco rd
    consumed so many pages, by the time the appellant is as old as the judge and continues this criminal activity, “the computer
    will run o ut of sp ace [to list the] c harg es....” T he a ppe llant w as 3 2 yea rs old a t sen tenc ing.
    -4-
    CONCUR:
    ___________________________
    GARY R. WADE, Judge
    ___________________________
    WILLIAM M. BARKER, Judge
    -5-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 03C01-9611-CR-00431

Filed Date: 12/1/2010

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014