State v. James Hyde ( 2010 )


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  •              IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT JACKSON
    MAY 1999 SESSION
    FILED
    July 8, 1999
    Cecil Crowson, Jr.
    STATE OF TENNESSEE,                  )              Appellate Court Clerk
    )    C.C.A. NO. 02C01-9710-CC-00420
    Appellee,               )
    )     GIBSON COUNTY
    VS.                                  )
    )     HON. DICK JERMAN, JR.,
    JAMES HYDE,                          )     JUDGE
    )
    Appellant.              )     (Aggravated Robbery, Aggravated
    Rape, Reckless Endangerment
    & Unlawful Weapon Possession)
    FOR THE APPELLANT:                        FOR THE APPELLEE:
    GERALD S. GREEN                           PAUL G. SUMMERS
    147 Jefferson Ave., Suite 404             Attorney General & Reporter
    Memphis, TN 38103
    (On Appeal)                         R. STEPHEN JOBE
    Asst. Attorney General
    JESSE H. FORD, III                        John Sevier Bldg.
    P.O. Box 1625                             425 Fifth Ave., North
    Jackson, TN 38302                         Nashville, TN 37243-0493
    -and-
    DONNIE W. KNOTT                            CLAYBURN L. PEEPLES
    P.O. Box 547                               District Attorney General
    Milan, TN 38358
    (At Trial)                          TED NEWMAN
    Asst. District Attorney General
    110 South College St., Suite 200
    Trenton, TN 38382
    OPINION FILED:____________________
    AFFIRMED
    JOHN H. PEAY,
    Judge
    OPINION
    The defendant was convicted of aggravated robbery, aggravated rape,
    reckless endangerment, and unlawful possession of a weapon and was sentenced as a
    Range I standard offender to an effective sentence of twenty-three years in the
    Tennessee Department of Correction. He now appeals, arguing that he was placed in
    double jeopardy by being tried as an adult in criminal court after participating in a juvenile
    transfer hearing that was essentially a delinquency hearing. He also complains that the
    police officers lacked probable cause for a warrantless search and seizure and that their
    investigatory conduct “shocks the conscience.” Finding no merit to the defendant’s
    arguments, we affirm.
    The record on appeal contains only the technical record and the transcript
    from the juvenile transfer hearing, which reveals the following. A Trenton church daycare
    provider was robbed and raped at gunpoint one afternoon at work. After the incident, the
    victim summoned the Trenton police authorities and described her attacker as a very tall,
    thin black man wearing a red and black “Bulls” jacket. Because her attacker wore a ski
    mask during the incident, she could not identify his face. However, because her attacker
    forced her to perform oral sex on him, she described his genital area, stating, “He was
    long, little hair, a lighter color there.”
    The victim was taken to the hospital where a rape kit and pelvic examination
    was performed. Around the same time, an anonymous person called the Trenton police
    and said that the perpetrator had fled to Timmy Hyde’s residence, which was a short
    distance from the crime scene. Officer William Sanders went to the residence and
    knocked on the front and back doors for ten minutes, but no one answered. A short time
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    later, Officer Sanders learned that after he had left the Hyde residence, two other police
    officers had stopped and released a vehicle in which the sixteen-year-old defendant, a
    relative of Timmy Hyde, was riding. Officer Sanders returned to the Hyde residence,
    where he talked with Tommy Hyde, the defendant’s uncle, who volunteered to find the
    defendant and bring him to the police department.
    Later, the defendant, accompanied by his relatives, arrived at the police
    department. Officer Sanders obtained permission to search the Hyde residence, which
    uncovered a red and black “Bulls” jacket matching the victim’s description.           The
    defendant agreed to submit to a blood sample for DNA analysis. Because of the nature
    of the victim’s descriptions, Officer Sanders asked the defendant to accompany him into
    the bathroom and show him his genital area.          According to Officer Sanders, the
    defendant voluntarily consented. In Officer Sanders’ assessment, the defendant’s penis
    was “long,” as the victim had described. The DNA comparison of the defendant’s blood
    sample with male cells taken from the victim’s vagina produced a four-probe match that
    would have a 1 in 638,000,000 chance of occurring randomly in the black population.
    Based on this and other evidence presented at the hearing, the juvenile
    court judge found that the statutory grounds for transferring the defendant to criminal
    court existed. The case then proceeded to indictment and ultimately a jury trial, where
    the defendant was convicted as charged.
    The defendant first argues that the juvenile transfer hearing was essentially
    a trial on the merits of the delinquency petition against the defendant and that when he
