State v. Frantz ( 2010 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
MARCH 1996 SESSION
STATE OF TENNESSEE, )
)
Appellee, ) No. 03C01-9509-CC-00269
)
) Sevier County
v. )
) Honorable Ben W. Hooper, II, Judge
)
ROBERT WAYNE FRANTZ, JR., ) (Aggravated kidnapping and rape)
)
Appellant. )
For the Appellant: For the Appellee:
Charles I. Poole Charles W. Burson
133 Commerce St. Attorney General of Tennessee
Sevierville, TN 37862 and
Elizabeth T. Ryan
Assistant Attorney General of Tennessee
450 James Robertson Parkway
Nashville, TN 37243-0493
Alfred C. Schmutzer, Jr.
District Attorney General
and
Scott Green
Assistant District Attorney General
301 Sevier County Courthouse
Sevierville, TN 37862
OPINION FILED:____________________
AFFIRMED
Joseph M. Tipton
Judge
OPINION
The defendant, Robert W ayne Frantz, Jr., appeals as of right from his
conviction by a jury in the Sevier County Criminal Court for the offenses of aggravated
kidnapping and two counts of rape, Class B felonies. The trial court sentenced the
defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to fifteen years for each offense to be served
concurrently. In this appeal, the defendant contends that:
(1) the trial court erred in restricting the defendant from cross-
examining the victim about her divorce proceeding and the
judicial determination of fact that the victim had engaged in an
adulterous relationship with the defendant until mid-December
1992; and
(2) the defendant was denied the effective assistance of
counsel when defense counsel could not cross-examine a
witness about her prior inconsistent statements made to
defense counsel.
We affirm the judgment of conviction.
This case relates to events that took place on December 21 and 22, 1992.
Although the defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the convicting evidence, a
brief summary of the testimony at trial is useful to the analysis of the issues raised.
Cheri Ward, the victim, testified that a consensual sexual relationship began between
her and the defendant in August 1992, approximately one month after she and her ex-
husband had separated and she had filed for a divorce. She said that she wrote the
defendant love letters. She stated that the relationship between her and the defendant
continued while the defendant was incarcerated in the county jail in Greenville, South
Caroline, on unrelated charges. The victim testified that she visited the defendant at
the jail and the defendant called her. She said that after speaking to Deputy Wesley
Smith of the Greenville County Sheriff’s Department in late November 1992, she
decided to end the relationship. She said that she informed the defendant of her
decision sometime during the first week of December 1992.
2
The victim testified that she saw the defendant on December 7, the same
day that the defendant was released from jail, when he came to her workplace. She
said that she told the defendant not to come to see her at work and that she did not
want to see him anymore. The victim stated that the defendant initially refused to
leave. She testified that when she left work that night, the defendant was in the parking
lot in his car parked next to her car. The victim said that the defendant asked if he
could come by her house to get some of his things and she told him to come at a later
date. She stated that the next day, the defendant called her at work several times. The
victim testified that on December 9, the defendant brought his son to her workplace for
her to cut his hair. She stated that although she told the defendant she did not want to
talk to him, he repeatedly questioned her whether she was seeing anyone and asked
that they work things out.
The victim testified that the defendant was inside her house when she
returned from picking up her daughter on December 9. She said that the defendant
was very angry because one of her male friends was waiting outside in his car for her to
cut his hair. She stated that the defendant eventually left the house, and she called
Deputy Smith. The victim testified that when the officers arrived, the defendant was still
outside. She said that the defendant was placed on trespassing notice based on his
conduct, but the defendant continued to call her. She stated that the defendant also
left a message on her answering machine. The victim testified that on December 10,
she filed a complaint against the defendant for stalking, and from then until December
21, the defendant called less frequently. The victim denied seeing the defendant
romantically after she told the defendant that the relationship was over.
The victim testified that on December 21, she received a telephone call at
work from the defendant. She said that the defendant had learned of the stalking
charges and was angry. She stated that the defendant told her to drop the charges or
3
he would make her sorry, threatening to help the victim’s ex-husband obtain custody of
their daughter. The victim testified that she called Deputy Smith and her mother and
told them about the defendant’s actions and asked her mother to keep her daughter
overnight because she was afraid of the defendant.
