State v. Kenneth Jackson ( 2010 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON FILED
FEBRUARY SESS ION, 1998 May 5, 1998
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate C ourt Clerk
STATE OF TE NNE SSE E, ) C.C.A. NO. 02C01-9704-CR-00159
)
Appellee, ) SHELBY COUNTY
)
V. )
) HON . JAME S C. B EASLE Y, JR.,
) JUDGE
KENNETH W. JACKSON, )
) (AGGRAVATED ASSAULT;
Appe llant. ) RECKLESS ENDANGERM ENT )
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
A.C. WHARTON JOHN KNOX WALKUP
District Public Defender Attorney General & Reporter
TONY N. BRAYTON GEORGIA BLYTHE FELNER
Assistant Public Defender Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Justice Center, Suite 201 2nd Floor, Cordell Hull Building
201 Poplar Avenue 425 Fifth Avenu e North
Memphis, TN 38103 Nashville, TN 37243
JOH N W. P IERO TTI
District Attorn ey Ge neral
KAREN COOK
Assistant District Attorney General
Criminal Justice Center, Suite 301
201 Poplar Avenue
Memphis, TN 38103
OPINION FILED ________________________
AFFIRMED
THOMAS T. WOODALL, JUDGE
OPINION
The Defe ndan t, Kenn eth W . Jacks on, ap peals as of rig ht from his convictions
for aggravated assault and reckless endangerment following a jury trial in the Shelby
Coun ty Criminal Court. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Rang e II Multip le
Offender to ten (10) years for the aggravated assault conviction and four (4) years
for the reckless endangerment conviction. The sentences were ordered to run
cons ecutive ly and Defendant was a lso fine d a tota l of $2,0 00. In th is app eal,
Defendant argues that the evidence was insuffic ient to sustain convictions for
aggravated assault and reckless endangerment and that the trial c ourt er red in
ordering the senten ces to be served c onsec utively. We affirm the judgment of the
trial court.
Angie Sanders and one o f her sisters, Nina, we re co-signors on a lease to an
apartment on East Mallory Street in Memphis. In early August 1995, th ey went to
the apartment to evict another sister, Marilyn Clemmons, from th e apa rtmen t. Angie
Sanders testified that the Defendant, Ms. Clemmons’ boyfriend, was present during
the eviction and told h er that she wa s “going to get wh at [she] got com ing.”
Ms. Sanders did not see the Defendant again until August 22, 1995.
Sometime between 12:00 noon and 1:00 p.m. that afternoon, Ms. Sanders pulled
into the driveway of her home at 3750 Mia mi Str eet. An gie Sa nders lived at th is
home with her twelve-year-old sister, Shaquita, who was with her on this day. As
Ms. Sanders pulled into the drivew ay, she saw th e Def enda nt in a white car parked
nearby. She and Shaquita went into the house, and each went to their respective
bedrooms. Ms. Sanders’ bedroom is located on the front of the house facing the
-2-
street and has two big windows, with each one providing a view o f the stre et. Ang ie
Sanders watched Defendant from the windows, and she saw him pass her house
two or three times in the white car. As he passed the house the last time, Ms.
Sanders saw Defendant point a gun toward the house. She then yelled for Shaq uita
to “hit the floor” because Shaquita was on her way out of her bedroom going toward
the front of the house. Angie Sanders heard shots and immediately called the
police.
Testimony at trial revealed that there were four bullet holes in the front of Ms.
Sanders’ home, and th at two o f the bu llets ha d actu ally entered the home striking an
interior wall. Memphis Police Officer Jamie Joyner testified that he arrived at the
scene about !:00 p .m., and that Shaquita “just sat there just real scared stiff and
tears dripping down off her face.” Acco rding to Officer Joyner, Ms. Sanders was
“real panicked, real trembling, nervous, scared.” No one was physically injured.
The Defendant testified on his own behalf and stated that at the time of the
shoo ting he was at his mother’s house where he also lived. He said that he had
been at Marilyn Clem mons’ ho use earlier that day b efore driving bac k to his mo ther’s
house. He denied ever previously having any cross words with Angie Sanders. He
also denied even being present when Angie Sand ers evic ted M arilyn C lemm ons in
early Aug ust.
Marilyn Clemmons, sister of Angie Sanders, also testified for the defense.
She stated that Defendant had been at her house the morning of August 22, 1995.
Defendant was babysitting Ms. Clemmons’ children while she went to report her
sister An gie San ders to the police for taking her pos sessions w hen the locks were
-3-
changed on her fo rmer res idence . She sa id that she arrived back home between
12:00 noon and 1:00 p.m. on that day. She testified that Defendant then left to go
home to his mother’s house. She said that Defendant drove her blue Chevrolet
Nova to his mother’s house. Approximately ten minutes after Defe ndan t left, Ang ie
Sanders called her and asked to speak to Defendant. Ms. Clemmons then called
Defen dant at his mothe r’s house where h e said he had just a rrived.
