State v. George Rose ( 2010 )


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  •         IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT JACKSON
    MARCH SESSION , 1998
    STATE OF TENNESSEE,            )    C.C.A. NO. 02C01-9710-CR-00405
    )
    Appellee,                )
    )
    )    SHELBY COUNTY
    VS.                            )
    )    HON. L.T. LAFFERTY
    GEORGE ROSE,                   )    JUDGE
    )
    Appe llant.              )    (Direct Appe al - Posses sion of
    )    Controlled Substance)
    FOR THE APPELLANT:                  FOR THE APPELLEE:
    TONY N. BRAYTON                     JOHN KNOX WALKUP
    Assistant Public Defender           Attorney General and Reporter
    201 Poplar, Suite 2-01
    Memphis, TN 38103                   DOUGLAS D. HIMES
    Assistant Attorney General
    425 Fifth Avenu e North
    Nashville, TN 37243
    WILLIAM L. GIBBONS
    District Attorney General
    CHARLES W . BELL
    Assistant District Attorney
    201 Poplar Avenue - Third Floor
    Memphis, TN 38103
    OPINION FILED ________________________
    AFFIRMED
    JERRY L. SMITH, JUDGE
    OPINION
    Appellant George S . Rose wa s convicted on April 16, 1997 b y a jury in the
    Shelby Coun ty Crim inal Co urt of po sses sion o f a con trolled substa nce, to wit:
    cocaine, with intent to sell. As a Range I standard offender, Appellant was
    sentenced to 210 days incarceration in the Shelby County Correctional Center
    and five years probation.        The trial court also imposed a $2,000.00 fine.
    Appellant presents the following issue for our consideration on this direct appe al:
    whether the trial court denied Appellant his constitutional right to trial by jury by
    refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of simple possession
    of a controlled substance or casual exchange.
    After a revie w of the re cord, we affirm the ju dgme nt of the trial co urt.
    I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
    The proof shows that during the evening of July 20, 1995, the Organized
    Crime Unit of the Memphis Police Department conducted a "buy-bust" drug
    operation directed at apprehending street-level drug dealers. The focus of this
    particular operation was the Whitehaven area, specifically, Shelby Drive and
    Hodge in Memphis.
    Officer Michael Hardy testified at trial that he posed as the decoy officer on
    July 20. Officer Hardy marked approximately $100.00 in "buy money" by writing
    his initials in the corner of the bills.
    At approximately 8:15 P.M., Officer Hardy was parked at the corner of
    Shelby and Hodge.        He testified that he motioned to a black female--later
    determined to be Edna Strickland--to his car. After Strickland approached the
    automobile, Officer Hardy inform ed her that he wanted to pu rchase a twe nty-
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    dollar rock of coca ine. Ms. Strickland re plied that she kne w where to get it and
    stepped into the car. She d irected Hard y to 4503 Neeley Road in Memphis.
    Hardy testified that he handed Strickland twenty dollars of marked buy money
    consisting of one ten -dollar bill and two five-dollar bills. At approximately 8:20
    P.M., Strickland got out of the car and walked up to a window of the house. Ms.
    Strickland knocked on the window, and a black male answered her knock,
    appearing at the window. At trial, Officer Hardy identified Appellant as the same
    person who appeared inside the house at the window. According to Officer
    Hardy, Appellant wo re a white T-sh irt and d ark pa nts on the eve ning o f July 20.
    Officer Hardy recalled that Appellant op ened the w indow and engaged in a short
    conversation with Ms. Strick land. After the conversation, Appellant walked away
    from the window for a short time. Upon returning, Appellant handed Strickland
    the cocaine, and she gave Appellant the twenty dollars. Ms. Strickland returned
    to the automobile. Officer Hardy testified that he never lost sight o f Strickla nd's
    clasped hand conta ining th e obje ct given to her b y App ellant. Once inside the
    vehicle, Strickland gave Hardy a white rock-like object. Officer Hardy drove down
    the road a short distance and gave the "take-d own" signal. Su pport officers
    immed iately arrived at the hous e and Ha rdy's car.