The victim testified that as she tried to shut the door after arriving at home
from work, the defendant stuck his hand in the door and pushed it open, causing her to
drop her purse, mail and packages. She said that the defendant grabbed her and
placed his hand over her mouth, telling her to be quiet and stating that he only wanted
to talk to her. During her testimony, the victim detailed the arguments and the assaults
that took place inside the house and explained the attempts she made to get away from
the defendant and seek help. She testified that the defendant eventually told her that
they were leaving and going to Caesar Mountain so she would listen to him. She said
that although she told him that she did not want to go, he forced her to leave the house.
The victim testified that she took her cigarettes, purse and beer with her, leaving
clothes, cosmetics, and contact solution behind. The victim testified that she screamed
and tried to run away from the defendant once they got outside. She said that the
defendant became angry, putting his arm around her to force her to go to the truck.
The victim stated that the defendant threatened to use a gun once they got inside the
truck.
The victim testified that the defendant then drove to Caesar Mountain.
She said that the defendant told her that he was hurt and upset. The victim stated that
she told the defendant that she was sorry she hurt him and that she would drop the
charges if he would take her home. The victim also testified that they discussed
Christmas, and she said that she told the defendant that she and her ex-husband had
talked about going to Gatlinburg to see the Christmas lights but that she would no
longer be able to go. The victim recalled the defendant saying that she would be able
4
to go. She stated that although the defendant told her that he was taking her home, the
defendant later stated that they were going for a ride and refused to take her home.
During her testimony, the victim described how the defendant watched her when he
stopped the truck and how she attempted to call her parents for help on one occasion.
The victim testified that she had fallen asleep but awoke at approximately
4:30 a.m. when the defendant told her that they were in Gatlinburg, Tennessee. She
detailed how the defendant walked her into a hotel room and how she attempted to run
out the door while the defendant was in the jacuzzi tub, but the defendant grabbed her
and pushed her onto the bed. The victim stated that the defendant, who was nude, lay
beside her on the bed. The victim said that she fell asleep but was awakened by the
defendant rubbing her thighs and back and kissing her neck. She testified that
although she told the defendant to stop, he undressed her from the waist down and
penetrated her vagina with his finger and his penis. During her testimony, the victim
described other attempts to escape from the room and to use the telephone to call for
help.
The victim testified that the defendant then took her to a drugstore to
purchase saline solution for her contacts and to purchase cosmetics. Before entering
the drugstore, the defendant told the victim that if she tried anything, he would use the
gun. The victim said that they also went to a restaurant before returning to the room at
approximately 12:00 or 12:30 p.m. The victim then described how the defendant raped
her a second time.
The victim testified that they then left the motel room and drove up to ski
hill, and she said that the defendant threatened to kill them both by driving off the
mountain because he said that he could not live without the victim. She said that the
defendant then drove to Pigeon Forge where they went to several shops and made
5
purchases. The victim claimed that she paid for her purchases with checks and credit
cards to leave evidence of where she had been. She testified that they then went to a
restaurant called Jersey Joe’s to eat dinner. She said that the defendant allowed her to
go to the restroom by herself at the restaurant. The victim stated that she heard a
knock and a woman’s voice while she was in the restroom. The victim testified that she
gave the woman her parent’s telephone number and told her to tell them that she had
been kidnaped. She said that shortly afterwards, an officer came into the restaurant
and arrested the defendant.
The victim testified that in February 1993, approximately one week after
her divorce, she received a letter from the defendant. In the letter, the defendant stated
that he was sorry about what happened with the victim’s divorce and that he did not
mean for it to happen. The defendant also expressed his love for the victim and
explained that he only wanted the victim to be happy and for them to be a family.
During cross-examination, the victim was questioned about her
relationship with the defendant. She testified that she met the defendant approximately
two years before she became romantically involved with him. She conceded that her
relationship with the defendant developed quickly. She identified several love letters
that she wrote to the defendant. The victim also admitted that she went on trips with
the defendant along with her daughter and the defendant’s son, and she identified
several photographs taken while she was dating the defendant. The victim was also
cross-examined about the number of collect telephone calls she accepted from the
defendant while he was incarcerated in jail. She conceded that she had accepted a
total of one hundred and eight telephone calls, talking to the defendant approximately
fifty-one hours. The victim admitted that she had stated in her affidavit in support of the
stalking warrant obtained on December 10, that she had tried to end the relationship
with the defendant approximately three weeks earlier while the defendant was in jail.
6
However, she conceded that between November 19 and December 6, she accepted
more than fifteen calls from the defendant, with some calls lasting more than one hour.
