State of Tennessee v. Brandon Lee Laferty ( 2013 )


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  •         IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT KNOXVILLE
    Assigned on Briefs December 18, 2012
    STATE OF TENNESSEE v. BRANDON LEE LAFERTY
    Appeal from the Criminal Court for Sullivan County
    No. S55643    Robert H. Montgomery, Jr., Judge
    No. E2012-01210-CCA-R3-CD - Filed March 13, 2013
    The Defendant, Brandon Lee Laferty, appeals the Sullivan County Criminal Court’s revoking
    his probation for solicitation of aggravated sexual battery, a Class D felony, and ordering his
    ten-year sentence into execution. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred
    in revoking his probation and ordering him to serve his sentence. We affirm the judgment
    of the trial court.
    Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed
    J OSEPH M. T IPTON, P.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which J AMES C URWOOD W ITT,
    J R., and C AMILLE R. M CM ULLEN, JJ., joined.
    Stephen M. Wallace, District Public Defender; and Steven D. Bagby, Assistant Public
    Defender, for the appellant, Brandon Lee Laferty.
    Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter; Leslie E. Price, Senior Counsel; Barry
    Staubus, District Attorney General; and William B. Harper, Assistant District Attorney
    General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
    OPINION
    On February 7, 2011, the Defendant pleaded guilty to solicitation of aggravated sexual
    battery. Pursuant to a plea agreement, he was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to
    ten years on supervised probation. On October 7, 2011, a probation violation warrant
    affidavit was signed by Janet Burgess, a probation officer, alleging that the Defendant
    violated rule six of the conditions by removing his GPS tracking device and by failing to
    report for a scheduled polygraph. The warrant was filed on November 1, 2011.
    According to the affidavit, Probation Officer Heath Eanes instructed the Defendant
    not to remove his GPS device. On October 7, 2011, Officer Eanes was notified by Veritracks
    of a master strap tamper on the Defendant’s GPS. The Defendant could not be located at the
    last known location shown by the GPS. The Defendant also failed to report to Counseling
    and Consultation Services for a polygraph on October 7 at 2:30 p.m. as instructed by Officer
    Eanes.
    At the revocation hearing , the Defendant testified that his affidavit of indigency was
    accurate. He said that he was extradited from Illinois and that he had not acquired new
    charges but absconded there from Tennessee. He said that he saved $600 from his paychecks
    in Illinois but that his uncle spent the money. Upon the Defendant’s testimony, the trial court
    appointed the public defender’s office to represent him.
    Defense counsel spoke with the Defendant the morning he was appointed and
    informed the trial court that the Defendant told him that the GPS came loose from the
    Defendant’s leg in a work-related incident but that he did not know if it was intentional or
    accidental. He also said that the Defendant did not have the money to pay for the polygraph
    examination and was told not to report if he could not pay. He said these statements were
    partial admissions and partial denials. The court asked counsel if he wanted to hold an
    evidentiary hearing or if the Defendant wanted to plead guilty to the violations. Counsel
    responded that a no contest plea would be the most appropriate course because of the
    Defendant’s statements. The court told the Defendant that it would hear what he wanted to
    say but that if he pleaded no contest, the court would likely order him to serve his sentence
    because of his statements under oath.
    The Defendant waived his right to a hearing and entered a no contest plea. Counsel
    stipulated to the facts in the affidavit. The trial court found that the Defendant violated the
    terms and conditions of his probation. The court held the disposition immediately, and
    counsel said that would be “fine.” The court asked if counsel would present any witnesses,
    and counsel responded that he would typically call the Defendant but that because of the
    Defendant’s possible more serious violation regarding the sexual offender registry, he did
    not want the Defendant to testify in more detail. Counsel said he had not spoken to the
    State’s witnesses, and the court gave him time in court to do so. After speaking with the
    witnesses, counsel decided not to present evidence, and the State also presented no evidence.
    The trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation and ordered his sentence into
    execution. The court found that the Defendant entered a no contest plea to violations of
    removing his GPS and failing to take a scheduled polygraph. The court found that during
    the Defendant’s testimony about his affidavit of indigency, he said that he absconded to
    Illinois and worked there. The court stated that it knew the Defendant was shot and that he
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    left the state again after he was served with the violation warrant while he was at the hospital.
    The court found that it would be inappropriate to return the Defendant to supervised
    probation and ordered him to serve his ten-year sentence.
    I
    The Defendant contends that the trial court erred in revoking his probation. He argues
    that the violations alleged were not violations of law and that no evidence was presented at
    the hearing showing he was given notice that his conduct was prohibited. He argues the
    court denied him sufficient time to consult with his attorney and prepare for the adjudication
    and disposition of his probation violations. He also argues that the court improperly
    considered facts and information outside the record of the violation hearing. The State
    responds that the trial court did not err in revoking the Defendant’s probation and ordering
    him to serve his sentence. We agree with the State.
    A trial court may revoke probation upon its finding by a preponderance of the
    evidence that a violation of the conditions of probation has occurred. T.C.A. § 40-35-311(e)
    (2010). If a trial court revokes a defendant’s probation, its options include ordering
    confinement, ordering the sentence into execution as originally entered, returning the
    defendant to probation on modified conditions as appropriate, or extending the defendant’s
    period of probation by up to two years. T.C.A. §§ 40-35-308(a), (c), -310 (2010); see State
    v. Hunter, 
    1 S.W.3d 643
    , 648 (Tenn. 1999). The judgment of the trial court in a revocation