    On cross-examination, Officer Hardy testified that the distance between his
    vehicle and the house was ap proxima tely fifty feet. Moreover, he stated that he
    had an unobstructed side view of the transaction and that ample daylight enabled
    him to see cle arly.   Hardy conce ded tha t he could not see th e item which
    Appellant placed into Ms. Strickland's hand but reiterated that he never lost sight
    of her hand after Appellant put the object into it. Officer Hardy stated that the buy
    money was recovered from Appellant and was later reused.
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    Detective Byron Hardaway testified that he was a "take-down" officer at the
    Neeley Road address on the evening of July 20, 1995. Hardaway explained that
    the take-down officer's responsibility is to locate and detain suspects after the
    decoy officer g ives the take-d own s ignal. After Officer Hardy gave the take-down
    signa l, Hardaway and other officers approached the Neeley Road residence.
    Officer Hardy had described Appellant over the radio as a black male with a
    shoulder length jheri-curl and wearing a white T-shirt.       Detective Hardaway
    knocked on the door, and Appellant's mother, Ruthie Rose, answered the door
    and let in Hardaway and the other officers. At this time, Appellant was walking
    down the hall behind his mother.       The officers took Appellant outside, and
    Detective Hardawa y recovered the buy mo ney from Appella nt's right fron t pocket.
    At this time, Appellant wore jogging pants.
    Detective Hardaway testified on cross-examination that he and the other
    officers arrived at the house within one to two minutes follo wing the take-down
    signa l. He stated that it was still daylight when he and the othe r officers arrived
    but that it was getting dark. Detective Hardaway saw o nly Ap pellan t, Appe llant's
    mother, and a younger boy inside the home. Hardaway explained that he did not
    search Appella nt's bedro om be cause it was so filthy. He returned the buy money
    to Officer Hardy.   Detective Hardaway identified Appellant as the individual
    arrested at 4503 Neeley Road.
    Officer Phillip Fun derbu rk state d that h e was a take -down officer o n this
    particular occasion. Funderbu rk testified that several m oments p assed be fore
    anyone opened the door. Appellant's mother finally answered the door, and
    Appellant and a younger boy stood behind her.              Appellant matched the
    description of the person who made the exchange with Ms. Strickland. He had
    a jheri-curl and wore a white T-shirt. Officer Fu nderburk testified that once
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    outside, Detective Hardaway performed a pat-down search of Appellant and
    recovered the buy money containing Officer Hardy's initials.
    On cross-examination, Officer Funde rburk testified that Ms. Ruthie Rose
    consented to a search of her son's bedroom.              The search lasted for
    approximately five to ten minutes.
    Officer Preston Morton testified that he was in charge of the holding and
    testing of evidence. Officer Hardy took the rock-like object to Officer Morton in
    the testing van. Officer Hardy watched as Morton performed a Ferguson field test
    on a portion of the suspected crack cocaine. The test revealed the substance to
    be cocaine.    Subsequently, the substance was sent to the University of
    Tennessee Toxicology La boratory for further an alysis. Fried a Saha rovici, a
    professional chem ist, testifie d that a nalysis revealed the substance to be
    condensed cocaine in its free base form.
    Ms. Ruth ie Ros e, App ellant's mother, testified tha t five individuals were
    inside the residence on July 20, 1995 when the police knocked on the door.
    These five pe ople were herself; her husband, George Rose, Sr.; Appellant; her
    grandson, Spence r Miller (also known as "Darrell"); and Appellant's friend,
    Nathaniel Turner (also known as "Main") . According to M s. Rose's testim ony,
    Appellant answered the door, and the police entered the residence and searched
    Appe llant's room without permission. One of the officers stated that he had found
    something and walked from the bedroom carrying a bag of lye soap. She denied
    that drugs were being sold from her residence.According to Ms. Rose, Appellant
    wore cut-off jogg ing pan ts with no p ockets and wore no shirt. She further stated
    that officers recovered no money from Appellant. Ms. Rose further averred that
    peop le visiting Appellant typically knocked on his window. Finally, Ms. Rose
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    stated that she did not hear anyone knock at her son's window on the evening of
    July 20 but believed that she would have heard the knock had someone done so.