The victim also conceded that she gave a false statement in her affidavit
in support of the stalking warrant that in the message left by the defendant on her
answering machine, the defendant stated that he had talked to the victim’s ex-husband
and told him a bunch of lies. She denied telling co-workers that if anything happened to
her, the defendant was the cause. The victim testified that she did not remember
stating at the preliminary hearing that it was not true that she and the defendant were
having an affair for months and stating that she and the defendant had dated for two
months and that was all. The victim admitted that she never saw the defendant with a
gun while she was kidnaped. She also conceded that she had given a statement earlier
that the defendant had inserted his finger in her anus, but she claimed that she could
no longer remember whether it had happened, stating that therapy had helped her
remember some things but not others. The victim admitted that her testimony as to
some of the details of the events that took place at the motel were different than to what
she testified at the preliminary hearing. She stated that she did not ask for help while at
the shops in Pigeon Forge because she was scared. The victim also testified that when
she talked to the woman at Jersey Joe’s restaurant, she neither told her that she had
been raped nor asked her to call the police.
Other witnesses corroborated details of the victim’s testimony. Tracy
Jones testified that she was eating dinner at Jersey Joe’s restaurant on December 22,
1992. She stated that the victim exited the restroom as she was entering. She said
that the victim whispered to her in a shaky voice to call her parents because she had
been kidnaped by the defendant. She stated that the victim gave her the telephone
number of her parents. Ms. Jones testified that the victim continuously looked around
and downstairs to see if the defendant was coming. She described the victim as being
7
extremely nervous, shaking and about to cry. Ms. Jones testified that the victim told her
several things, some of which she could not remember, but that one thing that stuck in
her mind was that the victim told her that the defendant forced her to have sex with him.
On cross-examination, Ms. Jones conceded that in her statement to police, she did not
state that the victim told her that the defendant had raped her.
I. CROSS-EXAMINATION ON DIVORCE DECREE
First, the defendant asserts that the trial court erroneously prohibited him
from questioning the victim about her divorce proceeding and the judicial determination
that the victim had engaged in an adulterous relationship with the defendant until mid-
December. The defendant argues that the divorce decree was “relevant, material and
admissible.” He contends that the divorce decree was admissible as a certified public
record under Rule 1005, Tenn. R. Evid., and as a judgment dealing with personal or
family history constituting a hearsay exception under Rule 803(23), Tenn. R. Evid. The
defendant argues that pursuant to Rule 616, Tenn. R. Evid., and the Sixth Amendment
to the United States Constitution, he should have been allowed to question the victim
about the divorce proceedings to show that the victim had a motive to lie against the
defendant. In response, the state contends that the trial court properly excluded the
divorce decree and refused to allow the defendant to question the victim about the
divorce proceedings because the findings in the divorce proceedings were irrelevant
and inadmissible hearsay.
Before trial, the defendant requested that he be allowed to introduce a
divorce decree relating to the victim and her ex-husband, Bryan Ward. The divorce
decree reflects that the victim filed for a divorce on July 30, 1992, and Mr. Ward filed a
counterclaim. Though the victim withdrew her complaint, Mr. Ward proceeded on his
counterclaim, and a divorce was entered on March 9, 1993. The defendant asserted
8
that a portion of the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the
divorce decree were relevant and pertinent to his case:
[Mr. Ward] has shown that [Ms. Ward] over the term of
the marriage has engaged in an adulterous relationship without
the knowledge or consent of [Mr. Ward]. The actions of [Ms.
Ward] have destroyed the marriage. The evidence establishes
that [Ms. Ward] had the inclination and the opportunity to
commit adultery and did commit adultery with one Robert
(Robbie) Frantz, the last occurrence being in mid December
1992. [Mr. Ward] is entitled to an absolute divorce on grounds
of adultery.
The defendant argued that he should be allowed to use the divorce
decree to cross-examine the victim because he expected the victim to testify that her
relationship with the defendant ended when he went to jail on October 24, 1992. The
defendant contended that the divorce decree was essential to his defense theory that
because the defendant was going to testify at the divorce proceedings in favor of Mr.
Ward, the victim voluntarily went to Gatlinburg with the defendant and then filed false
charges against the defendant to prevent the defendant from testifying at the divorce
proceedings on February 9, 1993. The prosecutor disagreed, stating that the divorce
decree was inadmissible in that it was merely a trial court’s finding of fact and not an
admission by the victim. Without stating the grounds for its exclusion, the trial court
ruled that the divorce decree was inadmissible. The trial court stated that although the
divorce decree was not admissible, the defendant would be permitted to cross-examine
the victim about her relationship with the defendant and whether it extended into mid-
December 1992.