Ms. Clemmons testified that the distance between her home and An gie
Sanders’ is a twenty (20) to twenty-five (25) minute drive. She said that the distance
from her home and Defendant’s mother’s house is approximately a ten (10) to fifteen
(15) minute drive. According to Ms. Clemmons, the drive from Ms. Sanders’ home
to Defen dant’s m other’s ho me is fiftee n (15) m inutes.
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Defendant argues that the evidenc e prese nted at trial w as insufficie nt to
support his convic tions for ag gravated assau lt and reck less end angerm ent.
Specifica lly, he conte nds tha t the eviden ce was insufficient a s to identity.
When an accused challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence, the
stand ard is w hethe r, after re viewing the evid ence in the ligh t mos t favora ble to the
prosection, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime beyond a reaso nable d oubt. Jack son v. V irginia, 443 U.S. 30 7, 319 (1979 ).
This stand ard is a pplica ble to fin dings of guilt predicated upon direct evidence,
circumstantial evidence or a combination of direct and circumstantial evidence.
State v. Matthews, 805 S.W.2d 776, 779 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990). On appeal, the
-4-
State is entitle d to the strong est leg itimate view of th e evide nce a nd all inferences
therefrom. State v. Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978). Because a
verdict of guilt removes the presumption of innocence and replaces it with a
presumption of guilt, the accused has the burden in this court of illustrating why the
evidence is insufficient to support th e verdict re turned b y the trier of fac t. State v.
Williams, 914 S.W.2d 940, 945 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) (citing State v. Tug gle, 639
S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982)); State v. Grace, 493 S.W.2d 474, 476 (Ten n. 1973).
Questions concerning the credibility of the witnesse s, the weig ht and va lue to
be given the evidence, as well as all factual issues raise d by the evidenc e, are
resolved by the trier of fa ct, not this co urt. State v. Pappas, 754 S.W.2d 620, 623
(Tenn. Crim. A pp.), perm. to appeal denied, id. (Tenn. 1987). Nor may this court
reweigh or reevalu ate the ev idence . Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d at 835. A jury verdict
approved by the trial judge ac credits the State’s w itnesses and res olves all co nflicts
in favor of the State. Grace, 493 S.W.2d at 476.
In this case , in order to s upport a conviction for aggravated assault, the State
must have proven that Defendant in tention ally or kn owing ly com mitted an as sault
as defined in Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-101, and used or displayed
a deadly weapon. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-102(a)(1)(B). In order to support the
conviction for reckless endangerment, the proof must show that Defendant acted
reckle ssly by firing shots into Ms. Sanders’ home and that that conduct placed or
could have placed twelve-year old Shaquita in imminent danger of death or serious
bodily injury. T enn. C ode An n. § 39-1 3-103(a ).
-5-
Ms. Sanders unequivocally stated that when she and Shaquita pulled into the
driveway of their hom e that she saw D efenda nt drive by in a white car. Once inside
the house, they w ent to their respective bedrooms. Ms. Sanders’ bedroom is located
on the front of the house facing the street, a nd has two big w indows which bo th
provide a view of the street. Ms. Sanders watched Defendant through those
windows drive past her house two to three times before actually shooting. Ms.
Sanders testified that she actually saw Defendant point a gun toward the house.
She to ld her tw elve-ye ar-old sister to “hit the floor,” and then she called the police.
The police determined that four bullets were fired at Ms. Sanders’ house.
When viewing the evidenc e in the light m ost favorable to the State, the jury
justifiably could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant was the
person who fired the gun at Ms. Sanders’ home, and that he did so knowing that Ms.
Sanders and Shaquita were inside the house at that time. Ms. Sanders testified that
she is positive that the person she saw fire the shots at her house was D efenda nt.
It was c ertainly within the jury’s prerogative to accred it the State’s witnesse s and to
believe their ver sion o f the fac ts rathe r than D efend ant’s. A s a firea rm wa s use d in
the commission of this offense, all the elements of aggra vated assa ult as d efined in
Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-102(a)(1)(B) were proven beyond a
reason able do ubt.
The nature of this o ffense , intentio nally, kn owing ly or rec klessly firin g a gun
into an occup ied house, ce rtainly meets the stand ard for rec kless co nduct.
Additionally, the fact that two of the four bullets entered the house, satisfies the
requirement that the cond uct pla ced o r could have p laced Shaq uita in imminent
-6-
danger of death or serious bodily injury, thereby justifying the reckless
endan germe nt convictio n. This iss ue is witho ut merit.
