Myers v. State ( 2010 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE FILED
AUGUST 1997 SESSION
September 4, 1997
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate C ourt Clerk
DAVID G. MYERS, * C.C.A. # 03C01-9612-CR-00457
*
Appellant, * HAMBLEN COUNTY
VS. *
* Hon. James E. Beckner, Judge
STATE OF TENNESSEE, *
* (Post-Conviction)
Appellee. *
*
For Appellant: For Appellee:
David G. Myers, Pro Se Charles W. Burson
228811 NECC Attorney General & Reporter
P.O. Box 5000
Mountain City, TN 37683 Marvin E. Clements, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Justice Division
450 James Robertson Parkway
Nashville, TN 37243-0493
Victor Vaughn
Assistant District Attorney General
510 Allison Street
Morristown, TN 37814
OPINION FILED:
AFFIRMED
PER CURIAM
OPINION
The petitioner, David G. Myers, filed a petition for post-conviction relief
on October 25, 1996. The trial court dismissed the petition as being barred by the
statute of limitations without appointing counsel or holding an evidentiary hearing.
The petitioner now appeals as of right the dismissal of his petition. We affirm.
Upon the petitioner's plea of guilt to rape, a final judgment of
conviction was entered on November 19, 1993. Effective May 10, 1995, an
amendment to the Post-Conviction Procedure Act reduced the time within which to
file a claim from three years to one year.1 This petition, alleging that the conviction
was void due to a defective indictment, was filed on October 25, 1996, and is thus
barred by the statute of limitations.
In Curtis Newbern, No. 02C01-9702-CR-00071 (Tenn. Crim. App., at
Jackson, July 1, 1997), appeal filed, July 24, 1997, a panel of this court found that a
defective indictment claim under the doctrine of State v. Roger Dale Hill, No. 01C01-
9508-CC-00267 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, June 20, 1996), appeal granted,
Jan. 6, 1997, was still subject to the statute of limitations. Newbern, slip op. at 2. In
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199 5 T enn . Pub . Act 207 p rovide s in pa rt:
This act sh all take effect upon becom ing a law, the public
welfa re requiring it and shall govern all petitions for po st-
conviction relief filed after this date, and any motions which
m ay be filed after this da te to reope n pe titions for pos t-
conviction relief which were c oncluded prior to the effective
date of this a ct. Notw iths tan ding any othe r provision of this
act to the contrary, any person having a ground for relief
recognized under this act shall have at least one (1) year
from the effective date of this act to file a petition or a motion
to reo pen und er this act.
Id. § 3 (em phasis add ed).
In this c ase , the statute of lim itations had not expired wh en the 19 95 P ost-
Conviction Procedure Act became effective, so the petitioner had one year from M ay 10,
1995, to file his petition.
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a more recent case, another panel of this court held that a petition challenging an
indictment for failure to allege the mens rea of an offense must still be filed with in
the statute of limitations set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-202(a). James
Edward Hayes v. State, No. 02C01-9704-CC-00169, slip op. at 2 (Tenn. Crim. App.,
at Jackson, July 23, 1997).
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
PER CURIAM
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