At trial, the defendant cross-examined the victim about her relationship
with the defendant. The victim’s telephone records were introduced during cross-
examination to show that the victim accepted collect telephone calls from the defendant
while he was in jail. The victim was also questioned about photographs taken of her
while dating the victim and about love letters written by her to the defendant.
9
Pursuant to Rule 616, Tenn. R. Evid., a witness’ bias in favor of or against
a party or another witness may be proven by cross-examination, extrinsic evidence, or
both. As the Advisory Commission Comments to the rule notes, evidence of bias is an
important ground for impeachment. See Creeping Bear v. State, 113 Tenn. 322, 325-
30, 87 S.W. 653, 653-55 (1905). In Creeping Bear, a murder case, the supreme court
held that the defendant was entitled to present witnesses to prove that the state’s main
witness had a strong friendship with the victim and bitter enmity towards the defendant
in order to show that the witness would be predisposed to suppress the victim’s
aggressive acts and misrepresent the defendant’s conduct. The court stated:
It is always competent to prove the friendliness or
unfriendliness of a witness, his partiality for one party or
hostility to the other, in order that the jury may judge of his
credibility and the trustworthiness of his testimony. It is the
experience of the trial courts that witnesses are often as much
influenced in testifying by feelings of friendship or hostility to
parties to the case as by direct pecuniary interest in the result
of the trial, and for this reason proof of the relations of the
witness to the parties may be shown by proving his conduct
and expressions in relation to them by cross-examination of
the witness, or independently by witnesses called for that
purpose.
Id. at 325, 87 S.W. at 653. However, when extrinsic evidence is used to demonstrate
the witness’ bias, the extrinsic evidence must also be admissible under the evidentiary
rules. See State v. Williams, 929 S.W.2d 385, 389 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996).
In the appropriate case, the limitation of the right to cross-examine a
witness may violate the defendant’s constitutional right to confrontation. See State v.
Belser, 945 S.W.2d 776, 783-84 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996); State v. Reid, 882 S.W.2d
423, 427-29 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). The Sixth Amendment provides that the accused
shall have the right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. Const.
amend. VI. The constitutional right of confrontation includes not only the right to
confront the witness at trial but also the “‘opportunity for effective cross-examination.’”
State v. Howell, 868 S.W.2d 238, 252 (Tenn. 1993) (quoting Deleware v. Fensterer,
474 U.S. 15, 20, 106 S. Ct. 292, 294 (1985)).
10
We believe that the trial court did not err by excluding the divorce decree.
Though statements contained in the divorce decree could have supported the
defendant’s claim that the victim was biased against the defendant and that the victim
had a motive to lie, the divorce decree constitutes inadmissible hearsay.
Hearsay is defined as “a statement, other than one made by the declarant
while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted.” Tenn. R. Evid. 801(c). Here, the defendant offered the divorce decree to
prove the truth of the matter asserted therein -- that the victim had an affair with the
defendant until mid-December. Therefore, the divorce decree constitutes hearsay
under Rule 801(c), Tenn. R. Evid.
Hearsay is inadmissible unless provided otherwise by an evidentiary rule
or by law. Tenn. R. Evid. 802. The defendant contends that Rule 803(23), Tenn. R.
Evid., provides an exception to the hearsay rule, allowing the admission of the divorce
decree. We disagree. Pursuant to the rule, judgments as to personal or family history
or boundaries are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the matters were essential to the
judgment. Tenn. R. Evid. 803(23). Judgment as to “personal or family history” relates
to matters such as death, marriage, divorce, birth, adoption, legitimacy, and other
familial relationships. Neil P. Cohen, et al., Tennessee Law of Evidence § 803(23).1, at
584 (3d ed. 1995). Moreover, we do not believe that the length of the victim’s
adulterous relationship with the defendant is essential to the divorce decree.
The defendant argues that the divorce decree constitutes a public record
admissible under Rule 1005, Tenn. R. Evid. We agree that the divorce decree is a
public record. However, Rule 1005 does not provide an exception to the rule excluding
hearsay. To the contrary, Rule 1005 provides that the contents of an official record, “if
otherwise admissible,” may be proved by a certified copy as provided under Rule
11
902(4), Tenn. R. Evid. (emphasis added). As mentioned, the divorce decree is not
admissible as it constitutes hearsay for which an exception is not provided.