    Cedric Brownlee, Appellant's cousin, testified that he visited the Neeley
    Road residence on July 20 but left before the police arrived. Mr. Brownlee was
    in Appe llant's room when Ms. Strickland came to the window. Brownlee testified
    that Strickland and Appellant spoke briefly and that Strickland handed Appellant
    something which he threw back out of the window. Brownlee departed before the
    conversation between Appellant and Strickland ended. According to Bro wnlee 's
    testimony, he never saw Appellant hand drugs to an yone a nd sa w no d rugs in
    Appellant's room. Appellant wore cut-off sweat pan ts and no sh irt. As Mr.
    Brownlee walked from the house, he saw Ms. Strickland retrieve something from
    the ground.
    Spencer Miller, Appellant's nephew and Ms. Ruthie Rose's grandson,
    testified that he was in the house when the police arrived. He also stated that
    Appellant, Appellant's mother and father, and Ce dric Brownlee were also there
    at that time. Appellant answered the door. According to Miller, Appellant wore
    cut-off sweat pants with no pockets and wore no shirt. Miller averred that the
    police officers recovered no drugs or money from Appellant. Additionally, Miller
    admitted that prio r to trial, he had discussed the incident with Appellant, Ms.
    Rose, and Mr. Brownlee.
    Appellant stated that he was at home on July 20, 1995. He testified that
    his parents, Spencer Miller, Cedric Brownlee, and Nathaniel Turner we re there
    as well. Mr. Brownlee was in Appellant's room when Edna S trickland c ame to the
    window. Accord ing to Ap pellant, Edna Strickland was intoxicated and flirted w ith
    him. Ms. Strickland allegedly told Appellant that she "had a trick in the car" and
    that she was "trying to buy some dope." Strickland asked Appellant where she
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    could get some drugs, and he told her that he did not know. Ms. Strickland threw
    some money in the window, but Ap pellan t picke d it up and threw it back to her.
    Appellant saw Stric kland retrie ve the m oney an d put it into he r pants.        She
    walk ed away and got into a car.         Appellant denied selling cocaine to and
    receiving mone y from M s. Stricklan d. He testified that he spoke to Strickland for
    about four or five minutes and that he never left the window. The police arrived
    at the residence about one-half hour later and arrested him. He stated that he
    wore shorts with no pockets and was shirtless. According to Appellant, one
    officer searched him and said that he had recovered the twenty dollars.
    Howeve r, Appellant claimed that the police took nothing from him. Appellant
    testified that wh en he aske d if he could see the mon ey, one of the officers
    directed him to "shut up."       The police searched Appellant's room without
    perm ission and d iscove red a b ag of h ome mad e lye so ap an d a m othba ll.
    II. JURY INSTRUCTIONS
    Appe llant's o nly complaint on this direct a ppea l is that he was d enied his
    constitutional right to tria l by jury b ecau se the trial court refused to instruct the
    jury on the lesser included offense of simple possession of a controlled
    substance or casual exchange. We disagree.
    Both the Sixth Ame ndm ent to th e Unite d State s Con stitution and A rticle I,
    § 9 of the Tenn essee C onstitution guaran tee an accu sed the right to trial by jury.
    Encompassed within the constitutional right to trial by jury is the accused's right
    to a corre ct and com plete c harge of the la w applicab le to the ca se. State v.
    Phipps, 883 S.W .2d 138 , 142 (T enn. C rim. App . 1994); State v. Wright, 
    618 S.W.2d 310
    , 315 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981). The trial court's failure to instruct the
    jury on any lesser included offenses denies a defendant his constitutional right
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    to trial by jury. Wright, 
    618 S.W.2d 310
    , 315 (citing State v. Staggs, 
    554 S.W.2d 620
    , 626 (T enn. 1977 )).
