Hamilton v. State ( 2010 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE FILED
AUGUST 1997 SESSION
December 9, 1997
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate C ourt Clerk
WILLIAM HAMILTON, * C.C.A. # 03C01-9611-CR-00439
Appellant, * HAMILTON COUNTY
VS. * Hon. Stephen M. Bevil, Judge
STATE OF TENNESSEE, * (Post-Conviction)
Appellee. *
For Appellant: For Appellee:
Tom Landis, Attorney Charles W. Burson
Suite 327 Attorney General and Reporter
744 McCallie Avenue
Chattanooga, TN 37403 Clinton J. Morgan
(on appeal) Counsel for the State
450 James Robertson Parkway
Steven G. Moore, Attorney Nashville, TN 37243-0493
1800-A Lafayette Road
Fort Oglethorpe, GA 30742 Bates W. Bryan, Jr.
(at evidentiary hearing) Assistant District Attorney General
Courts Building, 600 Market Street
Chattanooga, TN 37402
OPINION FILED:__________________________
AFFIRMED
GARY R. WADE, JUDGE
OPINION
The petitioner, William Hamilton, appeals the trial court's denial of
post-conviction relief. The issue presented for our review is whether the guilty plea
was involuntary due to the ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
On May 7, 1992, the petitioner pled guilty to attempted second degree
murder. The trial court imposed a Range II, twelve-year sentence. On April 25,
1995, the petitioner filed this petition for post-conviction relief alleging, among other
things, that his plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered and that his counsel
was ineffective. Post-conviction counsel was appointed and an amended petition
was filed on behalf of the petitioner. At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing,
the trial court determined that petitioner had been provided the effective assistance
of counsel and had knowingly and voluntarily entered a plea of guilt.
In order for the petitioner to be granted relief on grounds of ineffective
assistance of counsel, he must establish that the advice given or the services
rendered was not within the "range of competence demanded of attorneys in
criminal cases" and that, but for his counsel's deficient performance, the result of his
trial would have been different. Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975);
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). This two-part standard, as it applies
to guilty pleas, is met when the petitioner establishes that, but for his counsel's error,
he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on trial. Hill v. Lockhart,
474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).
The burden is on the petitioner to show that the evidence
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preponderates against the findings of the trial judge. Clenny v. State, 576 S.W.2d
12, 14 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978). Otherwise, the findings made by the trial court are
conclusive. Graves v. State, 512 S.W.2d 603, 604 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1973).
In Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), the Supreme Court ruled
that trial courts must establish a record at the submission hearing that all guilty pleas
are knowingly and voluntarily entered. In order to meet constitutional standards, the
plea must represent "a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative
courses of action [available]." North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970); Clark v.
State, 800 S.W.2d 500 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990).
At the evidentiary hearing, the petitioner complained that the trial judge
had represented that his sentence would be served in the county workhouse rather
than the state penitentiary. He also insisted that the trial judge should have
dismissed the indictment rather than granting a second continuance when state
witnesses failed to appear at trial. He argues that his trial counsel was ineffective
for failing to seek a dismissal.
The record shows that the petitioner had prior convictions which had
resulted in periods of incarceration. In 1964, the petitioner received a five-year
sentence for felonious assault. In 1971, the petitioner received concurrent
sentences of three and ten years for felonious assault and second degree murder.
At the evidentiary hearing, the petitioner's trial counsel recalled that the
trial judge allowed the defendant a period of time after his plea to provide care for
his mother before reporting to serve his sentence. While the record indicates that
the trial judge did advise the petitioner to report to either the county workhouse or
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the court to begin the service of his sentence, trial counsel explained that "it was
never part of the plea agreement that he was to actually serve his sentence at the
workhouse, that would have been an impossibility." The petitioner was to merely
surrender himself at a later date to the jail or to the court. Trial counsel believed the
petitioner understood the plea and that because a self-defense theory was not
viable in light of four stab wounds to the victim and several state witnesses refuting
the claim, the plea agreement was "absolutely" advantageous to the petitioner.
The submission hearing record demonstrates that the petitioner
responded intelligently to a variety of questions imposed by the judge. The
petitioner clearly acknowledged that his plea was free and voluntary and that he
willingly accepted the state's offer to reduce the charge in return for the guilty plea.
In our view, the petitioner's plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered.
Moreover, there is no indication that trial counsel was ineffective. Trial counsel
testified that she had sought a dismissal when the state moved to continue the case
from its original trial date on February 6, 1992. The trial court properly denied that
motion. Had counsel insisted on a dismissal for deprivation of the right to a speedy
trial, that relief would not have been warranted under these circumstances. The
crime was committed in September of 1991. The petitioner entered a guilty plea on
his scheduled trial date of May 7, 1992. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972);
State v. Bishop, 493 S.W.2d 81 (Tenn. 1973). From all of this, it appears that trial
counsel performed within the applicable standards.
Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.
________________________________
Gary R. Wade, Judge
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CONCUR:
_____________________________
Paul G. Summers, Judge
_____________________________
William M. Barker, Judge
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