We also hold that the defendant’s constitutional right to confrontation was
not violated. The trial court’s ruling did not prevent the defendant from questioning the
victim about her relationship with the defendant or presenting evidence of the
adulterous relationship by other means. In fact, defense counsel conceded at the
sentencing hearing that he could have presented the testimony of other witnesses to
establish the relevant facts contained in the divorce decree regarding the length of the
victim’s relationship with the defendant.1 Despite defense counsel’s failure to present
witnesses to show that the adulterous relationship between the victim and the
defendant continued through mid-December, defense counsel otherwise conducted a
vigorous cross-examination of the victim. The defendant was not denied his right to
confront witnesses. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court properly excluded the
divorce decree as being inadmissible hearsay and that the defendant’s confrontation
rights under the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution were not violated.
II. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Next, the defendant contends that he was denied the effective assistance
of counsel because defense counsel could not cross-examine Tracy Jones about her
prior inconsistent statements made to defense counsel without defense counsel
becoming a witness at trial.2 The state asserts that the defendant has waived the issue
by failing to cross-examine Ms. Jones at trial regarding her prior inconsistent statement.
1
The re cord do es not re flect whe ther defe nse co unsel su bpoen aed an y witnesse s.
Defense cou nsel stated at the sentencing hearing that although he aske d Mr. W ard to testify, Mr. Ward
told defense counsel that he did not want to get involved. Defense counsel also said that Mr. Ward was
presen t at trial but was exclude d as a w itness be cause he sat in the courtroo m du ring the trial.
Regardless, the prosecutor stated that Mr. Ward told defense counsel that the dates in the divorce decree
were w rong an d that the a dulterous relationsh ip took pla ce befo re the de fendan t was inca rcerated .
2
We note that the defendant’s counsel is contending that he, himself, rendered the
ineffective assistan ce of co unsel.
12
See T.R.A.P. 36(a). In the alternative, the state argues that the evidence would not
have produced a more favorable result for the defendant.
The victim testified that when she saw Tracy Jones at the restroom at
Jersey Joe’s restaurant, she gave Ms. Jones her parents’ telephone number and asked
her to call and tell them that she had been kidnaped by the defendant. She said that
she did not tell Ms. Jones that she had been raped. When questioned about the
victim’s statements made to her, Ms. Jones testified that the victim not only told her that
she had been kidnaped but also stated that the defendant had raped her. Ms. Jones
said that the one thing that stuck in her mind was that the victim told her that the
defendant forced her to have sex with him. On cross-examination, Ms. Jones admitted
that she did not tell the police that the victim had told her that the defendant had raped
her.
In his motion for new trial, the defendant raised as a ground for relief:
Tracy Jones, a witness for the State materially changed
her testimony from statements previously given to . . . counsel
during pre-trial preparations and investigation . . . in that she
had previously stated that the . . . victim . . . had never even
mentioned being raped or sexually assaulted by the defendant
but completely changed her testimony at trial to state that what
she remembered the most was [the victim’s] statement that
she had been raped.
The defendant attached to his motion for new trial an affidavit by defense counsel
concerning the pretrial discussions defense counsel had with Ms. Jones.
The affidavit states that defense counsel spoke to Ms. Jones on the
telephone on January 20, 1994, as part of his investigation and preparation for trial.
Defense counsel’s affidavit reflects that Ms. Jones told defense counsel that the victim
told her that she had been kidnaped and the victim asked her to call her parents. It
shows that defense counsel questioned Ms. Jones about her statement to the police,
noting that she had not mentioned that the victim had told her that the defendant
13
sexually assaulted or raped the victim. The affidavit states that Ms. Jones told counsel
that the victim never stated that she had been sexually assaulted or raped and that the
victim only mentioned that she had been kidnaped from South Carolina. The affidavit
also reflects that counsel spoke to Ms. Jones in person at the Sevier County
Courthouse on February 23, 1995, the day of trial. It states that counsel asked Ms.
Jones a second time about her statement to the police, and Ms. Jones again stated that
the victim had not told her that she had been raped. Counsel asserted in his affidavit
that Ms. Jones’ change in testimony from her prior statements was extremely prejudicial
to the defendant in that there were no independent witnesses to the conversations
between counsel and Ms. Jones, and therefore, counsel was unable to cross-examine
Ms. Jones effectively about her prior inconsistent statements without placing counsel in
the position of becoming a witness as well as being an advocate.
At the hearing on the motion for new trial, the defendant called Ms. Jones
as a witness, but upon objection by the state, the trial court refused to allow Ms. Jones
to testify because the accuracy of counsel’s affidavit was not being questioned.3
Defense counsel argued that because he was the only person who interviewed Ms.