    Tenn . Code Ann. § 4 0-18-11 0 provide s in part:
    (a) It is the duty of all judges charging juries in cases of
    criminal prose cution s for an y felony where in two (2) or more
    grades or classes of offense may be included in the
    indictme nt, to charge the jury as to all of the law of each
    offense included in the indictm ent, without any request on the
    part of the defendant to do so.
    Tenn. C ode Ann . § 40-18-110 (a).
    Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure 31(c) permits a defendant to be
    convicted of "an offen se nec essarily inc luded in th e offense charge d. . . ." T ENN.
    R. C RIM. P. 31(c).
    Tennessee case law is cle ar that a defen dant is entitled to a jury instruction
    "on all lesser included offenses where ``any facts. . . are susceptible of inferring
    guilt of any lesser included o ffense.'" State v. T rusty, 
    919 S.W.2d 305
    , 310
    (Tenn. 1996) (quoting State v. Wright, 
    618 S.W.2d 310
    , 315 (Tenn. Crim. App.
    1981)).   In Howa rd v. State , the Ten nesse e Supr eme C ourt articula ted the
    approp riate test for determining whether a particular offense is a lesser offense
    nece ssarily included in the indictment. 
    578 S.W.2d 83
    , 85 (T enn. 19 79). "[A]n
    offense is nece ssarily included in another if the elements of the greater offense,
    as those elem ents a re set fo rth in the indictment, include, but are not congruent
    with, all the elem ents of the lesser." 
    Id.
     See T rusty, 919 S.W .2d 305 , 311
    (approving the definition of "lesser included offense" as set forth in the Howard
    decision).
    
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-418
     provides in pertinent part: "(a) It is an
    offense for a pe rson to know ingly possess or casually exchange a controlled
    substance unless the substance was obtained directly fr om o r pursu ant to a valid
    prescription or order of a practitioner while acting in the course of professional
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    practice." Tenn. Co de Ann. § 3 9-17-418(a ). 
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-419
    provides:
    It may be inferred from the amount of a controlled substance
    or substances possessed by an offender, along with other
    relevant facts surrounding the arrest, that the controlled
    substance or substances were possessed with the purpose
    of selling or otherwise dispensing. It may be inferred from
    circumstances indicating a casual exchange among
    individu als of a small amount of a controlled substance or
    substances that the controlled substance or substances so
    exchanged were possessed not with the purpose of selling or
    otherwise dispensing in violation of the provisions of § 39-17-
    417(a). Such inferen ces shall be transmitted to the jury by
    the trial judg e's ch arge, a nd the jury will consider such
    inferences along with the nature of the substance possessed
    when affixing the p enalty.
    
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-419
    .
    Appellant was co nvicted of p ossess ion of coc aine with in tent to sell.
    Officer Michael Hardy purchased twenty dollars worth of cocaine as part of the
    Organized Crim e Unit's "buy-bust" drug operation. Under similar circumstances,
    this Cour t previo usly ha s refus ed to re quire that the jury be instructed as to
    simp le possession of a controlled substance as a lesser included offense of
    possession with intent to s ell. See, e.g., State v. William Howard Horton, No.
    01C01-9312-CR-00435, Davidson Coun ty (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, October
    6, 1994), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. 199 5); State v. J. S alts III, No. 01C01-
    9306-CC-00181, Sum ner Co unty (Te nn. Crim . App., Nashville, March 29 , 1994).
    The trial court was not required to instruct the jury as to the inferences which are
    permitted by 
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-419
    .
    The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
    ____________________________________
    JERRY L. SMITH, JUDGE
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    CONCUR:
    (See Below )
    JOE B. JONES, PRESIDING JUDGE
    _________________________________
    GARY R. WADE, JUDGE
    The H onorab le Joe B . Jones d ied May 1, 1998 , and did n ot participa te
    in this Opinion. We acknowledge his faithful service to this Court, both as a
    member of the Court and as its Presiding Judge.
    -1 0 -
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 02C01-9710-CR-00405

Filed Date: 12/1/2010

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014