II. Sentencing
Defendant does not contest the length of his sentences, but he does challenge
the mann er in which they are to be serve d. Defen dant was sentenced to ten (10)
years as a Range II offender for the aggravate d assault con viction and four (4) yea rs
as a Ran ge II offend er for the re ckless e ndang ermen t conviction. The trial court
ordered the sentences to be run consecutively. Defendant contends that the
sentences should have been orde red to run con currently.
When an accused challenges the length, range, or the manner of service of
a sentence, this court has a duty to conduct a de novo review of the senten ce with
a presumption that the determinations made by the trial court are correct. Tenn.
Code Ann. § 40-3 5-401(d). Th is presump tion is “conditioned u pon the affirma tive
showing in the reco rd that the trial court considered the sentencing principles and
all relevant facts and circumstanc es.” State v. Ashby, 823 S.W.2d 166, 169 (Tenn.
1991). There are, however, exceptions to the presumption of correctness. First, the
record must d emon strate that the trial court considered the sentencing principles and
all relevant fac ts and circ umsta nces. Id. Seco nd, the presu mptio n doe s not a pply
to the legal conc lusions re ached by the trial co urt in sente ncing. T hird, the
presumption does not apply whe n the determ inations mad e by the trial court are
predicated upon u ncontro verted fac ts. State v. S mith, 898 S.W.2d 742, 745 (Tenn.
Crim. A pp. 199 4), perm. to appeal denied, id. (Tenn . 1995).
-7-
Our review requires an analysis of: (1) The evidence, if any, received at the
trial and sentencing hearing; (2) the presentence report; (3) the principles of
sentencing and the arguments of counsel relative to sentencing alternatives; (4) the
nature and characteristics of the offense; (5) any mitigating or enhancing factors; (6)
any statements made by the defendant in his ow n beh alf; and (7) the d efend ant’s
potential for rehab ilitation or treatm ent. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35-102, -103, & -
210; see Sta te v. Smith , 735 S.W .2d 859, 863 (Tenn. Crim . App. 1987 ).
If our review reflects that the trial court followed the statutory sentencing
procedure, imposed a lawful sentenc e after having given due consideration and
proper weight to the facts and principles set out under the sentencing law, and that
the trial court’s findings of fact are adequately supported by the record, then we may
not modify th e sente nce eve n if we wo uld have preferred a different re sult. State v.
Fletcher, 805 S.W.2d 785, 789 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991). Upon review of the record,
we find that the trial court followed proper statutory sentencing procedure, and
therefore, review by this Court is de novo with a presumption of correctness.
Consec utive sentences should be imposed only after the proof establishes (1)
that the terms imposed are reasonably related to the severity of the offenses
committed; (2) the sente nce is ne cessar y to protect the public from further criminal
acts by the offender; and (3) that the d efenda nt mee ts at least one of the criteria as
set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-1 15(b). State v. Wilkerson,
905 S.W .2d 933 (Tenn . 1995).
In considering whether to order consecutive or concurrent sentences, the
court found two factors to be app licable: (1) that Defend ant has a rec ord of extensive
-8-
criminal activity; and (2) that he was a d angero us offend er. See Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 40-35-115(b)(2) and (4). The court specifically stated:
[T]he Court ha s taken in to accou nt the fact that the
defendant has a -- is an offender whose record of criminal
activity is extensive and also that this is a dangerous
offender. For the sta tute whose behavior indicates little or
no regard for hum an life a nd no hesita tion abou t a crime
in which the risk to human life is high; the Court finds that
both of tho se are a pplicable .
The record reflects that Defendant had an extensive criminal history. The
court found th at Defendant had four prior felony convictions, five misdemeanor
convictions, and had even violated his proba tion in the p ast. We find that this proof
is sufficient to support a finding that Defendant’s criminal activity has been extensive.
See, e.g., State v. Chrisman, 885 S.W .2d 834 , 839 (T enn. C rim. App . 1994).
Because only one of the enumerated factors in Tennessee Code Annotated section
40-35-115(b) must be fou nd by a prepo ndera nce o f the evid ence in order to impose
consecu tive sentencing, w e need no t address the matter of the trial court finding
Defendant to be a dangerous offender under Tennessee Code Annotated section
40-35-115 (b)(4). See also Mann ing v. State, 883 S.W.2d 635, 641 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 1994). We further agree with the trial court’s finding that it is necessary to
protect the pu blic from Defe ndan t and w e find th at con secu tive sen tencin g is
reaso nably related to the severity of the offenses committed by Defendant in th e
case sub judice. See Wilkerson, 905 S.W .2d at 938 . This issu e is withou t merit.
Based on the fore going re asons , we affirm th e judgm ent of the tria l court.
____________________________________
THOMAS T. W OODALL, Judge
-9-
CONCUR:
(not participating)
JOSEPH B. JONES, Judge
JOHN H. PEAY, Judge
-10-