Jones, he was placed in a situation where he could neither call himself to the stand nor
ask Ms. Jones whether she had made a prior inconsistent statement to him. He
asserted that he could not be a witness and an advocate for the defendant at the same
time. Counsel also stated that he believed that he could only ask Ms. Jones whether it
was true that other than her testimony at trial, Ms. Jones had never made the statement
that the victim told her that the defendant raped her.
In response, the prosecutor argued that assuming that defense counsel’s
affidavit was true, it did not provide grounds for relief warranting a new trial. The
3
The record reflects that defense counsel informed the court that Ms. Jones’s testimony
would be that she remembered the victim’s statements regarding the rape after speaking to defense
couns el but befo re testifying at trial.
14
prosecutor asserted that any prior inconsistent statement by Ms. Jones merely provided
a basis for impeaching her trial testimony, noting that there was no claim of newly
discovered evidence. Defense counsel asserted that a new trial was warranted
because he was precluded from further impeaching Ms. Jones with her prior
inconsistent statements. The trial court denied the motion for new trial.
Under the Sixth Amendment, when a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel is made, the burden is upon the petitioner to show (1) that counsel's
performance was deficient and (2) that the deficiency was prejudicial in terms of
rendering a reasonable probability that the result of the trial was unreliable or the
proceedings fundamentally unfair. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.
Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984); see Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 113 S. Ct. 838, 842-44
(1993). The Strickland standard has been applied, as well, to the right to counsel under
Article I, Section 9 of the Tennessee Constitution.
State v. Melson, 772 S.W.2d 417, 419 n.2 (Tenn. 1982).
We question whether the ineffective assistance of counsel issue is
properly before us. It is not in the motion for new trial, although the motion does include
a complaint about inability to cross-examine Ms. Jones. However, the parties did not
direct their attention in the trial court to the issue of the ineffective assistance of
counsel. Pursuant to Rule 3(e), T.R.A.P., the failure to state in the motion for new trial
the ground upon which a new trial is sought constitutes waiver of the issue on appeal.
Likewise, we note that in State v. Jimmy L. Sluder, No. 1236, Knox
County, slip op. at 7 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 1990), app. denied (Tenn. July 16, 1990),
this court recognized that when appellate counsel raises on direct appeal the ineffective
assistance of counsel issue for the first time, such practice is “fraught with peril.” See
also State v. Anderson, 835 S.W.2d 600, 607 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992). The peril is
15
twofold. First, pursuant to T.R.A.P. 3(e), any issue presented for review which seeks a
new trial, such as, ineffective assistance of counsel, must be specifically stated in the
motion for new trial or it will be deemed waived. Thus, absent plain error on the record,
see, e.g., State v. Ogle, 666 S.W.2d 58, 60 (Tenn. 1984), such a path by counsel is
doomed to procedural failure. Second, if the appellate court chooses to decide the
issue based upon the record before it, appellate counsel has elected to proceed without
an evidentiary hearing which, if held, might be the only way that harm could be shown --
a prerequisite for relief in ineffective assistance of defense counsel claims. Strickland,
466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. “The better practice is to not raise the issue on
direct appeal . . . . The issue can be subsequently raised in a post-conviction
proceeding” if the defendant is not successful on direct appeal. Jimmy L. Sluder, slip
op. at 7.
Thus, we do not believe that the issue of the effective assistance of
counsel at trial is properly before us. In any event, we see nothing worthy of reversal
relative to the defendant’s underlying complaint relative to Ms. Jones. The
impeachment of her testimony with her prior inconsistent statement would not have
affected the outcome of the trial. At trial, the victim did not testify that she told Ms.
Jones at the restroom that the defendant had raped her. Had the victim testified in this
way, Ms. Jones’ testimony would only have been considered corroborative of the
victim’s testimony. Rather, the victim testified that she did not tell Ms. Jones that she
had been raped. Thus, the only effect impeachment of Ms. Jones’ testimony would
have been to discredit Ms. Jones’ testimony in a way not related to the victim’s
testimony. We do not believe that Ms. Jones’ testimony on this point was material to
the defendant being convicted in this case. Under these circumstances, we conclude
that the failure to impeach her with her prior inconsistent statement did not affect the
jury verdict to the defendant’s detriment.
16
In consideration of the foregoing and the record as a whole, the judgment
of the trial court is affirmed.
Joseph M. Tipton, Judge
CONCUR:
Paul G. Summers, Judge
Charles Lee, Special Judge
17