    was tried as an adult in criminal court, he was placed in double jeopardy. As support for
    this conclusion, the defendant asserts that because the juvenile court found at the
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    conclusion of the transfer hearing that the offenses were committed in an aggravated
    manner, the court necessarily determined that the offenses were actually committed and
    thus determined his guilt.
    According to the transfer hearing transcript, the juvenile court judge
    enumerated the factors under T.C.A. § 37-1-134 he must consider in determining whether
    the State could try the defendant as an adult in criminal court. One of these factors, the
    juvenile court judge stated, is whether “the alleged offense was committed in an
    aggravated pre-meditated manner.” The juvenile court judge later stated, “I could restate
    on the record what I have just gone over [the § 37-1-134 factors], but I do specifically find
    in my docketing that each of those grounds of 37-1-134 were met at today’s hearing.”
    A review of § 37-1-134 reveals that the juvenile court judge misspoke; the
    applicable factor to be considered is not whether the defendant committed the offense
    in “an aggravated pre-meditated manner,” but whether he committed the offense in “an
    aggressive and premeditated manner.” T.C.A. § 37-1-134(b)(4). Even so, we fail to
    discern how the juvenile court judge’s finding necessarily constitutes a finding of guilt so
    as to implicate double jeopardy concerns, as the defendant contends. The record reflects
    that the juvenile court judge repeatedly acknowledged that the sole purpose of the
    transfer hearing was to determine whether the defendant should be tried as an adult.
    Never did the judge suggest that based on the evidence, he found the defendant to be
    delinquent or guilty; rather, he specifically limited his review of the evidence in context of
    determining “whether or not there are reasonable grounds to believe that the child
    committed the delinquent act as alleged,” as required by § 37-1-134(a)(4)(A). Thus,
    contrary to the defendant’s argument, jeopardy did not attach in the juvenile transfer
    hearing, and the defendant’s trial as an adult, therefore, did not twice place him in
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    jeopardy. State v. Davis, 
    637 S.W.2d 471
    , 473 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982)(where court
    simultaneously found that “reasonable grounds to believe” an offense had been
    committed and that the defendants were delinquent, jeopardy attached; but had the court
    found only “reasonable grounds” without a finding of guilt, “we would have no hesitancy
    in saying that double jeopardy did not attach”).
    Next, the defendant contends that because the reliability of the anonymous
    informant cannot be assessed, the police officers did not have probable cause for the
    “warrantless search and seizure” of the defendant’s groin area. The defendant also
    contends that the police officer’s personal assessment of the size of the defendant’s
    genitalia cannot give rise to “the probable cause necessary for further investigation and
    prosecution.” The limited record on appeal contains no indication that the defendant ever
    raised this issue in the trial court. Because this issue was not previously litigated, it has
    been waived. See, e.g., State v. Lunati, 
    665 S.W.2d 739
    , 749 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983).
    Even so, contrary to the defendant’s claim that Officer Sanders “forced” him to “exhibit
    his phallus,” the limited record before us indicates that the defendant voluntarily
    consented. Further, the defendant cites no authority that “probable cause” is needed to
    merely investigate a suspect of a crime when the suspect voluntarily supplies authorities
    with incriminating evidence. The defendant’s contentions lack merit.
    Finally, the defendant asserts simply that the Trenton police department’s
    investigation “shocks the conscience” and that the “search which began this investigation
    was humiliating and intrusive.” The defendant also claims, “The whole prosecution was
    based on the fabrication of the Trenton Police.” The defendant never specifies what this
    “fabrication” might be. Because of the conclusive nature of the defendant’s assertions
    and the lack of authoritative citations, this issue is waived. Rules of the Court of Criminal
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    Appeals of Tennessee 10(b). Even so, because nothing in the record supports the
    defendant’s bald assertions, this issue lacks merit.
    Finding no merit to the defendant’s arguments, the judgments are affirmed.
    _______________________________
    JOHN H. PEAY, Judge
    CONCUR:
    ______________________________
    JOE G. RILEY, Judge
    ______________________________
    THOMAS T. W OODALL, Judge
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Document Info

Docket Number: 02C01-9710-CC-00420

Filed Date: 12/1/2010

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014