    proceeding will not be disturbed on appeal unless there has been an abuse of discretion. See
    State v. Williamson, 
    619 S.W.2d 145
    , 146 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981).
    Regarding the Defendant’s argument that he did not violate the law and that no
    evidence was presented showing his conduct was prohibited, we conclude that the record
    contains substantial evidence that the Defendant violated his probation conditions. The
    evidence shows the Defendant signed a probation supervision order and an amended order
    that listed the conditions of his probation, including a rule requiring that he follow the
    instructions of his probation officer. The Defendant conceded violating his probation at the
    revocation hearing. The affidavit underlying the probation violation warrant states that
    Officer Eanes instructed the Defendant not to remove the GPS and that Officer Eanes was
    informed of a master strap tamper on the Defendant’s GPS. When Officer Eanes went to the
    last location shown by the GPS, the Defendant was not there. The affidavit also states that
    the Defendant failed to report to a scheduled polygraph examination as instructed by Officer
    Eanes. The Defendant admitted not following the instructions of his probation officer when
    he stipulated to the facts in the affidavit and pleaded no contest at the hearing. This evidence
    supports the trial court’s finding that the Defendant violated his probation, and upon
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    revocation, the court was within its discretion to order the Defendant’s sentence into
    execution. See T.C.A. § 40-35-310(a) (2010).
    Regarding the Defendant’s argument that the trial court denied him time to consult
    with counsel and prepare for his revocation hearing, the record reflects that the Defendant
    was able to speak with counsel and that he gave counsel information about the violations
    before his hearing. When the court asked counsel if the Defendant wanted to have a hearing
    or enter a plea, counsel told the court that a no contest plea was the more appropriate course
    because of the Defendant’s statements. The Defendant states in his appellate brief that
    counsel requested to continue the hearing, but the record reflects that counsel said, “I suppose
    we can have a dispositional hearing on it either later this morning or this afternoon.” When
    the court announced that it would have the dispositional hearing immediately, counsel said,
    “That will be fine, Your Honor.” Further, when counsel said he had not spoken with the
    State’s witnesses, the court gave him time to speak with the witnesses. Counsel consulted
    with the witnesses, presented no witnesses of his own, and did not object to the hearing.
    Nothing in the record indicates that the Defendant objected to the hearing. The Defendant
    consulted with counsel before his hearing and admitted his violations.
    Regarding the Defendant’s argument that the trial court improperly considered facts
    outside of the revocation hearing, the record reflects that the court heard the Defendant’s
    statements under oath during the hearing on his affidavit of indigency and read the facts of
    the affidavit describing the violations of probation to which the Defendant stipulated. A trial
    judge may enter judgment as the judge deems proper “under the evidence adduced before the
    trial judge.” T.C.A.§ 40-35-311(d) (2010).
    The Defendant argues that the court improperly relied on the Defendant’s favorable
    plea agreement when revoking his probation. The court noted that the Defendant was
    granted “a lot of consideration” by the State or that there were evidentiary issues when he
    received probation rather than the lengthy sentence he could have received if convicted of
    the crime with which he was charged. The Defendant’s indictment, request for acceptance
    of guilty plea and waiver of rights, order accepting the guilty plea, and judgments were
    before the court at the revocation hearing. The court saw that the Defendant was originally
    charged with rape of a child, a Class A felony, and pleaded guilty to solicitation of
    aggravated sexual battery, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-12-102; 39-13-504; 39-13-
    522 (2010). We conclude that the evidence was before the court.
    The Defendant argues that the trial court improperly considered that the Defendant
    was served at the hospital and that he had been shot. The court asked during the hearing on
    his affidavit of indigency if the Defendant had been shot, and the Defendant said he was shot
    in Hawkins County. The warrant that was before the court notes that the Defendant was
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    served at “HVMC.” We conclude that the evidence was before the court. Although the
    evidence was before the court, nothing in the record indicates the court relied on these facts
    to find the Defendant violated his probation. The court’s written order states the Defendant
    violated the conditions of his probation by removing his GPS, and the court’s oral findings
    relied on the Defendant’s removing his GPS and absconding to another state.
    The Defendant also argues that the trial court improperly considered his testimony
    about absconding to Illinois during the indigency hearing. The court heard the Defendant
    state under oath that he was extradited from Illinois and that he received paychecks from a
    job in Illinois. Although a defendant is entitled to notice of alleged violations of probation,
    the court found the Defendant violated his probation primarily by removing his GPS, not for
    absconding to Illinois. See Practy v. State, 
    525 S.W.2d 677
    , 680 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1974).
    We conclude, though, that the evidence of the Defendant’s absconding was before the court
    and that the court did not err by using the evidence to support its revoking the Defendant’s
    probation once the violation was found.
    In any event, the trial court concluded in its written order that the Defendant violated
    the terms of his probation because he removed his GPS device. The Defendant admitted
    removing his GPS and failing to attend a scheduled polygraph. The court did not abuse its
    discretion in finding the Defendant violated the terms of his probation and revoking his
    probation.
    Based on the foregoing and the record as a whole, we affirm the judgment of the trial
    court.
    ____________________________________
    JOSEPH M. TIPTON, PRESIDING JUDGE
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Document Info

Docket Number: E2012-01210-CCA-R3-CD

Judges: Presiding Judge Joseph M. Tipton

Filed Date: 3/13/2013

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014